

Introduction

Nước: *Archipelogics and Land/Water Politics*

In Vietnamese, the word for *water* and the word for *a nation, a country*, and *a homeland* are one and the same: *nước*.

—LÊ THI DIEM THÚY¹

Beirut was the birthplace for thousands of Palestinians who knew no other cradle. Beirut was an island upon which Arab immigrants dreaming of a new world landed.

—MAHMOUD DARWISH²

. . . Remember:

home is not simply a house, village, or island; home
is an archipelago of belonging.

—CRAIG SANTOS PEREZ³

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Vietnam is *nước*: water, country, homeland. Land and water. Water is land.

A duality without division; a contrast without contradiction.

Nước Việt Nam: a home, a cradle, a point of departure.

One island in an archipelago of diasporic collectivity.

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According to Vietnamese mythology, Vietnam was born out of the consummation of water and land. Âu Cơ, the mountain fairy, fell in love with Lạc Long Quân, the sea dragon king. Together they produced a hundred human children, *Bách Việt*. But Âu Cơ longed for the mountains, and Lạc Long Quân longed for the sea, and so they separated, dividing their children across the lands and waters of Vietnam.

Perhaps this originary division of a mother's children prefigured future cleavages: the division of North from South Vietnam along the 17th parallel in 1954,

followed by two decades of civil war and US military intervention, and then the division of a unified Vietnam from its post-1975 refugee diaspora, who fled war's aftermath by air and by sea, who touched down on new lands and were washed in saltwater.

Vietnamese refugees resettled around the world, forging new islands of belonging in their respective countries of asylum. Collectively, these islands make up an archipelago of resettlement: a postwar diaspora connected by the fluid memory of a beloved homeland, lost to war. As the Pacific Ocean links what Tongan writer Epeli Hau'ofa famously termed a "sea of islands," so too does *nước* connect the archipelago of Vietnamese refugee resettlement.⁴

But resettlement is vexed when refugees resettle in settler colonial states. Resettlement is unsettling when predicated on the systemic dispossession of Indigenous peoples. This book asks: What are the political implications of refugees claiming refuge on stolen land? Do archipelagos of refugee resettlement reinforce ongoing structures of settler colonialism? Or can they be refracted through *nước*—a land/water dialectic—to call forth decolonial solidarities? These questions challenge us to think through distinct yet overlapping modalities of refugee and Indigenous displacement, shaped by entangled histories of war, imperialism, settler colonialism, and US military violence. They invite us to imagine new forms of ethical relationality.

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Yêu nước: to love one's country, "[t]he highest virtue demanded of a Vietnamese"⁵

Mất nước: to lose one's country, "to be without the life source of water"⁶

Làm nước: to make water/land, to quench the thirst of a parched heart

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This book puts Indigenous and settler colonial studies in conversation with critical refugee studies in order to theorize the *refugee settler condition*: the vexed positionality of refugee subjects whose citizenship in a settler colonial state is predicated upon the unjust dispossession of an Indigenous population. Settler colonialism is a distinct form of colonial violence defined by the expropriation of Indigenous lands and waters for colonial settlement. As a reiterative "structure" rather than a singular "event," settler colonialism incessantly seeks to overwrite Indigenous relationships to place.⁷ In other words, settlers attempt the "elimination"—or what Palestinian American scholar Lila Sharif calls "vanishment"—of Indigenous subjects from the lands and waters that have shaped their cosmologies, in order to establish a myth of colonial nativity.⁸ But settler colonial projects are never totalizing. Indigenous survivance persists, via place-based acts of resistance, resurgence, and decolonization.⁹

Critical refugee studies, meanwhile, intervenes in dominant representations of the refugee as a victim of persecution or an object of humanitarianism, to instead

conceptualize the refugee as a paradigmatic figure of geopolitical critique.¹⁰ In “We Refugees,” Giorgio Agamben, building on the work of Jewish political theorist Hannah Arendt, posits the refugee as “nothing less than a border concept that radically calls into question the principles of the nation-state.”¹¹ Nation-states, with their conflation of one nation or people with one sovereign state, territorialize land and erect borders to delineate inclusion and exclusion. Refugees render visible the fiction that a nation-state order can guarantee human rights for stateless peoples.¹² Refugeehood thus calls forth “a no-longer-delayable renewal of categories,” a push to reimagine more multiplicitous forms of collective organization.¹³ Refugees are not, however, mere abstract figures of political philosophy but complex subjects with individual stories. According to Yǎn Lê Espiritu, the “refugee” is a “critical idea but also . . . a social actor whose life, when traced, illuminates the interconnections of colonization, war, and global social change.”¹⁴ Refugee movement marks overlapping structures of forced displacement; to trace an archipelago of refugee resettlement, therefore, is to illuminate the entanglement of these seemingly disconnected structures.

