

# Dokument I

## Pollock an Brown<sup>1</sup>

Berlin, Aug. 7, 1945

Dear Everett<sup>2</sup> and Colleagues –

*I have at last been able to find time to write you a brief note. Time has passed so quickly that I can scarcely realize I've been away from the U.S. nearly a month. My flight to Paris was quite perfect and took only 23 hours with stops at Newfoundland and the Azores. I could have gone by way of Britain but the Paris route was faster and got me to Frankfurt quicker. My two days in Paris were pleasant although without taxis or busses one is dependent on military transport. Between the Embassy and the Army I managed to crowd a lot into a short time. I met many people I knew including Lovell who was getting ready to go to Warsaw.*

*My arrival in Frankfurt was timely for in another week the movement of the Control staff to Berlin began. I was received with every courtesy. General Milburn, who is General Clay's Chief of Staff sent his aide with me to see that I got a good billet. I was taken to the Chief Forester's Lodge in the woods near Hofheim about 7 miles from Hoechst, the suburb of Frankfurt in which the US Group Control Council had its headquarters. Hence I had every comfort in a spacious modern lodge with maid service. The week in Frankfurt was devoted largely to orientation in policies and problems of the American zone. I had two trips, one to Wiesbaden and Mannheim, the other to Heidelberg and Darmstadt. The extensive destruction I was prepared for, but my powers of description are inadequate to give you an adequate picture. Heidelberg alone remains as it was except for the bridges. Darmstadt and Mannheim and Frankfurt are almost useless. I one time spent two weeks in Frankfurt and knew the city well. I drove around for a whole hour one day trying to find a single landmark which would help me to locate certain spots. The huge I.G. Farben buildings in Frankfurt and in Hoechst were conspicuous exceptions – completely untouched. Hence the Americans staffs were well provided with modern offices.*

<sup>1</sup> Dieses Schreiben ist dem Occupation Diary, Teil I beigegefügt, Pollock Papers, Mich. Hist. Coll. 58–11, 12 (IfZ, Bd. 2).

<sup>2</sup> Everett S. Brown, Professor, Chairman of the Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

*Ambassador Murphy and General Clay having gone to Berlin for the Conference,<sup>3</sup> I found myself in the midst of what might be called a jurisdictional dispute over my humble services. It seems that both the Army and the State Department had asked for me and with the two principals in Berlin, their subordinates didn't want me to be permanently assigned. That suited me and now that I have seen Murphy and Clay I have a broad assignment in planning for the reconstruction of German government along democratic lines. Every facility and courtesy have been extended to me. I couldn't ask for more.*

*After a week in Frankfurt I was sent up here with the first echelon of staff people. Landing at Tempelhof I was met and driven to the headquarters in Dahlem. Berlin is indescribable – nearly 80 % destroyed. Our area which is the best residential section is damaged but only about 20 % destroyed. I was put up at Harnack House which used to be the club for the whole Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft. Later I was assigned to a rather beautiful modern residence – incidentally just across the street from Himmler's former house.*

*The Ambassador called me out to Babelsberg where the Conference staffs were housed. He asked me to remain for lunch with Sir William Strang, Will Clayton, Pauley and others. I returned several other times for consultation while the Conference was on, got a glimpse of the President<sup>4</sup> and Stalin, and enjoyed the opportunity of seeing how a great international conference was run. The actual sessions of the Big Three were held in the Crown Prince's former residence at Cecilienhof in Potsdam a few miles away.*

*A week ago Monday the Central Control Council held its first real business meeting here at our headquarters. It was really quite an historic occasion. I saw Eisenhower, Shukov, Monty and Koenig. The next meeting is Friday and I am busily at work passing upon several proposals which General Clay plans to present. More anon. I have already come to grips with several basic governmental problems involving both top planning and operations. I'm happy I arrived in time to have a part in some of these early basic decisions. I disclaim any responsibility for the zones which I don't like! There are other earlier policy directives which I disapprove, but I think the Berlin Declaration<sup>5</sup> will straighten many of them out. I hope you liked the procedure outlined in it for the eventual re-establishment of self-government. I'm now engaged in implementing the policy and procedure – a big order.*

*The end of the week the General is sending me out on a three weeks tour of the entire American zone. I shall then be able to see Arthur<sup>6</sup> in Munich. I tried to call him from Frankfurt but the connections were not good. Some-*

<sup>3</sup> Zur Potsdamer Konferenz siehe S. 51, Anm. 3.

<sup>4</sup> Harry S. Truman.

<sup>5</sup> Siehe S. 61 Anm. 6.

<sup>6</sup> Arthur W. Bromage.

*one in Hoechst said that Red<sup>7</sup> was coming to work in Economics but he hasn't shown up here. My only complaint is that I haven't been able to have enough good German wine, but may be this situation will improve. I've met many officers I know and I'm gradually getting used to wearing a uniform again and following army routine. Fortunately I'm in a special category with high assimilated rank and free in my activities.*

*I've certainly started on a perfectly fascinating experience and I only hope my dear family will get along without difficulty while I'm away from them. I know the Department will get along fine. Let me hear the news. I'm always interested to know what's going on.*

*In case Agnes<sup>8</sup> hasn't given you my address, here it is: Political Division, Hq. US Group CC (Germany), APO 742, Postmaster, New York. My cable address is Amseta. Always specify a cable to be sent via RCA – it comes faster.*

*Kind regards to all,  
Jim*

*[P.S.] Sir William Strang related this story to me. Churchill at one of the big dinners offered a toast to Attlee as follows: "To the Leader of the Opposition – whoever he may be!" This was of course before the election results were announced. Did he have a premonition?*

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<sup>7</sup> Harlow J. Heneman.

<sup>8</sup> Mrs. Pollock.

## Dokument II

### Paper on Länderrat<sup>9</sup> Regional Government Coordinating Office

Stuttgart, 19 February 1946

#### THE LÄNDERRAT

The Länderrat, or Council of States, located at Stuttgart, is the coordinating agency for all matters of German administration affecting more than one Land within the U.S. Zone. Established in October 1945, and at that time called the Council of Minister-Presidents it was designed to fill the need resulting from the lack of a central German administration. Subject to the approval of Military Government, the decision of the Länderrat is final as to all matters within its jurisdiction. It is essentially a coordinating agency and not a zonal government. The action necessary to effectuate the policies agreed to in the Länderrat is taken by the Ministers in the several Länder.

The Länderrat is composed of the Minister-President of Bavaria, Greater Hesse, Württemberg-Baden, and the Mayor of Bremen. The latter, however, has no vote except when the interests of his area are concerned. Stationed at Stuttgart is a permanent representative of each of the three Minister-Presidents. Stated meetings of the Länderrat are held the first Tuesday in each month. During the interval between meetings, the permanent representatives possess ad interim authority to act on matters which can not be postponed. Such action is taken following consultation between the permanent representatives and their respective Minister-Presidents, and the action when taken must be confirmed by the Länderrat, at its next meeting.

