In the shadow of Auschwitz … Jews before Special Courts of the ‘Third Reich’ 1933–1945

I Introduction

The purpose of this article^[1]) has been to analyse – both qualitatively and quantitatively – the presence of Jews before Special Courts of the ‘Third Reich’^[2]), mostly as defendants and convicts. Such matters do not seem to have aroused major interest among researchers so far, except in some relevant literature^[3]), which has actually been circulated to only a limited extent. If there were to be a partial explanation for this state of affairs, there are probably two: On the one hand, the subject requires knowledge of the criminal law of the ‘Third Reich’ and German-language court files; and on the other hand, perhaps paradoxically, this issue represents ostensibly only a minor aspect within the overall tragic fate of huge proportions that befell Jews during World War II.

The source basis of this study consists predominantly of cases dealt with by particular Special Courts in Germany in the years 1933–1945. Work was thus based around results of archival research in which judicial decisions were examined, while detailed statistics in respect of defendants and penalties and other matters are seen to present specific situations in which Jewish defendants were held criminally liable. In the overwhelming majority of cases (notwithstanding marked deviation), the data proved adequate, in that they may be collected using a statistical method, and by reference to the examination of complete source material (not merely a research sample). For this purpose, statistical data on the presence of Jews standing accused before individual Special Courts, as established in the literature, were made subject to analysis, with these data also set against the general population of defendants, as well as being set against the situation pertaining in other Special Courts. Beyond that, an overview of the literature on particular Special Courts of the ‘Third Reich’ allowed for the formulation of a hypothesis regarding the minor (even marginal) involvement of Jews among defendants and persons convicted by Special Courts in the area of the so-called Old Reich.

Equally, the matter looks different at least in a part of the ‘eingegliederte Ostgebiete’ (territories incorporated into the Reich), i.e. western areas of the Republic of Poland annexed in 1939: Wielkopolska (Greater Poland), Małopolska (Lesser Poland), Pomerania, Silesia with a part of Western Lesser Poland and northern Masovia. Although also here the proportion of Jewish defendants remains low, the absolute figures involved does probably reach out beyond the purely marginal. The inquiries of relevance here will not include the area of Poland incorporated into “the General Government”. The jurisprudence of Special Courts in this latter area has not so far been studied; the desirability of such research must be postulated.

Also in the interests of clarity, it must be recalled how Special Courts in the ‘Third Reich’ were developed by Germany’s National Socialists as early as in March 1933, with a view to their serving as typical political courts, in line with the so-called ‘Dolchstoßlegende’. This was a legend assuming that the German Army of World War I was not overcome by the armies of the Entente countries but rather treacherously ‘stabbed in the back’ from inside by anti-patriotic forces. In this context, joint responsibility for the collapse of Germany might be attributed to the judicial system, which had clearly been pursuing those internal enemies with insufficient effect. The enemies of the state under consideration here were considered to include social democrats, pacifists, liberals, certain Catholics, deserters and common offenders^[4]).

The newly established Special Courts and People’s Tribunal were assigned their roles in the belief that a repetition of 1914–1918 events must be averted. However, as the years went by, the jurisdiction ratione materiae of Special Courts was extended to cover political, criminal and economic matters. A significant, distinguishing factor of these Special Courts is a simplified procedure which foresaw no preliminary judicial investigation, and just one instance. This allowed the Prosecutor’s Offices to obtain more rapid judgments^[5]).

According to statistical data gathered as a part of the population census of16^th June 1933, approximately 500.000 people of Jewish faith lived at that time in Germany. These people therefore amounted to a mere 0.8 % or so within an overall population of 65 million^[6]). 144.000 of them lived in Berlin, giving a share in the population equal to 4 %. In other major cities (Hamburg, Cologne, Leipzig and Breslau), the percentage of Jews was approximately 1 %. 15.5 % of the Jewish population lived in villages and small towns of less than 10.000 residents, while 13.6 % lived in towns and cities of between 10.000 and 100.000 residents. Most of them classified as urban middle class. There had been a downward demographic trend in the number of German Jews, as reveals a comparison with the General Census of 1925. By the time of the following Census of 17^th May 1939 (admittedly rather close to the War), the reported number had shrunk to 328.000 Jews, and was still falling, although it by now included what had been and would later be Austria). Factors contributing to that decline include the growing fear of Jews to acknowledge their belief formally, after anti-Semitic actions of authorities, e.g. legislation preventing mixed marriages, the Jewish community suffered major outflows of people, and of course emigration^[7]).