Critical analyses of settler colonial states necessitate an engagement with Indigenous and settler colonial studies in addition to critical refugee studies, insofar as these states’ “jurisdiction is predicated upon the ability to settle certain people and unsettle others.”¹⁵ Reconfiguring Indigenous lands and waters as colonial property, settlers mark not only stateless refugees but also Indigenous subjects as external threats to the national body politic. Indeed, one could argue that Indigenous subjects are even more disruptive to the settler colonial state than stateless refugees, given that the ongoing presence of Indigenous subjects challenges the myth of colonial nativity, while stateless refugees can be absorbed and granted citizenship in the settler colonial state. Contra Agamben and Arendt, Espiritu argues that refugees can “constitute a *solution*, rather than a *problem*” for nation-states.¹⁶ For example, following defeat at the end of the Vietnam War, the United States elided accusations of imperial intervention by reframing itself as the humanitarian rescuer of anticommunist Vietnamese refugees: what Espiritu identifies as the “we-win-even-when-we-lose” syndrome.¹⁷ By extension, this book argues that refugees are often positioned as a solution for settler colonial states seeking to counter critiques of colonial violence: the humanitarian resettlement of refugees not only projects an image of multicultural inclusion but also pointedly occludes ongoing structures of Indigenous dispossession.

I propose that we name these refugees, resettled in settler colonial states, *refugee settlers*, and that we grapple with the colonial implications of the *refugee settler condition*. Previous scholarship has identified the ways in which settler colonialism intersects with white supremacy, heteronormativity, and racial capitalism, necessitating an analysis of the power dynamics structuring different non-native settler positions. Lorenzo Veracini, for example, distinguishes settlers from migrants, “a category encompassing all forms of nonsovereign displacement.”¹⁸

More specifically, Jodi Byrd (Chickasaw Nation of Oklahoma) borrows Caribbean poet Kamau Brathwaite's term "arrivant" to describe nonsovereign slaves and coolies forcefully brought to the Americas, thus calling attention to "arrivant colonialism."¹⁹ Byrd's work echoes that of Haunani-Kay Trask (Kanaka Maoli), who critiques the ways "settlers of color" have undermined Native Hawaiian sovereignty via civil rights struggles for inclusion into the settler colonial state.²⁰ Inspired by Trask, Asian Americanists such as Candace Fujikane, Jonathan Y. Okamura, and Dean Saranillio have developed the field of "Asian settler colonialism," which includes scholarship on Chinese "railroad colonialism" across Native American lands; Japanese American internment on Native American reservations; Asian-Indigenous cross-representations throughout the Americas; colonial entanglements between Alaska Native peoples and Asian immigrants in the "last frontier" of Alaska; aesthetics of ocean passage across Oceania; and "settler allies" and "settler aloha 'āina" in Hawai'i.²¹ Iyko Day proposes the term "alien" to index the particular racialization of Asian laborers simultaneously rendered perpetual foreigners in North American settler colonial states, while Yu-ting Huang prefers "co-colonizer" and "minor settler" to identify Chinese labor migration to the Pacific Islands.²² None of these studies, however, adequately address the distinct positionality of *the refugee* in settler colonial states.²³

Although this is the first book to theorize the refugee settler condition, the term "refugee settler" itself is not new. An analysis of American newspapers from the late nineteenth century reveals that the term was once used to describe white working-class settlers who braved the so-called "frontier" in pursuit of private property, and who were subsequently chased out of their settlements by Indigenous nations defending their lands.²⁴ This white settler narrative of refugeehood—which depicts white settler colonists as innocent victims of Native violence, rather than aggressive intruders onto sovereign land—is foundational to American national identity, since it morally absolves the US of settler imperial violence.²⁵ In the words of one high school valedictorian in 1924: "Once we were a handful of refugee settlers; today we are 110 million strong."²⁶ Indigenous and settler colonial studies scholars meanwhile have argued that the term "refugee settlers" may apply to Indigenous "refugee" subjects, forcibly displaced from their traditional homelands by American expansion, who end up resettling on another Indigenous nation's territory.²⁷ Alternatively, historian Ikuko Asaka has used the term "refugee settler" in reference to fugitive Black subjects fleeing slavery during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries who aspired to inclusion in the white settler body politic in North America.²⁸ Lastly, during World War II, many Anglophone newspapers described Palestine as a "homeland for Jewish refugee settlers."²⁹ Although the term "settlers" here acknowledges the non-native status of Jewish refugees who had fled the Holocaust, the designation of Palestine as a "homeland" for these Jewish subjects undermines Palestinians' Indigenous claims to the land.³⁰

The term “refugee settler” is thus contested, alternatively deployed to describe native and non-native peoples displaced onto Indigenous lands. In this book, I use the term “refugee settlers” to describe non-Indigenous refugees who, due to resettlement following forced displacement, become settlers in settler colonial states. Refugee settlers are not directly responsible for the settler colonial policies of the state into which they are both interpolated and interpellated. However, their processes of home-making—of creating an island of belonging in their new country of resettlement—do take place on contested land, rendering them what Michael Rothberg calls “implicated subjects.”³¹ The challenge, then, is to put refugee critiques of the nation-state in conversation with Indigenous critiques of settler colonialism in order to challenge settler colonial states’ monopoly over the land and sea. Articulated together, refugee modalities of statelessness and Indigenous epistemologies of human-land-water relations can unsettle settler colonial state violence, pointing us toward more pluralized forms of collective belonging routed through *nước*. To *làm nước* then, to make water/land, is to forge decolonial futurities.

