definition the sovereign is not simply exceptional but "he who decides on the state of exception." By this definition, it is Anaxagoras who is the sovereign.

VISION OF THE OBSCURE

To suggest this is to point to Anaxagoras's ambivalent investment in the power of Nous. In Athens Anaxagoras was apparently nicknamed Nous, and as the mind that sees, knows, and organizes the world imagined in this text, the author has a special affinity for his protagonist.[74] Indeed, we might view Nous as the personification of the authorial mind within the text and a projection of its totalizing vision. The order of Mind's *diakosmēsis* is the cosmic order discerned and described by Anaxagoras, and Nous's knowledge is ultimately the author's own.

Aligning himself with Nous's omniscient gaze, Anaxagoras goes beyond the limitations of human perception to obtain a "vision of the obscure." Sextus Empiricus reports that Anaxagoras faulted the senses, saying that "because of their feebleness we are not able to distinguish the truth" (*krinein t'alēthes*, B21/D5). The proof of their unreliability is the mixing of colors. If we take two dyes, black and white, and pour one into the other drop by drop, our sight will not be able to differentiate (*diakrinein*) the minute changes, "although they truly exist in nature."[75] With our blunt vision we can see the gross phenomena created by the *apokrisis* but cannot discern the boundless *khrēmata* of which they are composed; we cannot see the everything in everything that constitutes "the truth" of physical reality. And yet for one who knows how to see, "appearances [or phenomena] are a vision of the obscure" (*opsis adēlōn ta phainomena*, B21a/D6).[76] The word *adēlōn* evokes the regime of visibility introduced by Nous, the new capacity to discern what each thing is "most manifestly" (*endēlotata*, B12.29/D27). Nous separated the imperceptible elements into visible phenomena; the fact that Anaxagoras uses the same word—*khrēma*—for both shows that the former things are still obscurely present in the latter.[77] David Sider notes the "amphiboly" of *opsis*, which is both subjective (seeing) and objective (something seen).[78] Anaxagoras's text mediates between the two. By allowing us to see with our minds the *khrēmata* we cannot see with our eyes, he allows us to grasp the objective reality of our world. In this way he lets us

74. Diog. Laert. 2.6 (< A1/P42); Plut *Per.* 4 (< A15/P43).

75. Only the first quotation is reported as Anaxagoras's own words, but the example is likely to be drawn from him. See Warren 2007a, 32–35.

76. Sextus quotes this fragment in the course of a discussion of Democritus, and it is possible that he, not Anaxagoras, is the author. Sider (2005, 165–66) believes it is Anaxagorian.

77. "No thing (*khrēma*) is born or dies but it is mixed together and distinguished out of the things that are" (*eontōn khrēmatōn,* B17/D15): the first *khrēma* denotes phenomena, the second the basic elements. At B12.16–17/D27, Nous knew both "the things that are mixed together and the things that are separated off and becoming distinct." To his panoptical eye, both the phenomena and the invisible things that compose them are equally manifest.

78. Sider 2005, 166–67: "The amphiboly seems intentional" (166).

see, as he does, through Nous's eyes, granting us too some share of Nous's discriminating power, his ability to discern the *khrēmata* within the *khrēmata* and thus to "distinguish the truth" (*krinein t'alēthes*, B21/D5).

That truth is both ontological and cosmological: it is a truth about the nature of the things around us today as well as about their primordial origin. Nous's perennial gaze forms the bridge between the two. It encompasses all things past, present, and future—"whatever sorts of things were going to be, and whatever sorts were that now are not, and however many are now and whatever sorts will be" (B12.17–18/D27)—and also discerns their fundamental identity over time. Thus Nous can see "most manifestly what each thing is and was" (*esti kai ēn*, B12.30/D27). This line encapsulates Anaxagoras's cosmogonic project and, indeed, the intellectual project of cosmogony as a whole, which explains what each thing is by revealing what it originally was. When the cosmologist writes "as in the beginning (*arkhēn*) so too now all things are together" (B6/D25), he adopts Nous's eternal gaze and he, like Nous, transcends time.[79]

