senses, and style not only has a politics but itself *is* a politics, part of a contest over the very principles of order and of the power, sovereign or otherwise, they sustain.

A COMMUNITY OF THINGS

The Ionian philosophers begin, as we said, with the search for an *arkhē*, the first principle of the cosmos: for Thales, it is water, for Anaximenes, air. Anaxagoras's *arkhē* is a collective, a collocation, a community. Fragment B1/D9 is the opening of his book:

> ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα ἦν, ἄπειρα καὶ πλῆθος καὶ σμικρότητα· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σμικρὸν ἄπειρον ἦν. καὶ πάντων ὁμοῦ ἐόντων οὐδὲν ἔνδηλον ἦν ὑπὸ σμικρότητος· πάντα γὰρ ἀήρ τε καὶ αἰθὴρ κατεῖχεν, ἀμφότερα ἄπειρα ἐόντα· ταῦτα γὰρ μέγιστα ἔνεστιν ἐν τοῖς σύμπασι καὶ πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει.
>
> All things were together (*homou*), unbounded both in amount and smallness, for the small, too, was unbounded. And since all things were together, nothing was manifest on account of smallness. For air and aether held down all things, both being unbounded, for these things are greatest among all things, both in amount and magnitude.

This original community is defined by a shared space (*homou*).[21] Like Anaximander, Anaxagoras imagines the cosmos as an infinite sphere, but its structure is importantly different from the political geometry traced by Vernant. For Vernant the spatial and political logic of the city is centralized and centripetal: power placed in the center is a virtual definition of the polis. But for Anaxagoras, the center is not a strong reference point. His cosmic motor is a vortex (the *perikhōrēsis*), so the order it eventually produces will be centrifugal; all the action happens at the periphery, and the diction of the *meson* is absent from the extant fragments.[22] For Anaximander *to apeiron* named both the singular ruling *arkhē* of the whole cosmos and the cosmic whole itself. In Vernant's reading, it is because *to apeiron* stands in the middle, equivalent to none of the individual elements, that they can be equal members of an egalitarian universe. But for Anaxagoras, *apeiron* is not an autonomous metaphysical governing principle but an immanent physical quality of the elements. If Anaxagoras uses the word in B1/D9 in allusion to Anaximander, he transfers its conceptual primacy from the whole to the parts, from the

21. Cf. B6/D25: "As in the beginning (*arkhēn*) so too now all things are together" (*einai kai nun panta homou*). Nancy (2000, 1–99), from whom the epigraph to this chapter is taken, conceptualizes being as a being-with-one-another or originary "co-ipseity" (44). See also Benjamin's (2010) interesting study of place, commonality, and being.

22. Earth and other heavy things are closer to the middle (B15/D30; cf. A1.28/≠LM, A42.2/D4.2, A88/≠LM) but only contingently, as a result of the physical force of rotation: see Curd 2007, 208.

cosmos to the things that constitute it, large and small alike, "for the small too was *apeiron*."[23] The things come first, and they are together and infinite.

So what are these things? In B1/D9, Anaxagoras calls them simply *khrēmata*. The word is prosaic, even plebeian. It is far from the ontological abstraction of Parmenides's *To Eon* or the technical specificity of Empedocles's *rhizōmata* or the atomists' *atoma*. An everyday Greek word for everyday things, *khrēmata* is material and mundane. If we hear the verb *khraomai* behind the noun, these humble *khrēmata* are functional, useful, perhaps even necessary things.[24] These "things" are the basic ingredients of Anaxagoras's universe. The first qualities we should notice about them are that they are plural and they are real.[25] The reiterated variations on "being together" (*homou panta khrēmata ēn*, B1/D9; *pantōn homou eontōn*, B4b/D12; *einai . . . panta homou*, B6/D25) lay equal stress on "being" and "together" and bind reality and plurality conceptually. This is in strong and probably pointed contrast to Parmenides, whose *To Eon*, as we saw in chapter 1, is insistently singular.[26] Like Parmenides's unitary Being, Anaxagoras's plural things have no birth or death (B17/D15): there is no time when they do not exist. No matter how small they may be they will never cease to exist (B3/D24), and there will never be more or fewer of them, but "they are all eternally equal" (*panta isa aei*, B5/D16). So Anaxagoras's things are ontologically basic: they are and cannot not be.

