

violated by Nonbeing, wandering like *doxai*, it would be revealed as precisely *epideues*—lacking its own proper identity as *To Eon* and requiring a metaphor to make good that lack.

LIKE A WELL-ROUNDED SPHERE

The metaphor of Anankē's bonds, and indeed the Aletheia as a whole, reaches its limit in the simile of the sphere.

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πείρας πύματον, τετελεσμένον ἐστί
πάντοθεν, εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ,
μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντῃ· τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μείζον
οὔτε τι βαιότερον πελέναι χρεὸν ἐστί τῇ ἢ τῇ.
οὔτε γὰρ οὐκ ἔδν ἔστι, τό κεν παύοι μιν ἰκνεῖσθαι
εἰς ὁμόν, οὔτ' ἔδν ἔστιν ὅπως εἴη κεν ἔόντος
τῇ μᾶλλον τῇ δ' ἦσον, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἔστιν ἄσυλον·
οἱ γὰρ πάντοθεν ἴσον, ὁμῶς ἐν πείρασι κύρει. (B8.42–49/D8.47–54)

Moreover, since there is a furthest boundary,
it is perfected from all sides, like the bulk of a well-rounded sphere,
equal everywhere from its center. For it must be neither greater
nor smaller at all in this place or that.
For neither is there Nonbeing that could stop it from reaching
its like, nor is there any way that, being, it could be
more being here and less there, since as a whole it is inviolate.
For equal to itself from all sides, it reaches likewise to its boundaries.

Parmenides's Being gets its spherical shape from its metaphorical limits: it is in reaching for its furthest boundary (*peiras pumatōn*, 42/47) and maintaining itself inside its boundaries (*en peirasi kurei*, 49/54) that Is becomes perfect and spherical. With the repetition of *peiras*, the bounding metaphor neatly encircles the sphere, defining it “from all sides” (*pantōthen*, 43/48, 49/54).⁷¹ These *peirata* are strictly speaking unnecessary, since a sphere is a figure whose limits are intrinsic: they are not imposed from without but defined from within by a determinate relation to the center, as Parmenides emphasizes (*messōthen*, 44/49).⁷² In this sense, the sphere in and of itself is a geometric representation of the finite nature of *To Eon* and the fulfillment of Parmenides's dream of a bounded entity with no beyond. In

71. On the link between *peirar*, *telos*, and the circle, see Onians 1951, 426–66; Detienne and Vernant 1978, 279–326; Cassin 1998, 59; and Mourelatos 2008c, 31, 123–29. It makes little difference to my argument whether we understand the *sphaira* as a sphere (shape) or a ball (object), as it is taken, e.g., by Sedley (1999, 121); and Iribarren (2018, 142–53).

72. The *meson* renders Parmenides's sphere three-dimensional but is not otherwise a significant reference point: it is not a stop on the goddess's itinerary, much less its *telos*. One can circle around (*amphis*) Being, but never penetrate to its center.

pointedly encircling this self-delimiting sphere with the superfluous metaphor of limits, Parmenides demonstrates the point I argued in the last section: that this metaphor is not in fact superfluous nor peripheral to the project of defining Being. Instead, it constitutes the center, the *meson*, of Parmenides's ontology, the poetic core from which it radiates out until it reaches its furthest limit.

At that limit, Being itself becomes a metaphor, or more precisely, a simile. Simplicius tells us not to be surprised (*mē thaumasēs*) by this simile "because Parmenides is writing poetry, so he applies a sort of fictional invention (*muthikou tinos . . . plasmatos*)."⁷³ Nonetheless, it is surprising. Being has many predicates in the poem, but this is the only simile. Predicates are problematic enough, as we have seen: if you say that Being is one, you are saying it is two things, Being and one.⁷⁴ A simile magnifies and draws attention to this problem, and Parmenides's simile does so pointedly with the striking four-syllable epic adjective *enalinkion*. Describing through difference, similes overtly double the identity of the thing they describe. Parmenides's monism becomes a weird dualism, Being plus sphere. And this, moreover, in a passage that emphasizes Being's perfect homogeneity, its internal uniformity (*isopales*, 44/49; *ison*, 49/54) and self-sameness (*homon*, 47/52; *homōs*, 49/54), in short, its absolute identity. At the very moment that Being becomes fully and only itself, it is like something else.

