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Religion on the Rostrum: *Euchomai* Prayers in the Texts of Attic Oratory

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Abstract: This paper examines the use of prayers that are denoted by the verb *euchomai*, and their function as a means of affecting the cognitive/emotional disposition of people in forensic, symbouleutic and epideictic orations. It is argued that (references to) prayers may be of explicit or implicit character, and that they serve a variety of purposes: to secure the goodwill of the audience for the speaker; to present his character and civic/political qualities positively, while attacking, undermining and incriminating opponents for religious and political misconducts; to invite people in court or in the Assembly to think they are inspected by an invisible yet omnipresent divine audience; to refer to patriotism; and to triangulate relations between the speaker, his opponents and the audience.

Keywords: Prayers, *euchomai*, unity/division, cognitive/emotional, Attic oratory.

1 Introduction

This paper examines the use of prayers that are denoted by the verb *euchomai*, and their function as a means of affecting the cognitive (a term referring specifically, in this paper, to thoughts, judgement and the general mental perception) and emotional disposition of people in forensic, symbouleutic and epideictic contexts of public speaking in classical Athens.[1] The use of religious discourse – an umbrella notion that refers to a wide range of aspects or practices of religion, from ritualistic dicta to references to the gods and other divine agents (such as *tuchē*) – in oratory has attracted the interest of several scholars. Beyond discussions about the connection of religion and law in the institutionalized settings

1 I would like to thank William Furley, Millie Gall, and the anonymous readers for the useful and thought-provoking feedback they offered me, helping me think again about, and improve, the arguments and the structure of this paper.

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of Athens,[2] important studies have also discussed the ways in which religious discourse is used in rhetoric, specifically in the speeches that have come down to us in a textual form.[3] An increasingly intriguing aspect of studying religious discourse in ancient public speaking is the discussion about the different kinds of oratory – referring to the three major categories of speeches (i. e. forensic, symbouleutic and epideictic) and a few other generic dichotomies (i. e. public/private, defence/prosecution, logographic/non-logographic speeches) – which arguably make it compelling for the speaker to change rhetorical techniques from context to context. This also "affects the use of religious discourse: orators use it in accordance with the rules and norms of the institutional context in which they give a speech because it is thought that the Athenians voted differently, according to the speaking context and institutional setting in which they were called to make decisions".[4] This paper examines the use of *euchomai* prayers in the three generic and institutional contexts of public speaking – forensic, symbouleutic and epideictic – to find out whether the variation in context has any impact upon how prayers are used.

A caveat that has to do with the scope of research and method needs to be made here: this paper explores the use of *euchomai* prayers specifically, not the wide range of prayers and invocations to the gods that are used in the Attic oratorical texts. For it has been argued that prayers, invocations and other religious and ritualistic dicta, such as oaths, are denoted by simple vocatives (as in Antiphon 6.40; Demosthenes 6.37, 18.285), prepositional phrases (as in the construction πρὸς + genitive; see, for example, Aeschines 3.61; Dinarchus 1.68, 3.1; Demosthenes 3.17, 8.32, 8.34; Lysias 13.95) and particles (as the use of νὴ and μὰ in Dinarchus 3.15; Isaeus 6.61; Lysias 6.7, 32; Demosthenes 8.51, 9.54, 10.7,

2 See, for example, Filonik 2013, 11–96 on impiety trials; Gagarin 2013, 59–78 on the interconnection between law, politics and religion in early Greece; Harris 2015, 53–83 on religion and law; Harris 2015, 419–454 on the treatment of pollution caused by homicide in Attic law. On a general discussion of the interrelation between religion and the institutions of the Athenian *polis*: Parker 1983 specifically on *miasma*; Sourvinou-Inwood 1988, 259–274; 1990, 295–322 on *polis-religion*; Mikalson 2016. On oaths: Plescia 1970.

3 Dover 1974; Mikalson 1983; Parker 1997; Martin 2009; 2016, 281–300; van Hove 2017; Serafim 2021a. Some insights particularly into the use of prayers in oratory, among other genres, are given in Pulleyn 1997.

4 Serafim 2021a, 64. This is the theory of New Institutionalism, according to which different institutions have different 'logics of appropriateness' that condition the ways in which discourses interact and affect society. For similar ideas about how appeals to emotion are made in speeches and how other rhetorical techniques are used: Rubinstein 2004, 187–203; 2005, 129–145, where the role of the legal character of the speeches, public or private, is emphasized as an important factor that plays a role in delimiting the public speaking choices of the speaker.

10.20).[5] I decided to focus on the examination of the religious/ritualized dicta that are denoted by the (grammatical forms of the) verb *euchomai* because these are unambiguously meant to be prayers, whereas dicta denoted by particles can be taken as oaths, and vocatives and prepositions are thought to indicate invocations to the gods, but not necessarily prayers. An invocation in general may or may not include an attempt to actually communicate with the addressee; as in the case of the vocative or prepositional phrases, invocations may take the form of a reference to the divine (e. g. πρός τῶν θεῶν "by the gods"). But a prayer is more than simply referring to the gods: when a speaker (or any other kind of performer in antiquity) utters the word *euchomai* he signals his desire to talk to the divine – and he actually does so. This is the speech-act theory of J.L. Austin and J.R. Searle: in saying, for example, "I now pronounce you husband and wife", the speaker performs the very action they refer to, provided that they have the appropriate institutionalized role (in this case, that of a priest) and that the circumstances are the proper ones.[6]