These *khrēmata* are the material basis of all the phenomenal *khrēmata* we use and need in ordinary life, again in marked contrast to Parmenides, for whom *To Eon* is rigorously segregated from the world of phenomena. The latter—also called *khrēmata* (B17/D15)—are for Anaxagoras compounds formed through *apokrisis*, a process of separation and combination driven by the vortex. Now, strictly speaking, this phenomenology could operate with a small number of initial elements, like Empedocles's four roots that compound through Love and Strife to produce all the objects in the world.[27] This makes it all the more noteworthy that Anaxagoras's

23. In B2/D10, the great surround (*periekhon*) of the cosmos is described as boundless (*apeiron*). Nous will also be *apeiron* at B12.1/D27. On the meaning of *apeiron* in Anaximander, see Kahn 1960, 231–39.

24. An eminently practical verb, *khraomai* can mean to need or desire; to borrow or lend; to use or experience. Virtually the first meaning of *khrēma* in the extensive LSJ entry is "a thing that one needs or uses." *Khrēmata* in classical Greek also means property or money. For the semantic range of the noun and interpretation of its sense (in relation to Protagoras B1/D9) see Van Berkel 2013, 39n6.

25. The forms of *einai* in B1/D9 are predicative, but see Kahn (1973) on the close connection between the predicative, existential, and veridical functions of the verb. The question of what exactly Anaxagoras includes among the primary elements is disputed, but I agree with Curd (2007, 153–77; cf. 1998, 131–41) that the *khrēmata* are not just the opposites (hot and cold, etc.) but all basic ingredients for future phenomena; contra, Marmodoro 2017, 11–43.

26. Curd (2007, 137–42; see also 1998, 131–54; 2002; 2008, 231–33; and Furley 1987, 61–78) sees Anaxagoras's theory of everything in everything as a means of reconciling Parmenides's theory of being with the empirically observed coming-to-be and passing-away of phenomena. Thus Graham (1999, 176) labels Anaxagoras an Eleatic pluralist; cf. Sisko 2003.

27. As Aristotle points out, *Cael.* 3.3 302a28–b5.

khrēmata are infinitely diverse and heterogeneous. Fragment B4a/D13 describes these "seeds of all things" as "many and all sorts" (*polla te kai pantoia*).[28] They have all sorts of forms or appearances (*ideas pantoias*), complexions or colors (*khroias*), and flavors or maybe even pleasures (*hēdonas*).[29] The things are diverse and have diverse perceptible forms; their world is rich and sensory, made up of all sorts of shapes, colors, and tastes. We get some examples of this diversity in B4b/D12: the wet and the dry, the hot and the cold, the bright and the dark. But these pairs are just exemplary. As the fragment goes on to say, the seeds are limitless (*apeirōn*) and in no way like one another (*ouden eoikotōn allēlois*). Anaxagoras repeats the point for emphasis: "For none of the other things was alike one to the other" (*oude gar tōn allōn ouden eoike to heteron tōi heterōi*).[30]

Aside from heterogeneity, the other quality these things seem to have in the beginning is size or number, but Anaxagoras is curiously casual about the distinction. In B1/D9 we are told that the *khrēmata* are boundless in *plēthos* and *smikrotēs*, and these two terms recur frequently throughout the fragments. But their precise measure is hard to reckon. *Plēthos*, which I have translated "amount," usually denotes a large number or multitude. In Anaxagoras, confusingly, the word seems at times to indicate a great number, at other times large mass or extent.[31] In the first sentence of B1/D9, coupled with *smikrotēs*, it could denote either magnitude (vs. smallness) or number (vs. size). The confusion is compounded by the ambiguity of

28. The relation between these *spermata* and the *khrēmata* is debated. Sider (2005, 94) identifies *kai spermata* in B4a/D13 as a *kai* of specification ("many and varied things, i.e. seeds"); cf. Vlastos 1950; and Schofield 1980, 121–33. Inwood (1986, 26) and Curd (2007, 171–77), by contrast, see *spermata* as a higher level of organization than the basic ingredients (cf. Raven 1954; Lanza 1966, 203–4; and Lewis 2000). Teodorsson (1982, 45–64) surveys views on the question; cf. Marmodoro 2017, 147–53. Diels-Kranz print B4, reconstructed from two related passages of Simplicius, as a single fragment, but most modern editors consider it to be two separate fragments, which I label 4a and 4b (= Laks-Most D13 and D12).

