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Abstentions in the German Bundesrat and ternary decision rules in weighted voting systems

  • Olga Birkmeier , Andreas Käufl and Friedrich Pukelsheim
Published/Copyright: March 3, 2011
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Abstract

Ternary decision rules allowing for abstentions,besides Yea- and Nay-votes, are analyzed. The German Bundesrat serves as a prime example. We show that the decision-making efficiency of the Bundesrat would increase if abstentions were allowed. A general formula for the mean success margin of a ternary decision rule is derived assuming selfdual and permutationally invariant distributions. The ternary Penrose–Banzhaf model is discussed in detail, and the influence probabilities of voters and a rule´s influence sensitivity are evaluated.


* Correspondence address: University of Augsburg, Institute of Mathematics, 86135 Augsburg, Deutschland,

Published Online: 2011-03-03
Published in Print: 2011-03

© by Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, Augsburg, Germany

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