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Exclamation, epistemic assertion and interlocutor's subjectivity

<https://doi.org/10.1515/tl-2025-2003>

Abstract: This commentary expands and tries to improve on the use of embedded exclamations to clarify what it means for exclamations to be assertive and draw further conclusions on the nature of the subjectivity and emotivity that everyone admits that exclamations convey. Although much attention was paid to emotive embedding, considering its coexistence with epistemic embedding and the actual prevalence thereof clarifies the way the multiple layers of exclamatory utterances interact. In particular, the presence of a non-emotive, *bona fide* epistemic assertion brings back into play the interlocutor's subjectivity, which must be inscribed in the meaning of exclamation, along with the speaker's.

Keywords: exclamation; embedding; complement clauses; assertion; subjectivity; interlocutor

In the target article “Exclamation, intensity, and emotive assertion,” Andreas Trotzke and Anastasia Giannakidou (henceforth T&G) propose a novel analysis of exclamatory utterances.¹ They make two important and mutually independent contentions:

1. Exclamation is the expression of an *attitude* from the speaker; there is no exclamatory speech act and there is no exclamatory illocutionary operator. Their arguments come from the possibility of exclaiming parasitically on various clause types and of cumulating exclamation with diverse speech acts (question, declaration, etc.);

¹ In the present paper, following T&G (p. 2), I will use *exclamation* to refer to the speech act that a speaker performs or the attitude that a speaker adopts when exclaiming. *Exclamative* will be used to refer to clause types that are assumed to convey such a speech act/attitude. The plural *exclamations* covers all the utterances that are used to exclaim, whatever their clause type. As an adjective, I will use *exclamatory*.

I would like to thank Hans-Martin Gärtner for his invitation to contribute, and Nikos Angelopoulos and Wiebke Matuschat-Petersen for judging the Greek and German examples and/or asking their informants to do so for me.

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2. Exclamatory utterances make two assertions and convey a presupposition.² It is presupposed that the speaker that exclaims subjectively believes *p*; s/he both asserts the propositional content of the utterance and that s/he feels emotional about it.

In this commentary, I will leave aside point 1, with which I partially concord,³ and focus on the second part, which deserves much attention, in particular due to the methodology that the authors adopt and from which more (and somewhat different) conclusions can be drawn in my view. In a nutshell, although sometimes on a distinct or opposite empirical basis, the present article provides support for T&G's idea that (1) not only emotive but also descriptive assertion is conveyed by exclamatory utterances, and (2) the presuppositional part of exclamations is subjective (speaker oriented). It supplements it, as well as previous works, in claiming that exclamations include an interlocutor-oriented subjective part, which precisely is to be derived from the newly uncovered assertive part of exclamations.

The commentary is organized as follows. Section 1 summarizes my construal of T&G's results, insisting on the parts that will be discussed later. Section 2 comes back to their comparison between emotive embedding and exclamations, and shows its limitations. In Section 3, embedding under epistemic attitude predicates, which is mostly left aside in the target article, is examined and shown to ultimately buttress T&G's claims. In the light of this conception of the embedding test and additional, continuation data, in Section 4, I discuss further implications for the interactive part of exclamations and the role that is devoted to the interlocutor in the meaning of exclamations. Section 5 concludes the commentary.

1 Trotzke & Giannakidou's conclusions from emotive embedding

Paramount for T&G is the comparison between clauses tagged as exclamations and embedded under an emotive verb, on the one hand, and root exclamations, on the

² About this rephrasing of T&G's claims, see below.

