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Italian Migration and Settlement in Latin Greece: The Impact on the Economy

The Fourth Crusade, which ended with the conquest of Constantinople in 1204, generated important developments in three closely related fields. First, it furthered and hastened the political and territorial fragmentation of Byzantium, initiated some twenty-five years earlier, and led to the establishment of new political entities in the territories conquered by the Latins. Latin demographic expansion into this region was yet another outgrowth of the Fourth Crusade. The conquest opened the way to Latin migration and settlement on a scale and along patterns unknown before in the Byzantine lands or Romania. The volume and effects of these processes were particularly pronounced in the former western territories of the Byzantine Empire, some of which remained for more than two centuries under Latin rule. The Italians had a major share in both migration and settlement and contributed decisively to the long-term economic evolution of western Romania, which is the third field that warrants our attention. The interaction between migration, settlement and economic development is particularly well documented for some areas of Latin Greece in the period extending from the early thirteenth century to about 1390, on which we shall focus. Yet the nature and impact of this interaction can only be understood in the wider context of the Eastern Mediterranean, to which frequent references will be made.

A brief survey of political developments in the region of Latin Greece with which we are concerned is essential for an understanding of the processes we are about to examine. Beginning in 1205 French and Italian knights occupied the Peloponnese, Attica, Boeotia and the island of Euboea or Negroponte. The largest and most important among the new states they founded was Frankish Morea, which for a short period of fourteen years only, from 1248 to 1262, covered almost the entire Peloponnese. In 1262, however, Byzantium regained a foothold in the peninsula, and its continuous pressure induced Prince William II of Villehardouin to seek in 1267 the support of Charles I of Anjou, King of Sicily. Following William's death in 1278 the principality came under the rule of Charles I and was administered by his officials, those of his successors and those of the princes of the Morea, two of whom only resided for short periods in the Peloponnese. In 1376 or 1377 the Order of the Hospitallers leased Frankish Morea for five years from Queen Joanna of Naples, and a few years later Angevin rule in the principality

collapsed¹. Venice was the third power present in the Peloponnese. It was undoubtedly the main beneficiary of the Fourth Crusade, which enabled the foundation of its colonial empire. From 1207 to 1500 Venice held the ports of Modon and Coron and their rural areas in the southwest of the peninsula, and in 1388 it acquired Nauplia, Argos and their rural territories, occupying the former city in the following year and the latter in 1394². Venice's most important colony overseas was Crete³. Outside the Peloponnese the lordship of Athens, which extended over Attica and Boeotia, was governed by its Frankish lords until 1311, when it was conquered by the so-called Catalan Company that ruled it for about seventy years⁴. The island of Euboea or Negroponte was divided into three main feudal units, except from 1208 to 1216. In 1211 Venice obtained a quarter in the city of Negroponte, the capital of the island. In the following century it progressively extended its rule from this outpost to the whole of Euboea and some islands of the Aegean, which were in Latin hands since shortly after the Fourth Crusade. This second stage of Venetian expansion was completed by 1390⁵.

The origin of the conquerors, the political regime they established in their new territories and, finally, the political ties of the latter with western powers had a strong bearing on the nature, composition and distribution of Latin migration and settlement in Greece in the two centuries following the Fourth Crusade. After 1204 the knights within the conquering armies provided the first nuclei of settlers in continental Greece and islands in its vicinity. They were later joined by their kinsmen and other members of the knightly class from their lands of origin. The majority of these settlers hailed from Capetian France and neighbouring lordships, from which they transplanted to Greece the feudal regime with which they

¹ For the general historical background, see *Jean Longnon*, *L'Empire latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée* (Paris 1949); *Antoine Bon*, *La Morée franque. Recherches historiques, topographiques et archéologiques sur la principauté d'Achaïe (1205–1430)* (Paris 1969); *David Jacoby*, *La féodalité en Grèce médiévale. Les "Assises de Romanie": sources, application et diffusion* (Paris, La Haye 1971) 17–91; *Denis A. Zakythinos*, *Le Despotat grec de Morée*, vols. I–II (London 1975); *Kenneth M. Setton*, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204–1571)*, vol. I, *The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries* (Philadelphia 1976) 1–162.

² *Jacoby*, *La féodalité en Grèce médiévale*, 213–236; *Anthony Luttrell*, *The Latins of Argos and Nauplia: 1311–1394*, in: *Papers of the British School at Rome* 34 (n.s. 21) (1966) 34–55, repr. in: *idem*, *Latin Greece, the Hospitallers and the Crusades 1291–1440* (London 1982) VIII.

³ Crete has been purposely left out of this paper because it was entirely in the Venetian orbit and its development, therefore, differed in several ways from that of the Greek mainland and the islands in the latter's vicinity.

⁴ *Kenneth M. Setton*, *Catalan Domination of Athens, 1311–1388* (London 1975), and *idem*, *The Papacy and the Levant*, vol. I, 405–473.

⁵ *Jacoby*, *La féodalité en Grèce médiévale*, 185–202, 210–211, 237–239, 271–81, 295–302; *Johannes Koder*, *Negroponte. Untersuchungen zur Topographie und Siedlungsgeschichte der Insel Euböia während der Zeit der Venezianerherrschaft* (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Denkschriften 112, Wien 1973); *B. J. Slot*, *Archipelagus Turbatus. Les Cyclades entre colonisation latine et occupation turque, c 1500–1718*, vol. I (Nederlands historisch-archaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul 51, Istanbul 1982) 13–65.

were familiar. Other knights came from northern and central Italy. The quest for landed fiefs was the main incentive prompting their settlement in Latin Greece, yet in the fourteenth century we also find in the Principality of Morea knights and sergeants holding exclusively money-fiefs or money-sergeantries. The lords and their retinue resided either in inland castles or in the acropolis of their main city. Whatever the case, many of them also owned or held property in urban centres. Economic pursuits, namely trade, banking and the exercise of crafts induced a far larger number of Latin commoners, mostly Italians, to settle in the main ports and some inland cities of Latin Greece. The strong political links existing between the Kingdom of Naples and the Principality of Morea since the late 1260s and the military support provided by the former to the latter fostered economic intercourse between these regions, afforded opportunities for the merchants and bankers active in the kingdom to extend their business to the principality, and enhanced the immigration of knights and commoners from southern and central Italy to the Peloponnese. On the other hand, Venetian seaborne trade, Venice's rule over Modon and Coron and its presence in a quarter of the city of Negroponte and in neighbouring islands account for the concentration of Venetian settlers in these areas. Venetians, however, also established themselves elsewhere, as in Chiarenza, Argos and Nauplia. Finally, the Catalan conquest of the duchy of Athens in 1311 resulted in immigration from Aragonese territories and in strong economic ties with them. These various factors account for the diversity of the Latin population established in Greece and the complexity of western involvement in the economy of this region⁶.

The Latin conquest of western Romania brought about a redistribution of real estate in favour of the Latins, who took hold of imperial lands and those of absentee landlords. In addition, they confiscated some of the property belonging to, or held by local ecclesiastical institutions and members of the former Byzantine social elite, the *archontes*, remaining under their rule. This development, however, did not alter the nature of the region's predominantly agrarian economy. Land remained the main source of income, wealth and taxation. The conquerors, whether feudal lords, the Venetian state or the Catalans, displayed pragmatism and flexibility in their approach to local administrative, fiscal and legal institutions and practices. To a large extent they preserved the agrarian and social infrastructure inherited from the Byzantine period, while adapting it to the political regime they had introduced. In feudalized areas, however, the privatization of former state

⁶ *David Jacoby*, Social Evolution in Latin Greece, in: *Kenneth M. Setton* (ed.), *A History of the Crusades*, vol. VI (Madison, Wisconsin 1969–1989) 175–221; *David Jacoby*, From Byzantium to Latin Romania: Continuity and Change, in: *Mediterranean Historical Review* 4 (1989) 1–44, repr. in: *Benjamin Arbel*, *Bernard Hamilton* and *David Jacoby* (eds.), *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204* (London 1989); *David Jacoby*, La dimensione demografica e sociale, in: *Giorgio Cracco* and *Gherardo Ortalli* (eds.), *Storia di Venezia*, vol. II (Roma 1995) 681–711. Note, however, the presence of commoners from France, Germany and England in fourteenth century Patras: *Ernst Gerland*, *Neue Quellen zur Geschichte des lateinischen Erzbistums Patras* (Leipzig 1903) 89.

rights must have been hardly felt at the level of daily life. The basic continuity of the Byzantine infrastructure, which provided the framework for agricultural exploitation and taxation, is well illustrated by the structure of the large estates of Frankish Morea, numerous agricultural contracts, as well as Venetian and Catalan documents. Yet the flight of some *archontes* and the loss of property suffered by others who remained under Latin rule sharply reduced the financial capacity of the members of this group. The Latins also put an end to the dominant role of the local Byzantine elite in the sponsoring and financing of various economic activities in agriculture, manufacture and trade⁷.

This role is well illustrated for the eleventh and twelfth century. Indeed, the *archontes* of Thebes may be safely credited with the development of the silk industry in their city, which became the major industrial centre in western Byzantium and competed successfully with Constantinople in the quality and sophistication of its fabrics. They apparently acted as entrepreneurs, encouraging sericulture in their own region, providing capital for the industrial infrastructure, and attracting highly-skilled labour. In addition, they had a predominant share in the trade in Theban silk fabrics, either selling them to Venetian merchants or exporting them on their own to Constantinople and other Byzantine cities. Local *archontes* presumably fulfilled a similar role in other centres of silk manufacture. In addition, the *archontes* assumed the role of intermediaries between rural producers and the marketing network, as in the Peloponnese. For instance, those of Sparta sold locally or exported olive oil produced on their own and most likely also on other estates⁸. The diminished economic role of the *archontes* after 1204 provided an opportunity for the Latins to step in and exploit the resources of the territories under their rule.

On a more general level, the events of 1204 resulted in the collapse of the centralized system of imperial supervision over the economy of western Romania and definitively abolished the restrictive control of the Byzantine state over specific branches of manufacture and trade. Thus, for instance, before the Fourth Crusade the export of raw silk and several types of silk fabrics from the Empire was either prohibited or severely limited. In addition, Latins were apparently barred from investments in the Byzantine silk industry⁹. The contrast with developments in the aftermath of the Latin conquest is striking. The political fragmentation of Latin Romania stimulated competition. It prevented the Latin lords from limiting western access to raw silk or silk fabrics manufactured on their respective territories or from supervising the distribution of these commodities. It was in their best interest to provide foreign traders with direct access to sources of production and markets, attract investments, enhance foreign purchases, and thereby ensure themselves of increased revenues from trade and customs dues. In short, there was

⁷ Jacoby, *From Byzantium to Latin Romania*, esp. 26–32.

⁸ See David Jacoby, *Silk in Western Byzantium before the Fourth Crusade*, in: *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 84/85 (1991–1992) 470–488, 492.

⁹ *Ibid.* 490–492.

a striking departure from traditional Byzantine policies and practices, clearly not limited to silk, which substantially furthered Latin penetration into the economy of the region.

This last process had in fact begun much earlier, though on a more modest scale. It was fostered by the conjunction of two important developments, one proper to Byzantium and the other to the pattern of seaborne trade of the western maritime powers in the Mediterranean. Since the first half of the eleventh century the Byzantine social elite and the urban middle stratum, the latter particularly in Constantinople, enjoyed an accumulation of wealth generating a change in behavioural patterns and a rise in the consumption of luxury products. The increasing demand for silks in this framework stimulated an expansion of the Empire's silk industry and a diversification of its products, which henceforth also included lower-grade silk fabrics. The rise and development of new centres of silk manufacture in the western provinces of the Empire since the eleventh century, particularly at Thebes, Corinth and Patras, as well as in the islands of Andros and Euboea, was clearly oriented toward the supply of the Byzantine internal market, primarily the Empire's capital. The higher standard of living of a section of the urban population in Constantinople was also illustrated by the growing consumption of foodstuffs imported from remote provinces¹⁰.

The seaborne trade of Venice, Amalfi, Pisa and Genoa in the Eastern Mediterranean was closely linked to this general evolution¹¹. It was not limited to the exchange of goods between these cities and Romania, as commonly believed. Since the second half of the eleventh century Venetian merchants and carriers took advantage of their sailing between Venice and Constantinople to engage in business operations in the main ports of call along their way. They increasingly conveyed agricultural, pastoral and industrial commodities between the provinces and the capital of the Empire and thus progressively expanded their operations within the internal trade and shipping networks of Byzantium. For instance, in the twelfth century the Venetians were involved in complex business ventures involving silk fabrics and presumably also other commodities between Thebes, the Peloponnese, Thessalonica and Constantinople. In addition, they exported oil from the Peloponnese and cheese from Crete to the Byzantine capital. This development partly accounts for the Venetian dominance among foreign traders active in the Peloponnese and neighbouring territories, located along their main sailing route, before the Fourth Crusade. The first stage of Venetian commercial expansion within Romania was followed by a second one, when the Venetians gradually extended the geographic range of their operations in this region by connecting them with others in the Levant and in Egypt in the early twelfth century. Thus, for instance, Venetian merchants exported Byzantine silk fabrics and cheese to Egypt. Somewhat later Pisan and Genoese merchants active in Egypt and the Levant

¹⁰ Ibid. 472–473, 494.