The first measures of recognisably anti-Semitic and discriminatory legislation characteristic for National Socialism prohibited, for example, Jews from going into swimming pools, market places or even certain villages as a whole^[8]). These were local initiatives. State-level legislation, an important step in excluding Jews from German society, came with the notorious (and unanimously adopted) two Nuremberg Laws of 1935, but had already appeared in the ‘Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service’ of 1933^[9]).

In one of the aforesaid Nuremberg Laws, i.e. the ‘Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour’^[10]), a ban was introduced on marriages between Jews and Germans (on pain of imprisonment in harsh conditions), as well as on sexual contacts outside marriage (with alternative sanctions again involving prison sentences or time in prison in harsh circumstances). In the initial period under Adolf Hitler, Jews were most frequently found guilty of the offence of race defilement, also for disseminating alleged or true hearsay gossip – especially in the context of the political persecution of the Jewish minority – or telling political jokes or for foreign-currency misdemeanours in connection with emigration. In the thirties, Nazi rule saw Jews indicted before courts more often than it had been the case before, although there were not many new anti-Semitic provisions in place. Relevant criminal procedures were often initiated with the involvement of informants^[11]).

II Special Courts in the so-called Old Reich

Let us now follow the judicial practice of Special Courts in the so-called Old Reich from the moment the National Socialists first came to power in 1933. As mentioned above, the years 1933–1939 saw almost half of the entire Jewish population emigrate out of Germany. In 1933 there were 38.000 emigrants, followed by 22.000 in 1934; 21.000 in 1935; 24.500 in 1936; 23.500 in 1937; 14.000 in 1938; and 78.000 up to 1^st September 1939^[12]).

III Special Courts in the polish territories incorporated into the Reich

Special Courts were established by Germany in the so-called eingegliederte Ostgebiete (polish territories incorporated into the Reich) during and following the September 1939 campaign. As a result, western areas of the Republic of Poland, i.e. Wielkopolska (Greater Poland), Pomerania and Silesia with a part of Małopolska (Lesser Poland) and northern Mazovia were incorporated into the ‘Third Reich’^[51]). The remaining Polish territories occupied by the Reich understood the so-called Generalne Gubernatorstwo (General Government). In this latter area worked a dual system of Polish and German courts in operation which involved the General Government’s Special Courts^[52]).

An overarching goal of German policy in the territories incorporated into the Reich was to achieve unification of the new areas in national, social and economic terms. An integral element of that policy was the extermination of approximately 600.0 Jews who lived in the incorporated territories, among which no fewer than 200.0 were residents of Lodsch (Łödź), and between 100.000 and 120.000 in the province of Silesia^[53]). In these areas persecution of the Jewish population started from the very beginning of military operations. The first steps of were decrees demanding Jews to give away their radio receivers, dogs and bicycles, or to step down from the pavement whenever a German passed by. Jewish shops were shut and Jewish employees dismissed^[54]). Jewish fugitives were not allowed to return home once hostilities ended^[55]), as Jewish property, businesses and bank accounts were subject to sequestration. An obligation was introduced for Judensterne (Jewish badges) to be worn. Jews were denied shopping from non-Jews as well as public transport, entering offices or attending concerts^[56]). For an illegal crossing of the border, Jews were threatened with draconian punishments including death penalty^[57]). They were even killed while attending synagogues – as at Będzin (Bendsburg) on 9^th September 1939^[58]). So-called ‘Aryans‘, motivated by the chance to take over Jewish property, denounced their neighbours readily enough^[59]).

Two normative acts proved especially important for the judicial practice of Special Courts in matters against Jews. The first of these was the ‘Regulation on the Criminal Law for Poles and Jews in the Eastern Incorporated Areas’ of 4^th December 1941^[60]) which envisaged the exclusive jurisdiction of Special Courts or a Circuit Judge (Circuit Court). Its vague prerequisites allowed for ‘unlimited interpretation’^[61]) and imposition of the death penalty for practically any behaviour ‘violating the majesty of the Reich and authority of the German nation’. New penalty types were introduced, i.e. penal camps and maximum security penal camps. A Public Prosecutor was to bring a case before a Special Court if he anticipated a sentence of more than five years in a penal camp or a maximum of three years in a security penal camp.