The simile that doubles Being is itself doubled in the near-pleonastic adjective "well-rounded" (*eukuklou*). Calling the same object by two different names (*kuklos* and *sphairos*), the adjective evokes the polyonymy of the *Doxa*, to which Parmenides alludes a few lines earlier in speaking of the name (*onoma*) mortals give to phenomena "believing them to be true" (B8.38–39/D8.43–44). As a simile, the sphere belongs to the register of *doxa*, that "deceptive *kosmos* of words" (B8.52/D8.57). The simile thus insinuates *Doxa*'s false appearances into the realm of Being and makes those appearances a defining supplement to Being's wholeness. The weight of this doxic supplement can be felt in the noun *onkos* in line 43/48, "like the bulk (*onkōi*) of a well-rounded sphere." This superfluous dative maintains a distance between the immaterial *comparandum* and its bulky *comparans*. That bulk is itself surprising, since, as we have seen, Parmenides is capable of conceptualizing sphere as an abstract mathematical figure. He goes out of his way, then, to give it physical heft. Its physicality links the sphere of Being to the various spheres

73. Commentary on Arist. *Phys.* 146.29 (< A20/R5b). Bollack and Wismann (1974, 204) take the simile of the sphere as "the decisive moment" when Being accedes to representation. Cf. Iribarren (2018, 142–53), taking it as the pivot between ontology and cosmology.

74. We might respond that the predicate is just another version of Being, as Coxon (2009, 20–21) does, apparently unconcerned about what this polymorphism means for Being's identity. But even if we are satisfied with that solution, the simile flagrantly advertises the problem. Likewise, the simile troubles Mourelatos's (2008c, 57) notion of a "speculative *esti*" which conflates predication and identity such that "on the side of the predicate, the subject fully explains itself, and in terms of itself." Simile turns that self-explication into alterity.

of the phenomenal world, such as the “circuit of the circle-eyed moon” (*kuklōpos* . . . *periphoita selēnēs*, B10.4/D12.4) and the “garlands” (*stephanoi*) of fire and night and flame that make up the cosmos (B12/D14b, A37/D15). Scholars generally suppose that these repetitions make the mundane orbs doubles of the metaphysical sphere and signs (*sēmata*, B10.2/D12.2) of its deeper reality.⁷⁵ But if the “circle-eyed” moon replicates Being’s “well-rounded” sphere, the reverse also seems to be true, as the massy physicality of *onkos* suggests. Being, in its spherical perfection, is like the phenomenal orbits that are like it, a cycle of simile and similitude to which we will return momentarily.⁷⁶

Parmenides’s entire poetics is implicated in this tropic geometry. In the ring composition that encircles the simile of the sphere with the metaphor of the bounds (B8.42/D8.47, B8.49/D8.54) the poem formally reproduces its contents. That miniature ring is itself reproduced in the composition of the poem as a whole. The *Peri Phuseōs* moves around (*peri*) its subject in an annular pattern that belies the linear trajectory of its road metaphor. The road reaches its apparent *telos*—“as far as passion might reach” (*hikanoi*, B1.1/D4.1)—where Being reaches (*hikneisthai*, B8.46/D8.51) its limits in the sphere. “At this point I stop (*pauō*) my trustworthy *logos* and thought about truth” (*amphis alētheiēs*, B8.50–51/D8.55–56). The linear route is now revealed to be a circuit that loops around (*amphis*) the Aletheia.⁷⁷ It then continues on—the goddess’s *pauō* is in fact merely a pause—toward the Doxa: “From this point, learn mortal opinions, hearing the deceptive order of my words” (B8.51–52/D8.56–57). From there it will circle back, reaching its end in the return to its starting point, as the goddess expressly announces: “In common for me is the point from which I begin, for I will reach it once again hereafter” (*palin hixomai authis*, B5/D5).

This annular structure inscribes the poem’s ultimate wisdom in its opening images: return invests these cryptic symbols with the force of revelation, thereby turning them into allegories or metaphors. In the poem’s many prolepses, details take on greater resonance—or only make sense to begin with—in light of later truths. Thus the road on which the philosophical initiate sets out is said to “bear a man who knows” (*pherei eidota phōta*, B1.3/D4.3), an auspicious beginning

75. Mourelatos 2008c, 222–63; and Coxon 2009, 356. The ambiguous doubling of Being in phenomena is signaled by Parmenides’s description of the Doxa as a *diakosmon eikota* (B8.60/D8.65): *eikōs* evokes similarity but also speciousness. See Bryan 2012, 66–74; Johansen 2016; and (on *eikos*) the essays in Wohl 2014.