¹¹ For what follows, see *ibid.* 493–500; *David Jacoby*, *La Venezia d'oltremare nel secondo Duecento*, in: *Cracco and Ortalli*, *Storia di Venezia*, vol. 2, 263–299.

similarly expanded their trade to Romania. This general development was greatly enhanced by the establishment of Latin rule and privileged commercial outposts in the Levant in the wake of the First Crusade. In this period, then, the formerly loosely connected trade links between the West, Romania and the Near East were integrated within a triangular system, each of these regions interacting with the others and enhancing commerce and shipping between them with its own products. The existence of this triangular network was of substantial importance for Latin migration, settlement and economic activity in the areas of western Romania, especially after the Fourth Crusade.

Seaborne trade between the West and the Byzantine Empire before 1204 was primarily based on the circular, cyclic and seasonal migration of travelling merchants returning to their base of departure. In addition, however, this trade also generated linear migration leading to the temporary or permanent settlement of small numbers of Latins in some key points within the Empire, the most important of which in western Romania were Thebes, Corinth and the city of Euripos, later known as Negroponte. The location of this region along the main waterways linking Venice and other western ports to both Constantinople and the Levant was of major importance in this respect. After 1204 the function of western Romania as a transit area within the triangular trade system of the Eastern Mediterranean further enhanced circular and linear migration. Three new factors substantially contributed to this process: the opening of the region to the Latins and the latter's easier access to local resources, including the products of the rural hinterland, the presence in the region of a resident Latin population and clientele, and new patterns of western demand. The latter derived from some general developments in the West since the twelfth century, which essentially consisted in a rise in purchasing power of an ever larger section of the population, in particular within the urban class, a growing inclination toward the display of luxury as a status symbol, and a refinement in daily life.

The conjunction of these factors called for a larger and more variegated supply of commodities, among which the share of finished products grew consistently. Yet it also provided the background to the rise of the Italian cotton and silk industries in the twelfth and their substantial growth in the thirteenth century, and to the accrued western demand for a diversified supply of industrial raw materials, which included high-grade dyestuffs used in all western textile industries. Latin Greece contributed its share to this supply. It exported to Italy raw silk, wool, locally manufactured textiles, hides, in addition to wine, raisins, oil, cheese, honey, as well as salt since the 1280s. This traffic was largely in the hands of Italian carriers from southern Italy, Genoa and especially Venice. The Latins, in particular those settled in western Romania, also increasingly intruded since the thirteenth century into short-haul and regional trade and transportation, and even the indigenous Greeks relied ever more on their ships. The enhanced demand in Italy for the products of western Romania, the intensification of commercial exchange between the two regions, the growing share of Italian vessels in this traffic and, finally, the activity of Italian travelling merchants and settlers led to a decisive

change in the orientation of western Romania's economy. Prior to the Fourth Crusade its surpluses of agricultural, pastoral and industrial products primarily supplied the internal Byzantine market, particularly Constantinople. By contrast, in the thirteenth century the region became increasingly integrated within a trade network largely geared toward the West, a shift substantially furthered since the second half of that century by Venetian presence and activity in the region. Indeed, the seaborne trade and shipping of Latin Greece were increasingly subordinated to the requirements, routes and seasonal rhythm of long-distance maritime trade dominated by Venetian merchants and carriers. These took advantage of Venice's naval and diplomatic protection and the logistical infrastructure offered by its colonies and commercial outposts.

The expanding volume of Latin mercantile migration, settlement and economic activity in western Romania was channeled to specific locations. Not surprisingly, Modon, Coron and Negroponte, regular stopovers for vessels sailing between Italy and the Eastern Mediterranean, were among the main beneficiaries of these developments. They supplied services to transiting merchants and ships, mainly Venetian. In addition, they functioned as warehouses, distribution centres and transshipment stations for commodities in transit or collected from nearby areas. Finally, they served as bases for western penetration into the hinterland. The same holds true of Patras and Corinth, both included in the Principality of Morea¹². These two ports acted as outlets for their own silk fabrics and the produce of their fairly rich countryside¹³. The evolution of Frankish Corinth in the thirteenth and fourteenth century is now better known, thanks to recent excavations and stratified coin finds¹⁴. The city enjoyed a lively economic activity, at any rate from the 1250s until the Catalan attack of 1312, judging by coins issued in Corinth itself by William II or in Chiarenza by this prince and his successors, building activity, and the import of pottery from northern and central Italy, in addition to Venice. All these suggest an increasing role of the city as regional commercial centre, its firmer integration within the western trade system, and a growing affluence¹⁵. The pres-

¹² For Patras, see *Bon*, *La Morée franque*, 449–453, and *Elene Saranti-Mendelovici*, *A propos de la ville de Patras aux 13^e–15^e siècles*, in: *Revue des études byzantines* 38 (1980) 219–232, none of whom, though, deals in a satisfactory way with the city's economy. Various aspects of the latter are examined by *Gerland*, *Neue Quellen*.

¹³ *David Jacoby*, *Silk Production in the Frankish Peloponnese: the Evidence of Fourteenth Century Surveys and Reports*, in: *Haris A. Kalligas* (ed.), *Travellers and Officials in the Peloponnese. Descriptions – Reports – Statistics*, in Honour of Sir Steven Runciman (Monemvasia 1994) 44–48, 54–55, 59–61. See also below.

¹⁴ For the history, see *Bon*, *La Morée franque*, 474–475. Archeological reports are by *Charles K. Williams*, *II* and *Orestes H. Zervos*, *Corinth*, 1990: Southeast Corner of Temenos E, in: *Hesperia* 60 (1991) 19–44, 51–58; Frankish Corinth: 1991, in: *Hesperia* 61 (1992) 133–191; Frankish Corinth: 1992, in: *Hesperia* 62 (1993) 1–52; Frankish Corinth: 1993, in: *Hesperia* 63 (1994) 1–56; Frankish Corinth: 1994, in: *Hesperia* 64 (1995) 1–60.

¹⁵ *Williams* in: *Hesperia* 61 (1992) 176–177, and *Hesperia* 62 (1993) 33–35, ascribes both the construction and the import of the pottery to the period beginning in the 1290s, while in: *Hesperia* 64 (1995) 16–22, to the late thirteenth century. The historical arguments for this dating are not convincing, and I shall return to them elsewhere. In any event, the coin finds

ence of coins issued by the Frankish dukes of Athens until 1311 confirm that Corinth continued to serve as a port of transit for the lordship of Athens and for Thebes in particular¹⁶. In 1312 the Catalans inflicted heavy damage on Corinth, attested by written and especially by archeological evidence. In the 1340s and 1350s Corinth suffered from Turkish raids¹⁷. The resulting sharp decline in population and in the volume of economic activity is illustrated by limited rebuilding of poor quality, the disappearance of Corinth's silk industry, and the absence of coins until the 1360s. Moreover, after 1311 the Catalans' use of Livadostro, a city under their rule, as maritime outlet for the lordship of Athens and particularly Thebes deflected a portion of their trade from Corinth¹⁸. Corinth appears nevertheless to have witnessed later the transit of commodities produced in its countryside, namely grain, raisins and *grana* or kermes, a scarlet dye derived from the dried bodies of a female insect, as attested for the 1330s by the commercial manual of Francesco Balducci Pegolotti¹⁹. Despite the efforts of Niccolò Acciaiuoli to restore the economy of the lordship of Corinth, which he obtained in 1358, the seigniorial revenue yielded by the city itself in 1365 was still lower than about 1210²⁰. Since the 1370s Corinth appears to have recovered and again fulfilled a fairly important role in trade, as suggested by the large number of Venetian coins found there²¹. It is also noteworthy that in 1389 the lord of Corinth, Nerio I Acciaiuoli, had merchandise "to the value of 12,000 to 15,000 florins", if not more,

point to prosperity beginning earlier. On building activity in the time of William II, see *Williams* in: *Hesperia* 60 (1991) 37–38; *Hesperia* 61 (1992) 142–146; *Hesperia* 62 (1993) 20.

¹⁶ Evidence on these functions in the preceding Byzantine period in *Ralph-Johannes Lilie*, *Handel und Politik zwischen dem byzantinischen Reich und den italienischen Kommunen Venedig, Pisa und Genua in der Epoche der Komnenen und der Angeli (1081–1204)* (Amsterdam 1984) 195–197.

¹⁷ *Antonio Rubió i Lluch* (ed.), *Diplomatari de l'Orient català (1301–1409)* (Barcelona 1947) [hereafter: DOC] no. 57, a letter of 1312 by Pope Clement V; *Elizabeth A. Zachariadou*, *Trade and Crusade. Venetian Crete and the Emirates of Menteshe and Aydin (1300–1415)* (Venice 1983) 42, 56, 66.

¹⁸ On Livadostro, see *Kenneth M. Setton*, *Catalan Domination of Athens, 1311–1388* (London 1975) 35, 85, 88. Yet on trade between Thebes and Corinth in the 1330s, see *Francesco Balducci Pegolotti*, *La pratica della mercatura*, ed. *Alan Evans* (Cambridge, Mass. 1936) [hereafter: *Pegolotti*] 119. On the fate of Corinth's silk industry, see *Jacoby*, *Silk Production in the Frankish Peloponnese*, 48–49, 58.

¹⁹ *Pegolotti*, 118, 149, 157, 208, 297.

²⁰ Shortly after 1210 Prince Geoffrey I of Villehardouin granted 400 hyperpers out of the revenue of the commercium of Corinth as money-fief: *Marino Sanudo Torsello*, *Istoria del Regno di Romania*, fol. 1v, in: *Charles Hopf* (ed.), *Chroniques gréco-romanes inédites ou peu connues* (Berlin 1873) 100; in 1365 the total seigniorial revenue from the city was only 615 hyperpers: *Jean Longnon* [et] *Peter Topping* (eds.), *Documents sur le régime des terres dans la principauté de Morée au XIVe siècle* (Paris, La Haye 1969) [hereafter LT] 162. See also *Jacoby*, *From Byzantium to Latin Romania*, 14–15.

²¹ The earliest is from the time of Doge Andrea Dandolo (1343–1354); the largest numbers are from the reigns of Andrea Contarini (1368–1382) and Antonio Venier (1382–1400): see *Alan Stahl*, *The Venetian Tornese. A Medieval Colonial Coinage* (The American Numismatic Society, Numismatic Notes and Monographs 163, New York 1985) 24–25, 82, and the reports mentioned above, n. 14.

stored in Corinth²². By contrast, Thebes suffered neither from the Latin conquest of 1209 nor from the Catalan conquest of 1311, and remained the major industrial centre of western Romania in the thirteenth and fourteenth century. Theban silks, renowned for their high quality, were exported to the West in the thirteenth and first quarter of the fourteenth century. In 1300 Venice granted the duke of Athens exemption from taxes for the transit of twenty pieces of samite he sent to the papal court. An unpublished commercial manual composed in Florence in the 1320s and later western sources attest to exports of silk fabrics to the West and Egypt²³. Not surprisingly, Thebes aroused wide interest among Latin merchants and bankers, as will soon be shown.

In addition to the economic factors considered until now, military factors as well as political and territorial fragmentation in Latin Greece also contributed to the development of consumption and trading centres, to changes in the trade network, and to the distribution and concentration of Latin migration and settlement. Andravida, in the midst of the fertile plain of Elis, was one of the major urban centres of the Peloponnese at the time of the conquest. Its choice as princely residence shortly afterwards was largely determined by two major considerations. The extensive pasture land surrounding it enabled the grazing of numerous horses, a prime military factor initially related to the conquest of the southwestern Peloponnese and, later, to the maintenance of the principality's cavalry. Secondly, a short distance only separated Andravida from the most convenient landing place along the western coast of the peninsula at which military reinforcements and supplies could be brought in from Italy. The political function of Andravida, underscored by the convening of the princely court and knightly assemblies, contributed to the establishment of an episcopal see in the city and attracted settlers, both knights and commoners²⁴.

The connection of the landing place just mentioned with Andravida decisively contributed to the swift economic and urban growth of a new port, Chiarenza, which by the mid-thirteenth century had already become the main emporium of Frankish Morea. Its role as outlet for the growing export of rural products from its hinterland to Italy and as transit port further contributed to its economic development²⁵. The princes had a mansion in the city, at which Isabella of Villehar-

²² These sums appear in a proposal submitted to Venice by Nerio's brother, Donato: *Jean Alexandre Buchon* (ed.), *Nouvelles recherches historiques sur la principauté française de Morée et ses hautes baronnies*, vol. 2/1 (Paris 1843–1845) 238.