29. "Flavors" is a specialized meaning of *hēdonē* in the Ionian writers: LSJ s.v.; Diogenes B5/D10; cf. Arist. *Part. an.* 2.17 660b9; Theophr. *Hist. pl.* 4.4.7. *Pantoia* is emphasized through repetition in B4a/D13: it describes both the seeds themselves and their qualities. Later in the fragment it will also describe the *khrēmata* of our phenomenal world: "And the earth grows many and all sorts of things (*polla te kai pantoia*) for them, the most beneficial of which they gather into their houses and use (*khrōntai*)." Note the echo of *khrēmata* in *khrōntai*.

30. Cf. B12.27–28/D27: Nous is entirely the same (*pas homoios esti*) but nothing else is the same as anything else (*heteron de ouden estin homoion oudeni*). There is debate about how restrictively to understand the opposites (e.g. Schofield 1980, 107–21; Teodorsson 1982, 25–43; and Curd 2007, 153–71). I take them to be exemplary not exclusive.

31. Number seems implied in the reference to "seeds boundless in *plēthos*" (B4b/D12) and the "*plēthos* of things separated out" (B7/D23); size or extent, in B2/D10's description of the *periekhon* as "boundless in *plēthos*." In the final line of B1/D9, paired with *megethos* it would seem to mean number: "size" would make it pleonastic. In B6/D25 ("since the shares of the large and the small are equal [*isai*] in *plēthos*") it is uncertain whether we should take *plēthos* with "shares" (in which case it denotes number) or with "large and small" (in which case it suggests size). Every instance seems to me ambiguous. Inwood (1986, 32) comments, "This ambiguity of quantity terms . . . is an annoying feature of Anaxagoras's style." He understands *plēthos* as total amount, not countable number (23–27).

smikrotēs itself, which, as Aristotle already noted, seems to combine number (few) and size (small).[32] Patricia Curd proposes that Anaxagoras conflates the different measures and that *smikrotēs* and *plēthos* denote not absolute size or number, but a greater or lesser degree (respectively) of submergence of one thing in another. She and others accordingly imagine the things not as particulates of various sizes but as more like liquids that come in varying concentrations.[33] But this liquid model is hard to reconcile with the term *khrēma*, which usually names a discrete object, and Anaxagoras seems to imagine the *khrēmata* as discrete things, for example, at B12.28/D27: "No other thing is similar to anything else" (*heteron de ouden estin homoion oudeni*).[34] "None" (*ouden*) implies a "one" (*hen*) and suggests that the things are at least theoretically countable, even if Anaxagoras is unable—or unwilling—to count them.

Regardless of whether we view the things as liquids or particles, Curd seems right that large and small imply preponderance not absolute size. This means that these predicates are not essential differentiating qualities of the individual *khrēmata* but rather contingent effects of their interactions. Largeness indicates a higher degree of association of like elements; smallness, a lower degree. Largeness and smallness are thus relative terms. Anaxagoras says this expressly in B3/D24: there are no absolute degrees of largeness and smallness but "each thing is both large and small relative to itself" (*pros heauto de hekaston esti kai mega kai smikron*). This in turn suggests that while smallness and largeness form a binary, they do not form a hierarchy. Large and small are equal (*ison*, B3/D24, B6/D25) and both equally boundless.[35] The identity of the things is likewise relational and nonhierarchical. If, as we just saw, "no other thing is similar to anything else" (*heteron de ouden estin homoion oudeni*, B12.28/D27), each thing *is* a thing—a one—only in its relation of difference to each other thing. The things are both individual and

32. Arist. *Metaph.* 10.6 1056b28–30 (A60/≠LM): Anaxagoras "should have said paucity (*oligotēti*) instead of smallness (*mikrotēti*)." Further examples of Anaxagoras's bad math include the conflation of quality (*hopoia*) and quantity (*hosa*) at B12.17–19/D27, and the occasional substitution of "many" (*polla*) for "all" (*panta*) in the phrase "everything in everything," discussed below.

33. Curd 2007, 34, 178–91. For this "non-particulate view" see also Barnes 1982, 323–26; Inwood 1986; and Furley 1987, 67. Contra, Graham 1994, 101–12; and Sider 2005, 86–88. Schofield (1980, 68–79) considers both views and concludes that Anaxagoras may not have settled the question in his own mind.

34. *Khrēma* is used of goods or property, sacred objects, flocks, implements, and slaves. I can find no instance where it refers to a liquid. *Khrēmata* can of course occur *en masse:* in the plural the word can express "a great number or mass . . . a heap of" (LSJ II.3.b), but Anaxagoras does not use it in this way, and even as such it is still at least notionally countable.