³ In my own work, alone or in collaboration, I also argued that there is no exclamatory illocutionary operator (Faure 2012) and that exclamation can be treated uniformly across the host clause types (Biraud et al. 2021), although I defended the view that there does exist an exclamatory speech act, which arises from the association of two contradictory attitudes from the speaker: objective adhesion to and subjective detachment from the content of the exclamative utterance. Crucially, this semantic paradox is coded as a syntactic paradox, by placing the (part of the) predicate that triggers the exclamation in a focal position, even if its content is given. Instead of yielding a crash of the derivation, this clash of features is cashed in on the expressive tier and the exclamatory effect arises. The two (objective and subjective) attitudes are detectable from the interactions exclamatory utterances are involved in (Faure 2016b).

other hand. They claim that the latter is amenable to an analysis in terms of the former, based on a thorough exploration of their similarities. Their data are drawn from English, German and Greek. For example, consider the Greek and German examples in (1) [T&G's (28) and (29)] and (2) [T&G's (78a) and (74b)], respectively, and their English translations.

- (1) a. Ti grigora pu/*oti/*na etrekse o Kipchoge!
 what fast that run.3SG.PST the Kipchoge
 ‘How fast Kipchoge ran!’
 b. I Ariadne thavmase pu/*oti/*na o Kipchoge etrekse toso
 the Ariadne was.amazed that the Kipchoge run.3SG so
 grigora.
 fast
 ‘Ariadne was amazed that Kipchoge ran that fast.’
- (2) a. Dass Eliud aber auch so schnell ist!
 that Eliud PTC PTC so fast is
 ‘How surprising that Eliud is so fast!’
 b. Andreas is erstaunt, dass Eliud eine Pause gemacht hat.
 Andreas is amazed that Eliud a break made has
 ‘Andreas is amazed that Eliud took a break.’

From this comparison, T&G draw several conclusions, which are summarized here under points (A), (B) and (C).

- (A) Syntactically, T&G emphasize that the (a) sentences resemble the embedded sentences in (b) (Section 3.3, p. 25–33, Section 4, p. 37–44). In particular, they observe that the Greek emotive complementizer *pou* features in (1) to the exclusion of the other (non-emotive) complementizers *oti* and *na*. In German, the subordinate syntax, with the verb in final position, is visible in (a) as in (b). Based on this observation, they claim that a silent emotive verb is present in the (a) sentences.
- (B) Interpretively, both root exclamations and complements to emotive verbs are traditionally deemed factive, i.e., to convey some kind of presupposition. In both cases, the authors take issue with the factive status of the content of the clause.⁴ As far as complements to emotive verbs are concerned, they report

⁴ Factivity is defined as a presupposition of objective veridicality in Giannakidou and Mari (2021: 62) and the target article argues that what exclamations involve is *subjective* veridicality.

data points like (3) (Égré 2008: 102), in which the proposition embedded under *regret* is false in the context.⁵

- (3) John wrongly believes that Mary got married, and he regrets that she is no longer unmarried.

As for root exclamatives, like assertions, they can be denied (4) [T&G's (13)] and are found in answers to questions (5) [T&G's (20)].

- (4) A: Ti nostima glyka pu ftiaxni o Janis!
 what delicious sweets that bakes the John
 'What delicious desserts John bakes!'
 B: Oxi/Ba/A, ba! Ta agorase apo to zaxaroplasteio.
 no them buy.3SG.PST from the cake shop
 'No/Nah! These are store-bought.'
 B': Oxi/Ba/A, ba! Dhen mou aresoun.
 no NEG to.me appeal.3PL.PRS
 'No/Nah! I don't like them.'
- (5) A: Tell me, how did Eliud Kipchoge do in the race?
 B: [He was very fast.]_F
 B': My god! [How fast he was!]_F
 B'': My god! [Der war aber auch schnell!]_F
 this-one was PTC PTC fast

From these observations, the authors draw the conclusion that *wh*-exclamatives and not just declarative exclamations⁶ involve assertion. In fact, their description even leads to the conclusion that exclamations carry two assertions, even though they do not phrase it exactly this way. Consider the conclusion of Section 2, on p. 18:

[our proposal is that] exclamations as a class (*wh*- and declarative ones) indeed convey descriptive content and are emotive assertions of intensity.