²³ *Jacoby*, *Silk in Western Byzantium*, 464 and n. 63; for the 1230s and 1240s, see below 118–119; for 1300: *Elena Favaro* (ed.), *Cassiere della Bolla Ducale – Grazie – Novus Liber* (1299–1305) (Fonti per la storia di Venezia, Sez. I – Archivi pubblici, Venezia 1962) 32 no. 136: *pro faciendo gratia ... de dacio peciarum .XX. de samitis quas idem dominus dux misit ad Romanam curiam per aquas nostras*.

²⁴ At the time of the conquest: *Jean Longnon* (ed.), *Livre de la conquête de la principauté de l'Amorée. Chronique de Morée (1204–1305)* (Paris 1911) [hereafter: *Chronique de Morée*] pars. 92–93, 105. On the Frankish city: *Bon*, *La Morée franque*, 318–320, 547–553, 590–591, 677–678.

²⁵ According to *Chronique de Morée* par. 110, this was definitely a new port: *dou port de*

douin and Philip of Savoy stayed for some time after arriving in the Morea in 1301²⁶. From Giovanni Boccaccio's story of Alatiel, the daughter of the sultan of Egypt, we may gather that it was located on a cliff overlooking the shore, possibly within the *castrum* or citadel²⁷. Some knights and barons also had houses in the city²⁸, and the princely court was occasionally convened there, all of which enhanced Chiarenza's economic activity. The city maintained its expansion and prosperity as long as the favorable geo-political conditions that enabled its rise persisted. It may have already begun to decline in the late fourteenth century. According to an estimate made in 1391 for Amadeo of Savoy, who aspired to become prince of Frankish Morea, there were only about 300 households or between 1,200 and 1,500 inhabitants in Chiarenza²⁹. Finally, two more urban centres enjoying a limited growth should be mentioned in this context. Political factors promoted the development of Athens, its lord residing on the Acropolis, and that of Naxos, capital of the duchy bearing that name, which had the advantage of being accessible from the sea. The presence of the rulers, their court and administration attracted Latin settlers and stimulated economic activity.

Some of the cities just mentioned were not only trading and consumption centres, but also functioned as financial markets. In the thirteenth century credit required for commercial and non-commercial purposes in western Romania was mainly supplied by resident Italian merchants and bankers. The connection between trade and credit in Latin Romania is well illustrated since an early date. The Venetian Matteo di Manzolo at first conducted trade from Venice with the Aegean island of Melos, which belonged to the Duchy of Naxos ruled since 1207 by a

Saint Zacarie, la ou la ville de Clarence est ores, i.e. now. On the city: *Bon*, La Morée franque, 320–325, 602–607; *Elene Saranti-Mendelovici*, He mesaionikē Glarentza, in: *Diptycha he-taireias byzantinōn kai metabyzantinōn meletōn* 2 (1980–1981) 61–71, both without sufficient considerations about the economy. The transit function of Chiarenza in the 1330s is well conveyed by *Pegolotti*, 117: Et se la mercatantia che mettesi in Chiarenza non la volessi vendere in Chiarenza e volessila trarre di Chiarenza per portarla in altra parte a vendere, si la puoi trarre senza pagare niuno diritto.

²⁶ *Chronique de Morée* pars. 848–867, esp. 858; *Alfred Morel-Fatio* (ed.), *Libro de los fechos et conquistas del principado de la Morea* compilado por comandamiento de Don Fray Johan Ferrandez de Heredia (Publications de la Société de l'Orient latin, Série historique 4, Genève 1885) pars. 506–513, esp. 509.

²⁷ *Vittore Branca* (ed.), *Decamerone* in: *Tutte le opere di Giovanni Boccaccio*, vol. 4 (Milano 1974–1983) 169–171, Second Day, Seventh Tale. As shown recently, the story is not based on historical facts yet contains some trustworthy elements, among them on Chiarenza, reflecting Boccaccio's years in Naples from 1326 to 1339, his friendship there with Niccolò Acciaiuoli, and his acquaintance with Florentine merchants and bankers active in the Morea; the *Decamerone* was completed between 1349 and 1351: see *Peter Schreiner*, Ein Mord in Glarentza: der *Decamerone* von Boccaccio und die Peloponnes im 14. Jahrhundert, in: *Hero Hokerwerda*, *Edmé R. Smits* and *Marinus M. Woesthuis* (eds.), *Polyphonia Byzantina. Studies in Honour of Willem J. Aerts* (Groningen 1993) 251–255. For the location of the citadel, see *Bon*, La Morée franque, Album, plate 22.

²⁸ LT 48 1. 29, house of Lise du Quartier prior to 1337; 196 ll. 19–23, house of Lorenzo Acciaiuoli in 1379, which he may have inherited from his father Niccolò.

²⁹ Text in *Bon*, La Morée franque, 692.

branch of the Venetian Sanudo family. He settled in Melos some time before 1219, yet by 1222 had returned to Venice. In 1239 he apparently resided and traded in Negroponte, where he served as agent for Angelo Sanudo, duke of Naxos, and acted as guarantor for a loan which the latter received from Andrea Ghisi, another Venetian³⁰. Thebes was yet another important banking centre, in which credit played an important role in the financing of the local silk industry³¹. Since 1255 both Guy I of la Roche, lord of Athens, and Venice sided with the barons of Euboea who refused to acknowledge the suzerainty of the prince of Morea, William II, over the island³². It is not surprising, therefore, that after arriving in Negroponte at the head of a Venetian military contingent Marco Gradenigo should have turned to Thebes to finance his activity. In December 1255 he borrowed the sum of 2,740 hyperpers from a group of seven of the city's Latin *burgenses*, long-term or permanent residents, among whom we find one hailing from Brindisi and three others bearing the surname Grasso. In May 1256 three members of the consortium gave power of attorney to three merchants from Piacenza, with whom they obviously conducted business, to obtain the reimbursement of their share of the loan from the Commune of Venice³³. One of these individuals, Rinaldo Beccario, had been living for many years in Venice, from where he operated as far as Greece³⁴.

Chiarenza, however, became the major credit centre of Latin Greece in the second half of the thirteenth century. A number of merchants hailing from Italian inland cities and settled in Chiarenza were involved in trade and in credit operations. Two of them known by name, both Sienese, warrant our attention. They were granted fiefs in Frankish Morea as partial or full repayment for large loans made to Prince William II or to Angevin baillis who ruled the principality after the prince's death in 1278. One of them was Petrono of Siena, established at Chiarenza since about 1260. In 1293 Prince Florent of Hainault intervened on his behalf after the authorities of Ancona had confiscated a sum of 1,400 florins belonging to him, from which we may gather that his inclusion within the knightly class of Frankish Morea did not prevent him from pursuing his commercial and financial dealings³⁵. The same holds true of Mino Mainetti, or Manetti, another Sienese

³⁰ For the career of Matteo di Manzolo: *Raimondo Morozzo della Rocca and Antonino Lombardo* (eds.), *Documenti del commercio veneziano nei secoli XI-XIII* (Torino 1940) [hereafter DCV] nos. 558, 583, 592, 606, 607, 628, 640, 643, 646, 756, 765, 774 (1245, with reference to 1239); see also *Jacoby*, *La Venezia d'oltremare nel secondo Duecento*, and for the loan, *idem*, *La féodalité*, 271–272.

³¹ For details, see below 118–119.

³² Background in *Jacoby*, *La féodalité*, 24, 190–193.

³³ DCV no. 833. In this document the surname Grasso is spelled 'Grasius'. It is attested in both Venice and Genoa: see below, n. 86.

³⁴ Rinaldo Beccario de confinio Sancti Eustadii in Venice appears as quondam de Placentia, nunc Venecia commorante as early as January 1247 (and not 1246, as indicated by the editors): *ibid.* no. 778.

³⁵ *Charles Perrat et Jean Longnon* (eds.), *Actes relatifs à la principauté de Morée, 1289–1300* (Collection de documents inédits sur l'histoire de France, Série in 8^o.6, Paris 1967) 70–71 no.

residing at Chiarenza. Some time before 1294 he was rewarded with a fief in the principality and full exemption from commercial taxes on land and maritime trade³⁶. We lack any information, however, about the commodities these Sieneese handled.

The business methods of Italian bankers settled in Latin Greece, the links between them and their colleagues, and the particular circumstances necessitating large non-commercial loans in this region are strikingly illustrated by the unpublished will of the Sieneese Azzolino Rustichino, drafted in the latter's residence in the city of Negroponte by a Sieneese notary on 11 October 1312. This individual apparently belonged to the rich and influential Sieneese mercantile and banking family of the Piccolomini³⁷. Since he does not mention this family in his will, he may have been acting on his own. Azzolino had a personal account book, in which he registered in detail his financial operations. He explicitly mentions one of them *prout continetur distinte in libro meo*, which clearly points to his activity as a merchant-banker³⁸. In the preceding years Azzolino had conducted his major dealings with Walter, count of Brienne and Lecce, duke of Athens from the summer of 1309 to his death at the hands of the Catalan Company on 15 March 1311. In the spring of 1310 Walter of Brienne had hired this military contingent in order to re-establish the protectorate held since 1303 by his predecessor Guy II of La Roche over the Greek state of Thessaly, and waged with it a successful campaign that enabled him to extend his rule northwards, beyond the territory of southern Thessaly already in his hands. The financing of this costly military venture compelled Walter to borrow heavily. His inability to muster all the necessary resources induced him after the campaign to retain in his service only two hundred horsemen and three hundred foot soldiers of the Company, and to dismiss the others without paying the arrears he owed them for four months. This step led to his confrontation with the Company, his violent death, and the loss of

67: quod dictus Petronus jam sunt anni triginta et plus elapsi qui pheudetarius et homo noster ligius extiterat et burgensis [Clarentie].

³⁶ *Perrat et Longnon*, Actes relatifs à la principauté de Morée, 97–98 no. 94; he appears as mercator and habitator of Chiarenza, a term generally pointing either to a fairly recent settlement or to temporary residence. The Manetti were among the families of Siena legally excluded from the popolo and later from government, although exceptionally one of its members served on the Council of the Nine in 1304: *William M. Bowsky*, *A Medieval Commune. Siena under the Nine, 1287–1355* (Berkeley 1981) 72.

³⁷ I wish to thank here Dott. Mario Borracelli, Siena, who has kindly sent me a transcription of this precious document, preserved at the Archivio di Stato of Siena, which he plans to publish. He has also suggested the link with the Piccolimini family. A contract by Ranieri di Rustichino Piccolimini in 1258 indeed points to the name 'Rustichino' in the family: *Edward D. English*, *Enterprise and Liability in Sieneese Banking, 1230–1350* (Cambridge, Mass. 1988) 47–48. On the Piccolimini, see *ibid.* 22–25, 85–93.

³⁸ In Venice the bankers' ledgers were *cosa publica* and had the same authority as notarized documents: see *Reinhold C. Mueller*, *The Role of Bank Money in Venice, 1300–1500*, in: *Studi Veneziani*, n.s. 3 (1979) 49–50, 59. This appears to have also been the rule elsewhere.

his duchy³⁹. As surety for a loan he received from Azzolino the duke pledged 13,905 florins on the income of his French lordship of Brienne, in Champagne⁴⁰.

After Walter's death his widow, Jeanne of Châtillon, possibly held out for some time on the Athenian Acropolis before fleeing to the city of Negroponte, like many other Frankish residents of the duchy⁴¹. She granted Azzolino a confirmation of the duke's pledge⁴², and obtained from him another loan, for which she owed 8,000 hyperpers. It would seem that as surety for one of the loans either Walter of Brienne or his widow had deposited with the Sienese banker a gold crown adorned with pearls and precious stones, which presumably belonged to the duke, a garland, the nature of which is not specified, and jewels worth 800 hyperpers which possibly were Jeanne's own. The Sienese banker had entrusted these pawns to Agostino Sassi for sale, because neither the duke nor the duchess were in a position to reimburse the loans and he apparently needed cash⁴³. Significantly, Azzolino Rustichino had been appointed *baiulus* or administrator of the Duchy of Athens, presumably by Walter during his brief rule or else by Jeanne before she left Negroponte for Naples, in the hope that his business experience would be most useful once the territory were recovered from the Catalans. It was also a convenient way to enable him the recovery of his loans directly from the revenue of the duchy⁴⁴.

³⁹ *Longnon*, *L'empire latin de Constantinople*, 295–299; on Walter of Brienne: *Setton*, *Catalan Domination of Athens*, 6–13; on political and territorial aspects: *David Jacoby*, *Catalans, Turcs et Vénitiens en Roumanie (1305–1332): un nouveau témoignage de Marino Sanudo Torsello*, in: *Studi Medievali*, 3a serie 15 (1974) 226–232, repr. in: *idem*, *Recherches sur la Méditerranée orientale du XIIe au XVe siècle. Peuples, sociétés, économies* (London 1979) V.