35. Curd (2007, 40) believes this means that large and small are equally complex; cf. Lloyd 1970, 45; and Inwood 1986, 30–32. Porter (2016, 424) remarks that Anaxagoras's "mind-boggling calculus of infinite scales . . . nearly ruin[s] the coherence of 'scale.'"

equal in their difference from one another, their egalitarian diversity stressed by the polyptoton *ouden . . . oudeni*.[36]

If the qualities of the *khrēmata*, both their size/number and their heterogeneous identities, are fundamentally relational, they are meaningful only to the extent that the things exist all together: *homou panta khrēmata ēn* (B1/D9). What it actually means for all things to be together—the nature of this diverse community and the relations it entails—is explicated in B6/D25:

> καὶ ὅτε δὲ ἴσαι μοῖραί εἰσι τοῦ τε μεγάλου καὶ τοῦ σμικροῦ πλῆθος, καὶ οὕτως ἂν εἴη ἐν παντὶ πάντα· οὐδὲ χωρὶς ἔστιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάντα παντὸς μοῖραν μετέχει. ὅτε τοὐλάχιστον μὴ ἔστιν εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο χωρισθῆναι, οὐδ' ἂν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ὅπωσπερ ἀρχὴν εἶναι καὶ νῦν πάντα ὁμοῦ. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ πολλὰ ἔνεστι καὶ τῶν ἀποκρινομένων ἴσα πλῆθος ἐν τοῖς μείζοσί τε καὶ ἐλάσσοσι.
>
> And since the shares (*moirai*) of the large and the small are equal (*isai*) in amount, in this way too all things would be in everything; nor is it possible to be separate, but all things have a share (*moiran metekhei*) of everything. Since it is not possible that there exist a least thing, it could not be separated nor come to be by itself, but just as in the beginning so too now all things are together. And in all things there are many things even of the things being separated off, equal (*isa*) in amount both in the greater ones and in the lesser.

"Everything in everything" (*en panti panta*) is Anaxagoras's mantra. He repeats it numerous times in even the few fragments we have, sometimes confusingly substituting *polla* (many) for *panta* (all), although apparently with no difference in meaning (another instance of arithmetic imprecision). The phrase encapsulates Anaxagoras's physics as a whole. Because the elements are eternal—they do not come into being or pass away, nor increase or decrease—even after they have been separated out in the *apokrisis*, every single element still contains at least some bit of every other single element. Anaxagoras may have developed this bizarre theory to explain how, for example, a child grows bigger by eating bread: there must be some bone and muscle and blood already in the bread.[37] So every thing in Anaxagoras's universe, no matter how small, contains all other things within it; and every thing, no matter how big, is in all other things. There can be no autonomous or pure element, apart by itself—with one supreme exception to which we will return shortly.

36. Cf. B4b/D12, again with polyptoton: "Of the other things none is alike one to another" (*tōn allōn ouden eoike to heteron tōi heterōi*). *Heteron* implies a closed and equal difference: one of two (comparable) things.

37. "For how can hair come to be from what is not hair and flesh from what is not flesh?" (B10/D21; cf. A46/D3). The authenticity of the quotation has been questioned by Schofield (1980, 133–43), but it is accepted as genuine by Mansfeld (1982); Curd (2007, 53–54); and Macé (2011). The details of Anaxagoras's physics are vigorously debated. Articulations of the problems and various attempts to solve them can be found in Cornford 1930; Vlastos 1950; Raven 1954; Stokes 1971; Kerferd 1974; Strang 1975; Schofield 1980; Furth 1991; and Graham 1994.

This physical theory is articulated in B6/D25 in strikingly political language. *Metekhein* ("to have a part") is the verb used to express political belonging: to be a citizen is *metekhein tēs poleōs* or *metekhein tēs koinōnias*. In a democracy, Aristotle comments, "everyone has a share of everything" (*metekhousi pantes pantōn*).[38] *Moira* (share or portion) is a word associated with distribution and distributive justice: *isai moirai* occurs in Homer for the distribution of *timē* (*Il.* 9.318) and of meat shared at the feast as a symbol of relative rank (*Od.* 20.282, 294).[39] This idea of distributed portions conforms to Vernant's geometry of *to meson*, as common goods are shared out among members of the group defined *as* members by virtue of receiving a share. The power relations behind this centralized distribution are clear if one thinks of Zeus in the *Theogony*, who after coming to power allots to the gods their various *moirai* and *timai* (Hes. *Th.* 348, 413, 544, 789).