This timeless vision lets the author see not only what Nous sees, but even further, for he sees the world before Nous existed and discerns the things that are unclear to Nous clearly enough to declare them unclear. If there is no "before" of Nous, as I suggested in the last section, that is because Anaxagoras retrojects Mind's principle of visibility and discrimination to a time before he exists. The author becomes omniscient in the figure of Nous, but Nous also becomes omniscient in the person of the author, able to see even what predates himself. If Nous is the projection of the author within the text—the eye with which he surveys and knows the world he has imagined—the authorial mind outstrips its own creation. It is Anaxagoras who "holds all knowledge about everything and has the greatest strength" (B12.10–11/D27).[80]

Anaxagoras, however, works to obscure this fact. He projects his cosmogonic power onto Nous and conceals himself behind his character. Let's return to B12/D27 and the counterfactual conditions from which Nous's sovereignty is born.

79. Other examples of the author's transtemporality are the shift from the past to the present tense at the end of B1/D9 (noted by Inwood [1986, 26–27]) and the shift in perspective in B12.17–18/D27 (noted by Sider [2005, 29]) from a vantage point in the cosmos's first moments ("whatever sorts of things were going to be") to one in our present ("whatever sorts were that now are not, and however many are now and whatever sorts will be").

80. Perhaps ancient readers intuited this: coins from ancient Clazomenae figure Anaxagoras holding or seated on a globe (A27/P49), and Aristotle relates that, when asked why one should choose to be born rather than not, Anaxagoras replied, "to view the heavens and the order in the entire cosmos" (*Eth. Eud.* 1.5 1216a10–14 < A30/P35). Similarly, his epitaph praised him for "reaching the furthest limit of truth of the heavenly cosmos" (Diog. Laert. 2.15 < A1/P46). Philosophy continues to identify with omniscient Mind: as Curd (2007, 89) observes, versions of the numismatic images appear in volume 3 of Diels-Kranz's *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* and on the cover of volume 2 of Guthrie's *A History of Greek Philosophy* (1965).

> Nous is unbounded and *autokrates* and has been mixed with no thing, but he is alone himself by himself. For (*gar*) if he were not by himself, but had been mixed with something else, he would have a share of all things, if he had been mixed with anything; for (*gar*) there is a share of everything in everything, as I have said before (*hōsper en tois prosthen moi lelektai*). And (*kai*) the things that were mixed together would prevent him from controlling (*kratein*) any thing in the same way as he does being alone by himself. (B12.1–8/D27)

With its redundant hypotheticals and otiose causal connectives, this passage foregrounds its logical argumentation and draws attention to the mind behind this logic. That shadowy authorial presence is concretized by the sudden first-person intervention: "as I have said before" (*moi lelektai*).[81] In this instant the author appears only to retreat behind his own *logos*: the authorial *egō* declines to the dative (*moi*). That *logos*, furthermore, merely repeats the facts of the cosmos: "For there is a share of everything in everything." It is thus neither Anaxagoras himself nor his *logos* that sustains Nous's power but the physical law of everything in everything to which he is an exception. The circular logic of the passage and its repeated causal particles (*gar*) create an inferential loop in which the bare fact of Nous's *autokratos* is its own justification: he rules because he is exceptional and he must be exceptional because he rules. The author just reiterates this illogical logic, his creative force eclipsed by Nous's self-authorizing sovereignty.[82]

It thus appears that the world exists, and the author merely occupies it. We have seen how other Presocratic writers advertise the value of their teachings by opposing their own unique knowledge to the ignorance of others. Thus in his first fragment Heraclitus sets the incomprehension of mortals against his own *logos*, "such words and deeds as I expound, distinguishing each thing according to its nature and saying how it is" (Her. B1/D1).[83] Anaxagoras seems to do something similar in B17/D15 when he criticizes the Greeks, who "do not think rightly (*ouk orthōs nomizousin*) about birth and death, for (*gar*) no thing is born or dies but it is mixed together and distinguished out of the things that are. Thus they would correctly call (*houtōs an orthōs kaloien*) 'to be born' 'to be mixed together' and 'to die' 'to be distinguished.'" But Anaxagoras contrasts the ignorance of the Greeks not to his own philosophy but to the physical reality of the cosmos. Again the causal connectives create a logical circle in which the facts of the universe are their own justification: the physical law of combination and separation is the logical

81. The only other first-person authorial intervention is at the end of B4a/D13, in the same phrase: "These things have been said by me (*tauta men oun moi lelektai*) about the *apokrisis*." Anaxagoras is the only Presocratic philosopher to use this phrase (an apparent parallel in Thales B3/R44 is not *ipssisima verba).* Sider (2005, 30n17) contrasts Anaxagoras's retroactive use of the phrase to the variations of *moi dokei* that often come at the beginning of works, "staking out a claim and calling attention to the author's own contribution to knowledge."