The Secretariat, with a Secretary General at its head, constitutes the administrative agency of the Länderrat. The Secretary General possesses no executive power, but is responsible for preparation of the several agenda, for preparing necessary data and reports, and for generally supervising the administrative functions of the Länderrat. He is assisted by a small technical and clerical staff. As might be expected, the Minister-Presidents are dependent largely on committees, to which are referred for study and recommendation various matters presented to the Länderrat. These com-

<sup>9</sup> Diese Aufzeichnung ist dem Occupation Diary, Teil I beigelegt, Pollock Papers, Mich. Hist. Coll. 58-11, 12 (IfZ, Bd. 2).

mittees are appointed by the Länderrat on recommendation by the Secretary General. Starting with four committees the Länderrat now has approximately thirty. In several instances working staffs have been created to assist the committees in their activities. The normal procedure by which questions requiring coordination through U.S. zone is decided is substantially as follows: A matter is presented to the Länderrat by either U.S. or German authorities; it receives preliminary consideration at a stated meeting of the Länderrat and, as a general rule, is of such a character that reference to a committee is necessary; the question is referred to the appropriate committee for study and report; the committee submits its report at a stated meeting of the Länderrat; the Länderrat adopts, rejects, or modifies the committee's report and forwards its recommendation to Military Government. Military Government then acts on the recommendation of the Länderrat and notifies it of the action taken. Throughout this whole procedure the channel of communication between Military Government and the Länderrat is the Regional Government Coordinating Office which, together with the Länderrat, occupies the Villa Reitzenstein at 15 Richard Wagnerstrasse, Stuttgart.

Many problems of great importance have been referred to the Länderrat by Military Government during the few months of its existence. Among them are questions concerning Food and Agriculture, Transportation, Post and Communications, Evacuation of Germans from the East, the many aspects of Economics, Electric Power, Labor, and the drafting of new laws, including a uniform law on Denazification. After each meeting of the Länderrat, Military Government receives many proposals from it. As the Länderrat has organized itself more efficiently, as it has gained in experience, and as Military Government has submitted more and more matters to it for action, the number of proposals presented to Military Government, naturally, has increased. Among the proposals made by the Länderrat, which have been approved by Military Government, are the virtual elimination of the agricultural subsidy; the transportation, reception, care and settlement of evacuees from the East; the establishment at Munich of a Senior Post Directorate for the U.S. zone; the creation for the U.S. zone of a Transportation Directorate, which will exercise a supervisory power over transportation; the beginnings of economic rehabilitation within the limits of U.S. and Allied policy; and the increase in production of electric power and its conservation. The uniform Denazification Law is awaiting action by Military Government.

JAMES K. POLLOCK  
*Senior Representative  
of the Deputy Military Governor*

# Dokument III

Pollock an Brown<sup>10</sup>

Stuttgart, 14 March 1946

Professor Everett S. Brown  
Department of Political Science  
University of Michigan  
Ann Arbor, Michigan

My dear Everett:

*I have been trying to find time to answer your letter of February 1st. It came about three weeks ago as I was about to depart for Frankfurt and Bremen to take charge of interzonal meetings between the German officials in our zone and those from the British. Although General Clay was very kind to put his plane at my disposal to go to Bremen and back, I still was terribly rushed upon my return because we had arranged to move the sixth meeting of the Länderrat to Munich. This involved some rather serious problems but turned out to be a big success. The Germans had over a period of two months worked out a very thorough-going Denazification Law and I was anxious that this German proposal to eradicate Nazism should be formally adopted in Munich, die Hauptstadt der Bewegung.<sup>11</sup>*

*General Clay and the Ambassador<sup>12</sup> came down for the occasion and I went back to Berlin with the General in his train and stayed there for several days, during which time I had the opportunity of going with him to a meeting of the Coordinating Committee and the Control Council, neither of which I had been able to attend in several months.*

*I am now back in Stuttgart getting caught up with my work here. I wish I could give you a more accurate and detailed notion of just what I am doing but I shall have to reserve that until I get home.*

*I was interested to have all the news about the Department but quite disappointed to hear that "Red"<sup>13</sup> had treated you somewhat shabbily. I can see how difficult it is going to be to handle the tremendous rush of students.*

<sup>10</sup> Dieses Schreiben ist dem Occupation Diary, Teil I beigelegt, Pollock Papers, Mich. Hist. Coll. 58-11, 12 (IfZ, Bd. 2).

<sup>11</sup> Siehe S. 167, Anm. 54.

<sup>12</sup> Murphy.

<sup>13</sup> Harlow J. Heneman.

*My own plans are not yet clear but I would like to ask you to give me as soon as possible information about the exact time when the fall term begins. General Clay and the Ambassador both want me to stay and, perhaps, I should, but my present intention is not to request an extension of leave but to return in the fall. Exactly what time, remains to be worked out. It is rather hard to be away from the family so long and Agnes, I think quite wisely, decided to stay at home, although they could be very comfortable in Switzerland. The situation is not yet in Germany good enough that I personally would want to bring anyone here. I don't mean to imply that I am not well taken care of because I am, but I couldn't understand how families would enjoy present conditions.*

*I have had so many letters about the situation in Michigan and I am somewhat distressed to learn that we can find 6 1/2 Millions for buildings but not one cent for salaries.*

*Please write me as soon as possible, giving information about the fall term and what you are expecting of me.<sup>14</sup> I am assuming that you are counting on having me back, and it would probably be a good idea to say so in case I have to tell the General about it.*

*Please give my best to May and let me hear the news.*

*My best regards to everybody!*

*Sincerely,  
Jim*

*P.S. – The picture I sent to you showed the 3 top officials in the American zone, namely, The Minister-President of each of the three States. They were not Municipal officials as your letter seemed to indicate.*

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<sup>14</sup> Hschr. Randvermerk Pollocks: "Mon[day] 19 orientation[,] Registration Sept 19–21 [,] Classes begin Mon[day] Sept 23".

## Dokument IV

Pollock an Brown<sup>15</sup>

Stuttgart, 27 July 1946

Professor Everett S. Brown, Chairman  
 Department of Political Science  
 University of Michigan  
 Ann Arbor, Michigan

My dear Everett:

*General Clay came to see me on Thursday and it is now finally determined that I can come home and resume my duties at the beginning of the fall term. I regret any inconveniences which the uncertainty about my return may have caused you, but I think I will be able to explain to your satisfaction when I return how difficult it has been for me to extricate myself from the handling of this German problem.*

*In any case, I want you to know at the earliest possible moment that my present plans are to fly from Paris around 15 August and to be in Ann Arbor in good time for the opening of the term, which I understand begins around 25 September. I shall probably have to spend about a week in Washington in conferences with War Department and State Department officials and I will, of course, want to get re-acquainted with my family who will probably meet me in Washington or New York. I shall be in Ann Arbor in time to arrange for any last-minute adjustments in courses, but I assume that I shall be teaching European Government, British Government and some kind of advanced seminar to be determined, probably dealing with postwar political developments in Europe.*

Cordially yours,

Jim

JAMES K. POLLOCK

Senior Representative

of the Deputy Military Governor

<sup>15</sup> Dieses Schreiben ist dem Occupation Diary, Teil I beigelegt, Pollock Papers, Mich. Hist. Coll. 58-11, 12 (IfZ, Bd. 2).

## Dokument V

### Memorandum Pollocks für das State Department<sup>16</sup>

Cable

[Berlin,] 3 February 1947

Draft

MEMORANDUM TO: John Hilldring  
 Assistant Secretary  
 Department of State  
 Washington, D.C.

Complying with your request I present a brief summary of my personal views regarding (1) the organization of a provisional government for Germany, (2) certain problems involved in setting up a new constitutional system for Germany, (3) proposed international boundaries, (4) Ruhr, (5) the French Memorandum relative to the provisional organization of Germany, and (6) procedure to be followed in the conference in the achievement of American objectives.