76. This explains the urgency of the debate over whether Parmenides imagined Being as “like a sphere” or as literally spherical. Scholars who argue against the latter (on the grounds that it makes the metaphysical physical) rarely acknowledge the risks of the former (which makes the metaphysical metaphorical). The question is closely linked to the question of whether Being’s spatial extent is to be understood as literal or metaphorical: see Tarán 1965, 150–60; Sedley 1999, 121; McKirahan 2008, 210–14; and n. 53 above.

77. Mourelatos 2008c, 191–93: all thought and language are “round about” (on account of, with reference to) reality; “mind revolves around, or pivots on, the real” (193).

that anticipates the journey's end in the final attainment of wisdom.⁷⁸ Several of these prolepses themselves take the form of a circle, like the "untrembling heart of well-rounded Truth" (*Alētheiēs eukukleos atremes ētor*, B1.29/D4.29), a phrase that anticipates both the untrembling wholeness of Is (*atremes*, B8.4/D8.9) and the "well-rounded sphere" to which it is ultimately likened (*eukuklou sphairēs*, B8.43/D.48).⁷⁹ Circles spiral around one another, as the circular images reiterate the poem's circular structure, which itself reiterates the sphere of Being.

This troping on turning is generally understood as an artful mimesis: as a *logos* "about truth" (*amphis alētheiēs*, B8.51/D8.56) the poem imitates the spherical form of its subject.⁸⁰ In this sense the poem enacts its own correspondence theory of language, in which reality is accessible to speech and true speech participates in reality. Through this mimetic artistry, the poem seems to redeem both the "back-turning path" (*palintropos keleuthos*, B6.9/D7.9) of deluded human *doxai* and the deceptive language that describes them. This is how Mourelatos understands the many "similarities-with-a-difference" between the Aletheia and the Doxa. In the latter's verbal equivocations mortals "cannot help feeling the presence of the εὖν [*eon*]: as a goal, as an intention, as an implicit commitment, as a half-forgotten memory of the ancient covenant with reality."⁸¹ We indiscriminate mortals wander around in circles (*palintropos*). But if we can discern the true meaning behind the ironic ambiguities of the goddess's speech, we will intuit the true unity of Being behind the multifarious phenomena and recognize the singular sphere behind the revolutions of the "circle-eyed" moon. The poem's own annular form thus seems to align the mundane circles of mortal existence with the totality of Being in a metaphysical harmony of the spheres. At the same time, it redeems poetic language as both the medium and one element of that harmony. For a man who knows/has seen (*eidota phōta*), the lush poeticism that describes the moon

78. *Eidota phōta* may carry initiatory overtones which contribute to the prolepsis: the initiate has already attained the light that is often the *telos* of initiation (*eis phaos*, B1.10/D4.10) and is passing it on (hence the present tenses in the verbs of the first lines: Sider forthcoming, ad loc). The initiatory structure of the poem is stressed by Tor 2017, 267–73; Kingsley 1999, 80–85, 2002, 369–81; and Ranzato 2015, 57–123. See also Derrida (1982b, 257) on revelation as metaphor's "twisting return toward the already-there of a meaning."

79. *Eukukleos* is the reading of Simplicius, followed by Diels-Kranz (see Diels 2003, 55–56) and defended by Mansfeld 1995, 232; Bollack 2006, 99–100; Couloubaritis 2008, 363, 370–76; Palmer 2009, 90, 378–80; Ranzato 2015, 114–18; and Sider forthcoming, ad loc. Plutarch's reading *eupitheos* (*Adv. Col.* 114D) is adopted by Gallop 1984; Coxon 2009; and Laks-Most, and defended by Jameson 1958; and Mourelatos 2008c, 154–57. Other prolepses include the "double circles" (*kuklois*) of wheels, whirling on both sides (*amphoterōthen*, B1.8/D4.8) of the chariot, the wise (*poluphrastoi*, B1.4/D4.4) horses, the presence of *themis* and *dikē* (B1.14/D4.14, B1.28/D4.28) and of *pistis alēthēs* (B1.29–30/D4.29–30), and the lintel and threshold that surround (*amphis ekhei*) the gates of Night and Day (B1.12/D4.12). In B1.3/D4.3, *asinē* (unharméd) has been conjectured (in lieu of *astē*) in anticipation of the inviolate (*asulon*) sphere at B8.48/D8.53.