82. Schofield (1980, 3–22) offers a subtle analysis of this fragment's logic (or lack thereof).

83. Cf. Parm. B6/D7, B8.38–41/D8.43–46, B8.50–61/D8.55–66; Emp. B2/D42, B4/D47, B11/D51; Alcmaeon B1/D4; Hecataeus FGH 1 F1. Schofield (1980, 36–40) notes the contrast in his discussion of the "impersonal" (39) style of the opening of Anaxagoras's book.

premise (*gar*); the conclusion (*houtōs*) follows. The fragment brings Greek *nomos* and nomenclature into alignment (*orthōs*) with physical reality, but also elides the author's role in that orthonomic process. The universe itself corrects the Greeks' error, without overt intervention from Anaxagoras.

This authorial self-effacement is generalized throughout Anaxagoras's text by his idiosyncratic use of logical connectives. Anaxagoras uses *gar* frequently, almost always—as in the instances we have just seen—to reiterate physical facts of the cosmos. Often there seems to be little difference in semantic force between *gar* (for) and *kai* (and), explanation and description.[84] Thus a construction that might normally work to assert the presence of the author in his text, offering explanations and drawing out causal inferences, instead makes the description of the universe its own logical support. The philosopher merely follows the logic of his world; he does not produce it. The same is true of another favorite construction, the use of the genitive absolute as a connective.[85] B4a/D13 begins: "These things being so, it is necessary to believe (*khrē dokein*) that there are many and all sorts of things in everything." In the logic of this passage, a posited reality generates its own argumentative necessity. The reader must believe not because the author tells her to but because this is simply how it is; the author falls out of the equation. We get a similar construction in B5/D16: "These things having been separated out in this way, it is necessary to know (*ginōskein khrē*) that . . . all things are equal." In place of belief (*dokein*) we are here enjoined to knowledge (*ginōskein*) and the same kind of knowledge said to be held by Nous, who "holds all knowledge (*gnōmēn*) about everything" (B12.10/D27; cf. *egnō*, B12.16/D27). Reading the text, following its logic and accepting its necessary conclusions, we come to know what Nous knows: reality in its totality. The discursive effort that produces that knowledge is, in the process, erased.

In a text dominated by tropes of visibility, the author thus renders his own creative force invisible, *adēlon*.[86] By effacing himself, Anaxagoras sustains Nous

84. Schofield 1980, 97: "Despite the inferential particles . . . Anaxagoras is not arguing with his reader in the manner of a Plato or Aristotle. . . . He is just explaining the way things are." See, e.g., B9/D14, where the logic seems causal but phrases are linked by *kai;* or B12/D27, where the *gar*s of the first nine lines then yield to *kai,* with no apparent shift in argumentative force. I count fifteen instances of *gar* in the extant fragments. Of these, only three are anything other than a bare assertion of the physical facts as Anaxagoras sees them: the counterfactual at B12.3/D27 and the theoretical premises in B3/D24 and B5/D16 ("for it is impossible for what is not to be"; "for it is impossible to be more than all"). In some cases the causality is ostentatiously circular, e.g., in B4b/D12: "Seeds boundless in amount, none like to one another; for (*gar*) of the other things none was alike one to another."

85. E.g., B1/D9: "All things were together . . . and all things being together, nothing was manifest." Equivocating between circumstance and cause, the genitive absolute poses as a neutral description of reality: circumstance *as* cause. Ugolini (1985) shows how the interplay of expository and exegetical structures Anaxagoras's sentences. The genitive absolute also occurs in the first and last sentence of B4b/D12 and in B13/D29b; the grammar of the genitives in B7/D23 and B9/D14 is ambiguous.