1. Because of the critical conditions in Germany due to the failure to implement the Potsdam Agreement,<sup>17</sup> there is urgent need for the establishment of a Provisional Central Government for the whole country. The Control Council is not now, nor is it likely to become, a substitute for a German Central Government. The Potsdam Agreement pointed toward the establishment of central administrative agencies and toward the gradual restoration of Germany as a member of the international community. Under the circumstances, therefore, early agreement among the Four Powers looking toward the establishment of a Provisional Central Government is not only urgently needed, but also would give effect to previous agreements.

Before presenting a suggested procedure for setting up a Provisional Central Government, the following essential preconditions should be listed on which agreement must first be had:

<sup>16</sup> Pollock Papers, Mich. Hist. Coll. 64-9 (IfZ, Bd. 35).

<sup>17</sup> Siehe S. 61, Anm. 6.

- a. the common utilization throughout Germany of its indigenous resources including agreed allocations for experts and for reparations;
- b. an agreed import-export program with full understanding as to the financial responsibility of each of the occupying powers;
- c. a financial reform program to be made applicable throughout Germany under quadripartite control;
- d. free accessibility in Germany for the personnel of its occupying powers and for all Germans engaged in legitimate pursuits;
- e. as free a German press and radio as security will permit under quadripartite and not under zonal control;
- f. freedom for approved political parties and trade unions and quadripartite supervision of elections in all zones;
- g. definition of zonal boundaries as limitations for security responsibility only; and
- h. exercise of German responsibility in the central agencies through German Land or provincial administrations and not through zone commanders.

Unless agreement can be secured on the above points, the creation of the Central Provisional Government may only lead to interminable arguments at the quadripartite level.

The most feasible and satisfactory plan for creating a provisional government emanated from the Conference of Minister-Presidents in Bremen last October.<sup>18</sup> Because of the soundness of this suggestion and because it implements the Byrnes Stuttgart address,<sup>19</sup> I am ready to suggest it as part of the plan to follow. After agreement has been reached among the Four Powers to set up central German agencies, the Control Council should invite the Minister-Presidents of the existing administrative areas into which the four zones are presently divided, to form a National Laenderrat or National Council of States. Later on this German executive body could be supplemented with a Volksrat consisting of representatives from the various political parties seated in the state legislatures, this latter body to serve merely in an advisory capacity. The National Laenderrat or Council could then be authorized to set up the administrative agencies envisaged by the Potsdam Declaration plus any others which are needed. Using the successful experiment of the Laenderrat in the American zone, the National Council should create a small Secretariat headed by a Secretary General. The Control Council could then designate a representative to deal with the National Council through its Secretary General. This procedure would

<sup>18</sup> Protokoll der Interzonenkonferenz der Ministerpräsidenten und der Chefs der Länder und Freien Städte vom 4.–5. 10. 1946 in Bremen, AVBRD 1, Dok. 36.

<sup>19</sup> Rede des amerikanischen Außenministers Byrnes am 6. 9. 1946 in Stuttgart, in: Germany 1947–1949. The story in documents. Hrsg. vom Department of State (Publication 3556, European and British Commonwealth Series 9), Washington 1950, S. 3–13.

avoid captious interference by anyone of the members of the Control Council and would expedite administrative action.

After the National Council composed of the heads of the various German States had gotten forward with the task of setting up and coordinating the necessary central administrative agencies, they should be instructed to set up a preparatory constitutional committee to begin work on a proposed draft of a national constitution. This parliamentary constitutional work could take place best at some convenient research center outside of Berlin, such as Heidelberg, Tübingen or Jena.

The National Council, acting as a coordinating body for the various administrative agencies, would have to approve all important actions proposed to be taken by the individual administrative agencies and then pass them on to the Control Council. If such administrative measures, having been proposed by a central administrative agency approved by the National Council are not disapproved by the Control Council, the National Council could then issue orders to the existing State governments which would then carry out the orders. An exception might well be made in only two cases, namely, transportation and post and telegraphs, where orders might more appropriately go directly from the administrative agency to the individual RBD's and RPD's.

In this transition stage Regional Military Government in the various zones would be expected to observe and report to their respective Zone Commanders and through them to the Control Council on the effectiveness with which orders are being carried out in the various States in the four zones. The exact pattern for the relationship between civil and military authority has been spelled out very satisfactorily in the American zone by the Directive of September 30, 1946.<sup>20</sup>

Any action by the Zone Commanders in these central agency fields must be notified to the Control Council and subject to its revocation. It should, of course, be understood that the Control Council is able at any time to issue orders to the German National Council in the same way in which American Military Government issued orders to the Laenderrat in the American zone in the early months of its operation.

The principal point about the above suggestion is that the burden of responsibility for setting up and operating the central German agencies and pulling them together would rest upon the top German officials who have either been elected or designated in the various zones. Experience in both the American and British zones shows that this is a relatively certain and satisfactory way by means of which to get forward with the reestablishment of necessary central institutions. Probably the most difficult problem in the

<sup>20</sup> Military Government Directive, 30 September 1946: Relationship between military and civil government (U.S. Zone) subsequent to adoption of Land constitutions; in: Germany 1947-1949, S. 155-157.

achievement of this plan is the securing of agreement with the French and possibly with the Russians, the French appearing to favor a constant and detailed control over all aspects of administration. The experience in Austria and in the Kommandatura should be used to advantage in keeping the Control Council out of detailed intrusions into German administration.

A timetable might well be established which would point toward approximately April 1, 1948, as a date for a national election of delegates to a National Constitutional Assembly. The Assembly so elected should meet around May 1, 1948 at some proper place outside of Berlin, and because of the preparatory work above referred to might reasonably be expected to have a proper constitution ready for a referendum around September 1, 1948. Simultaneously with the referendum an election should be held for members of the National Parliament provided for in the constitution. Two months after the establishment of the new governmental system under the adopted constitution, the Control Council should be superseded by high commissioners and as soon as Germany is admitted to the United Nations the high commissioners should be succeeded by regular ambassadors.

2. In the creation of a new constitutional system for Germany, the first point which has to be decided is the extent to which the Germans are to be allowed freedom of choice. My very strong opinion is that the United States should insist upon the Germans having complete freedom of action in the formulation of their new governmental system. This is the plan we followed in our own zone with the State constitutions. American policy has favored a decentralized federal form of government and we can be quite sure the Germans, even without instructions, will follow our policy. It is probably necessary, however, for the Four Powers, acting through the Control Council, to decide upon a territorial organization for Germany without leaving this problem for German decision. There is reason to believe that even the Germans would prefer to have this done by the Occupying Powers rather than leave the decision to them. I favor the so-called big state plan of having around ten substantial federal units.

Even though I think that the American policy should be essentially a "hands off" policy in the formulation of a new constitution for Germany, it is necessary that the American delegation have a pretty definite idea of what kind of a central government we would favor. The basis point here is to be clear on the division of powers between the central government and the State governments. My own recommendation is that the American position should be midway between the French position, as expressed in the reference memorandum, and the apparent Russian position as expressed in Article 75 of SED proposal which appeared in November<sup>21</sup> and in the recent State constitutions of Thuringia, Sachsen-Anhalt, and Mecklen-

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<sup>21</sup> Verfassungsentwurf der SED für eine Deutsche Demokratische Republik vom 14. 11. 1946, siehe dazu *Neues Deutschland* vom 15. und 16. 11. 1946.

burg. Actually the best detailed enumeration of powers of a central government which I have seen and approve is the list of powers given in Schedule A of the British Ordinance No. 57, dealing with the powers of the Laender in the British zone.<sup>22</sup> All of the central government powers listed in this Schedule I agree with, excepting No. 13, which would vest wide control over highways and highway traffic in the central government, a power which I think should more properly be vested in the State governments.