The second normative act referred to was preceded by an agreement from September 1942 between Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler and the Minister of Justice of the Reich Otto Thierack, which allowed the transfer of the judicature in criminal matters against Jews, Russians, Poles, Sinti and Roma to the Police. This agreement paved the way for a complete exclusion of Jews from court jurisdiction in §1 of the ‘13^th Regulation to the Law on the citizenship of the Reich‘ of 1 July 1943^[62]). Thus, without court proceedings, the Police could shoot Jews in an uncontrolled manner^[63]). Poles had at least a guarantee of a trial, whereas Jews were subject to arbitrary treatment at the hands of the Police^[64]).

It must be noted that, even before these two Regulations were introduced, there was a practice initially relating only to persons convicted for race defilement (but extended during the War to all Jewish convicts) whereby the justice system sent reports to the Gestapo regarding prisoners 2–4 weeks before they should be released. That meant straightforwardly that completion of a sentence did not lead to restoration of liberty. At the prison gates, those released would be picked up and transported to Concentration Camps.

Such transfers did also take place earlier, prior to full serving of time, if a request to this effect was made by the Gestapo. It must be concluded that such rendition of prisoners to the Gestapo by the justice system had nothing to do with the law but was rather a contribution to the effective implementation of Nazi extermination policy^[65]).

Not every Special Court operating in the incorporated territories has had any monographic study devoted to it. In fact, researchers have so far paid little attention to existing archival materials^[66]). On the other hand – as in the case of the Special Court in Bielsko (Bielitz) – no files at all have been preserved^[67]). An especially acute desiderat is a study on the Special Court in Poznan (Posen) since, at the beginning of the German occupation, Wartheland was home to approximately 400.000 Jews^[68]).

In the literature it is easy enough to find the opinion, hard to contest or object to, that despite the high share of Jews in the overall populations of areas incorporated into the Reich, not many Jewish defendants were brought before Special Courts. This is true, but due to – first of all – that a significant share of all cases was straightforwardly taken over by the Police; and it reflects – second – the configuration of the judicial system in the Occupied Territories. Cases involving Jewish defendants were presumably examined most often by Circuit Courts. These facts certainly demand for research to also now examine more closely the relevant judicial practice of Circuit Courts^[69]). Moreover, the percentage of Jewish defendants before particular Special Courts in the territories incorporated into the Reich is seen to vary. It may reasonably be assumed that also external conditions led to differences, leaving aside specific policies when it came to the filing of bills of indictment, from one particular Oberstaatsanwalt (Over-Prosecutor) to another; as well as differing relations between the Police and Prosecutor’s Offices, above all as regards the scale and methods of repression pursued against Jews, up to and usually including the establishment of Ghetto areas.

The Ghettoisation of Jews in fact had the effect of allowing the justice system, the Police and the administration to exclude Jews from the operation and enforcement of German law as Ghettos basically became lawless areas^[70]). The unwillingness of the authorities to take any interest in the situations arising in Ghettos was reinforced by arguments relating to ‘plagues’. It was as early as July 1940 that the Over-Prosecutor for Łödź withdrew completely from any prosecution of ‘Jewish crime’ inside the Łödź Ghetto. This led to a decline in number of court cases when comparing 1941 to 1940. From 1942 on the number of Jews before Sondergerichte was further reduced, not least as, from autumn 1941 on, Jews increasingly became victims of murder^[71]).

A further factor may well have been that, in the face of such persecution, the Jewish population lost faith in the legal system and tried to avoid further repressive contacts with it. Moreover, bearing in mind the standard practice resorted to in dealing with Jews, it may be doubted if all relevant matters were brought before Special Courts^[72]).

The question of judicial practice in the Sondergericht Bromberg (Bydgoszcz) looks quite simple as there were just two Jews among a total of 1782 defendants that actually came to be indicted before the Court. It can be assumed that the Jewish population had fled the exterminatory activities of Einsatzkommando der Sicherheitspolizei (Special Task Groups of the Nazi Security Police) in the first days of the War. Indeed, we learn that – as early as November 1939 – the land and municipal district of Bromberg was already almost ‘free of Jews’^[73]). The same is confirmed by statistical data of the Higher Regional Court in Gdańsk (Danzig) relating to the first semester of 1941, with just six Jews being punished in court.