⁴⁰ Walter paid four ounces a month to heavily armed horsemen, two to light cavalymen and one to foot soldiers: *E. B.* (ed.), *Crònica de Ramon Muntaner*, Text i notes, vol. 6 (*Col·lecció popular Barcino*, Barcelona 1927–1952) 106, chap. 240. If the two hundred horsemen whom the duke retained in his service after six months of campaign were of the first category, their wages would have swallowed up the entire loan, since they totalled 4,800 ounces (200 x four ounces a month x 6) or 24,000 florins. On the exchange rate of one ounce: 5 florins, see below 116.

⁴¹ *Morel-Fatio*, *Libro de los fechos*, pars. 552–554. *Setton*, *Catalan Domination of Athens*, 13, wrongly believes that the duchess fled to the Morea. Negroponte, however, was a far more likely destination, considering its proximity to Athens and the arrival there of Frankish refugees (*cuncti fideles latini*) from the duchy, mentioned by Clement V in 1313: DOC nos. 60 and 318, a reference of 1371 to their numerous descendants in the island. Finally, Azzolino's residence is yet another argument in favour of Negroponte.

⁴² Azzolino's will mentions two letters, one from the duke and the other from Jeanne.

⁴³ This individual had died in the meantime, and the objects were to be delivered by the executors of his will to those of Azzolino. In January 1321 Jeanne's son Walter of Brienne came of age and was compelled to assume liability for the debts incurred by both his parents with respect to their Greek lands, according to two documents published by *André du Chesne* (ed.), *Histoire de la maison de Chastillon sur Marne* (Paris 1621) *Preuves*, 212–214. The first of these documents also appears in DOC no. 112. For their correct dating, see *Luttrell*, *The Latins of Argos and Nauplia*, 35 n. 3.

⁴⁴ While at Naples Jeanne was sending reinforcements to her lordship of Argos and Nauplia by March 1312: *Karl Hopf*, *Geschichte Griechenlands vom Beginn des Mittelalters bis auf unsere Zeit*, in: *Ersch und Gruber*, *Allgemeine Enzyklopädie der Wissenschaften*, vol. 85

Azzolino Rustichino was a wealthy man, judging by his yet unrecovered loans, the large liquid capital he owned, and his numerous legacies reaching a total of several thousand florins. Incidentally, one of these consisted in 100 florins promised to the Hospitallers *pro passagio de ultramare*. Yet, apart from using his own resources in business, he took advantage of his business connections to enlarge the capital at his disposal. His legacies to ecclesiastical institutions in Athens, Negroponte, Chiarenza and particularly Siena, as well as to individuals in this city and Thebes, point to these connections. He appointed Vanne di Tese Tolomei, a rich and influential member of this family in Siena, as one of the three executors of his will in Italy, France and elsewhere in the West⁴⁵. Two mercantile and banking companies formed by the Tolomei were operating at that time, yet had run into serious difficulties⁴⁶. He owed 100 Sienese pounds to Guccio Viviano of Siena, who belonged to the Vignari family, several members of which served on the Council of the Nine ruling the city in that period⁴⁷. Azzolino further acknowledged a small debt to Elabruccio Saraceni of Thebes, most likely a member of the Sienese Saraceni family which played a prominent role in Siena's trade, banking and government in the late thirteenth and fourteenth century⁴⁸. When the Catalan Company invaded the Duchy of Athens in 1311 the Saraceni of Thebes, like many other Latins settled in the duchy, fled to Negroponte where they are later attested as a prominent and rich family⁴⁹. Azzolino also acknowledged a debt of 300 florins to the Florentine Cerchi Bianchi mercantile and banking company (*societas*), active in this period in Greece⁵⁰. In short, he had business connections

(Leipzig 1867–1868) 411. On 22 November of the same year she appointed her own father Walter of Châtillon bailiulus and procurator of all the Brienne possessions, thus also those in Greece, presumably after learning of Azzolino's death: text in *Nicolas Vigner* (ed.), *Histoire de la maison de Luxembourg* (Paris 1619) 245. Walter appears in this capacity, though without explicit reference to the title, in several documents of 1314 and 1318: DOC nos. 63, 65, 93.

⁴⁵ On this individual, see *Bowsky*, *A Medieval Commune*, 113, 274; *idem*, *The Finance of the Commune of Siena* (Oxford 1970) 147 n. 101.

⁴⁶ See *English*, *Enterprise and Liability*, 79–100.

⁴⁷ *Bowsky*, *A Medieval Commune*, 73, 97 and 267–268, on the name Viviano in the family.

⁴⁸ *English*, *Enterprise and Liability*, 65 n. 27, 95 n. 42, 98 n. 51, 109.

⁴⁹ Saraceno de' Saraceni appears as burgensis of Negroponte in 1359 and as civis of the city in 1381: DOC nos. 239 and 467, respectively. In 1381 he was among the prominent individuals to whom Pedro IV of Aragon recommended his representative in Greece. In 1370 he was awarded full Venetian citizenship, presumably in return for financial and possibly also diplomatic support to Venice: *Ferdinand Gregorovius*, *Geschichte der Stadt Athen im Mittelalter von der Zeit Justinian's bis zur türkischen Eroberung*, vol. 2 (Stuttgart 1889) 210 and n. 1: *nostre civitatis Negropontis burgensis* [i.e., he lived in the Venetian part of the city] *originarius civis prefatae civitatis* [i.e. of Venice]. Gregorovius rightly suggested that the family originated in Siena. *Setton*, *Catalan Domination of Athens*, 186, errs in assuming that it was Venetian. Saraceno's daughter Agnes wedded Nerio I Acciaiuoli, who became lord of Athens in 1388, and like him died in 1394. His son Pietro was also involved in the affairs of the region: *ibid.* 186, 191, 198.

⁵⁰ On which see also below 113–114.

with members of prominent mercantile and banking families of Siena and Florence, and his ventures also extended to the West.

The loans offered by Azzolino were substantial. Since the mid-thirteenth century, however, there was an increasing demand in Latin Greece for large-scale non-commercial credit, which individual bankers were unable to meet. These circumstances opened the way to Italian mercantile and banking companies holding more liquid assets, enjoying a superior business organization, and operating in a wider geographic setting. These companies, which began to appear in the West in the early thirteenth century, shared several features. They were founded and maintained their headquarters in inland cities of central Italy, from where they gradually expanded the range of their activity as far as Flanders and England. They were corporate bodies endowed with a continuous legal identity that transcended the temporary partnerships binding their respective members. Their operation was based on a network of permanent agencies established outside the home-city, run by partners or by factors, salaried employees, who were formally empowered to act on behalf of the company they represented. The branches of the company were practically autonomous in their dealings, yet coordinated their business with their headquarters by correspondence and by messengers. The company also employed local correspondents at places where it had no permanent branch. After being stationed for some years at one location, partners and factors were transferred to another branch, as if rotating around their head-office, or returned to the latter. This rotating migration constituted a third type of mercantile mobility, in addition to circular and linear migration, already noted earlier⁵¹.

There is yet another feature common to the Italian mercantile and banking companies that should be stressed. They initially engaged in long-distance commercial and financial operations exclusively linked to western overland trade and consistently abstained from direct investments in shipping, a principle upheld throughout their existence⁵². This last feature goes far to explain their absence from the Eastern Mediterranean region up to the 1240s. Since then, however, they extended their activity to the crusader Levant and to Frankish Greece. Factors and circumstances common to both areas account for this development. The heavy expenditure for military purposes incurred by rulers, feudal lords and governors in the Eastern Mediterranean required credit on a massive scale⁵³. In addition, the financial operations of the Papacy, which essentially consisted in the transfer of funds to the papal treasury, were carried out on a fairly regular basis with the help

⁵¹ On the structure, legal continuity, operation, personnel and account books of the companies, see *Armando Saporì*, *Storia interna della compagnia mercantile dei Peruzzi*, in: *idem*, *Studi di storia economica (secoli XIII-XIV-XV)* (Firenze 1955-1967) 653-694; *idem*, *Il personale delle compagnie mercantili del medioevo*, in: *ibid.* 695-763.

⁵² In this respect the business methods of the mercantile and banking companies of Italian inland cities contrasted sharply with those of the merchants of maritime cities such as Venice, Genoa and Pisa.

⁵³ See *David Jacoby*, *Migration, Trade and Banking in Crusader Acre*, in: *Lenos Mavroumatis* (ed.), *The Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean* (Athens 1997) [in press].

of Italian mercantile and banking houses since the 1230s⁵⁴. This last type of operations led to the establishment of business relations with Latin church dignitaries.

The presence of Italian mercantile and banking companies in Latin Greece is documented since the 1270s. The earliest evidence in this respect appears to be included in a letter of 1273 sent by King Charles I of Sicily to Prince William II of the Morea, in which he asked to dispense justice to a Pisan citizen having a claim *contra Scottum vel personas alias*. This may well be a reference to the Scotti company, yet it is unclear where it was based since firms bearing that name existed in both Piacenza and Siena⁵⁵. In any event, neither the nature nor the scope of the company's business in Greece is known. The cash book of an unidentified Sienese company covering the years 1277–1282 provides more reliable and detailed information and offers a glimpse into the management of mercantile and banking companies in general at that time. This company, which had many dealings with another Sienese firm, the Tolomei, combined trade in local commodities such as wool, linen and felt, and in imported woollens from the Low Countries with extensive money-lending in central and southern Italy⁵⁶. Yet it also engaged in large-scale operations in Romania, as implied by a reference to its *Livro de la ragione di Romania*, or 'account book of Romania', that unfortunately has not survived⁵⁷. Several precise references in the extant cash book of the company point to the existence of a branch at Chiarenza, which served as a base for financial and commercial dealings in the Peloponnese and possibly also in neighbouring areas. Factors and messengers travelled, apparently quite regularly, between Siena and Chiarenza via Pisa, Barletta or Naples⁵⁸. In June 1278 Uguccio da Chiarenza brought

⁵⁴ Glenn Olsen, Italian Merchants and the Performance of Papal Banking Functions in the Early Thirteenth Century, in: David Herlihy, Robert S. Lopez and Vsevolod Slessarev (eds.), *Economy, Society and Government in Medieval Italy. Essays in memory of Robert L. Reynolds* (Kent, Ohio 1969) = *Explorations in Economic History* 7 (1969) 43–63; *English, Enterprise and Liability*, 9–40.

⁵⁵ Riccardo Filangieri et al. (eds.), *I registri della cancelleria angioina*, vol. 10 (Napoli 1950–) 93 no. 373 (29 June 1273): Iacobo Alfei, procuratori Bergii quondam Symeonis de Quarto, civi pisano. On the Scotti in Siena, see *English, Enterprise and Liability*, 16, 35, 46; on those of Piacenza, see Pierre Racine in: Piero Castignoli and Maria Angiola Romanini (eds.), *Storia di Piacenza*, vol. II, *Dal vescovo conte alla signoria* (996–1313) (Piacenza 1984) 198, 221–222, 301–346.

⁵⁶ Guido Astuti (ed.), *Il libro dell'entrata e dell'uscita di una compagnia mercantile senese del secolo XIII (1277–1282)* (Documenti e studi per la storia del commercio e del diritto commerciale italiano 5, Torino 1934) X–XXII, for the nature of the company, its account book and the range of its activities; see IX, for the dating of the book's sections. On relations with the Tolomei, see Robert-Henri Bautier, *Les Tolomei de Sienne aux foires de Champagne d'après un compte-rendu de leurs opérations à la foire de Provins en 1279*, in: *Recueils de travaux offerts à M. Clovis Brunel*, vol. 1 (Paris 1955) 110, repr. in: *idem*, *Commerce méditerranéen et banquiers italiens au Moyen Âge* (Aldershot, Hampshire 1992) VIII.

⁵⁷ Astuti, *Il libro* 121 (August 1278).

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* 251: merchandise brought from Romania in May 1282; 306: via Pisa to Romania in May–June 1278; 351: via Barletta to Chiarenza in October 1278; 482: via Pisa to Chiarenza in March 1280; 484: a letter received by messenger from Chiarenza via Naples in March or April 1280.

to Siena a *fiardello* of an unspecified merchandise. Since the term was often used for the standard parcel of raw silk, it would seem that the company occasionally imported this commodity from Greece⁵⁹. Another item in the account book refers to Meo Tancredi da Chiarenza, who owed the company a large sum, part of which he reimbursed in April 1280⁶⁰.

The extant cash book of the Siennese company warrants our attention for yet another reason. It lists in great detail the daily movement of money, separating debit and credit entries, the former registered in the front half and the latter in the rear half of the ledger. In order to obtain the weekly balance the smaller total of either debit or credit was transferred to the other section. The cash book thus displays an innovative method of double-entry book-keeping, invented in Tuscany somewhat earlier, about the mid-thirteenth century, and perfected since⁶¹. We may be sure that the same method was applied in the Romania account book and in the office of the company at Chiarenza. It follows that since the last quarter of the thirteenth century the Italian mercantile and banking companies introduced new forms of business management into Latin Greece, the wider implications of which will be examined below. Their activity in Frankish Morea is well conveyed by Marino Sanudo the Elder, a Venetian author of the first half of the fourteenth century. In the time of Prince William II, he writes, "there was so much courtesy and kindness that not only the knights but also the merchants went around without cash (...) and with a simple handwritten note of theirs, cash was delivered to them"⁶². This flowery description points to the existence of individual accounts and to the grant of both consumption and commercial loans by mercantile and banking companies.