My view is that the central government which is to be established should possess all those powers necessary to deal with essentially national problems, and that the second important point is to see that the Parliament which is set up, is organized, presumably into two Houses, so that one of the Houses could resemble the United States Senate or the Swiss Council of States, and thus give the States effective control over the exercise of whatever national powers are conferred on the central government. In other words, I do not favor a central government which is inadequately equipped with all the necessary powers which modern central governments require. I am insistent however, that the exercise of these powers be sufficiently controlled by a Parliament which is composed in such a way as to guarantee that it will be as interested in protecting State rights as it is in using the federal powers which are granted. On this point I am convinced that the Germans themselves are quite capable of devising constitutional provisions which will at the same time set up an effective central government and at the same time effectively safeguard the rights of the States.

3. The question of Germany's international boundaries need not interfere with the early stages of setting up a provisional central government. But before the Control Council, as suggested above, can work out a satisfactory territorial organization for a future federal system, there will have to be a determination of just what areas are going to be included in the new Germany. On this point I feel very strongly that the present Oder-Neisse boundary should be discarded, and that in addition to East Prussia and Danzig the Poles should only be given Upper Silesia and minor boundary rectifications along the former Corridor boundary. Adequate papers exist to document this point. The Eastern boundary question is of the utmost importance to the organization of a proper German State both territorially and economically, and to the preservation of the peace.

With regard to the Saar, I feel that it would be better to give the French exclusive control with the right of exploitation for a stated period,

<sup>22</sup> British Military Government Ordinance No. 57: Powers of Länder in the British Zone, 1 December 1946, Military Government Gazette, No. 15 (1945/46), S. 344f., zit. nach B. Ruhm von Oppen (Hg.), Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-54, S. 192-195.

say ten years, rather than actually incorporate the territory permanently in the French State.

4. Secretary Byrnes' Stuttgart speech settled the problem of the political disposition of the Ruhr but it did not settle the question of whether there should or should not be some kind of special international control over this area which is to remain a part of Germany. I have not been able to convince myself that any type of international control over the Ruhr would be successful, but assuming that there must be some form of international control, then I am certain that the international agency established should under no circumstances attempt to be an operation agency. It should rather be similar to the Federal Trade Commission in the United States, a body which has wide powers of investigation and also the power to issue an order to cease and desist when the public interest so requires. Such an international Commission in the Ruhr would be there to vote any German action which would tend either to violate the peace or discriminate against other nations. I am firmly convinced that only German administration of the Ruhr would produce satisfactory economic results. Only the Germans are capable of getting the most out of the Ruhr, and aside from this point the Occupying Powers only have an interest in seeing that the economic benefits are properly distributed and not utilized for any potentially warlike purpose.

My further suggestion is that if an international control is insisted upon for the Ruhr area that we insist upon a similar control over the Upper Silesian area.

5. On the French memorandum relative to the provisional organization of Germany, my views are as follows:<sup>23</sup>

The French proposal is fantastic. A government so constituted could not work. It would have neither the powers, resources, machinery nor personnel to effectuate its necessary functions. No modern state has ever had an administrative organization anywhere comparable to the proposed one, and one would have to go back to the eighteenth century in Germany to find even a remote analogy. All the administrative experience of modern states, including that of the French, is utterly disregarded in this flight into unreality and wishful thinking. For the present atomization of the four zones would be substituted a further atomization into perhaps twelve states. I cannot imagine anything better calculated to produce economic and political chaos in Germany than this French proposal.

The French have never had any experience with federalism, and by this memorandum prove that they know little about the general subject. For instance to deny to Germany a central Parliament elected by the people in

<sup>23</sup> Dieser Kommentar war bereits früher abgefaßt worden: "Comment by Dr. Pollock on the French Memorandum relative to the organization of Germany" vom 30. 1. 1947, Pollock Papers, Mich. Hist. Coll. 64-9 (IfZ, Bd. 7).

the constituent states is utterly impractical. Every modern state, even tiny Switzerland, has its central Parliament which is absolutely necessary for the proper functioning of modern government. Instead of proposing a Parliament in which state interests are strongly and adequately or even dominantly represented, the French proposal would establish a singularly weak, indirectly chosen Staatenhaus. Every reasonable protection of state powers and state control and influence can be much better accomplished through a strong upper house – like our Senate or the Swiss Council of States, without sacrificing administrative efficiency or producing political chaos. The proposed Staatenhaus could not even coordinate effectively, let alone make decisions in purely national matters.

Furthermore, the French proposal suggests an impractical system of allied supervision over proposed German agencies. American Zone experience is utterly convincing on this point. Also present in the French plan is a curious and confusing set of central committees with wide administrative powers. The theory seems to be that you can run a government with a series of Sanhedrins! The relationship between the Control Council and the German agencies is not clearly marked out, and despite much writing about principles, none is given which would properly settle the division of powers between the central government and the states. In fact the French memo can hardly be said to envisage a central government at all.

The really absurd attempt to divide the powers of finance and economics, of transport and communications between the states and the federal government leads one to question the sincerity, at least the competence, of the authors of this plan. Independent state railroad systems would exist, owning their own property. The states would have control over coastal navigation and their own telephone systems. Reference is made to the *national economy* of a *state* – a contradiction in terms. Wide powers over bank rates and the money market and notes is proposed for the states. These unsound allocations of power, when added to the weak and disorganized structure of the central agencies, render the whole proposal utterly useless as a basis of discussion. Under the guise of decentralizing government, the French propose to create an administrative morass which would make the present quadripartite confusion seem like efficiency.

There is a sane suggestion or two in the memo. One would establish a Supreme Court; another would emphasize a proper territorial organization; another emphasizes basic constitutional principles. But the numerous other suggestions such as state citizenship, no federal officials – only officials designated by the states, a council to head the department of national economy, a state appointed Parliament and a Ministry of Supply (not described) more than cancel out the few sensible suggestions.

I find the plan wrong and unsound in itself; I disagree with the proce-

ture and method by which it is to be set up; and I dissent absolutely from what it sets out to achieve. The whole proposal is the acme of political and administrative nonsense.

6. My suggestions regarding the procedure to be followed in the conference in discussing the various points are as follows:

I would endeavor to secure as quick an agreement as possible to the establishment of the central German agencies provided for in the Potsdam Declaration – in other words, to get the Russians to carry out what they have already agreed to, and to secure such agreement from the French for the first time. Second, I would raise the question of Germany's international boundaries, taking a strong position opposed to the perpetuation of the present Eastern boundary. Following this the various problems, such as the territorial organization of Germany, the Ruhr, reparations, and other matters can follow. I suggest this order, first, because of critical need for a central German government and second, because nothing is more important to the establishment of a proper German State than the inclusion of sufficient territory to sustain the population and develop a healthy national economy. Unless we get forward very rapidly with the reintegration of Germany we may be confronted with a chaotic situation. Furthermore, unless the new Germany can have the prospect of a reasonably adequate economy, no democratic system of government, federal or otherwise, will have a chance of succeeding.