So, there is emotive assertion, but the conveyance of descriptive content is also an assertion, as said above on the same page:

⁵ Similar results in Thalmann and Matticchio (2024), opposite view in Faure (2006), who reports the outcome of a questionnaire that shows that the French version of (3) is considered a contradiction by most native speakers.

⁶ Meant as exclamations that are conveyed by a declarative clause type (cf. T&G, p. 2–3).

The second major data point in the literature⁷ intended to show that [the claim that] exclamatives lack assertive content is questionable: exclamatives can indeed be used as answers to information-seeking questions provided that they occur in a relevant information-structural and discourse environment.

Thus, exclamations are taken to carry

1. An assertion of the propositional descriptive content;
2. An emotive assertion.

The second point is by far not new, as T&G acknowledge, e.g., in fn. 4. It is already found in, among others, Michaelis and Lambrecht (1996: 378): “The notion of surprise or expectation contravention comes into play because the exclamative utterance counts as an assertion that the degree of the scalar property in question is unusually high,” which they rephrase “assertion of affective stance” below on the same page. Evidence for this comes from the fact that exclamations can be prefixed with “I can’t believe” (p. 379). Likewise, Biraud et al. (2021) defend the view that one of the main ingredients of the exclamatory speech act is that “the speaker informs her/his interlocutor that s/he affectively does not accept the content of the exclamation” (p. 91, my translation). We find something similar in Rett (2011), although she is careful about describing exclamations not as assertions but as expressions (i.e., expressive acts).

Conversely, that the descriptive content of the exclamation is asserted and not presupposed is somewhat new. Only in Biraud et al. (2021), I find a comparable view: “The speaker intends to inform the interlocutor that the proposition is true (by a strong assertion)” (p. 91, my translation). Observing that *wh*-exclamatives pass the tests for neither conventional implicatures nor presuppositions, they adopt Martin’s (1987: 98–99) description that their content is presented as obvious. They distinguish between assertion and strong assertion. Strong assertion is a speech act that aims at enforcing the interlocutor’s acceptance, while (mere) assertion is neutral in this respect.⁸ Crucially, like T&G, the book shows that this part of the exclamatory speech act is valid whatever the clause type that harbors the exclamation.

- (C) Both contrary emotives and exclamations involve subjective presupposition, which divides into two parts: A counterexpectation presupposition (the speaker believed not *p* before the utterance *t*, formalized on p. 23) and a veridical presupposition (the speaker believes *p* at the utterance time, formalized on p. 24–25).

The point is borrowed from Giannakidou (2016) and Giannakidou and Mari

⁷ The alleged impossibility of using exclamations to answer questions.

⁸ They also entertain the alternative idea that Martin’s (1987) “obviousness” could be a conversational implicature but no test is provided to support this hypothesis. See also Chernilovskaya (2014: Chap. 3), who defends the similar idea that it is an entailment.

(2021), where it is formalized adapting the tools of modal bases to emotive modality. To my knowledge, while counterexpectation was identified a long time ago,⁹ the fashion in which a subjective-veridical-presupposition part in exclamations is identified and formalized is novel and in fact sheds new light on our understanding of exclamation. I will comment on it and try to take it a step further below.

2 Emotive embedding is limited

I would like to discuss the points that were highlighted in Section 1 (similarity with emotive embedding, assertion, subjective presupposition) in the light of the embedding data, which play a central role in T&G. As far as syntax is concerned, T&G's proposal cannot be maintained as such, in my view. First, if there is an equivalence between (a) and (b) sentences in (1) and (2), we do not see why the structure is different when the emotive verb is overt and when it is covert. Put otherwise, we do not see why (1a) and (2a) cannot be embedded unmodified, as in (6).

(6) Embedded exclamations

- a. ^{?*} I Ariadne thavmase ti grigora pu etrekse
 the Ariadne was.amazed what fast that run.3SG.PST
 o Kipchoge.
 the Kipchoge

Intended: 'Ariadne was amazed at how fast Kipchoge ran.'