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Resettlement: to settle again, after forced unsettlement


Re-settlement: to reproduce the act of producing a settlement

Reset-tlement: to settle again, and again and again, to constantly resettle, to never settle, to unsettle the settled status of the resettled

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In this book, I examine Vietnamese refugee settlers in Guam and Israel-Palestine using Espiritu’s method of “critical juxtaposing”: the “bringing together of seemingly different and disconnected events, communities, histories, and spaces in order to illuminate what would otherwise not be visible about the contours, contents, and afterlives of war and empire.”³² Guam and Israel-Palestine are often relegated to the margins of American studies. Area studies’ divisions, furthermore, inhibit discussions of the two in relation. Guam and Israel-Palestine, however, should be *central* to analyses of settler colonialism, US empire, and decolonization. To analyze the two in relation, furthermore, illuminates connections between seemingly distinct forms of settler colonial and imperial violence and attendant forms of Indigenous and refugee critique.

Previous scholarship on Vietnamese refugees has focused primarily on the United States, examining how refugee resettlement reinforces the machinations of liberal empire.³³ Less accounted for is how imperialism is co-constitutive with settler colonialism, manifesting what Byrd has termed the “transit of empire”: the usage of “executive, legislative, and judicial means to make ‘Indian’ those peoples and nations who stand in the way of U.S. military and economic desires.”³⁴



MAP 1. This map illustrates Vietnamese refugee migration to Guam and Israel-Palestine—what this book terms an archipelago of resettlement. This archipelago of Vietnamese refugee resettlement, in turn, illuminates a corresponding archipelago of trans-Indigenous resistance: how Chamorro decolonization efforts and Palestinian liberation struggles are connected through the Vietnamese refugee figure. Map drawn by M. Roy Cartography.

During the Vietnam War, for example, the US military racialized enemy territory as “Indian country,” linking settler colonialism across Turtle Island with imperialism in Southeast Asia.³⁵ Although the continental United States remains an important site for grappling with the refugee settler condition—indeed, chapter 2 of this book examines post-1975 Vietnamese Americans as a point of departure—it is overrepresented in the existing scholarship on Vietnamese refugees. This book therefore centers the overlooked sites of Guam and Israel-Palestine, extending the geographical scope of critical refugee studies. Tracing an archipelago of Vietnamese refugee resettlement to Guam and Israel-Palestine, moreover, illuminates two more forms of critical geography: an archipelago of US empire—how the Vietnam War is linked to US military buildup in Guam and unwavering support of Israel—and a corresponding archipelago of trans-Indigenous resistance—how Chamorro decolonization efforts and Palestinian liberation struggles are connected through the Vietnamese refugee figure. Chickasaw scholar Chadwick Allen coined the term “trans-Indigenous” to explore “new methodologies for a global Indigenous literary studies in English.”³⁶ In conversation with Allen, I invoke “trans-Indigenous” to trace “purposeful Indigenous juxtapositions” between locally situated but interconnected struggles against settler colonialism and refugee displacement.³⁷ In sum, the figure of the archipelago indexes formations of settler imperial power as well as challenges to it.

Guam, an unincorporated territory of the United States since 1898, served as the first major US processing center for Vietnamese refugees after the Fall of Saigon. Between April and October 1975, more than 112,000 refugees were processed by the US military in Guam. Operation New Life transformed the island, a strategic US military outpost in the Pacific, into a postwar humanitarian refuge. Such humanitarian rhetoric overwrote, however, the US military's continual dispossession of Indigenous Chamorros. Today, Vietnamese Americans who chose to stay in Guam after Operation New Life instead of resettling in the continental United States must grapple with their relationship to Chamorro decolonization struggles.

In June 1977, Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin granted asylum to sixty-six Vietnamese refugees as his first official act in office, citing parallels with the plight of Jewish Holocaust refugees three decades earlier. Two more groups of Vietnamese refugees would follow, bringing the total population of resettled Vietnamese Israelis to 366 by 1979. This was the first time Israel offered asylum and eventual citizenship to non-Jewish subjects. Furthermore, this case remains an exception to Israel's strict asylum policy, which continues to displace and dispossess native Palestinians, as well as turn away asylum seekers from Eritrea, Sudan, and Syria. By virtue of their citizenship, Vietnamese Israelis remain implicated in Israel's settler colonial foundation and ongoing structures of occupation, a situation that marks their fraught positionality in relation to the Palestinian liberation struggle.

In some ways, Guam and Israel-Palestine represent very different case studies in the history of Vietnamese refugee resettlement. While Guam served primarily as a temporary processing center for Vietnamese refugees, Israel-Palestine functioned as a country of permanent resettlement. Furthermore, the socioeconomic and ethnic backgrounds of the refugees in these two cases differ. Vietnamese refugees who were processed in Guam in 1975 were primarily anticommunist politicians of the fallen Republic of Vietnam; high-ranking officials of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN); individuals connected to the US government, military, or embassy; and their families—in other words, those most vulnerable to political retribution after the Fall of Saigon. For the most part, this first wave of Vietnamese refugees was highly educated and well connected.