7. Very adequate papers on most of the above subjects are being prepared in OMGUS.

James K. Pollock

## Dokument VI

### Study Trip Through the American Zone<sup>24</sup>

26 February 1947

#### MEMORANDUM FOR: General Clay

1. In the period from February 3 to February 19, 1947, I made a study trip through considerable portions of the American zone. In the course of my investigation I interviewed leading officials in all state governments, including the three Minister-Presidents and members of their cabinets, and also numerous local German officials. I used the occasion also to acquaint myself with the various aspects of Military Government and had the benefit of the counsel of the three Land Directors, members of their staffs, and of approximately a dozen Liaison and Security Officers.

2. I find that German civil administration at all levels is now operating very smoothly and satisfactorily. Lines of authority are well established, staffs are reasonably well organized, and fairly adequate facilities such as offices, transport and communication are now available. However, the offices available in Stuttgart to the German Ministries, particularly the State Ministry, are lacking both in adequacy and dignity. On the side of American Military Government, I am convinced that it is decidedly on top of its job and appears to be properly utilizing its accumulated experience in its present supervisory capacity. The quality of the personnel is still not as high as it should be and continued attention is needed to weed out incompetent people, and attract and promote able people.

3. It is very clear that German morale is at a very low ebb, and this is not due merely to the unusually severe winter but also to the German uncertainty about the future. The Germans feel extremely pessimistic and quite desperate. Unless a boost of some kind can be given to them in the form of some definite plan for improving the general situation in the country, I would not want to predict what might happen. The low state of morale plus the uncertainties and artificialities of the economic situation might well be pondered.

4. Although I was primarily interested, in accordance with your instructions, in paying particular attention to the political and governmental situa-

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<sup>24</sup> Dieses Memorandum ist dem Occupation Diary, Teil II, beigelegt, Pollock Papers, Mich. Hist. Coll. 58-12 (IfZ, Bd. 2) sowie 62-18 (IfZ, Bd. 37).

tion within the zone, I soon found that the problem of economic unification of the two zones dominated all discussions and came up without any stimulation from me. The various aspects of the bizonal problem have already been presented orally to you and need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that the bizonal difficulties were causing very considerable confusion in both German and Military Government circles. As a result of your conference with the Minister-Presidents, it appears that the major difficulties will be removed.

5. I was generally satisfied with the state of political development. I find responsible Germans have a considerable feeling of pride in having accomplished so much in our zone in a relatively short period of time in the revival of democratic institutions. Considerable concern, however, is expressed about the over-centralization of party structure and discipline as being incompatible with the federal idea. There continues to be considerable political activity, more on the organizational than on the programmatic side. All parties are finding it rather difficult to enlist the active interest and support of persons in the younger age groups so that party activity is still largely carried on by veterans of the republican period. The absence of a party press is a handicap to normal party activity.

6. Sufficient time has not yet elapsed to make a very dependable judgment of the relations between the state cabinets and their respective parliaments. I did, however, get the definite impression that the legislatures are feeling their importance and intend to play as active a part as possible in the redevelopment of democracy. It will take a little time for the legislatures to learn their limitations and to lose their present zeal for governing everything. The legislatures themselves consist very largely of inexperienced persons although there is an adequate group in each one of them consisting of experienced officials and politicians from the earlier republican regime. It is interesting to note the presence of considerable numbers of Landraete (county managers) and Buergermeisters in the membership of the legislatures. There appears to be a healthy atmosphere of both cooperation and friendly competition in the working out of responsible cabinet government in the various states.

7. In local administration I found few complaints or serious administrative failures. In Hesse they are working out an improved territorial organization of administrative areas. Several Landraete, however, referred to the fact that up to recently they had been prevented from employing trained officials because they had not yet been cleared by the Spruchkammer. They also raised a question about their present lack of police authority, having to rely upon the voluntary cooperation of the local police authorities whenever this is necessary. All of them expressed dissatisfaction with the present system of having the Kreistag elect the Landraete rather than having them appointed as formerly by the state ministry.

8. In the field of Denazification, which I made no effort to investigate, I

heard much criticism of the recording on the Kennkarte of the decisions of the Spruchkammer. Also, the heavy administrative burden imposed upon the Denazification Tribunals appears to be still unsolved.

9. The present status and functioning of the Laenderrat came in for considerable attention and I find that, despite the uncertainty about bizonal agencies, the Laenderrat continues to be looked upon by responsible Germans in our zone as a very necessary anchor to windward. They would strongly oppose any efforts to eliminate the Laenderrat from the present governmental picture as long as a provisional central government is lacking. The experience accumulated in the year-and-a-half's operation of the Laenderrat has been of great benefit to our Germans and this fact is universally recognized. The fact that they have recently reorganized the Laenderrat to include an advisory committee consisting of members of the three state legislatures is indicative of their desire to adapt their machinery to the changed constitutional position. Although the Laenderrat is clearly marked for extinction after the establishment of a provisional central government or the political merger of the Western zones, there is no question in my mind of its continuing usefulness in this transitional period. Similarly, the Regional Government Coordinating Office, which supervises the Laenderrat, should not be cut out of the Military Government picture, but rather should continue to be utilized for purposes of information, coordination, and conference. It has become a useful point of direct contact between yourself and the top German officials and the German press, and as such contributes materially to creating respect for and cooperation with Military Government. The weekly meeting at the RGCO of liaison officers from the three Land Military Government detachments is still a very useful device. This meeting might even be expanded to include reports from the bizonal agencies, since information about and liaison between these bizonal agencies and the Land detachments appears unsatisfactory.

10. With regard to problems of Military Government I naturally heard many complaints about the policy of rotation, and I must confess that I have considerable sympathy with these objections. The type of work performed by Military Government officers is hardly comparable to other military situations and hence previous Army rotation practice is not necessarily applicable. If the work of a Military Government officer is unsatisfactory, he should be rotated home, not to another station in Germany.

11. With regard to the transfer of housekeeping functions to the Army, I should urge caution in the case of the cities in which the Land Directors are located unless it can be clearly understood that present Military Government installations are not to be disturbed. There is considerable uneasiness among Military Government personnel about repeated efforts made at all levels, by various Army units, to acquire facilities which Military Government, after much time and labor, have been able to bring to their use. If the Land Directors had the rank of Lieutenant General given British

Regional Commissioners, they would not be outranked by local Army commanders and no question would arise. Since this is not the case in American Military Government, it would be unfortunate at this late date to have anything occur which would unsettle the established physical position of the Land Director.

12. I am also ready to question any serious reduction in the present size of personnel both at the Land level and in the field. The task of supervising German Government is in many respects more difficult than in the earlier stages when it was only necessary to issue orders. I am holding no brief for certain patent instances of over-staffing. I am only expressing my opinion with regard to the undesirability of cutting supervisory personnel to a point beyond which it will not be possible to do an effective job. I cannot see how field personnel can be further reduced as long as there are about two people in Berlin issuing instructions to every one in the Land detachments. Much of the work of Land detachments consists of tasks which must be done for Berlin. The need for which has long been felt of bringing the field officers more often into effective contact with the policy making officials in Berlin is still present. In other words, it is still desirable to associate the field more closely with the policy making process in Berlin.