- b. ^{?*} Andreas ist erstaunt, dass Eliud aber auch so schnell ist.
 Andreas is amazed that Eliud PTC PTC so fast is

Intended: 'Andreas was amazed that Eliud was so fast.'¹⁰

Second, as the authors themselves point out (p. 20, p. 43), the (b) sentences in (1) and (2) are not unambiguously exclamatory, so no firm conclusion can be drawn from them. Moreover, one of their arguments is that Greek exclamatives can exhibit the emotive complementizer *pou*, which is also found in emotive declarative embedded clauses (1b). However, this data point is not unequivocal either, since *pou* is also the homonymous relative marker (7). Relations between exclamative and relative clauses have been observed a lot across languages, especially when degree is involved (Culioli 1974; Delfitto and Fiorin 2014; Elliott 1974; Faure 2012; Rett 2009, a.o.).

⁹ For example in Michaelis and Lambrecht (1996) or Rett (2011). See fn. 15 here for a morphological manifestation of counterexpectation in Classical Greek exclamatives.

¹⁰ Like T&G, I refrain from translating the German particles *aber auch* because there is no straightforward English equivalent.

The Greek structure could similarly be the relativization of the degree to which the speed of Kipchoge's running is measured in (1a). The exclusion of *oti* and *na* follows, since they are excluded from relative clauses as well.

- (7) To vivlio pou/*oti/*na diavasa
 the book that read.1SG.PST
 'The book that I read.'

The unacceptability of (6) matches the robust crosslinguistic reluctance against embedding under emotive predicates. Consider the French *wh*-exclamative in (8a).¹¹ It cannot be embedded under contrary emotive verbs (8b). Although for *étonner* 'astonish' and *surprendre* 'surprise' this restriction can be ascribed to their difficulty of embedding *wh*-clauses in general (9a), this is not the case for *admirer* 'admire,' which accepts *wh*-clauses that are not exclamatives (9b)/(9c), but does not accept exclamatives (8b). Beyond *wh*-exclamatives, declarative exclamations are not embeddable either in that language. Observe the mood difference of the embedded verb in (10a) and (10b).

- (8) a. Comme Michel a été courageux!
 how Michel has been brave
 'How brave Michel was!'
 b. Je suis *étonné/*surpris¹²?j'admire comme Michel a/ait
 I am astonished/surprised/I.admire how Michel has.IND/has.SBJV
 été courageux.
 been brave
 'I am astonished/surprised/I admire how brave Michel was.'
- (9) a. *Je suis étonné/surpris à quel point Michel a été courageux.
 I am astonished/suprised to what extent Michel has been brave
 b. J'admire à quel point Michel a été courageux.
 I admire to what extent Michel has been brave
 c. *À quel point Michel a été courageux!
 to what extent Michel has been brave
- (10) a. Qu' il *fasse¹²/fait beau!
 How it does.SBJV/does.IND nice
 'How nice the weather is!'

¹¹ *Comme* is unambiguously exclamative, the corresponding interrogative *wh*-item is *comment*.

¹² Under the intended, exclamatory interpretation. Subjunctive is acceptable if the sentence is an order. This construal is irrelevant here.

- b. Je suis surpris qu' il fasse/*fait beau.
 I am surprised that it does.SBJV/does.IND nice
 'I'm surprised at how nice the weather is.'

In English, embedded exclamatives are reported with emotive verbs, like (11) (Elliott 1974: 237, ex. 57). However, most examples in the literature require that a preposition mediates between the predicate and the *wh*-clause (12) (Rett 2011, ex. (11a)/(11b), adapted), suggesting that the preposition is the proper selector of the clause. Worse, Rett (2011: 436–439) observes that only *wh*-exclamatives and nominal exclamatives are embeddable under emotives, to the exclusion of, e.g., subject-auxiliary-inversion exclamatives, and that their interpretation differs (different possible continuations; no degree restrictions).

- (11) I regret how very much trouble I have caused you.
 (12) a. Mary is surprised [?](at) what a delicious dessert John baked.
 b. Mary is amazed [?](at) how very many shoes John owns.