In contrast, Vietnamese refugees who resettled in Israel-Palestine were part of the second wave, who left primarily by boat. From 1977 to 1979, more than a quarter million “boat refugees” fled Vietnam to escape the communist government's radical reorganization of society. Without direct connections to US officials, many of these refugees—farmers, fishermen, former business owners, ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs, and low-level South Vietnamese government workers—drifted aimlessly at sea for days and even weeks, in the hopes of being picked up in international waters and dropped off at a Southeast Asian refugee camp of first asylum.³⁸ Of the 277,500 people who fled Vietnam, at least 30,000 to 40,000 perished at sea.³⁹ Images of the boat refugees circulated prominently in the international

media, prompting the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to declare a global crisis. In response, countries around the world, including the State of Israel, offered to resettle the boat refugees.

Vietnamese refugee resettlement in Guam and Israel-Palestine are connected, however, by two interrelated nodes of structural violence. First, both Guam and Israel-Palestine are spaces of settler colonialism. In 1521, Portuguese explorer Ferdinand Magellan stumbled upon the Chamorro island of Guåhan, meaning “we have.” In 1668, Spanish missionaries led by Father Diego Luis de Sanvitores formally colonized the island and renamed it “Guam.” During the following two centuries, genocide, disease, and forced relocation to Spanish-controlled population centers dramatically reduced the Chamorro population in Guam from approximately 100,000 to 9,000.⁴⁰

In 1898, following defeat in the Spanish-American War, Spain relinquished colonial control of Guam to the settler imperial United States. In the *Insular Cases* of 1901, the Supreme Court ruled that the United States did not have to extend civil rights to its colonial subjects; in short, the Constitution does not “follow the flag.”⁴¹ US military buildup in Guam began in earnest after World War II. In August 1945, Admiral Chester Nimitz requested 55 percent of the land for US naval operations, and in 1946 the Land Acquisition Act authorized the Navy Department to acquire private land with minimal—and sometimes no—compensation to Chamorro residents.⁴² By 1947, an estimated 1,350 Chamorro families had lost their homes.⁴³ Over the following decades, Guam was transformed from “a lonely American outpost surrounded by hostile Japanese islands” into “the center of an American-dominated lake that encompassed the entire western Pacific Ocean,” second in military importance only to Hawai‘i.⁴⁴ Following passage of the Organic Act of 1950, Chamorros were granted US citizenship but denied key constitutional rights, such as the right to congressional representation and the right to vote in presidential elections. According to Governor Ricardo J. Bordallo, who oversaw the processing of Vietnamese refugees during Operation New Life, the Organic Act was “not designed to enhance the dignity of the indigenous people” but rather “designed to enhance the colonial authority of the United States.”⁴⁵ Today, the US military occupies a third of Guam’s land, manifesting “the highest ratio of U.S. military spending and military hardware and land takings from indigenous U.S. populations of any place on Earth.”⁴⁶ In sum, in Guam, “settler colonialism and militarization have simultaneously perpetuated, legitimated, and concealed one another,” a dynamic that historian Juliet Nebolon has termed “settler militarism.”⁴⁷ Tracing what Setsu Shigematsu and Keith L. Camacho call the “militarized currents” linking Guam, Israel-Palestine, and Vietnam helps to illuminate corresponding connections between settler militarism, settler colonialism, and settler imperialism.⁴⁸

As in Guam, Zionist settlement in Palestine disregarded the land claims of Indigenous Palestinians.⁴⁹ In 1892, Austrian Jewish writer Nathan Birnbaum first coined the term “Zionism” to describe the exiled Jewish people’s millennia-long

aspiration to return to Zion, after their expulsion from Jerusalem following the destruction of their temples in 586 BCE and 70 CE, respectively. It was Theodor Herzl, though, who mobilized Zionism as a nationalist project. In response to the rise of both ethnonationalism and anti-Semitism in Europe during the late nineteenth century, he advocated the establishment of a Jewish nation-state.⁵⁰ In 1946, Hồ Chí Minh suggested Hà Nội to David Ben-Gurion as the headquarters of a Jewish government in exile.⁵¹ Zionist organizations eventually decided on Palestine as the ideal location, however, given the land's religious significance.

Zionists' settler colonial disregard for the native Palestinian population is epitomized by the *terra nullius* belief that Palestine was "a land without a people for a people without a land."⁵² Jewish historian Michael Brenner identifies five main waves of Zionist immigration, or *aliyahs*—a term with religious connotations of an accession to Mount Zion—to Palestine, extending from the 1880s to World War II and thus spanning Palestine's status as a subject of the Ottoman Empire to a British mandate following World War I.⁵³ By 1936, Jewish settlers constituted almost a third of Palestine's population, prompting the "Great Revolt": a three-year nationalist uprising by Palestinians demanding independence from Britain and an end to colonial control over immigration. Increasing tensions between native Palestinians, Jewish settlers, and British administrators culminated in the Zionist foundation of the State of Israel in 1948 as a Jewish settler state. Some 750,000 Palestinians fled their homes in terror: a catastrophe collectively remembered as *al-Nakba*.⁵⁴ Palestinian scholar Edward Said mourns the painful irony of having been "turned into exiles by the proverbial people of exile, the Jews."⁵⁵ Palestinians who stayed within Israel's 1948 borders, meanwhile, were rendered third-class citizens. Two decades later, the Israel Defense Forces conquered Gaza and the West Bank during the Six Day War of 1967, initiating Israel's colonial occupation of an ever-shrinking space of Palestinian mobility.⁵⁶ Referred to in "wry and subversive understatement" as *al-Naksa*, or the "setback," the 1967 war displaced an additional 400,000 Palestinians, about half of whom were 1948 refugees displaced yet again.⁵⁷ To this day, Israeli laws written to maintain a Jewish majority in Israel forbid Palestinian refugees and exiles the Right of Return.