13. I have not had time to check up on the three following questions which were raised in the course of my investigation. The first relates to police organization in the states; the second, to the need for so many well-staffed RTO's; the third, to trade union organization. With regard to the first question, the point is whether there is at present too highly centralized a control over the Land Polizei, or whether there should not be a change in the direction of restoring the formerly held police powers of the Landraete and Regierungspräsidenten. With regard to the RTO's, the question is why, with the Germans operating the railways, it is necessary to have more than a skeleton staff to perform the work of the RTO's. With regard to trade unions a question arises about why they have not organized on a zone basis as in the British zone.

14. Lively interest on the part of all top German officials is expressed in plans for a provisional central government. Without exception they are thinking in terms of the Bremen resolutions of last October which emanated from a joint conference of the Minister-Presidents of the American and British zones. I found but one influential politician, namely Josef Mueller, whom I would characterize as a centralist, the others are convinced federalists.

Respectfully submitted,  
James K. Pollock

## Dokument VII

### Summary Report on the Principal Findings and Observations Arising Out of my Recent Trip to the Three Western Zones<sup>25</sup>

Confidential

11 June 1948

My dear General Clay:

In addition to the verbal reports which I have previously given to you, I am now presenting a summary report of the principal findings and observations arising out of my recent trip to the three Western zones.

#### A. General Observations

1. The prestige of the United States as an Occupying Power remains higher than that of any other Occupying Power. Not only does the German population admire the American approach to economic recovery and the rebuilding of democratic institutions, but they have great respect for our power as a nation and in particular for its Military Governor in Germany. The appearance, behavior, and discipline of the troops are excellent – a great advance over a year ago.

2. Throughout all three zones there is a general improvement in economic and social conditions. The physical condition of the cities, the promising condition of the crops in the rural areas, and the physical improvement in the people show marked progress in the last year. With regard to the mental attitudes of the Germans, it is more difficult to speak with any assurance, but I have no reason to think that there is anything abnormal or disquieting about their psychological attitudes. Everyone is convinced that this is the year of decision. One disturbing element seems to be the large number of young men who are unemployed, and the sociological effect of the overcrowding of expellees gives me cause for great concern.

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<sup>25</sup> Dieses Memorandum ist dem Occupation Diary, Teil II, beigelegt, Pollock Papers, Mich. Hist. Coll. 58–12 (IfZ, Bd. 2) sowie 62–18 (IfZ, Bd. 37).

3. A comparison of the three zones makes it very clear that the American zone is not only in better shape economically, but that it has also made relatively greater progress in all aspects of reconstruction, economic, governmental and social, than any of the other zones. In both the French and British zones there is an undoubted longing among the leading German officials to bring their zones up to the standard of achievement already obtained in the American zone.

4. So far as the German population have any time to think about public matters over and above their struggle for food and shelter, one can say that their principal subjects of discussion today are three: first, currency reform; second, the creation of a West German government; and third, the Soviets. Leading Germans have already done a great deal of thinking regarding the steps necessary to develop a West German state. In fact, almost every leading German has a constitution in his pocket. I found many complaints about the dollar standard even though many understood why it was necessary and the good it has done. I am not sure that the good explanation you gave to the Germans at Stuttgart<sup>26</sup> has gotten around in the German press.

## B. Government in the Three Western Zones

### 1. The American Zone

a. Considerable progress has been made in many fields. The new Bavarian electoral law which was used in the recent local elections represents a distinct step in advance. Procedure in the state legislatures is now quite smooth and also represents an improvement over a year ago. Local governments are functioning smoothly. I feel, however, that there is not enough emphasis being given to the development of local home rule.

b. Similarly, I am not satisfied that we have made any headway in improving the civil services of the various states. Nor has there been quite enough progress in the direction of a proper territorial reorganization within the various states to achieve economy and efficiency. Hesse is a conspicuous exception. I am aware that the preoccupation of the German governments with other more pressing matters in part explains their slowness in coming to grips with the above-mentioned problems. The state and local governments are now reasonably well housed, and their channels of communication well established and operating efficiently. The difficulty of securing competent public servants is still present, but not as acute as a year ago. The termination of denazification has removed one disturbing factor, and the denazification process as a whole has avoided the rather

<sup>26</sup> Protokoll der Internen Besprechung der Ministerpräsidenten mit General Clay während der Länderratssitzung vom 1. 6. 1948 in Stuttgart, AVBRD 4, Dok. 54 C.

serious situation which exists in both the French and British zones of having in prominent public positions men who had bad Nazi records. Allowing for all criticisms and mistakes, the denazification process in the American zone has not only carried out our original policy but it has effectively brought home to the Germans the seriousness of their crimes. Despite deep forebodings which were heard earlier, we have now purged the public services and German life in general of a considerable amount of Nazi taint, and our achievement is not likely to react in any unsatisfactory way. In the British and French zones many unhappy developments are bound to occur in the future.

c. The presence in the Landtage of an inordinate number of Beamte is an unhealthy condition of which the Germans are aware and about which something needs to be done. Upwards of a third of the members of the state legislatures in the American zone hold state or local positions. However much one may defend the practice of permitting local officials to sit in the state legislatures, it seems to me to be a dangerous practice to allow state officials employed in the various state ministries to have seats in the legislature and thus to pass judgment upon their department heads and Minister-President. In the British zone it is prohibited.

d. I found no sign of any lack of cooperation by German officials with American authorities. We continue to enjoy the kind of cooperation which one could not possibly buy or command. This imponderable of the occupation remains one of its outstanding achievements.

e. Your handling of the dissolution of the Laenderrat was very astute and entirely satisfactory to the Germans. If the zonal Advisory Council in Hamburg can similarly be taken out of the picture, the Minister-Presidents of the two zones should not be impeded in their efforts toward a complete merger of the three zones. I have, however, no indication of French intentions with reference to any of their zonal agencies, including their recently created Laenderrat.

## 2. The British Zone

a. The most notable observation regarding this zone is the reduction in the powers and functions of the so-called zonal agencies. In every case, the former zonal offices which dealt with the various governmental functions which were reserved to British Military Government are being slowly liquidated. This is true of the Budget and Accounting Office at Hamburg, the Manpower Office at Lemgo, the Railway Office at Bielefeld, and a number of other zonal functional offices spread through the zone. The most notable dissolution of a zonal office was that accomplished by Ordi-

nance No. 142,<sup>27</sup> which transferred to the Laender activities which had formerly been exercised directly by British Military Government. There is, however, one important exception in the case of the German police. Although Ordinance No. 135 was effective 1 March 1948, the fact is that the control of the German police, with the exception of Land Hamburg, is still not effectively in the hands of the German officials. Three German Ministers of the Interior pointed out by chapter and verse how they were prevented from dealing effectively with the police officials who had been put into office by British Military Government. One Minister of the Interior referred to a police chief in a principal city who had a very bad Nazi record, and despite many complaints from the Minister was still in office, and he, the Minister, was unable to do anything about it.

b. With regard to constitutional development in the zone, I find that all the Laender have draft constitutions in various degrees of completion. In a very short time all of them could adopt satisfactory constitutions if this were encouraged by British Military Government. The present attitude of British Military Government seems to be to defer any constitutional activity until the nature of the new German government is more precisely known and until there is a clearer definition of the real spheres of action of Military Government on the one hand and the Laender on the other. The top German officials themselves, without exception, are anxious to bring about as near an approximation in the British zone of the constitutional position of the Laender in the American zone as is possible, not merely to strengthen their own Laender governments but to facilitate the transition to a new West German government.