Several of these companies based in Florence extended their business to Latin Greece about 1300, yet it is unclear whether all of them had resident agents in Chiarenza, the centre of their activity in the region⁶³. The Cerchi Bianchi appear

⁵⁹ On the *fiardello*, see *Jacoby*, *Silk Production in the Frankish Peloponnese*, 48 n. 26.

⁶⁰ *Astuti*, *Il libro* 111, 159, and 250, a payment partly made in *torneselli piccioli* di Chiarenza in March 1282.

⁶¹ Periodical balances were apparently also established in the same period by the Tolomei, and most likely other Italian companies operating at the fairs of Champagne: *Bautier*, *Les Tolomei de Sienne*, 114–116. They must have been based on a system similar to the one applied in the account-book of the Siennese company. On the evolution of double-accounting, see *Federigo Melis*, *Aspetti della vita economica medievale* (*Studi nell'archivio Datini di Prato*), vol. 1 (Siena 1962) 391–434, esp. 399–400.

⁶² *Marino Sanudo Torsello*, *Istoria*, fol. 1v., in: *Hopf*, *Chroniques*, 101–102: Nel suo tempo fù nel principato tanta cortesia e amorevolezza, che non solamente li cavallieri mà anche li mercadanti andavano sù e giuso senza denari ... e con il semplice loro scritto di mano se li dava denari.

⁶³ *Yves Renouard*, *Le compagnie commerciali fiorentine del Trecento* (Dai documenti dell'Archivio Vaticano), in: *Archivio Storico Italiano* 96 (1938) 41–68, 163–179, and *Sapori*, *Il personale*, in: *Studi*, 717–754, have collected extensive information on the branches and personnel of these firms. However, this information is clearly incomplete since it does not include the agencies of the companies in Latin Greece, except for one case: see below.

as papal collectors in Frankish Morea between 1303 and 1305⁶⁴ and, as noted earlier, are mentioned in 1312 in the will of Azzolino Rustichini. A factor (*procurator et gestor negotiorum*) of the Mozzi firm conducted in 1306 large-scale trade in Chiarenza, totalling a value of 3,857 hyperpers at one point, as well as in Corinth and Negroponte. In 1312 two partners of the firm were entrusted by a former inhabitant of Prato who had settled in Patras to obtain the reimbursement of 500 florins, owed to him by a member of the Bardi firm stationed at Chiarenza⁶⁵. In 1310–1311 they had dealings with the archbishop of Patras, one of the leading barons of Frankish Morea since about 1278, who also acted as papal collector in Latin Romania, and in 1313 with the Latin Patriarch of Constantinople, who resided on Venetian soil. The Scali dealt with the bishop of Coron in 1326 and the Bonaccorsi with the archbishop of Catalan Thebes in 1330⁶⁶. The growing economic activity in Corinth from the mid-thirteenth century to 1312 attracted several Italian mercantile and banking companies, the operation of which in turn stimulated the local economy. The reckoning counters or jetons of some of these companies, which were presumably represented by resident factors, have been found in recent excavations within a fairly reduced space, which suggest a concentration of their activity in a specific area of the city⁶⁷. Three of the jetons were issued by the Sienese Tolomei company, to which we shall return below. A fourth has been ascribed to the Cerchi, whose activity in Greece from 1303 to 1312 has already been noted above, yet this attribution is not warranted⁶⁸. Another jeton bearing the letter B has not been securely identified for the time being⁶⁹.

⁶⁴ *Silvano Borsari*, *L'espansione economica fiorentina nell'Oriente cristiano sino alla metà del Trecento*, in: *Rivista Storica Italiana* 70 (1958) 499 and n. 3.

⁶⁵ *Robert Davidsohn*, *Forschungen zur Geschichte von Florenz*, vol. 3 (Berlin 1901) 98 no. 511, and 125 no. 636: the sum was to be obtained from Benghe Cini domini Jacobi de Bardis, sotius of Cino Tigliamochi de Florentia in terra Chiarentie provincie Romanie. On the status and responsibilities of the procurator or factor, see *Sapori*, *Il personale*, in: *Studi*, 699–704; *English*, *Enterprise and Liability*, 57.

⁶⁶ *Borsari*, *L'espansione economica fiorentina*, 503–504. Shortly before 1278 the archbishop of Patras, who held eight fiefs, acquired the barony of Patras with its twenty-four fiefs and thus became the most prominent baron of Frankish Morea: *Bon*, *La Morée franque*, 106, 114, 146, 453–457.

⁶⁷ See *Williams* in: *Hesperia* 61 (1992) 178. It should be noted that written sources do not offer any evidence about the activity of the companies in Corinth.

⁶⁸ For the Tolomei, see *Zervos*, *ibid.* 186 and 190 no. 45; *C. Piton*, *Les Lombards en France et à Paris*, II. *Jetons des Lombards aux XIVe et XVe siècles. Leurs marques, leurs poids-monnaies etc.*, vol. 2 (Paris 1892–1893) 98 no. 196. For the attribution to the Cerchi, see *Williams* and *Zervos* in: *Hesperia* 62 (1993) 34, 47 and 51 no. 76, yet the letter inscribed on both faces of the jeton is G, as suggested by a comparison with figures in *Piton*, *Les Lombards*, 83 no. 121, 91 no. 162, 100 no. 203. The lower part of the letter C has a different shape: see *ibid.* 91 nos. 160–161. The alternative identification with the Riccardi of Lucca is most unlikely, since there is no evidence for the operation of this company in Greece nor, for that matter, elsewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean.

⁶⁹ *Zervos*, in: *Hesperia* 61 (1992) 186 and 190 no. 44, tentatively ascribes the jeton bearing a large letter B on both faces to the Biccherna 'family' of Siena, yet the Biccherna was the leading Sienese financial magistracy, the activity of which was limited to the city itself and did not

The largest and richest Florentine companies attested in Latin Greece were the Bardi, Peruzzi and Acciaiuoli, each of which had its own permanent branch and resident personnel at Chiarenza. Those of the Bardi and Peruzzi are attested since 1301 and 1303, respectively⁷⁰. In 1317 both companies agreed to carry out financial operations on behalf of the papacy in several countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, including Frankish Morea, Negroponte and the ecclesiastical province of Neopatra in central Greece. These contracts were renewed in the following years, yet none of the two firms managed to exercise this activity on a regular base in Latin Greece⁷¹. The Acciaiuoli also engaged in such transfers, in 1321 from Catalan Thebes, on behalf of its archbishop, and in 1338 from unidentified places in Romania⁷². Piero Guicciardini was their factor at Chiarenza in May 1337, July 1341 and February 1342, and most likely remained there during all these years. In 1341 Pope Benedict XII ordered the archbishop of Patras to deliver 2,000 florins to him, in order that the sum be transferred to the papal treasury, yet the Acciaiuoli company collapsed before the money reached Avignon⁷³.

include banking: see *Bowsky*, The Finance of the Commune of Siena, 1–15, and *L. Borgia et al.*, Le Biccherne. Tavole dipinte delle magistrature senesi (secoli XIII–XVIII) (Roma 1984) 1–10. One of the alternative suggestions, the Bardi, is rather unlikely. As for the Bonsignori, they had another mark on their jeton: see *Piton*, Les Lombards 98 nos. 193–194, and for their heraldic standard, see *Borgia*, Le Biccherne, 341, and examples in figs. 5, 58, 67. Another jeton remains unidentified: *Zervos*, in: *Hesperia* 63 (1994) 52 no. 80. Its cross-like monogram bears some resemblance with the one in *Piton*, Les Lombards, 94 no. 174. The most recent find appears in *Hesperia* 64 (1995) 55, no. 109.

⁷⁰ *Borsari*, L'espansione economica fiorentina, 498–499. Mazzetto de' Peruzzi was stationed at Chiarenza: *Riccardo Predelli e Pietro Bosmin* (eds.), I libri commemoriali della Repubblica di Venezia. Regesti (1293–1787), vol. 1 (Reale deputazione veneta di storia patria. Monumenti storici, Ser. 1, Documenti, Venezia 1876–1914) 26 (lib. 1 no. 108). The presence of branches in Chiarenza is not explicitly attested, yet is implied by the operations carried out by these companies. On the Bardi branch in 1312 and on those of the two firms in 1315, see above 114 and below 116, respectively.

⁷¹ Text in *Yves Renouard*, Les relations des papes d'Avignon et des compagnies commerciales et bancaires de 1316 à 1378 (Paris 1941) 620–623, and see 163.

⁷² *Borsari*, L'espansione economica fiorentina, 504 and 500, respectively.

⁷³ For 1337, Petrus Guizardinus de Aczarolis: LT 53 l. 16; for 1341–1342: *Renouard*, Les relations des papes d'Avignon 166. Presumably after the collapse of the bank in 1343 Piero returned to Italy, where he is attested in 1353: *Emile-G. Léonard*, Histoire de Jeanne 1ère, reine de Naples, comtesse de Provence (1343–1382), vol. 3 (Monaco, Paris 1932–1937) 503–504 no. 1. In 1360 Niccolò suggested that Piero together with Andrea Buondelmonti should accompany the newly elected archbishop of Patras, Giovanni Acciaiuoli, to his see: *ibid.* 643–644, no. 95: *Ludovico Tanfani*, Niccolò Acciaiuoli. Studi storici fatti principalmente sui documenti dell'Archivio fiorentino (Firenze 1863) 42 and 108, states that on 17 February 1341, in anticipation of his departure from the Morea to Italy, Niccolò appointed in Chiarenza Silvestro Baroncelli, Jacopo di Donato Acciaiuoli and Manente di Gherardo Buondelmonti as his representatives in charge of the Moreot estates he had obtained somewhat earlier from Catherine of Valois. This would imply that they were stationed at Chiarenza: see *Anthony Luttrell*, Aldobrandino Baroncelli in Greece, 1378–1382, in: *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 36 (1970) 278–279, repr. in: *idem*, Latin Greece XII. It should be stressed, however, that the three were Niccolò's personal representatives, and not those of the bank. Moreover, they apparently were to deal with his affairs in Italy, and not in the Morea, as we may gather from the

The three major Florentine companies also engaged in the transfer of funds for lay rulers. In 1312 or early in 1313 the Bardi granted Prince Philip of Taranto two loans totalling 5,500 gold ounces for the defence of his Greek possessions. They were to be delivered in the Morea and reimbursed at the rate of five florins per ounce, or 27,500 florins⁷⁴. In 1315 the agents of the Bardi and the Peruzzi in Cyprus undertook to hand over in Chiarenza half the dowry promised to the infante Ferdinand of Maiorca after his marriage to Isabel of Ibelin, namely 50,000 white besants of Cyprus. Yet, since they were not sure that their respective branch in Chiarenza would have sufficient liquid capital, they promised that the missing part of the sum would be handed over by their colleagues in Messina. The other half of the dowry was to be paid either in that city or in Chiarenza⁷⁵. Eight years later the Acciaiuoli company provided loans and provisions to Prince John of Gravina, which enabled his expedition in the Morea in 1325–1326⁷⁶. The Tolomei of Siena, whose presence in Corinth before 1312 has been mentioned above, apparently also participated in the financing of the military effort. In return John of Gravina, while in the Morea, awarded in 1325 or 1326 to Diego Tolomei feudal property in the villages of Mandria and Sperone, the latter including salt pans⁷⁷. The Bardi, Peruzzi and Acciaiuoli pursued their banking operations in Frankish Morea until their failure in 1343. The houses belonging to the Peruzzi company at Chiarenza are recorded in the ledgers of the company covering the last eight years of its operation⁷⁸.

The Acciaiuoli, however, managed to supplant all their rivals in Frankish Morea. Their close relations with the Angevin court of Naples and the princes of the Morea enhanced their standing and enabled them to extend their landed, financial and commercial interests in both Italy and the principality. Their acquisition of estates in Frankish Morea is of particular interest in our context. While in

fact that the first among the three was in Florence in May 1341: *Renouard*, *Le compagnie commerciali fiorentine*, 49.

⁷⁴ *Regestum Clementis Papae V ... curia et studio monachorum ordinis S. Benedicti*, vol. 8 (Romae 1885–1892) 170–174 no. 9260 (22 April 1313) and 273–275 no. 9621 (1st September 1313). Gherardo Lanfredini, Rinaldo Lotteringhi and Dino Forzetti, representatives of the company, appear in this context. The second and the third among them are also known from other sources: see *Sapori*, *Il personale*, in: *Studi* 750 no. 292, from 1310 to 1320, and 736 no. 89, from 1310 to 1338.

⁷⁵ *Louis de Mas Latrie*, *Nouvelles preuves de l'histoire de Chypre*, in: *Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Chartes* 34 (1873) 51–52, repr. in: *idem*, *Histoire de l'île de Chypre*, vol. 4 (Famagusta 1970). The infante was about to leave for Frankish Morea in an attempt to conquer it.