Guam and Israel-Palestine are sites of not only settler colonialism but also US empire—what Byrd identifies as "U.S. settler imperialism née colonialism."⁵⁸ The year 1898 marked a radical shift in US frontier expansion from what Manu Karuka calls "continental imperialism" to overseas imperialism.⁵⁹ Following the Spanish-American War, the United States acquired not only Guam but also the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico from Spain; Hawai'i via illegal annexation; Wake Island via imperial declaration; and eastern Sāmoa through the Tripartite Convention in 1899. As the so-called "Tip of the Spear," Guam has since served as a military stronghold of US imperialism in the Pacific.⁶⁰ Indeed, settler militarism in Guam facilitated US imperial intervention in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War, as well as the subsequent creation of a displaced Vietnamese refugee population

fleeing the war's aftermath. Meanwhile the State of Israel, the largest recipient of US foreign aid since World War II, acts as a proxy of US influence in the so-called Middle East. US tax dollars prop up Israel's settler colonial regime, implicating US citizens in the continual dispossession of native Palestinians.⁶¹ Ethnic studies scholars have noted mutually reinforcing parallels between US and Israeli settler colonialisms and, by extension, the Indigenous struggles of Native Americans and Palestinians.⁶²

Vietnamese refugees fleeing the debris of the Vietnam War ended up resettling in these spaces of settler colonialism and US imperialism: Guam and Israel-Palestine. Indeed, this book argues that long-standing US influence in Guam and Israel-Palestine *prefigured* the passage of Vietnamese refugees to these very sites. Inserted into a fluid circuit of US settler imperial power, Vietnamese refugees washed ashore on lands similarly caught up in the flow.

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I believe in the resilience
of our bodies
because our hearts
are 75% *hânôm*
and every pulse is
i napu: *a wave*
accustomed
to breaking

—CRAIG SANTOS PEREZ⁶³

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al-baḥr: the sea; the meter, or poetic measure, of Palestinian prosody⁶⁴

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Like *nước*, an archipelago is made up of both land and water. A duality without division; a contrast without contradiction. Land, understood as a “storied site of human interaction” and a “meaning-making process rather than a claimed object,” is a key focus of Indigenous sovereignty movements.⁶⁵ Indigenous sovereignty, moreover, is distinct from nation-state sovereignty, in that the former “embraces diversity, and focuses on inclusivity rather than exclusivity.”⁶⁶ While settler colonial states understand land as property, decolonization promotes “grounded normativity”: what Glen Coulthard (Yellowknives Dene First Nation) and Leeane Betasamosake Simpson (Alderville First Nation) define as “practices and procedures, based on deep reciprocity, that are inherently informed by an intimate relationship to place.”⁶⁷ Simpson elaborates: “Indigenous resurgence, in its most radical form, is nation building, not nation-state building” that works by “centering, amplifying, animating, and actualizing the processes of grounded normativity as flight paths

or fugitive escapes from the violences of settler colonialism.”⁶⁸ Since land is settler colonialism’s “specific, irreducible element,” it is “at the heart of indigenous peoples’ struggles” for sovereignty.⁶⁹

Water, on the other hand, connotes fluidity, fugitivity, movement, and connectivity—the erosion of borders by the constant waves of the sea. Water is a salient medium and metaphor for diaspora and forced displacement, from the Black Atlantic to the transpacific, from Syrian to Vietnamese boat refugees. Water, however, is not in opposition to land.⁷⁰ The figure of the archipelago, refracted through Vietnamese epistemologies of *nước*, reminds us of the entanglements between land and water, Indigenous and refugee; that, indeed, Indigenous peoples can be refugees of settler colonial displacement, and refugees can become settlers on Indigenous lands and waters. Indigeneity’s “emphasis on the specificities of origin, place, and belonging,” in other words, is not in opposition to “movement, dispersal, and diaspora.”⁷¹ This duality is most apparent in Pacific Islander scholarship, which theorizes Oceania as a life force connecting Indigenous island nations to one other as well as their respective diasporas.⁷²