c. The Laender governments in the British zone are far behind those in the American zone in their democratic development and in their accomplishments. They are still working on legislation which has been enacted months ago in the American zone, and they are still very unclear as to what they can do and what they cannot do. It should be emphasized, therefore, even though the British are gradually and slowly withdrawing themselves from operations and even making rather substantial reductions in their Military Government staffs, that there still persists, mostly in the higher levels of British Military Government, an attitude toward German officials which leaves the Germans in very grave doubt as to what they can do and what they cannot do. In other words, there is bound to be a considerable lag in the accomplishments of German officials in the British zone until British Military Government is able to achieve a degree of conformity or similarity to the operational practice of American Military Government. Despite the prior work of numerous zonal organizations one still does not find in the British zone an evenness of regulation and practice, not to

<sup>27</sup> Siehe für die British Military Government Ordinances: Military Government Gazette, 1945–1948.

mention achievement, which one finds uniformly throughout the American zone. It should also be added that British Military Government organization is still somewhat amorphous and disconnected, the different parts of the organization being utterly unacquainted with each other's operations, and the top maintaining a very tenuous and uncertain hold over the whole organization. This large, loose British organization contrasts strikingly with the small, closely-knit organization of American Military Government.

d. Elections are contemplated on the Gemeinde and Kreis level in various Laender of the British zone. In Niedersachsen it is doubted that a new election law can be promulgated before September or October, at which time elections are expected. If the Germans do not succeed in passing their own law, they will be forced to operate under British Military Government Ordinance No. 31. In Schleswig-Holstein elections are expected on October 24, although an election law is still in the mill.

e. The proper documentation of sailors is a matter which concerns a sovereign nation. In the British zone they have kept control of it and are understood to have a central registration bureau in Berlin. All registrations are passed on by British intelligence. They register them and give them certifications. Lately it has been proposed that this British bureau undertake the job for all German seamen. Bremen is anxious that such documentation be bipartite.

### 3. The French Zone

a. The French zone is still in a very backward state, democratically speaking. Despite the creation of states operating under constitutions, the French Military Government practice has been so rigid as to prevent the proper development of self-governing institutions. The recent creation of a Laenderrat in the French zone and its rather powerless and useless position is merely an indication of the relative backwardness of German agencies in the French zone. Only in Mainz, where there is a very enlightened and vigorous French Military Government officer, does one discover even an equivalent physical improvement which is a common feature of the cities in the other two zones. Cologne is a striking example of little physical improvement in the British zone.

b. A safe estimate of the strength of French Military Government may be set at 9,000. There is talk of further reduction, but it may be expected to move very slowly. There is an excessive number of French dependents, conservatively estimated in Baden-Baden alone at 15,000. It would seem to me to be a matter of some urgency for our

economics and financial people to determine the exact financial and economic position of the French zone in the light of the proposed subventions to the French zone under the Marshall Plan.

### C. Bizonal Problems

1. The present German bizonal organization at Frankfurt is operating under considerable difficulty, but represents a distinct improvement over the situation a year ago. The Frankfurt organization is tolerated, but hardly accepted by the Laender governments, and because of its lack of direct contact with the people is largely bureaucratic, inevitable as this is. The Economic Council, however, is a fairly businesslike body, but its organization lacks the experience and polish observable in the Landtage of the American zone and in the American zone Laenderrat. A definite rivalry exists between the various Laender and their Minister-Presidents and the leaders of the Frankfurt organization. Such rivalry is, I presume, inevitable, and can be eliminated with the establishment of a West German government. Meanwhile, very little can be done during the interim period until a constitution is adopted to alter the position of the Economic Council. Through the greater activity of the Minister-Presidents, Frankfurt can become the real center of the three zones and thus achieve a higher degree of recognition than is at present possible. The whole JEIA organization is not very well understood by many people and perhaps, like the Frankfurt German organization, is something which must be endured until a better solution presents itself.

2. The American side of BICO appears to be functioning with reasonable smoothness and represents a distinct advance over the situation, for instance, which existed at Minden a year ago. Nevertheless, serious problems of liaison between Frankfurt and Berlin are arising which will have to be solved in some way. Presumably the orders which are being given by BICO to the Germans are necessary in the circumstances even though they do conflict with our policy of supervision only.

3. The US/UK Coal Control group at Essen supervising the German coal mines administration operates in a rather difficult administrative situation, but seems to be doing a good job even though it is a different type of assignment than that being performed either in Frankfurt or in the Laender. It is, of course, desirable in any new German organization to tie all aspects of economic life into this new German organization and thus avoid the different types of administration control which are presently in existence.

### D. Problems of American Military Government

1. I am very gratified to find that despite recent personnel changes and the development of Bizonia, American Military Government continues to maintain a very high standard of efficiency in performing its mission of supervision over German governmental agencies. The recent reductions in personnel, although complained about, do not appear to be seriously preventing the performance of satisfactory work.

2. The Directors suggested that, if it were consonant with top policy, they should have closer liaison with BICO. They also feel that they should have more discretion in personnel allocations within their own detachments, thus giving effect to our own preachment about decentralization. They feel rather strongly that the old system under which the Military Governor convenes regularly with the Directors of Military Government at the time of the Laenderrat meeting in Stuttgart, should be carried on under the new bipartite arrangements so that they would not be deprived of this personal association and valuable informational contact with the Military Government. How this can be achieved is a matter of opinion, but it would seem entirely possible to arrange a proper meeting between the Military Governor and the Directors of Military Government in Frankfurt at the time of the bizonal Laenderrat meeting with the two Military Governors, or at any rate at some other appropriate time. The meeting of the Military Governor with the Military Commanders at which the Directors of Military Government are present would hardly fill the bill. There is a temporary problem of a channel to be used for the transmission of any Laenderrat requests during the period of the dissolution of that German organization.

3. It is obvious that the approaching amalgamation on the German side of the three Western zones, with consequent elimination of zone boundaries, presents the three Military Governments with a very difficult and serious problem of adapting the organization of Military Government in the three Western zones to the changed legal position which will follow the adoption of a new West German government. If the occupation statute and the German constitution can define with sufficient precision the exact position of Military Government in the ensuing period, it then becomes a matter of developing a tripartite organization in the various Laender which will give proper effect to the German and Allied positions.

4. It seems to me, as we pass into the later stages of Military Government, that it becomes increasingly necessary to improve our research and intelligence services and to make every effort to retain and to secure the most competent possible personnel. I do not believe that it takes a large staff in each Land to keep on top of the German situation, but it necessarily follows that with the reduction of staff one must be increasingly insistent upon the quality of the personnel which remains.

5. Despite much emphasis on our mission, it is still desirable to indoctrinate

nate our I.S.O.'s about what our policy is and exactly how we propose to carry it out. With the new program of democratization it is particularly desirable to have a carefully coordinated, and administratively efficient program.<sup>28</sup>

6. I regret to find much complaint, as in the past, concerning the failures of army administration in providing for Military Government the tools with which to execute programs – especially when these require something out of the ordinary. I find that transportation is still one of the biggest difficulties, and in this connection the suggestion has been made that since many Military Government personnel now have their own private vehicles which they can use on official trips to the zone, that consideration be given to providing personnel driving their own cars on official business a 5-cent mileage rate such as is the practice in the United States. In any case, I am convinced that the army concept of administrative services needs some revamping under present Military Government conditions.