80. Starting with Diels 2003, 56; and Reinhardt 1959, 60. See further Ballew 1979, 45–50.

81. Mourelatos 2008c, 226.

as a “night-shining alien light (*allotrion phōs*) wandering around (*peri*) the earth” (B14/D27) is no mere “deceptive ornament of words” but a lucent vision of the true effulgence of Being.⁸²

And yet that harmony immediately introduces a new discord, for the artful reduplication of the sphere sets the poem's mimetic form against its monadic content. The singular totality of Is is doubled in its likeness to a sphere, as we have seen, which is then doubled again in the spherical *logos* that describes it and again in the spherical poem that expounds that *logos*. This mimetic proliferation opens the door to all the problems Plato sought to solve with his theory of the Forms (a theory built on the back of Parmenides). Plato's ontology of the Forms dictates a unidirectional relationship between the original Form and its phenomenal copy. When Mourelatos speaks of the latent presence of *To Eon* within *doxa* “as a goal, as an intention,” he presupposes the same single directionality: the philosophical journey moves from ambiguous phenomena to the univocal truth of the meta-physical.⁸³ In this way Mourelatos reconciles the geometry of the road and the circle by imagining the route as a return to a forgotten truth, a philosophical *nostos*.⁸⁴ But Odysseus, we should remember, gets only one night back in his own bed before setting off again. Circles are by their nature nonteleological: they go round and round without end, and the relations they plot are necessarily reciprocal. Thus if the moon is like the sphere, the sphere is also like the moon, and we cannot read the poem as a mimesis of Being without also entertaining the reverse possibility: that Being is a mimesis of the poem, produced in its own spherical image.

The poem's annular form thus debars us from reading it as a unidirectional ascent from ignorance to enlightenment, or *doxa* to truth, for all that the metaphorical path may encourage us to do so. The ambiguities of the proem anticipate the revelations of Aletheia but also preview the duplicities of Doxa: the goddess's *logos*, as she says, comes full circle, ending where it began, in the human world.⁸⁵

82. Mourelatos (2008c, 224–25) takes this fragment as the starting point for his exegesis of the ambiguities of the Doxa. Cf. B15/D28, which describes the moon “always looking toward the rays of the sun.” “White Mythology” concludes with a discussion of heliotropism as a trope of metaphor's return to proper meaning (Derrida 1982b, 245–71).

83. Mourelatos 2008c, 226. The route is, as he says, “definitely one-way” (18). This unidirectional relation imbues our false opinions with a hidden substrate of truth, but does not trouble truth with the equivocations of *doxa*. Compare Johansen (2016), who argues that Parmenides relates the phenomenal world to Being as likeness to model in a way that anticipates Plato's *Timaeus*.

84. This return is predicated on his argument that Parmenides understands “an implicit quasi-subconscious ‘ontological commitment’” of thought to truth (Mourelatos 2008c, 180). On Parmenides's route as a *nostos*, see also Robbiano (2006, 133–45), for whom its circular movement ultimately comes to rest in the traveler's unity with immobile Being.

85. Thus the “circles” of the chariot wheels (*kuklois*, B1.8/D4.8) anticipate both the Aletheia's “well-rounded” sphere (*eukuklou*, B8.43/D8.48) and the Doxa's “circle-eyed” moon (*kuklōpos*, B10.4/D12.4); Dike's surrounding lintel (*amphis ekhei*, B1.12/D4.12) prefigures both Necessity's hold on Being (*amphis eergei*, B8.31/D8.36) and the surrounding heavens of the cosmology (*amphis ekhonta*, B10.5/D12.5). Even the *eidōs phōs* prefigures the appearances of Doxa (as Cosgrove 2011 argues) as well as the

In the endless circuit that takes the philosopher from *doxa* to *alētheia* and back again, no *Aufhebung* is irreversible. This means that the poetic language of *doxa* can never be transcended once and for all. It may serve as a metaphorical ladder that helps the philosopher ascend to the sublime reality of Is, but since that ascent is never final, the ladder can never be kicked away. The *eidōs phōs* will be needing it again and again.