According to Lanny Thompson, “archipe-logics” emphasize “discontinuous connections rather than physical proximity, fluid movements across porous margins rather than delimited borders, and complex spatial networks rather than the oblique horizons of landscapes—in sum, moving islands rather than fixed geographic formations.”⁷³ Archipelogs call to mind Édouard Glissant’s “poetics of relation”: a philosophy grounded in the Antilles archipelago, “in which each and every identity is extended through a relationship with the Other.”⁷⁴ Relational archipelogs mark this book’s metaphors and methodology: the practice of tracing an archipelago of Vietnamese refugee resettlement to illuminate an archipelago of US empire and a corresponding archipelago of trans-Indigenous resistance. In this configuration, Guam and Israel-Palestine represent “moving islands” apprehended in relation, rather than fixed geographic formations, calling to mind the Carolinian navigational practice of *etak*: what Filipino-Pohnpeian scholar Vicente M. Diaz theorizes as an “archipelagic way of apprehending self and space.”⁷⁵

This book builds on the growing field of archipelagic studies, which includes Michel Foucault’s “carceral archipelago” and Paul Amar’s “security archipelago,” Sylvia Wynter’s “archipelago of Human Otherness” and Gleb Raygorodetsky’s “archipelago of hope.”⁷⁶ *Archipelagic American Studies*, edited by Brian Russell Roberts and Michelle Ann Stephens, probes what American studies told from the viewpoint of islands, rather than the continent, entails.⁷⁷ Thompson pinpoints the United States’ 1898 colonial acquisition of Pacific and Caribbean island nations as the start of an “imperial archipelago,” which in turn paved the way in the second half of the twentieth century for what Bruce Cumings calls an “archipelago of empire”: a vast network of roughly eight hundred overseas US military installations.⁷⁸ Attending to oceanic territories and fractal temporalities, Roberts highlights the terraqueous nature of the “archipelagic States of America” via a

L'archipel de Palestine orientale



FIGURE 1. L'archipel de Palestine orientale, by Julien Bousac. Image courtesy of Julien Bousac.

focus on “borderwaters.”⁷⁹ To this scholarship, this book adds an *archipelago of resettlement* routed through *nước*.

The figure of the archipelago emerges from the specificity of this book’s sites of analysis. Guam is actually part of a larger archipelago of Indigenous Chamorro land, the Marianas. Centuries of colonization, however, have divided Guam from its fourteen sister islands to the north. After the Spanish-American War, the United States took over Guam, while Germany took over the Northern Marianas. Following Germany’s defeat in World War I, Japan ruled the Northern Marianas, until its own defeat in World War II.⁸⁰ To this day, the Chamorro people remain divided across two distinct political entities: the unincorporated territory of Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.⁸¹ To retain an archipelagic imaginary, therefore, is to resist what Chamorro scholar Tiara R. Na’puti calls “colonial cartographic violence.”⁸² *Hânôm* charts the fluid connections between Chamorros living across the Marianas archipelago as well as dispersed throughout the diaspora.

Palestine, meanwhile, has become increasingly archipelagic as Israeli settlement and occupation disrupt the contiguity of Palestinian life. In *L’archipel de Palestine orientale* (The archipelago of eastern Palestine), French artist Julien Bousac takes the 1995 Oslo Accords’ division of the West Bank into A, B, and C zones as a point of departure, illustrating, in Jennifer Lynn Kelly’s words, “how settler colonial state practice can create island formations without water.”⁸³ The 1995 Oslo Accords divided the West Bank into three distinct areas of jurisdiction: (1) the Palestinian Authority, which gained limited governing authority following the 1993 Oslo Accords, administers 18 percent of the West Bank designated Area A; (2) the Palestinian Authority and the State of Israel jointly administer 22 percent of the West Bank designated Area B; and (3) the State of Israel exclusively controls the largest and only contiguous portion of the West Bank, Area C, which includes Palestinian villages as well as illegal Israeli settlements. In his map, Bousac submerges Area C in blue water, illuminating an archipelago of noncontiguous Palestinian islands: “Holy Island” (*Ile Sainte*), or Bethlehem; “Capital Island” (*Ile Capitale*) or Palestine’s de facto capital of Ramallah, given Jerusalem’s occupation; “Isle of the Olive Trees” (*Ile aux Oliviers*), in honor of ancestral Palestinian groves; and “Island beneath the Wall” (*Ile sous le Mur*), for the area south of the Western Wall in Jerusalem and east of the apartheid wall separating the West Bank from the State of Israel.⁸⁴

According to Palestinian American scholars Loubna Qutami and Omar Zahzah, the Oslo Accords ushered in an “oppressive status quo of seemingly perpetual occupation, siege and geographical fragmentation.”⁸⁵ When Palestinian leaders abandoned “the boundless fervor of a call for liberation—and calls for decolonization are always boundless”—in favor of an aspirational two-state solution with Israel, they ceded 78 percent of Palestine to the Zionist state and

sacrificed “Palestinians’ legibility as one *peoplehood*.”⁸⁶ Qutami and Zahzah caution against Indigenous sovereignty movements that articulate their goals within the narrow discourse of nation-state independence. In the case of Palestine, the “quest for statehood prioritized a simultaneously arbitrary and life-shattering distinction of inside and out, of *mwatan* (citizen) and *lajet* (refugee), and left for dead those Palestinians inside 1948 territories, engulfed by the realization of a Zionist state that even enjoined recognition by its victims.”⁸⁷ Visions of decolonization therefore must not lose sight of *al-baḥr*: the sea, the Mediterranean, cut off from the West Bank and exiled Palestinians, ever since Israel’s settler colonial foundation in 1948.