86. Thus he is an exception to the text's totalizing world vision. Again, this exceptionality marks his sovereignty. Compare Foucault's reading of Velasquez's *Las Meninas,* where the unseen sovereign

as autonomous, self-authorizing, and self-authoring. The same dynamic would seem to explain the most characteristic feature of Anaxagoras's style, its predominantly paratactic structure.[87] Laying each point side by side, parataxis promises total visibility. Every element can be accounted for and the whole surveilled at a glance. Surveillance and the spatial distribution that facilitates it are a familiar technique of both imperial and domestic power and are especially appropriate for a power so intimately associated with vision as Nous.[88] The visibility effect of parataxis is reinforced by polysyndeton. Anaxagoras not only lays clauses side by side, but emphasizes that distribution with abundant connective and coordinating conjunctions that link the individual items even as they set them off: X *and* Y *and* Z. This combination of polysyndeton and parataxis sets textual objects out on a horizontal plane, each one discrete and identifiable. In doing so, it reiterates the differentiating *kratos* of Nous: every item can be seen, known, and counted.

An example comes in B12/D27, soon after the conditional sentences that both recount and repress the contested genealogy of Nous's *kratos*. That *kratos* is introduced as a hendiadys of power and knowledge: "He holds all knowledge about everything and (*kai*) has the greatest strength" (*gnōmēn ge peri pantos pasan iskhei kai iskhuei megiston*, B12.10–11/D27). The objects of this power/knowledge are then laid out over the next ten lines through paratactic accretion and polysyndetic accumulation: and (*kai*) Nous controls everything with soul, both (*kai*) the larger and (*kai*) the smaller; and (*kai*) he commanded the *perikhōrēsis*; and (*kai*) he knew all the things mixed together and (*te . . . kai*) the things separated out and (*kai*) the things distinguished, and so on. The only hypotactic constructions in this section (the result clause in line 13 and the relative clause in line 19) describe the transfer of Nous's force to the *perikhōrēsis*, where it continues: and (*kai*) the *perikhōrēsis* began to revolve, and (*de*) it revolved more, and (*kai*) it will revolve more. Through the *perikhōrēsis* Nous sets out each phenomenon and quality, identifying each one and putting it in array next to the others: the stars and (*te kai*) the sun and (*kai*) the moon and (*kai*) the air and (*kai*) the aether revolve; and

is the invisible organizing point of the painting (1970, 3–16). Anaxagoras, coincidentally, is said to have theorized the laws of perspective (A39/D97).

87. The extent fragments do, of course, contain hypotactic structures: see the subtle analysis of Ugolini (1985). But even where there is subordinating syntax, the subordination tends to be shallow: we rarely find the multiple layers of nested subordinate clauses that we see in Anaxagoras's contemporary Empedocles or, for that matter, in his predecessor Parmenides. Fränkel (1955, 40–96) emphasizes the "serial style" of archaic Greek literature as an immediate presentation of the facts of the world as they are perceived. This connects the construction to Anaxagoras's use of *gar* and the genitive absolute, discussed above. Compare Auerbach's famous study of Homeric style, emphasizing the full presence and visibility of every detail and relationship (1953, 3–23).

88. The classic work is Foucault 1977, 141–49, 195–228. Mourelatos (2008b, 316) connects parataxis to *noein* as "mental vision" but not specifically to Anaxagoras's Nous. Cf. Dewald (1987, 169–80): parataxis in Herodotus offers readers a god's-eye view of the overarching patterns of history, although there, she argues, the construction foregrounds the author's intervention.

(*kai*) the thick is separated out from the thin and (*kai*) the hot from the cold and (*kai*) the bright from the dark and (*kai*) the dry from the wet. The effect of distribution is reinforced by Anaxagoras's use (here and throughout) of neuter adjectives or participles with the substantivizing definite article (the hot, the cold, etc.) for a "thingification" of abstractions. Thus the syntax performs the *diakosmēsis* that makes all things *endēlotata*. It mimetically reproduces that process but also simply instantiates it as each thing—each concept, each noun—is laid out in order, discrete and discernible.