With such limited numbers of Jewish defendants it is difficult to arrive at much of an appraisal of unequal treatment. Still, two Bromberg Special Court judgments have explicitly anti-Semitic threads, with there being references to abuse of hospitality rights, “sich unberechtigt in die Angelegenheiten seines Wirtsvolkes ein[mischen]” (unauthorised meddling in matters of the host nation), or calling somebody a “typisch jüdische[r] Betrüger” (typical Jewish swindler)^[74]).

The only relevant study on the Sondergericht Kalisch (Kalisz) points to a complete absence of Jewish people^[75]).

The situation was different at the “Sondergericht Lodsch/Litzmannstadt” (Special Court in Łödź). Admittedly, Jan Waszczyński, a researcher of that Court’s case-law concluded that the number of defendants of Jewish origin (as compared with total numbers of Jews living in the area of Łödź) was low. The criminal repression of that population group was in fact in the hands of non-judicial agents from the beginning of the Occupation period^[76]). It is doubtful if the Police even brought to the attention of the justice system all of the matters in their hands involving Jewish suspects. In any case, the figures are not so marginal in absolute terms, given a total of 131 Jewish defendants (out of 6547 defendants overall), with 106 Jews sentenced (among 4223 sentences passed). Within that total, the offences imputed to Jewish defendants included: 14 political, 84 economic, and 33 criminal matters. Among the political charges, the dominant thread was anti-state speech, while among economic offences it is black market trading and smuggling that feature. Criminal cases in turn revolved around robbery and extortion^[77]). In Łödź, adherence to the Jewish faith was obviously a circumstance increasing severity of penalisation and some penalties indeed look drastic. It can be noted, however, that this local Sondergericht actually sentenced only one Jew to death^[78]).

The participation of Jewish defendants among the judgments of Sondergericht Lodsch/Litzmannstadt certainly changed over time. While they accounted for 2.6 % of the total overall, the figures for 1940, 1941 and 1942 respectively were 5.3 %, 4 % and 4 %. As compared with other Special Courts, this one looks to have a noticeably high level. The prevalence of economic offences is probably due to the dire economic situation faced by Jews. Even their chances to obtain food were being limited drastically^[79]). Still, the Ministry of Justice recommended imposition of the most severe penalties over economic matters involving Jews, because of nothing more or less than their ‘impudent and arrogant behaviour’^[80]). In fact, other (non-Jewish) Poles in the region also faced food shortages; procurement of something to eat was indeed challenging; everyone tried to evade the prices set officially, and to trade on the black market^[81]).

It must be added here that Judges of the Special Court in Łödź did do work relating to the operation of the Ghetto – something that may be seen as exceptional in the context of other Special Courts in the territories incorporated into the Reich. Legislation applicable in the incorporated areas, as in the Old Reich, did not expressly prohibit entry into the Ghetto, but authorities applied the general provision of §327 StGB on the introduction or spreading of a contagious disease. In one case a Jew living in the Ghetto was indicted under that provision after he had been visited by an Aryan friend who, on several other occasions, threw food to him over the Ghetto wall. Eventually, the Jew of spreading disease was acquitted on the basis that the man had himself not crossed beyond the boundaries of the Ghetto; his friend, however, was sentenced to seven months in prison. In another case, in which a Jewish defendant was given food over the wall and threw money back over in exchange, the said defendant was convicted and sentenced to a penalty of two years in prison, i.e. the maximum provided by §327 StGB.^[82]).

What can be said about the judicial practice of Sondergericht Kattowitz when it came to cases involving Jewish defendants? According to the study by Alfred Konieczny^[83]), among the total of 3786 defendants indicted before that Sondergericht, 149 were Jews. Among these, 77 were tried in 1942. The percentage of defendants of Jewish origin in the total of indicted persons was thus 3.9 %. Considering the relatively low number of defendant Jews, Konieczny drew attention to the displacement of the Jewish population beyond the limits of Katowice District at the turn of 1939 and in 1940, and the attendant concentration of Jews in Ghettos and forced Labour Camps – which facilitated permanent Police supervision and a general unwillingness on the part of the Nazi security police to refer Jewish cases to ordinary judicial bodies. In cases coming before the Sondergericht, issues arising most frequently involved economic offences (79.9 %), with these therefore far beyond cases involving race defilement (4 %), radio offences (2.7 %), and other types of act (20 cases – 13.4 %). Only 111 Jews (74.5 %) were convicted, and this figure is actually lower than for defendants overall (85.4 %). Since most of these Jews were indicted in 1942, this can be considered a result of the ‘Regulation on Criminal Law for Poles and Jews in the Eastern Incorporated Areas’ of 4^th December 1941 (n. 60). Statistics on the imposition of the penalty of severe prison (severe penal camp) show 2 Jews in 1939, in 1940: 12, in 1941: 8, in 1942: as many as 41, and in 1943: 5. The Regulation obviously generated a certain number of additional cases in the judicial practice of the Special Court. A similar generational impact of that Regulation of 4^th December 1941 can also be observed with regard to Polish defendants^[84]).