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In the car, Ma starts to cry. “What about the sea?” she asks. “What about the garden?” Ba says we can come back in the morning and dig up the stalks of lemongrass and fold the sea into a blue square. Ma is sobbing. She is beating the dashboard with her fists. “I want to know,” she says, “I want to know, I want to know . . . who is doing this to us?” Hiccupping she says, “I want to know, why—why there’s always a fence.”

—LÊ THI DIEM THÚY⁸⁸

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A note on terms: When referring to Palestinians and Chamorros collectively, I use the term “Indigenous”: “a political category that enables solidarity among diverse indigenous peoples and nations,” particularly in light of the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.⁸⁹ According to Māori scholar Linda Tuhiwai Smith (Ngāti Awa and Ngāti Porou), the term “Indigenous peoples” enables “the collective voices of colonized people to be expressed strategically in the international arena.”⁹⁰ As a collective formation, “Indigenous” is archipelagic in orientation: different communities “come together, transcending their own colonized contexts and experiences, in order to learn, share, plan, organize and struggle collectively for self-determination on the global and local stages.”⁹¹ When referring to local contexts, I often substitute “native” for “Indigenous” in order to distinguish natives from settlers under conditions of settler colonialism. “Native,” like “Indigenous,” is an “analytic of political resistance.”⁹²

Naming Indigenous land is a political act. At the risk of reproducing colonial cartography, I default to the colonial term “Guam” rather the Indigenous term “Guåhan” in order to index the ongoing structures of US imperialism and settler militarism. I reserve “Guåhan” for references to Chamorro visions of decolonization. Moreover, some self-determination activists have recently begun to identify as “CHamoru,” dismissing “Chamorro” as a product of colonial orthography.⁹³ Although I recognize the decolonial impetus of “CHamoru,” this book uses the more standard spelling “Chamorro” to reflect the orthography of the archival documents and the self-identification of the majority of this book’s older generation

of interview subjects. I also distinguish between “Chamorro” and “Guamanian.” Although the meaning of the term “Guamanian” has changed over time, in this book “Guamanian” refers to all residents of Guam, including settlers.⁹⁴

Similarly, the land to which both native Palestinians and Israeli settlers lay claim is contested, and naming this land is therefore a political act. This book uses different terms to refer to the land, depending on context. I use “Israel” when I want to emphasize and implicate Israeli state policies. For example, Vietnamese refugees are citizens of Israel, not Palestine. They are a product of Israeli executive action; Palestinians had no say regarding Vietnamese refugees’ resettlement on native Palestinian land. I use “Palestine” when I want to emphasize Palestinians’ Indigenous claim to the land and draw attention to Zionist settler colonialism. “Israel-Palestine” refers collectively to the lands known after 1967 as the State of Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank, thus indexing present conditions of colonial occupation.

For consistency with other country names, I use the English spelling “Vietnam” to refer to nước Việt Nam. However, except in direct quotes, this book defaults to the Vietnamese spelling of city names, such as Hà Nội and Sài Gòn. Diacritics, when known, are included for Vietnamese subjects’ names unless they have been dropped by the Vietnamese subjects in their countries of resettlement. Family names are placed at the beginning or end depending on the subject’s preference. For consistency, I follow the US convention of referring to Vietnamese subjects by their family names instead of their first names.

Throughout the book I refer to the post-1975 displaced Vietnamese as “refugees,” though US officials initially tried to distinguish them as “evacuees.”⁹⁵ As historian Jana K. Lipman notes, this linguistic preference was politically motivated: “Not only did *evacuee* lack the drama and compassion that *refugee* connoted, it also was bereft of international or national rights or obligations; there were no international conventions on evacuees.”⁹⁶ “Evacuee,” however, is not a legal term. According to US law, the first wave of displaced Vietnamese processed in Guam were actually “parolees,” “a linguistic invention in the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act, which allowed for ‘temporary admission’ for foreigners who fell outside U.S. immigration law.”⁹⁷ This book uses “refugee” to refer to the displaced Vietnamese because it is the term most often referenced in archival documents, and because it includes the multiple waves of escape from Vietnam. Moreover, “refugee” calls to mind the politics of “refugeetude”—what Vinh Nguyen, building on the work of Khatharya Um, defines as a “continued state of being and a mode of relationality.”⁹⁸ For many refugees, refugee subjectivity did not cease after citizenship in the settler colonial state; indeed, refugeetude is often passed down to subsequent generations via what Marianne Hirsch terms “postmemory.”⁹⁹ Refugeetude, furthermore, is “crucially tied to relational politics—ways of knowing and being with others.”¹⁰⁰ This book explores what decolonial futures are imaginable when refugeetude is understood in relation to Indigeneity.