In this section, we have seen that emotive embedding is rather limited for exclamations in the languages in which it was investigated. It seems to be almost limited to ambiguous (exclamatory or declarative) clauses. This puts in jeopardy T&G's idea that exclamations feature a silent emotive verb. This is not the case for epistemic embedding.

3 Epistemic embedding

In contrast to emotive predicates, epistemic (aka cognitive/semi-factive) attitude predicates are at ease with embedding exclamatives.¹³ Most of Elliott's (1974) English examples feature epistemic predicates (13) [T&G's (59) and (69)]. The French exclamative (8a) is comfortable with *savoir* 'know,' *comprendre* 'understand,' *réaliser* 'realize' ((14) to be contrasted with (8b)). In their corpus study of Classical Greek, Biraud et al. (2021) found 75 good examples of epistemic predicates versus 6 disputable examples of emotive verbs. The *hoíois*-clause in (15),¹⁴ with the emotive

¹³ Epistemic attitude predicates describe knowledge (*know*), lack of knowledge (*unaware*), knowledge acquisition (*learn*, *realize*) or transmission (*teach*, *show*). They are either factive or veridical, in Égré's (2008) sense that the truth of the complement to a veridical predicate is only entailed in contexts that are positive declarative (the latter condition should probably be extended to veridical contexts in Giannakidou's 1999 sense).

¹⁴ The abbreviations are borrowed from Liddell and Scott (1996) and the transliteration system from Giannakis (2014). In exclamatives, Classical Greek uses a series of *wh*-items that is distinct from the *wh*-interrogative paradigm (Faure 2021), although their usages sometimes overlap (cf. T&G p. 21 for Modern Greek *poso/ti*).

predicate *aiskhúnomai* ‘be ashamed at,’ is best construed as a direct exclamative: It is not coordinated with the object DP (in the preceding line) *tàs emautoû sumforás* and exhibits the particle *ára*, preferably found in direct speech (16).¹⁵ Conversely, the *hōs-kalōs* clause in (17) must be construed as an indirect exclamative, parallel to the direct (18).

- (13) a. Everyone knows what a nice person Chairman Mao is.
b. I know how very tall he is.
- (14) Catherine sait/comprend/réalise comme Michel a été
Catherine knows/understands/realizes how Michel has been
courageux.
brave
‘Catherine knows/understands/realizes how brave Michel was.’
- (15) Classical Greek exclamative under emotive verb, Ar. *Pl.* 774-775
aiskhúnomai *tàs emautoû sumforás*
I’m.ashamed the.ACC me.REFL.GEN miseries.ACC
hoiois *ár’ anthrópois* *xunòn elánthanon.*
what.kind.DAT PTC people.DAT be.with.PTCP I.was.unaware
‘I feel shame at my own miseries, what kind of people I used to associate with
unawares!’ (tr. Henderson adapted)
- (16) The particle *ára* in direct exclamative, Ar. *V.* 821
Ô déspoth’ hērōs, hōs khalepòn ár’ ên s’ ideîn.
PTC master hero how difficult PTC was you.ACC to.see
‘Master hero, how difficult it was to see you.’
- (17) Classical Greek exclamative under epistemic verb, E. *Ba.* 287
Didáxō s’ hōs kalōs ékhei tóde.
I.will.teach you.ACC how well has this
‘I will teach you how perfect sense this story makes.’
- (18) Classical Greek direct exclamative, E. fr. 25.1 Kannicht
Feû feû palaiòs aînos hōs kalōs ékhei.
interjections ancient saying how well has.
‘Oh, alas, how true the ancient saying is!’ (tr. Collard-Cropp)

¹⁵ The use of this particle is examined in Biraud et al. (2021: 78–81). In exclamatory utterances, *ára* is a discourse particle that is only used in sentences in the past, when the speaker does not adhere to the underlying proposition. It is materialization of T&G’s “counterexpectation presupposition of contrary emotives” (p. 23).