So from this perspective, the structure of Anaxagoras's prose supports the surveilling power/knowledge of Nous and reinforces the author's alignment with that all-seeing mind.[89] And yet there is another way to look at the lists of B12/D27 and the politics of Anaxagoras's parataxis in general. In his analysis of Hölderlin's paratactical structures, Theodor Adorno treats parataxis as an "antiprinciple" that resists the synthesizing operations of "a dominating Logos" to "evade the logical hierarchy of a subordinating syntax."[90] The political affordances of this "antiprinciple" have been developed by scholars of Indigenous narratives. Jared Dahl Aldern shows how parataxis in North Fork Mono storytelling undoes the bond between knowledge and power by fostering multiple, open-ended connections among ideas and "sustains a worldview of equivalence, reciprocity, and balance."[91] This narrative mode decenters settler power and levels its hierarchies, as Timothy Donahue argues in his reading of the narratives of the Great Basin, "because the relational and deconstructive thinking afforded by parataxis is antithetical to the unitary form of nation-state sovereignty."[92]

From this perspective we might view Anaxagoras's parataxis not as a stylistic tool of Nous's sovereign power/knowledge but instead as a formal alternative to it.[93] Willfully anachronistic, Anaxagoras's parataxis harkens back to a "premodern" distribution of the sensible; it evokes a time before Nous's *arkhē* and refuses the *telos* he imposes on the cosmos. The refusal of a *telos* is, in fact, a defining feature of the "strung-together style" (*lexis eiromenē*) of parataxis, according to Aristotle

89. Again that gaze extends even to the time before Nous: thus the long list of heterogeneous elements in the *summixis* in B4b/D12—and (*kai*) the moist and (*kai*) the dry and (*kai*) the hot and (*kai*) the cold and (*kai*) the bright and (*kai*) the dark and (*kai*) earth and (*kai*) countless seeds—surveils them retrospectively, discerning each element in order to identify it as indiscernible and unidentifiable.

90. Adorno 1992, 140, 131.

91. Aldern 2013, 9. He takes this narrative structure as a model for both ecological and cultural interactions. See further Kroeber (2004, 4–5) on the paratactic style of Native American narratives.

92. Donahue 2019, 24. "Parataxis at once foregrounds the relations between entities and deconstructs conventional hierarchical conceptions of those relations" (24); it is a form of "unsettlement" (33).

93. Lesher (1995, 126) hints at this when he remarks that "the archaic paratactic style which characterizes much of B12 obscures how Mind's powers of control relate to the 'discerning judgment' or 'knowledge.'" Lesher implies that Anaxagoras's formal primitivism evinces a failure to align with Mind's discrimination, but we might rather see it as resistance to such an alignment.

(*Rh*. 3.9 1409a29–b8). He finds the construction "unpleasant" (*aēdes*) because, he says, it is "unbounded" (*apeiron)* and "has no *telos* in itself but only stops when the content does." For Aristotle, as for Adorno, parataxis is a kind of anti-form, in contrast to the clearly defined periods of hypotaxis, "which has a beginning (*arkhēn*) and end (*teleutēn*) in itself and an easily seen magnitude (*megethos eusunopton*)" and is easier to remember "because it has number (*arithmon*) by which it can be measured (*metreitai*)." Without *arkhē* and *telos*, parataxis is *apeiron*—unbounded, indistinct—and immeasurable. In this it evokes less the boundless (*apeiron*, B12.1/D27) rule of Nous than the boundless (*apeira*, B1/D9) and countless *khrēmata* of the original state. Its refusal of subordination and emphasis on egalitarian relationality—each thing laid out side by side on a level syntactical plane—recalls their horizontal interrelations. Is parataxis the indigenous language of the things all together, the linguistic structure of their original communality?[94]

Recuperating the original collectivity of the things, parataxis, I propose, represents an alternative distribution of the sensible to Nous's solipsistic sovereignty. This formal alignment with the things is supported by other aspects of Anaxagoras's style as well. For instance, his use of the definite article to "thingify" an adjective or participle, which we earlier considered as a tool of Nous's distribution and surveillance, might instead be seen as a way of giving "an equal ontological dignity to each individuated thing," the large and the small alike.[95] Or we might think of Anaxagoras's use of simile and metaphor—or rather his non-use. Metaphor, as we discussed in chapter 1, is the master trope of an idealist metaphysics. Transferring the concrete to the conceptual, metaphor turns things into ideas (creating difficulties, as we saw in the last chapter, for Empedocles's materialist aesthetics). Anaxagoras eschews metaphor and sticks with the things.[96] Fragment B8/D22 offers a case in point: "They have not been separated from one another, the things in the one

