PREFACE

"IF Russia comes to liberate, she will be received with great sympathy; but if she comes to rule, she will find many enemies," wrote Liuben Karavelov, one of Bulgaria's most distinguished authors, in 1870. His words were a clear expression of the most important single rule which determined the relations of the Balkan peoples to the Russian government in the seven years after the Congress of Berlin.

The purpose of this study is to examine to what extent this principle was followed, and how Russian policy, based primarily on considerations of Russian interests as a European great power, came into intense conflict with Bulgarian nationalism, but, in contrast, won the sympathy of the Serbian people, who deeply resented the domination of Austria-Hungary. The emphasis will be placed chiefly on the relations of Russia with Bulgaria and Serbia; no attempt will be made to cover in detail the general European aspects of the events described.

In this study of Russo-Bulgarian and Russo-Serbian relations, the reader will perhaps be struck by the similarity of the events of the 'eighties to those of the decade after the Second World War. A note of caution must be sounded, however, for the two periods can be compared only superficially. In the years covered by this study, the question of Bulgaria and the Straits was one of the problems which dominated Russian diplomacy. Although Russia engaged in controversies with Britain over the central Asian territories and with China over Kuldja, these issues were regarded as being of lesser importance than Bulgaria and the Straits. In their relations with the Bulgarian people, the Russian officials were dealing with a nation of primary political significance, an autonomous state which enjoyed considerable freedom of action in international affairs, which Bulgaria does not have today. Despite the fact that Bulgaria was recognized at the Congress of Berlin as falling within the Russian sphere of influence, the Bulgarian leaders, as events were to prove, retained the means of blocking Russian domination. Unlike the situation today, when the Soviet Union stands as the only great military power in the area, the tsarist government was faced with the constant and formidable opposition of Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, and Germany. Moreover, Russian policy after the Congress of Berlin was strictly defensive. In any controversy with Russia the Bulgarian statesmen could expect positive support from Russia's opponents; consequently the Russian government always had to take into consideration the possible actions of other powers. Serbia at this time was under Austro-Hungarian, not Russian, domination.

At present, in contrast, Bulgaria as a nation has been relegated to a

viii Preface

position of minor importance, a satellite state in an area controlled by the Communist party. No great power has taken the place of the dismembered Dual Monarchy or the defeated German Empire on whom the small Balkan and central European states could depend as an effective balance against Russia. In a sense Jugoslavia is now in the position occupied by Bulgaria in the 'eighties, but the similarities are again more apparent than real.

Comparisons can be drawn between the present and the past on the role of ideology in the relations between the states. In her associations with the Balkan Slavs in the nineteenth century. Russia used the principles of Orthodoxy, conservatism, and Slavic brotherhood, and in the twentieth century communism and Slavic kinship, but the practical effects were totally different in the two periods. In 1878-1879, after the liberation of Bulgaria from Ottoman control. Russia did not attempt to impose upon the nation a system of government in conformity with that in St. Petersburg. In fact, the Bulgarian constitution drafted by Russian officials and subsequently sponsored by the Russian government not only established the form of government preferred by the Bulgarian people themselves but also granted constitutional rights to the Bulgars which Russia denied to her own citizens. Moreover, although the offices of the Orthodox church were used where possible to influence opinions, and the close racial and linguistic bonds between Russia and Bulgaria were exploited to the maximum, nothing in the nature of a modern propaganda campaign was organized or envisaged.

A study of the relations between Russia, Bulgaria, and Serbia in the nineteenth century demonstrates the great changes that have occurred in international relations since the First World War. In the last century the Balkans, the proverbial powder keg of Europe, were used as the classic illustration of an area dominated by anarchism, intrigue, political assassination, revolution, and warfare. The period of the 'eighties was certainly one of the most eventful in the history of that peninsula, vet the only war, the Serbo-Bulgarian, lasted two weeks and resulted in few casualties. And the great "atrocity" of the decade, the abduction of the prince of Bulgaria, Alexander of Battenberg, in retrospect reads like an incident in a light opera. Perhaps, then, the only valid generalization that can be made is that, although on the surface the declarations and actions of individuals of today and those of the 'eighties may appear to follow a roughly similar course, in recent years there has been an intensification of the latent aspects of the earlier era—the use of terror. of subversion, of naked force, and of despotic rule.