Moreover, if the philosophical route is an interminable loop, then every retreading of the path will encounter the same temptations to detour and errancy. The goddess says she will come back (*palin*) to where she began (B5/D5). But the point to which she returns is not identical to the one from which she started, a fact revealed by the very prolepses that instantiate the poem's circularity, as the poem's enigmatic symbols take on distinctly new meanings the second time around. Repetition introduces difference, and the same path repeated is a potentially different path.⁸⁶ Maybe this time the *eidōs phōs* will head off in another direction, not up into the sunlight of truth (*eis phaos*, B1.10/D4.10) but toward the "alien light" (*allotrion phōs*, B14/D27) of *doxa*. Maybe he will wander off the path altogether into that pathless expanse of Is Not. Maybe a detour will become the destination, this time with no return, and instead of a *logos* about (*amphis*) truth we will get a *logos* apart from (*amphis*) truth. These possibilities turn the goddess's circular (*palin*, B5.2/D5.2) road of inquiry into a *palintropos keleuthos* in all the senses of *palin*: backwards, again, contrary.⁸⁷

Derrida's "White Mythology" concludes with a discussion of philosophy's determination to return metaphor to univocal meaning. Metaphor as "the wandering of the semantic" — "the moment of the detour in which the truth might still be lost" — is brought home in a "circular reappropriation of literal, proper meaning."⁸⁸ But Parmenides's return refuses such reappropriation. The repetition built into its structure means that the poem's circle, unlike the metaphysical sphere, never fully closes. Its end and beginning may be "in common" (*xunon*, B5.1/D5.1), as the goddess says, but it lacks the hermetic cohesion (*sunekhes*, B8.6/D8.11) of

enlightenment of Aletheia. Deichgräber (1958) stresses the close link between the proem and both the Aletheia and the Doxa.

86. See Deleuze (1994), especially his comments (à propos of Nietzsche's eternal return) about the circle of difference (65–69, 156).

87. Parmenides's *palintropos keleuthos* (B6.9/D7.9) may evoke the *palintropos harmoniē* of Her. B51/D49 (if that reading is correct) and the goddess's return to a common (*xunon*) starting point in B5/D5 recall the common (*xunon*) beginning and end of the circle in Her. B103/D54. I agree with Graham (2002) (cf. 2006, 131–40), against Mansfeld (1964, 1–41) and Stokes (1971, 109–27), that the parallels are too strong to be coincidental. Indeed, there is something symptomatic about them, as if Parmenides needed to reach beyond himself in order to square the circle of his text, opening the circuit even as he closes it. See further Tarán 1965, 69–72; Nehamas 2002; and Bollack 2006, 134–36. The theory of Reinhardt (1959, 155–230) that Heraclitus followed Parmenides chronologically has been rejected by recent scholars (a notable exception being Hölscher [1968, 161–69]).

88. Derrida 1982b, 241, 270. Cf. 271 on the operation of metaphor as the opening of a circle.

Being. We saw in the first section how, under the goddess's command, the "road of inquiry" narrows from the branching *hodos poluphēmos* to a single word: Is. But Parmenides's poem contains within its ambit not only the road of "Is" but also all those forbidden detours glimpsed along the way. The road to Doxa is a false direction that the goddess exhorts the initiate to avoid (B6.3–5/D7.3–5). Yet, although "there is no true credence" in the *doxai* of mortals, she tells the *kouros*, "nonetheless you will learn these things too" (B1.30–31/D4.30–31).⁸⁹ Indeed, her account of the "deceptive order" of the Doxa originally filled some 300 lines.⁹⁰ Why Parmenides included this extended treatment of a topic he labels false and fraudulent is one of the most debated questions in Parmenides scholarship and with good reason: the contradiction seems to render the goddess's *logos*—if not Parmenides's very thought—incoherent.⁹¹

