Home Linguistics & Semiotics Redefining logical constants as inference markers
Article
Licensed
Unlicensed Requires Authentication

Redefining logical constants as inference markers

  • María José Frápolli, EMAIL logo and Stavros Assimakopoulos,
Published/Copyright: October 13, 2012
Become an author with De Gruyter Brill

Abstract

There is currently no universally accepted general definition of logical constanthood. With a view to addressing this issue, we follow a pragmatist rationale, according to which, some notion can be identified as a logical constant by considering the way in which it is used in our everyday reasoning practices, and argue that a logical constant has to be seen as encoding some kind of dynamic meaning, which marks the presence of an inferential transition among propositional contents. We then put forth a characterisation of logical constants that takes into account their syntactic, semantic and pragmatic roles. What follows from our proposal is that logical constanthood can be best understood as a functional property that is satisfied only by certain uses of the relevant notions.

Published Online: 2012-10-13
Published in Print: 2012-10-26

©[2012] by Walter de Gruyter Berlin Boston

Downloaded on 7.12.2025 from https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/tlr-2012-0023/html?lang=en
Scroll to top button