As the Bulgarian government turned away from Russia, it looked increasingly for advice and guidance to Russia's adversaries, Austria-

Preface ix

Hungary and Great Britain. Hence the Russian demands and the Bulgarian reaction received full coverage in the diplomatic reports. In Serbia, King Milan was often more frank in imparting his views to the Habsburg representatives than to his own ministers. The British and Austrian archives contain numerous accounts based on the conversations of N. K. Giers, Russian foreign minister from 1882 to 1895, who was remarkably candid in expressing his views. Both the British and Austrian representatives trusted and admired him, although they feared that his moderate and peaceful advice would not always prevail with the tsar.

This work is based mainly on unpublished material from Great Britain and Austria. The political dispatches from the British foreign office found in the Public Record Office and the similar sources in the Austrian Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv were excellent for the specific events discussed.

The great difficulty in preparing a study of Russian foreign policy is, of course, the scarcity of Russian documentary materials. The author was fortunate, however, in having access to the correspondence of Giers. Although the collection is incomplete, certain sections proved especially valuable for the subject under consideration. Of foremost importance was the correspondence with A. P. Davydov, A. G. Jomini, A. E. Vlangali, and I. A. Zinoviev.

Of the published material on the subject, C. E. Black's authoritative work, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria, has been used for the political background. E. C. Corti's biography of Alexander of Battenberg, based on the prince's correspondence, was the chief source for the views of the young ruler. Anyone who has used Slobodan Jovanović's monumental studies on Serbian history will appreciate the debt owed to him by any writer in the field. Simeon Radev's two volumes covering the formation of the Bulgarian state are an indispensable source for the internal history of Bulgaria. S. Skazkin's work on the Dreikaiserbund remains the best study of that subject and of Russo-Bulgarian relations to 1883. The author's debt to these five writers is reflected throughout the following pages. Mention should also be made of the recently published four-volume diary of D. A. Miliutin, and the work of I. V. Koz'menko on the Bulgarian constitution.

In the transliteration of Slavic names the Library of Congress system has been used, with certain exceptions. Where a name is familiar to the English reader in another spelling or under a different system of transliteration, that form has been adopted: Bulgariia (not B"lgariia), Tyrnovo (not T"rnovo), Ignatiev (not Ignat'ev), Kaulbars (not Kaul'bars). For those in the Russian service with non-Russian names,

the form familiar in the West and that found in the majority of the diplomatic dispatches has been used: Giers (not Girs), Jomini (not Zhomini), and so on. Specific dates are cited according to both the Julian and Gregorian calendars, a difference of twelve days in the nineteenth century. The dates in the footnotes are those found in the source. To save space in the footnotes, St. Petersburg is abbreviated (St. P.).

The manuscript was completed and submitted in January, 1956: published material which has become available after this date has not been incorporated in the text.

It is a pleasure to be able to acknowledge the generous help I have received in the preparation of this book. My first obligation is to the late Professor Robert J. Kerner, who gave me constant encouragement, advice, and guidance throughout my research. I have profited from my discussions on diplomatic history with Professor Raymond J. Sontag. My other colleagues, Professors Oleg A. Maslenikov, C. Bickford O'Brien, and Nicholas V. Riasanovsky read the entire manuscript and offered very detailed criticisms and suggestions, all of which were most helpful. I benefited from the general comments of Professors Walter Galenson and Julian Towster. Professor Myron F. Brightfield gave me professional advice and criticism in the writing of the work. None of these individuals, of course, is responsible for the presentation and conclusions, which are my own.

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Only I can appreciate fully the contributions which my wife made in every phase of the preparation of this work. Therefore, the dedication is a token gesture for all that she has done and meant.