94. Mourelatos (2008b) sets the "*logos*-textured world" of Plato against a "naive metaphysics of things" in which "each thing will be complete by itself, and the plurality of things will form a whole . . . in which all relations are external and explicit" (316). He posits a historical progression from this ontological parataxis (316) to Plato's hypotactic logic, with Anaxagoras marking a "relapse" (331). But the philosopher's choice of this archaic construction gestures not toward an earlier moment in Greek thought, in my view, but to an earlier moment in his own cosmology, and the opposition between a "naive metaphysics of things" and a "*logos*-textured world" is less a matter of intellectual progression than of political contestation. Cf. the discussion in the Conclusion.

95. The quotation is from Garcia (2014, 4), describing flat ontologies. Sider (2005, 32) notes Anaxagoras's use of this feature of Greek.

96. Of course he cannot avoid metaphor altogether (language itself being fundamentally metaphoric) but I can identify no word in Anaxagoras that *must* be understood metaphorically. Political diction like *moira* and *metekhein* can be interpreted metaphorically, but I have argued above for taking it literally. If Nous is considered immaterial, then the language of space ("in some things," "separate," "where the other things are") would have to be taken metaphorically when used of him; likewise the description of Nous as "lightest and purest of all things" (B12.9/D27). But to assume this is to concede Nous's metaphysical victory twice over: his ontological separation from the *khrēmata* and the attendant separation of concept from thing.

cosmos, nor have they been chopped off with an ax (*oude apokekoptai pelekei*), neither the hot from the cold nor the cold from the hot." Since the fragment describes a time before there could be such an object as an ax, the language is assumed to be figurative. Laks identifies it as the only metaphor in the extant fragments.[97] But it is not explicitly phrased as such. We don't get a simile where we expect one—even where we possibly have one.

The resistance to simile marks a problem with similitude more broadly. B9/D14 describes the speed of the vortex: "Their speed (*takhutēs*) was similar in speed (*takhutēta*) to no thing of the things that exist now among men, but it is many times as fast (*takhu).*" Speed is compared to speed in respect to speed only to declare the simile insufficient; the polyptoton (*takhutēs, takhutēta, takhu*) underlines the failure of the comparison even as the repetitions slow the line down, form pulling against content.[98] As tropes of substitution, simile and metaphor rest on ipseity, the discrete identity that enables the equation of one thing to another. At once absolutely dissimilar ("no other thing is similar to anything else," B12.28/D27) and materially the same (since everything is composed of everything else), the things resist such one-for-one equivalence. Instead their relation is fully metonymic, not a vertical substitution of one for another but the horizontal contiguity among interconnected parts.[99]

97. Laks 1993, 32; cf. Lanza 1966, 218; and Sider 2005, 117. It is an open question whether Anaxagoras imagined hot and cold as material things that could be chopped. In B19/D55, the apparently metaphorical proposition that the rainbow is a "sign (*sumbolon*) of a storm" is likely the scholiast's words, not Anaxagoras's, as Solmsen (1963) argues. Note too the antifigurative thrust of B22/D92: "What is called bird's milk is egg white" (if the fragment is by Anaxagoras and if that is the right reading; see Brennan 1995; and Sider 2005, 169–70). That the absence of metaphor in the treatise is deliberate is suggested by the report that Anaxagoras was the first to read Homer allegorically (Diog. Laert. 2.11): he was clearly capable of metaphoric thinking.

98. Perhaps the ultimate example of Anaxagoras's resistance to similitude is the fact that he posits multiple worlds but imagines them as "just like ours" (B4a/D13, the structure of which collapses the very difference it introduces: Louguet 2002, 528). This peculiar replication may be a byproduct of the mechanics of his universe, but for Vlastos (1975) the ramifications for Mind's discrimination are reason enough to reject the theory: "It is not likely that Mind would choose to engage in cosmic mass-production" (359; cf. Schofield 1996, 8: such a mind "forfeits its claim to *be* a mind."). Again (cf. n. 93 above), we can ask whether the lack of differentiation is Mind's failure or Anaxagoras's refusal to accede to his success. For various positions on the multiple-world theory and its implications for Nous's *diakosmēsis,* see Fränkel 1955, 284–93; Mansfeld 1980; Schofield 1996; Louguet 2002; and Curd 2007, 212–22.