Anaxagoras's *isai moirai* operate within a different economy and imply a different "distribution of the sensible." For *isai moirai* here denotes not equal portions the elements receive but instead the portions they are for everything else or they contain of everything else in the complete intermixing of *en panti panta*. Anaxagoras's language of partition indicates not a centralized, hierarchical distribution but rather a horizontal, multidirectional, and reciprocal interconnection of all things with each other. The *khrēmata* are not connected as equal parts of a whole that they share in common, like the equal citizens in Vernant's egalitarian polis. Instead they are connected in a reciprocal relation of part and whole such that every part is a whole for another part and every whole a part of another whole.

We get a quintessential formulation in B11/D26: "There is a share of everything in everything" (*panti pantos moira enesti*). *Moira* belongs equally to both "everythings," part *in* the first and part *of* the second; it is both the share everything has and the share everything is. The two everythings—again bound by the equalizing trope of polyptoton—are reciprocal and inseparable such that, as fragment B8/D22 says, they "have not been separated from one another nor chopped off with an ax." Their bond is material, literal, and direct. It is not mediated by a common connection to some determinate totality: note that it is *pan* indefinite not *to pan*, the whole. In fact, it is not even clear there could be a whole, since every whole is also a part, with no upper limit (B3/D24).[40] If there is a whole, it is nothing more

38. Arist. *Pol.* 7.9 1328b32–33. Aristotle's simple definition of the citizen is *metekhein kriseōs kai arkhēs* (*Pol.* 3.1 1275a22–24). Anaxagoras's elements can claim a share of the latter but the former is the preserve of Nous. *Metekhein* is also, incidentally, the word Plato will use for the participation of phenomena in the Forms.

39. Cf. Solon 34.8–9: "nor good men hold an equal share (*isomoiriēn ekhein*) of the rich earth of their fatherland to the bad." Vlastos (1947) examines *isomoiria* in early Greek philosophy, but the term is more rare than he suggests. The closest parallels are in Empedocles's use of *meros* (B17.29/D73.260, B22.1/D101.1, B26.1–2/D77b1–2); cf. Her. B20/D118, B25/D122b; Ps-Arch. B47.25/≠LM.

40. The only place where Anaxagoras suggests otherwise is B4b/D12: one must imagine all things to be in (*eneinai*) the total collective (*tōi sumpanti*). But that whole is nothing more than the *panta* that constitute it, as is suggested by the recurrence of the word in B1/D9 in the plural (*tois sumpasi*). In B8/

than the sum of the unmediated, reciprocal, and horizontal relations among the parts. This is what it means for *panta khrēmata* to be together, *homou*; it is not a *having* in common (as in Vernant's model) but a *being* in common: *en panti panta*. Through his novel redeployment of the language of partition—*metekhein* and *moira*—Anaxagoras posits a unique *partage du sensible*. In this initial state of things Anaxagoras imagines a radically egalitarian distribution of being; it is a *partage* in which every part has a part, since no thing can exist apart.

But all is not perspicuous in this distribution of the perceptible. B1/D9 says, "since all things were together, nothing was *endēlon* (visible, clear, manifest) on account of smallness." B4b/D12 reiterates the point: "Before these things were separated off because all things were together not even any color was manifest (*endēlos*), for the mixture of all things was preventing it" (*apekōlue gar hē summixis pantōn khrēmatōn*). The *summixis* of all things makes it impossible to discern anything. The concentrations of any given thing are too small to allow the perception of discrete colors, forms, flavors, or identities. Each thing is unique, like no other thing (B4b/D12, B12.28/D27). But if each thing contains everything else within it, sameness and difference are meaningless and the defining alterity of *heteron* and *heteron* is lost. As Aristotle observed, everything in everything means there can be nothing, properly speaking, no discrete entity with its own unique visible identity.[41] That is to say, this distribution of the perceptible leaves one thing *im*perceptible: identity, individuality, self-sameness, what Derrida terms ipseity.