⁷⁶ *Hopf*, *Geschichte*, 423–424.

⁷⁷ *Buchon*, *Nouvelles recherches historiques*, vol. 2/1, 45, 46–47, 68. In 1342 Niccolò Acciaiuoli transferred the salt pans he held in Sperone, some of which he had bought from Diego Tolomei, to the princely court in return for a fief he received in the area of Corinth: *ibid.* 111. Sperone was situated on the western coast of the Peloponnese to the north of Andravida: *LT*, 235–236. My dating of John of Gravina's grant relies on the Angevin register, destroyed in World War II, quoted by *Hopf*, *Geschichte Griechenlands*, 408 n. 11, although he cites other registers on 423 n. 70.

⁷⁸ *Armando Sapori* (ed.), *I Libri di commercio dei Peruzzi* (Milano 1934) 21–22, 154, 276, once in 1335 and twice in 1343, when the houses were sold for 150 florins.

the Morea Prince John of Gravina granted in 1325 or 1326 feudal property in the villages of Lichina and Mandria to the Acciaiuoli company represented by Dardano di Tingo degli Acciaiuoli, its director, and five other members (*cives et mercatores florentini, socii de societate Aczarellorum de Florentia*). The grant of this fief to the Acciaiuoli did not entail the customary personal link deriving from the lord-vassal relationship, the company being a corporate body, and was thus clearly a novelty in the feudal setting of Frankish Morea. The company transferred its rights to Niccolò Acciaiuoli in 1334, a transaction confirmed in the following year by Catherine of Valois and her husband Robert of Taranto. Somewhat later, in any case before 22 January 1336, Niccolò Acciaiuoli also purchased from Diego Tolomei his portions of Mandria and Sperone⁷⁹. The acquisition of the two fiefs, each of which included a section of the village of Mandria, consolidated Niccolò's position in the Morea, which was further enhanced by several grants made by Robert of Taranto and Catherine of Valois between 1332 and 1342, presumably in partial return for loans by the Acciaiuoli reaching some 40,000 gold ounces or 200,000 florins. About 1354 Niccolò had assembled vast holdings in Frankish Morea⁸⁰. His varied activities in the Kingdom of Naples and in Frankish Morea did not prevent him from maintaining a stake in his family's company. While residing temporarily in the Morea from October 1338 to June 1341 during the expedition of Catherine of Valois, Niccolò served as one of the two factors or agents of the Acciaiuoli branch operating at Chiarenza, the other being Piero Guicciardini, whom we have already encountered⁸¹.

⁷⁹ Several documents from 1334 to 1336: *Buchon*, *Nouvelles recherches historiques*, vol. 2/1, 32–51. John of Gravina's grant to the bank included salt pans in Sperone: *ibid.* 111. It must have been made about the same time as the one to Diego Tolomei: see above 116. The members of the Acciaiuoli bank cited in these documents are also known from other sources: see *Renouard*, *Le compagnie commerciali fiorentine*, 48–50. Dardano di Tingo thus remained director longer than assumed by Renouard. The other members were Bivigliano di Manetto de Marocello, apparently identical with Bivigliano di Manetto Buonricoveri; Acciaiuoli di Niccolò degli Acciaiuoli, probably director of the company in 1337; Giovanni di Bonaccorso; Lorenzo di Giovanni di Bonaccorsi, a close relative of the former; and Bannus olim Bandini, who does not appear in Renouard's list.

⁸⁰ *Borsari*, *L'espansione economica fiorentina*, 486–487, 490, 497–501, 503; *Bon*, *La Morée franque*, 209–211, but loans to John of Gravina were not included in this sum. Their total amount is stated in 1342: *Buchon*, *Nouvelles recherches historiques*, vol. 2/1, 112–113. Grants of fiefs from 1336 to 1338 and a survey of Niccolò's fiefs in 1354 or shortly afterwards in LT 19–116, 125–130 nos. I–IV, VI.

⁸¹ According to a list of branches dated 20 January 1341, which mentions Niccolò among the partners: *Buchon*, *Nouvelles recherches historiques*, vol. 1 46 n. 1. Niccolò also appears among the eighteen members providing a loan to the Commune of Florence in 1343: *ibid.* 47 n. In his will of 28 September 1338, drafted in the first person before his departure for the Morea, Niccolò provided that 500 florins should go to the bank because the latter had run into expenses for his personal affairs, yet should it turn out that he does not have to reimburse this sum, the money should be distributed as alms: *Tanfani*, *Nicola Acciaiuoli* 32, and for the date, 37. Yet this clause does not appear in the will drafted by a notary two days later: text in *Buchon*, *Nouvelles recherches historiques*, vol. 2/1, 161–198. Niccolò was a partner of the bank until its collapse. In the framework of the bankruptcy proceedings engaged by the

The information bearing on the activity of the Italian mercantile and banking houses in Latin Greece is scanty, fragmentary and highly selective, since it largely refers to credit and the transfer of funds. Although the companies also engaged in trade in the region, like some of the Sienese individuals mentioned above, only few notarial charters document their share in this field. It is noteworthy that the firms generally abstained from carrying cash from one place to another. Instead, they transferred funds by investing them in merchandise which they dispatched to specific destinations. This practice, common in the West, was most likely also the rule in Latin Greece. In any event, it is clear that the Italian mercantile and banking companies, in particular those represented by resident agents, contributed decisively to the influx and movement of liquid capital in Latin Greece and thereby stimulated the economy of this region.

The Italian intrusion into the economy of Latin Greece was not restricted to trade and banking. It also extended to industrial production, as illustrated by the treaty concluded in 1240 between Genoa and the lord of Athens, Guy I of La Roche, whose territory included Thebes, the major silk manufacturer of western Romania. The treaty points to the free export of Theban silk textiles by Genoese and other merchants, in sharp contrast to the severe restrictions enforced in Thebes in this respect in the Byzantine period. Yet it also reveals that the Genoese were deeply involved in the local manufacturing process, as Guy I refers to silk fabrics woven by them or woven by others for them⁸². Considering the general context of silk manufacture in this period, both in Greece and Italy, it appears that the Genoese did not participate directly in industrial production in Thebes. Rather, they acted as entrepreneurs financing the activity of a number of local silk workshops producing cloth exclusively for them. They supplied these workshops with raw materials or the capital required for their purchase and the payment of the workers' wages, and received the finished products in return. In addition, they ordered silk textiles from other Theban workshops without financing their operation. In both cases, though, they must have provided specifications for the fabrics they commissioned in order to ensure that these be easily marketable in the West. Before 1204 the Byzantine imperial court had acted similarly when ordering specific silks from Thebes for its own use⁸³. In fact, the Genoese entrepreneurs had taken over the economic role fulfilled in the Byzantine period by the Greek *archontes* who had contributed to the development of the Theban silk industry⁸⁴. Several factors explain their success in this field. They handled liquid capital on a larger scale than the *archontes* who had retained part of their assets under Frankish

commune of Florence in 1345 a mansion in the city belonging to him was sold to Gherardo di Buondelmonti and Andrea di Ranieri Buondelmonti: see *Tanfani*, Niccola Acciaiuoli, 46.

⁸² *Liber iurum Reipublicae Genuensis*, vol. I (*Historiae patriae monumenta*, vol. VII, Augustae Taurinorum 1854) cols. 992–993 no. 757: *de pannis sericis ab eisdem Ianuensibus vel pro eis in terra nostra textis seu compositis, ipsi Ianuenses nobis solvere teneantur id quod ab aliis exigi solitum est et haberi.*

⁸³ *Jacoby*, *Silk in Western Byzantium*, 488–490.

⁸⁴ See above 100.

rule. Moreover, they were familiar with western trade and shipping networks involved in silk marketing. And, finally, they also filled the void left by the Frankish lords established in Thebes who, imbued with knightly values, abstained from direct involvement in the urban economy⁸⁵.

By 1240 the Genoese were already engaged for some time in the export of Theban silk fabrics and in silk entrepreneurship in Thebes, since the treaty of that year renewed a previous agreement, the date of which is unknown. We may safely assume that particularly their involvement in entrepreneurship induced a number of them to settle in Thebes, whether temporarily or permanently. It is not excluded that the three members of the Grasso family attested as *burgenses* of the city in 1255 were among them⁸⁶. Incidentally, there is further evidence for Genoese presence and activity in the same region in that period. A Genoese consul is attested in 1236 in the city of Negroponte, several Genoese merchants conducted business in this locality between 1245 and 1251, and there possibly was a Genoese community there⁸⁷. A settlement pattern linked to silk manufacture in Thebes appears all the more plausible in view of the one existing in the Byzantine period. Indeed, Venetian merchants trading in local silks resided in Thebes almost without interruption from about 1071 to the time of the Fourth Crusade⁸⁸. Some are also attested in the city after 1204 (according to unpublished documents that will be examined). Even if one takes into account the fragmentary state of our sources for this period, it is likely that their activity in Thebes diminished with the rise of the Venetian silk industry, which already by the mid-thirteenth century was producing several types of Byzantine silk fabrics. In the first half of the thirteenth century it may have become more profitable to ship raw silk from Greece to Venice than to take advantage of the skills of the Theban silk workers and export their high-quality finished products to the West. A similar development appears to have occurred with respect to the Genoese. The Theban silks they exported to Genoa presumably encountered stiff competition from the sophisticated fabrics produced at

⁸⁵ On this whole issue, with full references, see *David Jacoby*, *Silk crosses the Mediterranean*, in: *Sandra Origone* (ed.), *Le vie del Mediterraneo. Idee, uomini, oggetti (secoli XI–XVI)* (Genova 1997) [in press].

⁸⁶ See above 107. The surname Grasso appears in several Genoese notarial charters of the twelfth century. Guglielmo Grasso, the famous pirate who operated in the 1180s and 1190s, served as Admiral of the Kingdom of Sicily and became Count of Malta, belonged to the Genoese clan of della Volta: *David Abulafia*, *Henry Count of Malta and his Mediterranean Activities: 1203–1230*, in: *Anthony T. Luttrell*, *Medieval Malta: Studies on Malta before the Knights* (London 1975) 108–109, repr. in: *David Abulafia*, *Italy, Sicily and the Mediterranean, 1100–1400* (London 1987) III; *Gerald W. Day*, *Genoa's Response to Byzantium, 1155–1204. Commercial Expansion and Factionalism in a Medieval City* (Urbana and Chicago 1988) 151. On the other hand, some time before 1215 the Venetian Giovanni Grasso was apparently active in Negroponte, thus in the vicinity of Thebes: DCV, no. 559. However, there is no later evidence bearing on members of these families in the area.

⁸⁷ *Michel Balard*, *Les Génois en Roumanie entre 1204 et 1261. Recherches sur les minutiers notariaux génois*, in: *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire, publiés par l'Ecole Française de Rome* 78 (1966) 480.

⁸⁸ *Jacoby*, *Silk in Western Byzantium*, 479, 494–496.

Lucca, the leading silk manufacturer of the West in that period. Precisely these marketing problems may have prompted the Genoese request of 1240 for a reduction of the customs dues on the export of Theban silks. In any event, the refusal of Guy I of La Roche to grant it must have hastened the gradual contraction of Genoese investments in the production of Theban silks, until these ceased completely. It would seem that the Genoese merchants increasingly engaged in the export of silk from Latin Greece, as noted below.

The growing Italian demand for industrial raw materials since the thirteenth century requires some further consideration. It clearly stimulated an expansion of their production in Latin Greece, a development confirmed by their export to Italy. Yet this export also had an adverse effect: it deprived the local industries of an ever larger share of their supplies and ultimately reduced their production. The export of silk and dyestuffs from Chiarenza and Patras in Frankish Morea, the Venetian ports of Modon and Coron, Byzantine Monemvasia and Negroponte is fairly well documented by notarial documents and by several fourteenth century commercial manuals⁸⁹. Not surprisingly, Lucca and Venice were the main destinations of the raw silk, silk cocoons and dyestuffs exported from western Romania in this period. The importance of Lucca in this context is illustrated by Lucchese and Genoese notarial documents of the second half of the thirteenth century, some of which mention the import of *seta chiarentana* and *seta de Patrasso*, silk from Chiarenza and Patras, respectively⁹⁰. In addition, a Pisan commercial manual composed in 1278 states that *in della Morea si pesa libra lucchese*. Considering the context in which this reference appears, the connection of the Lucchese unit with silk is obvious, since there could have been no other reason for its adoption in the Frankish Peloponnese⁹¹. Despite the absence of direct evidence, then, we may safely conclude that after 1204, at any rate in the first half of the thirteenth century, the bulk of silk exports from Frankish Morea went to Lucca via Southern Italy, a traffic still attested with respect to Naples as late as the 1380s⁹². It is a fair guess that Genoese merchants and carriers, the main suppliers of Lucca in raw silk, had a major share in this trade even before 1274, the year since which their activity in Chiarenza is documented by notarial charters⁹³. Their visits in this port in the first half of the fourteenth century, which were most likely connected

⁸⁹ On the role of some of these ports in this respect, see *Jacoby*, *Silk Production in the Frankish Peloponnese*, 43–48, 54–57, 59–61.

