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15. The Paralogisms of Pure Reason in the First Edition

(A338/B396–A347/B406; A348–380)
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371The A-Paralogisms15.1 The Position and Function of theParalogisms*While Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason attempts in its first majorpart, the Transcendental Analytic, to make positive argumentsconcerning the a priori structure of experience, its second majorpart, the Transcendental Dialectic, presents what is largely a nega-tive treatment of traditional metaphysical arguments for a prioritheoretical claims that go beyond human experience and henceare mere Ideas. The first substantive section of the Transcenden-tal Dialectic, the Paralogisms, presents a critique of rational psy-chology and of traditional arguments for its central Idea, im-mortality (B395n), whereas the next major sections, the Antino-my and the Ideal, are devoted to the arguments of rationalcosmology and speculative theology, and criticize, among otherclaims, all theoretical proofs concerning the Ideas of freedomand God. The pattern common to arguments in these threespheres is one of reason concluding, via a categorical, hypothet-ical, or disjunctive syllogism, to an “unconditioned” entity whichis required to ground particular conditioned items, such as athinking subject, a series of appearances, or the determinablethought of a thing as such (A340/B398, cf. A323/B379 f.,A397 f.). Thus, to infer a soul that has thoughts as predicates butKarl AmeriksThe Paralogisms of PureReason in the First Edition(A338/B396–A347/B406; A348–380)15*In what follows, “paralogism(s)” refers to the syllogisms criticized by Kant,Paralogism(s)” to the section of the KrV and its parts.

371The A-Paralogisms15.1 The Position and Function of theParalogisms*While Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason attempts in its first majorpart, the Transcendental Analytic, to make positive argumentsconcerning the a priori structure of experience, its second majorpart, the Transcendental Dialectic, presents what is largely a nega-tive treatment of traditional metaphysical arguments for a prioritheoretical claims that go beyond human experience and henceare mere Ideas. The first substantive section of the Transcenden-tal Dialectic, the Paralogisms, presents a critique of rational psy-chology and of traditional arguments for its central Idea, im-mortality (B395n), whereas the next major sections, the Antino-my and the Ideal, are devoted to the arguments of rationalcosmology and speculative theology, and criticize, among otherclaims, all theoretical proofs concerning the Ideas of freedomand God. The pattern common to arguments in these threespheres is one of reason concluding, via a categorical, hypothet-ical, or disjunctive syllogism, to an “unconditioned” entity whichis required to ground particular conditioned items, such as athinking subject, a series of appearances, or the determinablethought of a thing as such (A340/B398, cf. A323/B379 f.,A397 f.). Thus, to infer a soul that has thoughts as predicates butKarl AmeriksThe Paralogisms of PureReason in the First Edition(A338/B396–A347/B406; A348–380)15*In what follows, “paralogism(s)” refers to the syllogisms criticized by Kant,Paralogism(s)” to the section of the KrV and its parts.
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