But without ipseity, as Derrida stresses, there can be no politics.[42] For Rancière, too, politics require ipseity. This is precisely what is at stake in the question—which for him is *the* political question—of *who counts*: who is identifiable and thus has an identity within the regime of the perceptible. This question cannot be asked in Anaxagoras's original state, where everything has a part but nothing, properly, counts. Conflating size and number, his *plēthos* is, as we saw, innumerable. This bad math takes on specific historical significance when we remember that one of the most common meanings of *plēthos* in Anaxagoras's day was "the people," that population whose political excellence (as Aristotle says) lies in their numbers.[43] Politics, Rancière posits, begins with a miscount of the part for the whole and the

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D22 Anaxagoras refers to "the one cosmos" (*en tōi heni kosmōi*). But *kosmoi* too are plural for him (B4a/D13), and the phrase perhaps differentiates our cosmos from the presumably infinite others.

41. Arist. *Metaph.* 4.4 1007b18–26: if everything is everything else (in contravention of the law of noncontradiction) then nothing is anything, "and we end up with the state Anaxagoras describes when he says that all things are together: the result is that nothing truly exists." Cf. Porter (2016, 425–26), who also connects this lack of identity to the impossibility of measurement.

42. Derrida (2005, 13) defines democracy as "the power and ipseity of the people (*dēmos*)." *Rogues* explores this paradox of a sovereign *kratos* at the heart of a regime defined by *différance*. On the tense relation between democracy and ipseity in Derrida's thought, see Brown 2009.

43. Arist. *Pol.* 3.15 1286a21–b3. In Herodotus and other contemporary authors, *plēthos* functions as a virtual synonym for *dēmos*. E.g. Hdt. 3.80.6: "the *plēthos* ruling holds the most beautiful name of all, *isonomia*."

demand of those who do not count to be taken into account.[44] But such a politically generative miscount is impossible in Anaxagoras's cosmology because the difference between many and all—between "many things in all things" (*en pasi de polla*, B6/D25; cf. B12.25/D27) and "everything in everything" (*en panti panta*, B6/D25)—is literally immeasurable.[45]

Without ipseity, then, the political possibilities implicit in Anaxagoras's initial state cannot be developed or, in his idiom, become manifest (*endēlon*). In B1/D9, for example, we hear that air and aether "held down (*kateikhen*) all things, both being unbounded, for these things are greatest (*megista*) among all things, both in amount (*plēthei*) and magnitude (*megethei*)." *Katekhein* can mean simply to cover or contain, but it can also connote domination or mastery, suggesting a proto-organization, even a proto-politics; in classical Greek the verb is used of a superior power seizing and occupying a domain.[46] But in the mixture of everything in everything, air and aether are only "semi-emergent," and their potential domination over the things remains unrealized.[47] Nor can the egalitarian potential of the relations between the things be realized, as I have suggested, for if "all things have a share of everything," then there can be no "part with no part" whose demand for inclusion initiates politics. If everything is both a part of and a whole for every other thing, there can be no representation (part for whole) or participation (part of a whole). Moreover, the *summixis* of everything in everything eliminates not just ipseity, but also alterity and with it the overt and contestable relations that are the basis of the polis. A being-*in* rather than being-*with*, the originary state of "all things together" remains a confused collocation, not a real political community. It is a virtual distribution of the perceptible, but one that cannot actually become manifest, *endēlon*.

NOUS AUTOKRATES

Everything changes with the arrival of Nous. Nous marks a rupture in the space-time of the cosmos and an exception to its fundamental laws. He inaugurates a new distribution of the sensible.[48] The key text is fragment B12/D27.

44. Rancière 1999, 6, 10. Rancière begins with Arist. *Pol.* 7.4 1326a, where the first question of political theory is the number and nature of the *plēthos*. On politics and/as enumeration, see further Derrida 1997, esp. 1–25, 101–2.

45. Rancière (1999, 10) takes a similar conflation of many and all—"for all things are in the many" (*en gar tōi pollōi eni ta panta*), Otanes's formula for democracy at Hdt. 3.80.6—as paradigmatic of "the fundamental miscount of politics."

46. E.g. Hdt. 5.15, 5.45, 5.72; Thuc. 4.2.4, 4.92.6, 4.110.1, 6.23.2; cf. Hdt. 5.91 for domination by a tyrant. At Thuc. 2.65.8 Pericles is said to have restrained (*kateikhe*) the majority (*plēthos*).

47. "Semi-emergent" is Curd's (2007, 35) description. Inwood (1986, 26–27) suggests that air and aether are only virtually present, in the sense that the elements to constitute them are present: cf. n. 70 below.

48. I refer to Nous as "he" because the noun is masculine and is defined (with a few exceptions discussed below) by masculine adjectives and relative pronouns. I capitalize the word to highlight Nous's