In (Modern) Greek as well, embedding exclamatives under epistemic verbs is way better than under emotive predicates. Compare (19) to (6a).

- (19) I Maria dhen ixere ti nostima glyka pu ftiaxni o Janis.
 the Maria _{NEG} knew what delicious sweets that bakes the John
 ‘Maria didn’t know what delicious desserts John bakes.’

Summing up, embedding exclamations under epistemic attitude predicates is easier than under emotive predicates. This observation holds crosslinguistically and for clauses that unambiguously convey exclamations.

4 Discussion: interlocutor subjective orientation

Even if it seems to contradict T&G’s stance, the double embedding possibility (under epistemic and, to a lesser extent, emotive attitude predicates) actually dovetails with their account. Recall from Section 1 that, in addition to the subjective veridicality presupposition, exclamations perform two assertions: Assertion of the descriptive content, assertion of the emotive stance. Each is reflected by an embedding option: The former under epistemic predicates, the latter under emotive predicates.

This is not the only confirmation for the two-assertion stance. The presence of two assertive layers in exclamations (described in Section 1 (B)) is also manifest from the two denial options that are offered and nicely illustrated by (4): B denies either the descriptive content (B) or the emotive stance (B’). Very importantly, the emotive stance that can be rebutted is not A’s attitude, but the hypothesis that B’s attitude matches with A’s attitude.¹⁶ This limitation is due to A’s attitude being a presupposition, as T&G show (point (C) in Section 1 above), and presuppositions are famous for not being directly deniable. Consider the failed denial of the existence presupposition of the definite description in (20) (Beaver et al. 2024, ex. (9)).

- (20) #It’s the knave that stole the tarts, but there is no knave.

Nevertheless, under closer scrutiny, like the two embedding possibilities, B’s double option of reaction evinces an asymmetry between the two (emotive and descriptive) assertive layers. By uttering (4), A implies that B has the same attitude towards the exclamative’s content as hers/his. This implication can be taken to be part of the

¹⁶ It is tantalizing to consider that the discussion around the evaluation of the descriptive content, which features a predicate of personal taste (*nostimos* ‘delicious’) is metalinguistic (Sundell 2011) and thus can be discarded here, but I follow Soria-Ruiz (2023), who shows that it presents features different from metalinguistic negotiations.

descriptive assertion, and as such to prompt the same reaction as assertions: B can deny the attitude or tacitly accept it by carrying on the conversation.¹⁷

However, overt acceptance returns a somewhat different picture.¹⁸ Whereas denials can apply to both asserted parts, the descriptive content and the attitude, as we saw about (4), overt acceptance cannot so easily target the attitude, as visible from the infelicity of B' in (21) and (22) (*too* and *aussi* left aside for the moment). This observation is also correct when we move away from predicates of personal taste, like *delicious*, and consider measurable dimensions like speed in (23)B''' versus B'' (acceptance of the description), and in B and B' (rebuttal of both assertions).

- (21) A. What delicious desserts John bakes!
 B. For sure, John bakes delicious desserts.
 B'. For sure, I like them/John's desserts, #(too).
- (22) A. Quels délicieux desserts sont fabriqués par Jean!
 what delicious desserts are made by Jean
 B. Ça c' est sûr, Jean fait des desserts délicieux.
 it it is sure Jean makes ART.INDF desserts delicious.
 B'. Ça c' est sûr, j' aime #(aussi) les desserts de Jean.
 it it is sure I like too the desserts of Jean
- (23) A. How fast Kipchoge runs!
 B. No, he has wheels on his shoes.
 B'. No, I don't find him that fast.
 B''. For sure, he is really the fastest.
 B'''. For sure, I find him fast, #(too).