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[R]efuse to take for granted the naming process. To this end, the intervals between *refuge* and *refuse*, *refused* and *refuse*, or even more importantly, between *refuse* and *refuse* itself, are constantly played out. If, despite their relation, noun and verb inhabit the two very different and well-located worlds of designated and designator, the space in-between them remains a surreptitious site of movement and passage whose open, communal character makes exclusive belonging and long-term residence undesirable, if not impossible. Passage: the state of metamorphosis; the conversion of water into steam; the alteration of an entire musical framework.

—TRINH T. MINH-HA¹⁰¹

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Re(fugee)settlement flows into Re(fuse)settlement: the conversion of *nước* into steam.

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Archipelago of Resettlement is organized archipelagically, inviting an archipelagic reading practice. Each of the book's three parts consists of two chapters that should be read in conjunction, as well as in relation to the other chapter pairs. As the meaning of *nước* shifts in juxtaposition to *hànôm* and *bahr*, so too does the story and argument of each chapter unfold in relation to the others, forming individual islands that together make up an archipelago of analysis. Part one, "Mapping Sources," operates as a preface of sorts for the book's main case studies, establishing the historical and conceptual framework for making sense of Vietnamese refugee resettlement across Guam and Israel-Palestine. Chapter 1 examines how, even prior to post-1975 Vietnamese refugee resettlement, the fates of Vietnam, Palestine, and Guam became entangled in the US imperial imaginary; from the 1967 Six Day War in Israel-Palestine and President Lyndon B. Johnson's "Guam Conference" on the Vietnam War, to the 1975 Fall of Saigon and commencement of Operation New Life in Guam. This chapter introduces and exemplifies a method of archipelagic history that informs how to read the rest of the book. Chapter 2 elaborates the book's terms of engagement—refugee settler, refugee settler condition, and refugee settler desire—and situates the US War in Vietnam within a longer frontier history of US settler imperial expansion. Focusing on Turtle Island, this chapter examines the refugee settler condition in a context perhaps more familiar to American studies scholars, orienting readers for the following discussions of Vietnamese refugee resettlement in Guam and Israel-Palestine.

Part two, "Tracing Migrations," analyzes the resettlement of Vietnamese refugees to Guam in 1975 and to Israel-Palestine in 1977 and 1979. Drawing from oral histories developed with Vietnamese refugees as well as archival research

conducted at the Richard F. Taitano Micronesian Area Research Center (MARC), the Nieves M. Flores Memorial Library in Hagåtña, and the Israel State Archives (ISA), chapters 3 and 4 critique how the US military in Guam and the Zionist government in Israel emphasized the humanitarian aspects of Vietnamese refugee resettlement in order to direct attention away from contemporaneous policies of Indigenous dispossession. Such humanitarian rhetoric positioned Vietnamese refugees in a structurally antagonistic relationship with Indigenous struggles for decolonization, insofar as the refugee figure was used to recuperate the image of the settler colonial state. Both chapters end with examples of refugee refusal to ventriloquize state narratives of benevolence in the face of ongoing settler colonial violence. Read together, these chapters demonstrate how tracing an archipelago of Vietnamese refugee resettlement illuminates the archipelagic nature of US settler colonial empire.

Whereas part two narrates the development of the refugee settler condition in Guam and Israel-Palestine, part three, “Unsettling Resettlements,” theorizes decolonial potentials for refugee-Indigenous solidarity. Given the structural antagonisms dividing refugee and Indigenous subjects, no broad coalitions have yet formed in either Guam or Israel-Palestine. I therefore turn to cultural production to probe what Raymond Williams terms emergent “structures of feeling.”¹⁰² Chapter 5 examines three representations of Operation New Life and its afterlives: a Chamorro high school student’s newspaper article, a Vietnamese refugee repatriate’s memoir, and a Chamorro-Vietnamese college student’s blog. I posit that given the distinct permanent/transient temporality of settler militarism in Guam—in which the relative transience of individual militarized bodies masks the as-of-yet permanence of the US military as a settler colonial institution—the politics of staying in Guam resonates very differently than in other settler colonial contexts. Unlike the vast majority of Vietnamese refugees who used Guam as a stepping stone for permanent resettlement in the continental United States, Vietnamese Guamanians remain in dialogue with Chamorros’ ongoing calls for decolonization. Chapter 6 explores uneven translations between the Law of Return for Jewish immigrants, the Right of Return for Palestinian refugees and exiles, and the journey of return for Vietnamese refugees. Reading the work of Vietnamese Israeli poet Vaan Nguyen alongside Palestinian poet Mourid Barghouti, this chapter considers the implications of understanding home as what Barghouti calls a “shape of time.”¹⁰³ Via an analysis of the documentary film *The Journey of Vaan Nguyen*, it charts connections between Vietnamese and Palestinian experiences of displacement and land dispossession, marking potentials for a shared struggle.

Archipelago of Resettlement concludes with a gesture toward refugee futurities. The afterword juxtaposes two works of speculative fiction—Linh Dinh’s short story “A Floating Community” and Tuan Andrew Nguyen’s video installation *The Island*—to consider how the refugee histories analyzed in this book promise to shape our collective futures and decolonial horizons.

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When land meets water and water washes over land
Trace the archipelagos upon which to stand
Làm nước đi.

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