Being sentenced by the Sondergericht Kattowitz to a less-severe punishment did not guarantee survival. In that regard an exemplary case is that of Markus Luftglass, who was sentenced to two and a half years of imprisonment for an economic offence entailing the concealment of a large number of eggs (65.000 in fact). The Sondergericht Kattowitz considered the facts that the person involved was of good reputation and advanced years (born in 1867). This explains the Court’s refraining from imposition of the penalty of severe prison. Unfortunately, the noticeably large number of eggs hit the headlines^[85]), with a press release on Luftglass’s conviction reaching Hitler, whose express wish it then was that the death penalty be imposed. Luftglass was therefore handed over to the Gestapo for execution purposes^[86]). Preserved documents state that he in fact died at the Auschwitz Concentration Camp in early November 1941^[87]).

A further preserved case brought before the Sondergericht Kattowitz in 1943 seems representative for proceedings pending at the time of the (9^th July 1943) entry into force of the ‘13^th Regulation to the Law on the Citizenship of the Reich‘ of 1^st July (n. 18). A bill of indictment against a 40-year-old Jewish merchant from Sosnowiec (for a wartime economic crime) dated 21^st May 1943 was filed with the Special Court on 9^th June 1943^[88]). A standard procedure entailed the issuing of an Order by the President of the Court, whereby inter alia pre-trial detention was prolonged, a trial date appointed, and the defendant and witnesses summoned^[89]). However, the trial scheduled for 14^th July 1943 was annulled by Order of the President dated 8^th July 1943, with explicit reference made to the ‘13^th Regulation to the Law on the Citizenship of the Reich’^[90]). A final document preserved in that matter is a report by the Katowice Over-Prosecutor, in which that official notifies the Berlin authorities that he has handed over the case and the defendant to the Gestapo, given the person’s status as Jewish^[91]).

When it comes to discontinuations, these were motivated by either death prior to a trial^[92]), or the ‘evacuation’ of a Jewish defendant by the Gestapo. The latter situation confirms a disregard for the Special Court, its marginalisation, or even its relegation to the role of passive observer. One case for example saw the Over-Prosecutor file with the Sondergericht a bill of indictment against a 45-year-old Jewish woman resident in the Chrzanöw area (Krenau) for the possession of a large amount of cash. Two weeks later that same Over-Prosecutor applied to the Circuit Court for a lifting of pre-trial detention and the handover of the woman to the Katowice Gestapo. The Circuit Court in Katowice delivered the relevant decision, and discontinuation of the case before the Sondergericht was then a mere formality. The defendant was sent to the Concentration Camp at Ravensbrück in mid-December 1941, only to die eleven months later, again at Auschwitz^[93]).

Another case features a remarkable letter written by an Over-Prosecutor to the Attorney-General, informing him that the Gestapo have ‘evacuated’ a defendant who was a Jewish salesman. The Over-Prosecutor consented to this having contacted the President of the Special Court, because ‘imposition of the death penalty by the Sondergericht, in the face of evident difficulties, was not expected’^[94]). It would be hard to find a clearer example of perfidiousness than that attempt to make institutional use of the Sondergericht to achieve physical elimination of a Jew without legal imposition of the death penalty.

IV Conclusions

The tragedy that befell European Jews during World War II was unprecedented in history. The German judiciary did not directly participate in the Holocaust because, for obvious reasons, it could not. However, through their judicial practice, Special Courts nevertheless had (and availed of) the opportunity to participate in the Nazis’ extermination policy. Acts in this category involved instances of the death penalty being imposed on Jews under wartime criminal law, by reference to vague and flexible prerequisites that sought more severe penalties for deeds not warranting them under normal conditions. The German system of justice during the War also facilitated circumstances in which Jewish prisoners, while serving sentences, or upon their completion, were handed over to the Gestapo or were simply transported to a Concentration Camp.