Most interestingly, adding *too/aussi* is required to render the utterances (21)B', (22)B' and (23)B''' felicitous. *Too* is an additive operator, which, in our examples, presupposes that someone else likes John's desserts or finds Kipchoge fast. Thus, A's belief that p is true is presupposed, to wit, this test comes as a confirmation for T&G's view that exclamations convey a subjective veridicality presupposition. It is not surprising that this subjective presupposition must first be validated by the

¹⁷ The behavior of embedded exclamatives when the subject of the matrix predicates is in the second person is also telling, as clarified in Michaelis and Lambrecht (1996: 380) and Biraud et al. (2021: 110–115).

¹⁸ Using this test was inspired by Beyssade (2009: 27). What is unearthed here is probably the reason why exclamatives pass some assertion tests but not all (Kerfelec 2009: chap. 4; Chernilovskaya 2014: chap. 3). What I dub here "overt acceptance" might well be what Chernilovskaya (2014: 63–73) calls "confirmation," following Gunlogson (2008). The analysis of the interlocutor's subjectivity that follows does not hinge on this (subtle) distinction.

interlocutor (here with *too*) if s/he wants to express her/his acceptance of the extension of A's emotive stance beyond A's sole emotive state.

Beyssade (2009: 29, ex. (31)) proposes a test involving non-shared belief that goes in the same direction.¹⁹ Whereas the approval of the interlocutor cannot be requested on the presupposed content in (24a), this request is admissible on the content of an exclamative (24b), suggesting that it remains open to the interlocutor's validation.

- (24) a. # Jean regrette qu' il pleuve. Tu ne (penses/trouves)
 Jean regrets that it rains. You NEG thinks/finds
 pas qu' il pleut, toi?
 not that it rains, you
 'Jean regrets that it's raining. Don't you think it is raining?'
 b. Comme Marie est belle! Tu ne la trouves pas belle, toi?
 how Marie is beautiful you NEG her find not beautiful you
 'How beautiful Mary is. Don't you find her beautiful?'

If I am on the right track in proposing that the various options of embedding are each the reflex of one of the dimensions of exclamatory utterances, we can now understand why embedding under emotive predicates is more limited than under epistemic predicates. Subordination under epistemic predicates is just the reflex of the denial or acceptance of the descriptive content. Conversely, subordination under emotive predicates requires both this deny-or-accept move and that the subjective presupposition be taken into account. Most likely, this is why, when acceptable, the examples that are found in the literature feature performative-like properties on the matrix predicate (first singular, indicative present: (11), (15)).

5 Conclusions

Although this commentary has challenged the existence of a silent emotive verb in exclamations that T&G put forth, the main dimensions of their approach are maintained: There are two layers of assertion and a subjective presupposition in exclamations. To discuss and improve on their proposal, I extended T&G's methodologies of dwelling on the comparison with subordination cases and on replies to

¹⁹ Her whole paper is devoted to showing that exclamatives do not carry presuppositions and suggesting that they might convey conventional implicatures. Abels (2010) shows that they cannot involve conventional implicatures and concludes that they must be presuppositional. If anything, these articles show that exclamatives probably convey neither conventional implicatures nor presuppositions (same conclusion by Chernilovskaya 2014: Chap. 3, e.g., p. 51), unless it is a weaker presupposition, as the subjective veridical presupposition put forth in T&G's paper.

exclamations. In particular, I claimed that subordination cases are not the equivalents to direct exclamations. Instead, each embedding possibility explicates ONE of the dimensions of exclamations: Assertion of the descriptive content, assertion of the emotive stance. Overt acceptance was used to confirm the presence of a subjective veridicality presupposition and refine the role that it plays in exclamatory interactions. We uncovered that, along with the speaker-oriented subjective presupposition and emotive assertion, the emotive assertion contains a subjective, *interlocutor-oriented* part, namely a request that the interlocutor adopt the speaker's emotive state with respect to the content of the exclamation. This result corroborates the view that exclamations too are intersubjective items,²⁰ a dimension that must not be ignored in future attempts of analysis and formalization.

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²⁰ To my knowledge, this aspect has been little studied so far, except in the papers that are gathered in (Faure 2016a).

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