99. See Jakobson and Halle (2002, 69–96), whose definition of metonymy reads like a linguistic gloss on Anaxagoras's everything in everything. It is only under the differentiating regime of Nous that one discrete object could stand in metaphorically for another. But even then the abiding rule of everything in everything complicates the situation. Thus B21a/D6 (*opsis adēlōn ta phainomena*) both is and isn't a metaphor. On the one hand, the visible objects around us offer a perceptible analogy to the invisible mechanics of the cosmos, a tangible substitute for the intangible things. On the other hand, though, those objects simply are the things, and in looking at them we actually see their unseen components.

The avoidance of metaphor thus reinforces the paratactical structure, and both contribute to a flat textual ontology that reiterates the horizontal relations among the things, keeping their original communality alive even after the ascension of Nous. This paratactic distribution of the sensible not only recuperates and preserves that archaic order, but develops it, realizing its incipient political potential. In the original state, as we saw, there could be no politics properly speaking. Without ipseity there could be no accounting for those who do not count; with everything in everything there could be neither identity nor alterity, and thus no explicit relations between things. Parataxis, I have suggested, is the syntactical form of "all things together" (*homou panta khrēmata*), but with a significant difference, because parataxis is not everything *in* everything but everything *next to* (*para*) everything. In laying each thing side by side on a single ontological plane, parataxis grants each its own visibility and identity, its own ipseity: this thing and that thing and the other thing. Stringing each discrete thing together like beads on a thread (in Aristotle's image), parataxis preserves their ontological equality and egalitarian interconnectedness but makes the connections between them explicit. This overt relationality is reinforced by Anaxagoras's polysyndetic *kai*, which stresses connection but leaves its nature vague.[100] Ubiquitous but underdetermined, the relations between the things become open to interpretation and contestation. That is, they become political.

Thus a politics of horizontality that is, at most, obscurely adumbrated in Anaxagoras's cosmological theory is made fully manifest—*endēlotata*—in his paratactical style. Form pushes thought, enacting a new distribution of the sensible and opening new political possibilities. This reading of the politics of parataxis does not negate the reading that sees it as part of Nous's surveillance. In actuality, there is no way to decide between these two hermeneutic perspectives, between Nous's sovereign gaze and a formal community of equal things. How could one decide, for instance, whether Anaxagoras's substantivized adjectives represent the nomination and distribution of sovereign power/knowledge or the ontological leveling that bestows dignity on each individual thing? That undecidability is not a contingent feature of the theory, the result of its fragmentary condition or intellectual incoherence. Instead, it is a necessary entailment both of the openness of the form—the underdetermined nature of paratactic connections—and of the nature of *kratos*, which in the final reckoning is never self-positing and *autokrates*, for all it may claim to be, but is always the effect of political contest.

In Anaxagoras's cosmos, Nous wins that contest. Indeed, as we saw, he has always already won and *has* to have won, for his victory is the enabling condition

100. As a supremely general and generic copular conjunction, *kai* reinforces the openness of paratactical connections: see Trenker 1960, 30–60. Cf. Hayles 1990, 398: "Parataxis does not necessarily mean that there is no relation between the terms put into juxtaposition. Rather the relation, unspecified except for proximity, is polysemous and unstable."

of cosmology as a philosophical endeavor. But the competition decisively concluded in the physical theory carries on in the aesthetic form of the text. Anaxagoras's prose is a site of permanent struggle, where alternative visions of power play out without ever being decided. The style is thus political in the most active sense: it makes politics possible and is politics in action. Politics are aesthetic, a matter of visibility and invisibility, the disposition of elements in, under, or next to one another. Aesthetics are also political, as Rancière says: "The aesthetic experience—as a refiguration of the forms of visibility and intelligibility of artistic practice and reception—intervenes in the distribution of the sensible."[101] Anaxagoras's deceptively simple style gives us a vision of what is all but invisible in his cosmology. By making manifest a distribution of the sensible rendered imperceptible by Nous's *diakosmēsis* it preserves the possibility of an alternative politics that endures, obscurely, within that metaphysical sovereignty, for "just as in the beginning so too now all things are together" (B6/D25).

101. Rancière 2009b, 5; cf. 2009a, 25.