⁹⁰ References in *Telesforo Bini*, *I Lucchesi a Venezia*. Alcuni studi sopra i secoli XIII e XIV, vol. 1 (Lucca 1853) 49, 51, with correct identifications by *Salvatore Bonghi*, *Della mercatura dei Lucchesi nei secoli XIII e XIV* (Lucca 1858) 36–37.

⁹¹ *Roberto Lopez* and *Gabriella Aivaldi* (eds.), *Il più antico manuale italiano di pratica della mercatura*, in *Miscellanea di studi storici*, vol. II (Collana storica di fonti e studi, diretta da G. Pistarino 38, Genova 1983) 127 fol. 360 ll. 15–23. In the fourteenth century the Lucchese silk pound was also utilized in Florence and Pisa: *Pegolotti*, 197, 204.

⁹² See *Jacoby*, *Silk Production in the Frankish Peloponnese*, 47–48, 54, 61.

⁹³ On the Genoese role in the silk supply of Lucca from other sources, see *Jacoby*, *Silk crosses the Mediterranean*: see above n. 85.

with silk, are also illustrated by Giovanni Boccaccio's story of Alatiel in the *Decamerone*, already mentioned earlier⁹⁴.

A Venetian commercial manual completed in the 1320s at the latest, the *Zibaldone da Canal*, reveals that the silk weight used at Coron was different from the one common in Frankish Morea, clearly because this port was under Venetian rule and exported silk mainly to Venice⁹⁵. Since the second half of the thirteenth century the expanding silk industry of Venice was absorbing growing quantities of silk and kermes produced in the Peloponnese, including in the region of Corinth⁹⁶. Adverse conditions caused by Catalan and Turkish raids explain the paucity of information in the following decades. Venetian interest in the dyestuff was undoubtedly among the factors prompting the resumption of Venetian trade with Corinth since the 1360s, documented by finds of Venetian coins⁹⁷. Acorn cups used in dyeing and tanning were yet another industrial raw material exported from Latin Greece and much in demand in Venice⁹⁸. The supply of this city's industries in raw materials from Latin Greece was one of the incentives leading Venice to integrate Chiarenza and Patras within the Venetian network of long-distance seaborne trade in the early fourteenth century. Instead of sailing directly from Coron or Modon to Venice, a number of Venetian state galleys returning from Constantinople, Cyprus and the Levant were ordered each year to load the merchandise of travelling and resident Venetian traders at Chiarenza and, occasionally, also at Patras⁹⁹.

The Italian presence and economic activity in Latin Greece also affected the exploitation of rural resources. We have already noted that the integration of Italians within the knightly class of Frankish Morea began in the second half of the thirteenth century with grants of princely fiefs to merchants and bankers from central

⁹⁴ *Branca*, *Decamerone*, 165–168. This is yet another trustworthy element in the story that may be added to those mentioned by *Schreiner*: see above, n. 27.

⁹⁵ *Alfredo Stussi* (ed.), *Zibaldone da Canal*, manoscritto mercantile del sec. XIV (Fonti per la storia di Venezia, Sez. V – Fondi vari, Venezia 1967) 58 fol. 35 v. l. 19; for the dating of this work, see *David Jacoby*, *A Venetian Manual of Commercial Practice from Crusader Acre*, in: *Gabriella Airalidi e Benjamin Z. Kedar* (eds.), *I comuni italiani nel regno crociato di Gerusalemme* (Collana storica di fonti e studi, diretta da G. Pistorino 48, Genova 1986) 404–405, 410, repr. in: *David Jacoby*, *Studies on the Crusader States and on Venetian Expansion* (Northampton 1989) VII.

⁹⁶ See *Jacoby*, *Silk Production in the Frankish Peloponnese*, 45–47, 61. On Corinth, see above 103–104.

⁹⁷ See the reports mentioned above, n. 14. The price of kermes from Corinth is recorded in 1396: *Federigo Melis* (ed.), *Documenti per la storia economica dei secoli XIII–XVI* (Firenze 1972) 304 no. 87.

⁹⁸ In Frankish Morea: LT, 113 l. 10 (1354); 146 ll. 17–18 (1361). Export from Greece: *Stussi*, *Zibaldone da Canal*, 58–59; *Pegolotti*, 146, 149, 159, 198; *Luttrell*, *The Latins of Argos and Nauplia*, 38; *Freddy Thiriet*, *Régestes des délibérations du Sénat de Venise concernant la Romanie*, vol. 1 (Paris, La Haye 1958–1961) nos. 156 (from Byzantine Mistra) and 595 (from Negroponte). See also below 125.

⁹⁹ *Jacoby*, *Silk Production in the Frankish Peloponnese*, 54–55, 59–60, yet it is obvious that the export of other commodities was also taken into account: see *Stussi*, *Zibaldone da Canal*, 58–59; *Pegolotti*, 145, 149.

Italy. Next to them we find some Venetians. Lorenzo Tiepolo, son of Doge Giacomo, held a fief in Frankish Morea in the vicinity of Coron, apparently since 1262, yet left before 1268, when he himself was elected doge of Venice. In the late thirteenth century the lord of the Aegean islands of Tinos and Mykonos, Bartolomeo I Ghisi, scion of a Venetian family, held for some time the barony of Chandritsa after his marriage to the heiress of this fief. In 1377 the Venetian Pietro Cornaro married Marie of Enghien, heir to the lordship of Argos and Nauplia. Though of French origin, the Enghien had married into the Neapolitan nobility. In the meantime, as a result of Angevin rule over the principality, the number of Italian fiefholders had grown substantially with the grant of Moreot fiefs to royal and princely vassals and office holders, as well as to merchants and bankers residing or operating in the kingdom of Naples¹⁰⁰. Other Italians, including some members of the Florentine Medici family, were enfeoffed by the barons of Frankish Morea¹⁰¹. Some of the Italian fiefholders were settled in Frankish Morea, while others were absentee lords who managed their estates with the help of Italian agents residing temporarily or permanently in the Morea. Thus, for instance, in 1360 Averardo de' Medici, member of the well-known Florentine family, administered the lordship of Argos and Nauplia on behalf of Guy of Enghien, and in 1377 Louis of Conversano served in the same capacity as tutor of Guy's daughter¹⁰². Whatever the case, it is clear that both landholders and the higher echelon of their Italian agents considered the acquisition of fiefs, whether in return for credit or as a result of purchase, to be a profitable investment. All of them were imbued with the same capitalistic spirit. Their main concern was profit, and they were keenly aware of the economic benefits deriving from a market and export-oriented exploitation of their estates. While relying on the Byzantine agrarian and social infrastructure of the countryside, they believed that profit could be generated and expanded by improved management, the use of seigniorial authority to take full advantage of human and animal labour, in addition to proper investments, a more selective approach to production, a concentration on cash crops, the introduction of new types of culture and new farming methods achieving a rise in output. They also advocated and implemented an enhanced commercialization of the estates' produce. Both the Italian fiefholders and their agents shared yet another feature: they were highly experienced in business administration and in accounting¹⁰³.

¹⁰⁰ *Jacoby*, La féodalité, 84–85, 195, 213, 237–238; *Borsari*, Studi sulle colonie veneziane, 110–111; *Raymond-J. Loenertz*, Les Ghisi, dynastes vénitiens dans l'Archipel, 1207–1390 (Firenze 1975) 105–108; *Luttrell*, The Latins of Argos and Nauplia, 39–45.

¹⁰¹ In the fief of Argos and Nauplia: *Jacoby*, La féodalité, 214, 217–219. On the Medici, see also next note.

¹⁰² *Luttrell*, The Latins of Argos and Nauplia, 39, 50–52; *Jacoby*, La féodalité, 214–217, and 316–317 no. III. For the estates of Marie of Bourbon and the Acciaiuoli, see below.

¹⁰³ For instance, among those enfeoffed by John of Gravina we find Nicola de Boiano, a high-ranking financial official at the royal court of Naples and a relative of the official later found in the Morea. He died at the latest in 1342 and Niccolò Acciaiuoli obtained his land: *Buchon*, Nouvelles recherches historiques, vol. 2/1, 111, and see LT 144 n. 2.

The commercial approach of the Italian lords and agents and their familiarity with sophisticated management techniques are perfectly illustrated by the fourteenth century surveys of some feudal estates of Frankish Morea, one of them belonging to Marie of Bourbon and several others to members of the Acciaiuoli family. Shortly before 1354 Jacobo Buzuto from Brindisi, chief administrator of the fiefs held by Niccolò Acciaiuoli in Frankish Morea, repaired and enlarged a tower at Christiana that apparently served as a center of seigniorial administration and as residence for seigniorial officials on inspection tours. He also restored vineyards and renewed the operation of salt pans that had been neglected¹⁰⁴. In 1354 or shortly afterwards it was suggested to Niccolò Acciaiuoli to establish a *massaria*, a large farm of a type common in southern Italy, on particularly fertile seigniorial land in northern Messenia. This could be achieved, so he was advised, by increasing the number of his oxen and taking advantage of both the compulsory labour services owed by the local peasants and the hiring of fugitive peasants established in the vicinity. The same agent prompted Niccolò Acciaiuoli to order the peasants of Grebeni to put to work all their oxen when delivering their corvée on seigniorial land and raise thereby the latter's productivity¹⁰⁵. The Moreot estates of Marie of Bourbon were in particularly bad shape in 1361. Nicola de Boiano extensively recorded disagreements and litigation with other feudatories with respect to her assets and rights, and took firm action to regain whatever had been lost¹⁰⁶. He expressed his dissatisfaction with the performance of several of Marie's officials in charge of local affairs and removed them, as well as those exceeding their competence, appointing trustworthy and experienced men instead¹⁰⁷. He was particularly distressed by the behaviour of Bernardo Toscano, the leaseholder of Grizi, who instead of locally employing the villeins' work force let it to individuals in the Venetian area of Modon, obviously because it provided him with a more direct and larger income. In order to correct the situation in Grizi Nicola de Boiano temporarily suspended the peasants' obligation to perform their corvée and ordered them to restore the lord's buildings and vineyards, so that the village should be in good shape when it reverted to direct seigniorial management. In addition, he renewed the operation of the local salt pans¹⁰⁸. He took measures to prevent the flight of the villeins belonging to Marie of Bourbon, "because I do not want that in my time your villeins should run away". If security conditions permitted he in-

¹⁰⁴ LT 71 ll. 2–5; 77 ll. 6–7; 87 l. 18. On the tower, see *Peter Lock*, *The Frankish Towers of Central Greece*, in: *The Annual of the British School of Archaeology at Athens* 81 (1986) 110, yet I ascribe a somewhat different function to it.

¹⁰⁵ LT 126 ll. 14–18; 127 ll. 4–6; 128 ll. 5–8; 129 l. 25 to 130 l. 6. The reference to the villein's oxen is on 128 ll. 9–12; note particularly the following: *lo signore poria con ragione comandare li soy villani che ano lo potere che ciachuno facesse li bovi como sono tenuti*.

¹⁰⁶ LT 144–155, *passim*. He was determined to expose all the excesses of Centurione Zaccaria, one of the most powerful lords of the principality, *e se questo non proba, yo vollyo perdere la capu: ibid.* 151 ll. 26–30.

¹⁰⁷ See e. g. LT 145 l. 20 to 146 l. 4; 147 ll. 23–24; also 148 ll. 23–28, on the appointment of an official who was to replace him during his absence.

¹⁰⁸ LT 147 ll. 14–22.

tended to travel by sea to the area of Vasilika and Corinth, in the northeastern Peloponnese, in order to find leaseholders who would resume the cultivation of land abandoned by villeins put to flight by Turkish incursions. "Better to have something than to lose everything", he added. In one village he realized that a specific plot of seigniorial land was unsuitable for the growing of wheat, and decided that it should be converted into a vineyard¹⁰⁹. Aldobrando Baroncelli, whose family had close connections with other Florentine families settled in the Kingdom of Naples, the Buondelmonti and the Acciaiuoli, served in Greece from 1379 to 1382 at least as agent for Angelo and Lorenzo Acciaiuoli¹¹⁰. In 1379 he promised to increase the yield from the village of Sperone, which belonged to Lorenzo, by the proper use of beasts of labour and seeds¹¹¹.