In situations of the latter kind it might be pondered whether the fault of the Special Courts themselves weighs heavier, or that of the Prosecutor’s Offices, given their role as executive bodies that should exercise custody over convicts following the delivery of judgments. On the other hand, it is hard to believe that Judges remained entirely unaware of the fates befalling defendant Jews. In any case, such awareness is alluded to in the documentation of Sondergericht Kattowitz, as described above, with a Court’s management certainly being notified as regards the withdrawal of a bill of indictment and the handing over of a defendant Jew to the Gestapo (in line with the given reason that the Special Court was unlikely to go so far as to impose the death penalty).

It may therefore be concluded that Judges in Special Courts contributed indirectly or directly to Jewish extermination policy: by staying silent in a situation where Jewish citizens were deprived of access to court. All that was taking place in the shadow of Auschwitz, in courts, and under the guise of legal provisions.

The analysis carried out reveals that Jews in the area of the so-called Old Reich were rarely indicted before Special Courts, and their marginal number in comparison with defendants overall decreased even further as the War went on. In practice, the last years in which Jews were indicted were generally 1941 or 1942. As a result, it can be concluded that the provisions of the ‘13^th Regulation to the Law on the Citizenship of the Reich’ (n. 18) was practically insignificant in the so-called Old Reich, since matters involving Jews had already ceased to be brought before courts. The situation looks different for certain Special Courts in the territories incorporated into the Reich. For various reasons, some of these have not been examined so far. As regards the Special Court in Bydgoszcz (Bromberg), the statistical data for the participation of Jewish defendants equal the standard for the Old Reich closely, while figures are clearly higher in Łódź and Katowice. In both of the Special Courts involved, indicted Jews accounted for between 3 and 4 % of all defendants, even as Jews constituted a third or fourth ethnic group between them in those places.

Any consideration of the reasons for Jews to make more-frequent appearances in the incorporated territories must focus on several issues. First, it was only post-1939 that German authorities began to control these areas, which is why certain treatments of Jews and practices within the justice system only started to be pursued after some time-lag. Second, the Polish territories formed an area with an elevated Jewish population. Third, attention must be paid to the certain scope for discretion available to a Prosecutor’s Office leadership, in terms of policy as regards the filing of bills of indictment. Regardless of any objective factor (size of the Jewish population, offences committed, need for a propaganda use of a judgment), this resulted in a certain rigidity or liberalism, and hence to observable statistical disparities. Fourth, it should not be forgotten that, in many places, notwithstanding Ghettoisation, Jews were not yet isolated from the remainder of the Polish population. This was especially manifest in certain proceedings pursued by Sondergericht Kattowitz in regard to economic offences. This in turn meant that parties involved in illegal slaughter or black-market trading might in fact be Jews and non-Jewish Poles, to the extent that a single criminal procedure might see them held jointly liable before a Special Court. This was the case as a division of criminal proceedings or a filing of a bill of indictment with the Special Court against Poles combined with the way that application of ‘Police measures’ to Jews ensured additional complications in the life of a Prosecutor.

Researchers should be encouraged to reach for court files, and to use them in investigating the tragic fates of Jews during World War II. There are two further areas for such postulated archival research, involving the output of Circuit Courts, or else the Special Courts in the General Government area. The alternative that this denotes was made available by the ‚Regulation on Criminal Law for Poles and Jews in the Eastern Incorporated Areas’ dated 4^th December 1941 (n. 60). Regarding Circuit Courts, more significant effects can be expected from materials kept in Germany, since in Polish Archives the extensively preserved documents of Circuit Courts were disposed of many years ago, with only individual example cases retained for each category of matters. The possible research field is narrow as a consequence of this.

On the other hand, the output of Special Courts in the General Government is made use of by Holocaust historians. However, they have done this solely to establish facts, rather than to engage in legal analyses of proceedings. Such research must be conducted with caution, keeping in mind the dissimilarity of the legal framework in the case of the Reich. In the law of the General Government many new acts were introduced to carry a penalty of capital punishment, not least provisions of assistance to Jews or departures from a Jewish District achieved or attempted by Jewish people.

A further proposal to be advanced would see the arrangements for Special Courts in the Reich compared with those concerning the Special Courts in the General Government, albeit not solely in relation to cases involving Jews.