But perhaps this is precisely the point. Being is a closed circle, singular, unitary, and homogeneous, sealed within its autotelic bounds. But *logos* is unbounded. It speaks of the false as well as the true, deluded *doxa* as well as *alētheia*. It even speaks the unspeakable Is Not, conjuring its impossible presence again and again and inviting us to think its unthinkability. Encompassing not just the true path to Being but also the forbidden detours to Doxa and Nonbeing, the goddess's *logos* encircles (*amphis*) Being but is larger than it. And the poetic account is larger than her *logos*. This is easy to forget, since the first-person narrator who opens the poem soon becomes the goddess's silent interlocutor, his poetic persona replaced by her strong didactic voice. But the insistence of the first-person perspective at the start of the poem (and the continual reminder of it in the goddess's direct address), as well as the complex framing of the goddess's speech in the proem, indicates the difference between her *logos* and the *kouros*'s narrative and alerts us that the latter exceeds the former. The poem, moreover, exceeds both. Parmenides, probably reciting his verses to a large audience at a public festival, is not identical to the young initiate, although the first-person

89. The paradox that the goddess takes the route that she bars is encapsulated in the textual crux of B6.3/D7.3, where (depending on the supplement one accepts) she either "begins" (*arxō*) from the road of Doxa, after the road to Truth, or "bars" (*eirgō*) the road of Doxa, after the road to Nonbeing; see Cordero 1979, 2004, 108–24. Parmenides's equivocal treatment of the way of Doxa makes the textual debate undecidable.

90. Diels (2003, 25–26) believes the extant fragments represent 90 percent of the original Aletheia and 10 percent of the Doxa. That would mean that the Doxa was originally some 300 lines, twice as long as the Aletheia.

91. Nietzsche's biographical thesis, that Parmenides turned from *doxa* to *alētheia* as the result of a midlife conversion experience but never lost his "paternal good-will toward the sturdy and well-made child of his youth" (Nietzsche 1962, 70), registers the severity of the split. Among the seminal contributions to the debate are Owen (1960), for whom the cosmology serves a dialectical purpose as a case study in self-deception (similarly Long 1975) and Mackenzie (1982), who proposes that the contradiction deliberately renders the Aletheia self-refuting. Tor (2017, 163–221) offers a good recent presentation of the problem and an attempt to solve it; see also Curd 1992; Rosetti 2010; and Bryan 2018.

voice may invite us to mistake the one for the other.⁹² The goddess's speech surrounds Being, the *kouros*'s account surrounds her speech, and the poem itself surrounds them both in a series of concentric circles.

Parmenides presents Being as all, a totality with no outside. But in fact, it is his poem that is all, that contains not only the totality (*pan*) of Being but all the things (*panta*) of the phenomenal world, not only the determinate sphere of Is but the unbounded, infinite expanse of Is Not.⁹³ Parmenides wants to sublimate *logos*, to purify it so that it disappears in the dazzling presence of *Esti*. But he also wants his *logos* to exceed *To Eon* so as to encompass it and contain it as one (but only one) of its objects. These competing desires express a paradox built into the very project of ontology. Encircling both desires at once, Parmenides's poem binds *logos* and being, metaphor and metaphysics, in the aporetic geometry of a Möbius strip, each simultaneously inside and outside the other, passing into the other, separate but inseparably implicated in an endlessly twisting loop that can never be unwound into a singular closed circle. Following the impossible path of this figure, this chapter has circled around the central aporia of ontology itself, showing that from the very start the question of *to on* has always been a question of *logos*, defined—to the extent that it can be—by the wandering route of metaphor.

92. This is true even if, with Mansfeld (1964, 222–73), Kingsley (1999, 2003, 9–306), Robbiano (2006, 22–23), and Gemelli Marciano (2008), we imagine Parmenides as recounting his own mystical experience. Morgan (2000, 74) remarks on the “uneasy tension” between Parmenides as author, the *kouros* as narrator, and the goddess. On the performance context of Parmenides's poem, see Mackenzie 2021a, 67.

93. In the singular, *pan* is a predicate of Being in its totality (B8.5/D8.10, B8.22/D8.27, B8.24–25/D8.29–30); in the plural it belongs to *doxa* (B1.32/D4.32, B6.9/D7.9, B8.38/D8.43, B8.60/D8.65, B10.1/D12.1, B12.3–4/D14b.3–4, B13/D16, B16.4/D51.4). The poem's compass is broadened to infinity if we suppose, following Mourelatos, that Parmenides conceived of Nonbeing not as nonexistent but as indefinite, “that wholly unencompassable space of indeterminacy that lies outside the thing” (2008a, 347–48; cf. 2008c, 74–93; and Bollack 2006, 106–13).