The creation of new sources of revenue may be illustrated by the attention devoted to intensive cultivation relying on manure and irrigation. This type of cultivation was already practiced in the Byzantine period¹¹², yet appears to have been extended after 1204, particularly on seigniorial land on which new crops were grown. Both manure and irrigation were used in 1337 in the farming of a garden at Kotychi, in the plain of Elis, carried out by compulsory peasant labour¹¹³. Since this garden yielded an exceptionally high income, it must have been similar to the fourteenth century irrigated *cardina* or orchards attested in Crete, in which the growing of vines on treillis and particularly various fruits was being expanded under special lease contracts. Among these fruits we find cherries, marasca or sour cherries, pomegranates, peaches, pears, lemons and thick-skinned citrons¹¹⁴. Irrigation was also mandatory for the cultivation of the seigniorial orange grove located in 1354 in the fertile area of Petoni¹¹⁵. Incidentally, this is the earliest known evidence for the growing of sour oranges in Greece. Like sugar cultivation brought from the Levant or Cyprus to Crete, the introduction of citrus into Romania, whether from these same areas or Italy, clearly took place after the Latin

¹⁰⁹ LT 148 ll. 4–22, where *vaxalli* is used for *villani* (as in 1354, *ibid.* 68 ll. 2–3: *basallos seu vilanos*); 151 ll. 19–25; 147 ll. 12–13: *ca ave tristu terrinu per blava*.

¹¹⁰ On his career and his family's connections, see *Luttrell*, Aldobrando Baroncelli, 273–300. In the 1320s and 1330s, though, several Baroncelli had been partners in the Peruzzi company: see *Renouard*, *Le compagnie commerciali fiorentine*, 171–172.

¹¹¹ LT 197 ll. 6–7: *ed io m'ingegniero anchora di farlo megllio valere e con bestiame e con semente, come la vostra signioria vedera*.

¹¹² *Alan Harvey*, *Economic Expansion in the Byzantine Empire, 900–1200* (Cambridge 1989) 127–133.

¹¹³ LT 38 ll. 6–7: *ortus inrriguus qui reddit anuatim, excepto servicio hominum et fimo qui ibidem ponitur, yperpera octuaginta*; for the location, see *ibid.* 236.

¹¹⁴ *Salvatore Carbone* (ed.), *Pietro Pizolo, notaio in Candia (1300, 1304–1305)* (Fonti per la storia di Venezia, Sez. III – Archivi notarili, Venezia 1978–1985) nos. 445, 911, 990, all referring to the Cretan village of Macrendigho, south of Candia, in 1300 and 1304; see also below, n. 117. Water distribution was carried out on specific days *secundum consuetudinem loci*. See also *Mario Gallina*, *Una società coloniale del Trecento. Creta fra Venezia e Bisanzio* (Deputazione di storia patria per le Venezie, Miscellanea di studi e memorie 28, Venezia 1989) 19–21, 43–44, 57–58.

¹¹⁵ LT 113 l. 18: *arbores arangorum curie*.

conquest¹¹⁶. These luxury crops were highly appreciated and fetched a high price on the market. Two Cretan contracts testify that their cultivation, in particular that of citrus, was still fairly limited. In one instance the obligations of the lessee of two gardens included the yearly delivery of sixteen thick-skinned citrons, while in another the lessee was to hand over every year a full basket of each fruit he grew and, in addition, four lemon trees or saplings at the request of the lessor¹¹⁷. Large landlords could more easily than peasants invest resources in the building of expensive irrigation systems and take advantage of the water flowing through their estates or along their borders, two factors indispensable for the growing of luxury crops. It may be safely assumed, therefore, that the introduction of the sour orange at Petoni was due to the initiative of a seigniorial official managing this village after it had been handed over to Niccolò Acciaiuoli in 1338.

The Italian estate managers also took steps to increase production and storage facilities and enhance the commercialization of surpluses. Some time before 1354 Jacobo Buzuto repaired an oil press and a wine cellar at Christiana. The construction of a wine cellar at Grizi was suggested, because this village produced large quantities of wine that could easily be conveyed to the market. On the other hand, the sale of the wine produced at Petoni was seriously hampered because the village was isolated and land transportation was difficult. It would be wise, therefore, to keep this wine for the use of the lord and his family. An additional fish-pond was envisaged for Pilla¹¹⁸. In 1361 Nicola de Boiano reported that because of misman-

¹¹⁶ On the earlier diffusion of citrus cultivation, see *Andrew M. Watson, Agricultural Innovation in the Early Islamic World. The Diffusion of Crops and Farming Techniques*, 700–1100 (Cambridge 1983) 42–50, 89–90, 168 n. 21; *Eliyahu Ashtor, Essai sur l'alimentation des diverses classes sociales dans l'Orient médiéval*, in: *Annales, Economies, sociétés, civilisations* 23 (1968) 1025–1026. On the whole the growing of citrus fruit in Latin Greece has been hitherto overlooked.

¹¹⁷ *Carbone, Pietro Pizolo*, no. 911; *Antonino Lombardo* (ed.), *Zaccaria de Fredo, notaio in Candia (1352–1357)* (Fonti per la storia di Venezia, Sez. III – Archivi notarili, Venezia 1968) no. 82. In 1300 a resident of Candia was nicknamed 'Citron', presumably because of his sour temper: *Carbone, Pietro Pizolo* no. 363. From this amusing instance we may gather that the fruit was already known in Crete at that time, yet citrus growing in general was still fairly limited in Romania. *Pegolotti* 294, includes cederni or citrons in a list of commodities, yet without referring to their origin or destination. The extract of a Greek account book from Rhodes dated to the last two decades of the fourteenth century mentions two shipments including a total of 600 lemons (lemoni), 40 oranges ([n]erantzi) and 6 thick-skinned citrons (kitron), possibly originating in the island of Kos: *Peter Schreiner* (ed.), *Texte zur spätbyzantinischen Finanz- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, in: *Handschriften der Biblioteca Vaticana (Studi e Testi 344, Città del Vaticano 1991)* 70 and 73 ll. 46–47 (text and trans.), 66–67 (dating), 78 (commentary). Significantly, citrus fruit does not appear in fourteenth century commercial manuals. Yet later, about 1450, citrons (cedri) and oranges (mellaranci) were exported from Coron and Modon: *Giorgio di Lorenzo Chiarini, El libro di mercantantie et usanze de' paesi*, ed. *Franco Borlandi* (Torino 1936) 55. In the fifteenth century it was customary in Naxos for the duke's vassals to deliver to him each Christmas an orange as recognitive payment: examples in 1435 and 1453 in: *Perikles G. Zerlentes* (ed.), *Grammata frankōn doukon tou Aigaïou pelagou (1433–1564)*, in: *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 13 (1904) 145 (pomo uno di neranzo), 150 (unum pomum ranceum), and see *Jacoby, La féodalité*, 285.

¹¹⁸ LT 71 l. 5; 130 ll. 10–11; 128 ll. 14–16; 130 l. 6.

agement wine, salt, and 1,106 *modii* of acorn cups from the previous year's yield had remained unsold¹¹⁹. These export commodities had presumably not been offered for sale in time to be shipped to Venice by the autumn convoys sailing westward. Aldobrando Baroncelli found in 1379 that much wine was getting spoiled at Santo Archangelo because of the absence of a wine cellar, and decided to build one, while at Andravida he built and put into operation a mill, for which he bought a grinding stone¹²⁰.

There is yet another aspect of the Italian agents' activity in Latin Greece that deserves close attention. In 1361 Nicola de Boiano was unable to gather reliable information about the management of Vostitsa and concluded that he had to compile a new survey of the estate¹²¹. In 1379 Aldobrando Baroncelli emphasized that the report he was presenting was systematic, detailed and comprehensive, which indeed it was. He listed separately revenue and expenditure, item by item, and computed them; in addition, he recorded the assets in deposit. Aldobrando twice alluded to an account book, in which he must have used a sophisticated method of daily accounting¹²². The nature of this book is suggested by the work of the Italian official who, in 1365, established the yearly financial balance of the lordship of Corinth belonging to Niccolò Acciaiuoli. His registration and compilation included double-entry book-keeping in a more advanced form than in the Siense account book of 1277–1282, mentioned earlier, receipt and expenditure being placed on opposite pages. This bilateral form was common at that time in Italian mercantile and banking companies¹²³.

The Italians thus introduced into Latin Greece innovative methods in the exploitation and management of agricultural and other resources. Non-Italian barons and knights and Greek feudatories holding fiefs in Frankish Morea were in close touch with them. They met at their lord's court or with their lord's Italian agents, several of them had houses in the ports of Frankish Morea and the neighbouring Venetian territories, and they conducted business with Italian traders and bankers¹²⁴. As a result, they must have increasingly adopted the market and ex-

¹¹⁹ LT 146 ll. 17–18; 148 ll. 1–3.

¹²⁰ LT 205 ll. 22–27; 206 ll. 18–21; 215 l. 16.

¹²¹ LT 146 l. 6: *Conveneme omne cosa fare da novu li inventarii, zo che avete en queste parti.*

¹²² LT 196 ll. 11–13: *e per cierto io ci metto uno ordine si chiaro che per cierto vi piacera, e vedrete insino a uno danaro quello checci e.* The reports alluded to are LT 199–215 nos. XI–XII. On silk and cash in deposit at Modon: *ibid.* 215 ll. 4–5, 19–20. References to the account book: *ibid.* 207 l. 3; 215 ll. 2–3.

¹²³ LT 158–192 no. IX; see introduction 158, and 187 l. 20. For a Venetian example dated to the period from 1340 to 1363, see *Sandra Origone, Peter Schreiner, Annotazioni di conto veneziane nel Vaticano Ottobiano Greco* 14, in: *Römische Historische Mitteilungen* 29 (1987) 281–314. See also above 112.

¹²⁴ *David Jacoby, The Encounter of Two Societies: Western Conquerors and Byzantines in the Peloponnesus after the Fourth Crusade*, in: *American Historical Review* 78 (1973) 891–902, repr. in: *idem, Recherches sur la Méditerranée orientale II*. See also *idem, From Byzantium to Latin Romania*, 6–8; *idem, Jean Lascaris Calophéros, Chypre et la Morée*, in: *Revue des études byzantines* 26 (1968) 207–211, repr. in: *idem, Société et démographie à Byzance et en Roumanie latine* (London 1975) X.

port-oriented economic approach of the Italians and have been influenced by their improved estate management. The Italian business approach also spread to Byzantine Morea. Frankish lords and their Byzantine counterparts maintained permanent contact in various ways. In some areas of the Peloponnese the feudal lords of the principality and *archontes* or ecclesiastical institutions of Byzantine Morea shared the revenue of villages situated along the common borders of the two political entities, the so-called “casaux de parçon”. This arrangement involved agreements between the parties concerned and ensured them an intimate knowledge of agricultural work and management in these villages¹²⁵. In addition, Byzantine *archontes* attended seasonal fairs held in Frankish Morea. In June 1296, for instance, one of them visited the fair of Vervena, in Arkadia, in order to sell his raw silk, presumably because western traders attended this fair¹²⁶. The Byzantine province in the Peloponnese was also connected with its neighbours and Italy by maritime trade. According to an anonymous commercial manual compiled in Florence about 1320, the inhabitants of Monemvasia had earned a bad reputation for occasionally taking hold of the merchandise brought to their city by foreign traders, yet these nevertheless visited the port¹²⁷. Merchants from Monemvasia are attested in Venetian Crete in 1336–1337¹²⁸, and passing ships sailing between Italy and the eastern Mediterranean lands anchored sometimes at Monemvasia¹²⁹.

It is time to conclude. In the thirteenth and fourteenth century the temporary or permanent presence of an increasing number of Latins in Greece, mainly in coastal cities, and the activity of Italian merchants and bankers, whether visitors or residents, contributed to the infusion of liquid capital from the West and to its free flow between the various sectors of the economy. As a result Latin Greece experienced an ever stronger economic interaction between the rural area, the cities, and long-distance maritime trade. The Italian merchants and bankers also introduced new forms of business management, credit and marketing, which stimulated a growth in agricultural and pastoral productivity and output, generated a restructuring of production and trade and, more generally, boosted the economy of Latin Greece. The intimate interconnection between the various types of migration we have noted, settlement and economic evolution is thus obvious.

¹²⁵ See *David Jacoby*, Un régime de coseigneurie gréco-franque en Morée: les ‘casaux de parçon’, in: *Mélanges d’archéologie et d’histoire*, publiés par l’Ecole française de Rome 75 (1963) 111–125; repr. in: *idem*, Société et démographie VIII. In 1295 the Greek archon Photios visited the villages located in the area of Corinth which he shared with the Franks: *Chronique de Morée* pars. 663–664.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.* pars 802–803.

¹²⁷ Firenze, Biblioteca Marucelliana, ms. C 226, fol. 53v, where incidentally an interesting remark is made about imports to Monemvasia: Portaxi a vendere in Malvagia niente, perche habitatori di detta terra sono mala gente.

¹²⁸ *Raimondo Morozzo della Rocca* (ed.), *Lettere di mercanti a Pignol Zucchetto* (1336–1350) (Fonti per la storia di Venezia, Sez. IV – Archivi privati, Venezia 1957) nos. 1–2.

¹²⁹ Genoese evidence: *Michel Balard*, *Escales génoises sur les routes de l’Orient méditerranéen au XIV^e siècle*, in: *Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin*, 32, vol. 1 (1974), *Les grandes escales*, 248–249, 262.