### E. Emerging Problems

1. With regard to the numerous problems which will arise in the transition period between now and the adoption of a West German constitution, attention should be given, prior to the meeting of the Minister-Presidents, to the problem of the territorial organization of the Western zones. Under the London agreements,<sup>29</sup> boundaries were to be studied by the Minister-Presidents, and their proposals, when approved by the Military Governors, are to be decided by popular vote. My inquiries among numerous German officials elicited the fact that several of them, principally Dr. Adenauer, are looking toward a fusion of not merely Nordrhein with Westphalia, but also the southern districts of the Rhein province which are now under French control. If it is the desire of the Military Governors in the words of the London agreements, to avoid states that are either too large or too small, it might be well, in presenting the matter in the first place to the Minister-Presidents, to lay down certain pre-conditions under which they would have to operate in drawing up their proposals regarding Land boundaries. I find general agreement among German political leaders in Baden and Württemberg that the two states will join together, and that the Pfalz should be added to the combined Württemberg-Baden area. There also seems to be little question but that the former Hessian counties east of the Rhine, now in the French zone, will vote to rejoin Hesse, and the same is true with Rheinhessen which includes Mainz.

2. In the question of the timing of the elections for the constitutional

<sup>28</sup> Der folgende Absatz 6 wurde hier eingefügt. Er ist in der Vorlage als offensichtlich nachträglich abgefaßter Absatz dem Dokument angehängt worden.

<sup>29</sup> Siehe S. 317, Anm. 108.

convention, and in other details and procedures, attention should be paid to the wishes of the Minister-Presidents because of the possible political repercussions arising out of currency reform and the changed international position of Germany, the more so because they were not given the first word about London.

3. Presumably the Minister-Presidents will feel called on to form themselves into a sort of "care-taker" government or, as the Germans call it, a "Geschäftsregierung". This should be done in such a way as not to disturb any of the constructive activity of the economic organization in Frankfurt, but also to mitigate any of the differences within the zones which might militate against a common German administration.

4. A suggestion which came to me from several Minister-Presidents might well be adopted. They feel the need for setting up immediately a preparatory commission to work on a draft constitution so that something will be ready when the convention meets. This is not only a prudent procedure but it will expedite the work of the convention and thus get a new constitution more quickly.

#### F. Conclusion

1. In conclusion, I should like to add that I was given every opportunity by British Military Government to look into the operations in their zone, both on the British and on the German side. In the French zone there continues to be a certain hesitation to permit the curtain over the German government to be lifted up – a curtain which in the French zone is referred to as "the velvet curtain". Nevertheless, I found a somewhat changed French attitude and the change is for the better. There is now at last a recognition of the correctness of the American position in restoring German self-government, and I believe there is also a recognition of the contribution which we have made in preserving and developing the federal idea in the American zone. Among the British there is a somewhat reluctant but nevertheless a genuine admission that they have been much too slow in turning over responsibility to the Germans, and also they evince a somewhat stronger desire to cooperate in the developments which lie ahead. The atmosphere at least is favorable for future administration and political cooperation.

2. The American government and the American people have every reason to be proud of the achievements of their occupying forces in Germany, and as the future amalgamation of the three zones occurs, it should become clearer what a superior job we have done, not only relative to that of the other powers, but also absolutely.

Respectfully submitted,  
JAMES K. POLLOCK

## Dokument VIII

### Gedicht über die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik bis Ende 1946

Dieses Gedicht wurde von ehemaligen Mitarbeitern der amerikanischen Militärregierung in Erinnerung an ihre große Zeit und Aufgabe in Deutschland auf einer Weihnachtsfeier Ende 1946, vermutlich in Ann Arbor, vorgetragen. Es befindet sich in: Pollock Papers, Mich.Hist.Coll. 98.

#### Char[les] Jamison in Quadrangle

A state of grave emergency  
will mark this date in history.  
The world is tossing to and fro  
because it lost its status quo.  
And now we may as well confess  
We're in a very frightful mess.  
We tore the world apart, and then  
we could not build it up again.  
In vain, to set the world aright,  
we got into a sordid fight.  
Now that our energy is spent,  
we view with disillusionment  
the shattered fragments of the wreck,  
and wonder how to hold in check  
the world's complete disintegration,  
deep despair and sheer frustration.

We wish that we could clarify  
what's wrong in India – and why.  
And other problems in the East –  
the rampage of the Russian beast,  
the future of the Yellow Sea,  
and Japanese democracy.  
But this is clear, without a doubt,

they have no zones to think about.  
In Europe, on the other hand,  
four rival nations rule Deutschland.  
To understand their inane acts,  
we should observe some background facts.

The Allies planned to march right in  
– and in, and in, straight to Berlin.  
They planned this action in advance,  
ourselves, Great Britain and un-great France.  
The German Reich we'd occupy;  
the Hun's resistance we'd defy,  
with no surrender at the border,  
as stated in the Allied order.

But after little France had fallen,  
we made a deal with Joseph Stalin.  
Roosevelt backed up the Russian Nation  
with plans for zonal occupation.  
But Churchill made a different point –  
the occupation should be joint.

At Yalta Russia had intruded  
and France was thereupon excluded.  
But Frank and Winnie at Quebec  
thought France had got it in the neck,  
and Roosevelt thought it time to alter  
the plan he made with Jo at Yalta.  
But Stalin would not budge an inch.  
To get France in was not a cinch.  
If part by France was occupied,  
our own two zones we must divide.  
And that is how it came about  
the zonal boundaries worked out  
have made the zones a crazy quilt  
where unity could not be built.  
The Russian zone was very good;  
they had the land that raised the food.  
Great Britain, as we now can see,  
got all of German industry.  
But scenery is all we got,  
a feature that won't help a lot  
when German people must be fed,  
and clothed and housed and put to bed.

The Potsdam plan for occupation  
    raised another complication.  
France, no party to the pact,  
    felt she had nothing to retract,  
and steadfastly would disagree  
    and irritate the other three.  
The Control Council in Berlin  
    was not all that it might have been;  
and yet one plan was crystalized –  
    the Germans were demobilized.  
Sub-committees here and there  
    added to the Hun's despair  
by speeding up disarmament  
    with complete accomplishment.  
Otherwise the occupation  
    drifted into sheer frustration,  
when each occupation zone  
    had a program of its own.

In spite of all these disaffections,  
    Lucius Clay called for elections.  
But ere this could be applied,  
    voters must be qualified –  
must come up for registration  
    in our zone of occupation.  
When this job had been effected,  
    village councils were elected,  
followed by the counties then,  
    looking for judicious men.

Then big cities had their turn,  
    each one voting with concern  
for their new democracy,  
    which they guarded jealously.  
Let this fact be fully noted;  
    nine-tenths of the people voted.  
One more thing we ought to mention  
    is the constitutional convention,  
called upon to formulate  
    a constitution for each state –  
charters making chances littler  
    for return of men like Hitler.  
To sum it up in language terse,  
    the situation might be worse.

And though our foreign policy  
is not as good as it might be,  
we here at home are far from peace  
with labor strikes that never cease.  
We wonder how the world will view us  
for being paralyzed by Lewis.  
But while we have some coal to burn,  
we by the fire our thoughts now turn  
to Christmas season jollity,  
forgetful of world polity.