Prayers, whether used in oratory or in other literary genres, encapsulate and exemplify the interconnectivity and synergy between religion and rhetoric (the art of using discourse for purpose). For, as L. Pernot eloquently puts it, "to pray is to speak to the gods in the form of an argued discourse. Therefore, prayer should be analysed as discourse, insofar as prayer is a speech that a person addresses to a divinity, and prayer can be understood in terms of the ancient categories of discourse".[7] M. Depew also highlights the rhetoricity of prayers, saying that "one interlocutor presses his claim on the other (whether it be recognition, hospitality or protection) by situating it in terms of mutually recognizable and valued information".[8] Prayers follow a specific ritual pattern: the worshipper first addresses the gods and adds 'second-names' (*epiklēseis*) to invoke attributes of the god(s); he or she mentions the reasons why the gods should listen propitiously to the invocation; and, finally, a request is made. The second part of the structural pattern of praying to the gods includes argumentation that is based on the *do ut des* ("I give so that you may give") tenet: the worshipper seeks to persuade the deity to return the favour to him/her. "In worship the Greeks aimed at generating an atmosphere of reciprocal *charis* … the gods in turn grant them their *charis*, goodwill, which translated into wealth, health and power".[9]

5 Serafim 2021a, 65.
6 Austin 1962; Searle 1969, 1975, 59–82, 1976, 1–24; Risselada 1993, 26–29; Bary 2009.
7 Pernot 2005, 331.
8 Depew 1997, 233.
9 Furley 2010, 119.

It should be noted, at this point, that the standardized pattern of praying is not always strictly adhered to in the forensic, symbouleutic and epideictic texts, since these are not given in ritualistic locations that need to follow ceremonial etiquettes meticulously. It is true, of course, that Assembly meetings and law-court trials in Athens started with a series of rites that come with, and call for the use of, ceremonial etiquettes (as, for example, the sacrifices to Apollo and Artemis Boulaia, and to Artemis Phosphorus and Zeus *Ktēsios*, of a pig whose blood was spattered over the auditorium). A series of "procedural oaths", as R. van Hove calls them, was also used in public speaking contexts in classical Athens (as, for example, the judicial oaths, others that are taken by sworn-in magistrates or by the parties involved in inter-state agreements).[10] But in the course of giving a speech, the speaker was not necessarily obliged to deploy the standardized structural pattern of prayers, as described above, or to stick to the religious practices that would have been used in ceremonial places. He may not always have, for example, to recite prayers with the vocal ploys (cf. Demosthenes 18.259–260) and the hand gestures (cf. Pseudo-Aristotle, *On the Universe* 400a16; Plato, *Laws* 717a) that accompany them, as ancient sources inform us. This may seem to be an example of overacting, of being exaggeratedly histrionic, which was considered risky or unacceptable in public speaking settings. Even without the typical structure of a prayer, however, *euchomai* dicta in orations have the potency of a religious act, provided of course that they are directed towards the divine.

This direction may be both *explicit* (as in cases where the gods are mentioned) and *implicit* (whenever there is no direct and unambiguous reference to the divine, but we can surmise that the speaker's request can only be directed to, and expected to get satisfied by, the gods or other divine agents). The 33 instances of (*euchomai*) religious wording in forensic speeches (0.007 %) and the 9 instances in symbouleutic/epideictic oratory (0.006 %)[11] that I found after investigating the 151 transmitted forensic, symbouleutic and epideictic speeches of the Ten Attic Orators through *The Diorisis Ancient Greek Corpus*, a digital collection of 820 ancient Greek texts (from Homer to the early fifth century AD),[12] fall

10 van Hove 2017, 163.

11 Rates are calculated by the quotient of the number of imperatives and the total number of words in forensic speeches (34 instances in 428591 words) and symbouleutic/epideictic speeches (9 instances in total of 149894 words).

12 In the list of 151 speeches, the 15 extant letters (6 of which belong to Demosthenes and 9 to Isocrates) and the fragments of two lost speeches of Hypereides in the Archimedes Palimpsest (the speeches *Against Timandros* and *Against Diondas*) are not included.

into these two broad categories of explicit and implicit (references to) prayers.[13] Implicit prayers are uttered not in the *here and now* of the trial, but whenever else. Implicitness leaves much room for subjective readings and speculation, in the sense that, in the absence of clarity, analysis depends largely on how each reader understands passages and thinks of their content in a specific context. In what follows, I investigate how I think the passages that include *euchomai* prayers invite the historical audience, i. e. the audience at the public speaking settings of ancient Athens, to think, feel and react by (re)making up their mind and casting their verdict. Whether those *invited* reactions were provoked or not,

13 *Euchomai* prayers of both explicit and implicit character, in forensic, symbouleutic and epideictic speeches per orator:

Orator	Legal speeches	Symbouleutic/epideictic speeches
Aeschines	1.23, 1.116, 1.133–134, 2.118, 3.18	–
Andocides	1.149	–
Antiphon	1.19, 6.1, 6.45	–
Demosthenes	18.1, 18.8, 19.70–71, 19.128, 21.133, 22.77, 25.99, 54.16, 20.25, 20.49, 20.67, 24.20, 43.12, 43.66	6.30, 8.20, 14.39
Dinarchus	1.64–65	–
Hyperides	1.3	–
Isocrates	–	5.68, 8.103, 12.7, 12.137, 12.244, 15.246
Lycurgus	1.1	–
Lysias	6.4, 18.18, 18.26, 25.22	–

Forms of *euchomai* can also be found elsewhere in the speeches of Attic oratory, but examples do not invariably seem to have a religious dimension. In most of these cases, *euchomai* means "wish"/"desire" (e. g. Demosthenes 20.55: ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐπράξαμεν πάνθ' ὅσ' ἂν εὐξαίμεθα "when we did all that we wished for", and 18.176: πρῶτον μὲν ἂν εὔξαιτο Φίλιππος ποιήσομεν "first, we shall do what Philip wishes"; Aeschines 1.159: ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῶν τοιούτων ἀπορεῖν ἂν εὐξαίμην ἐν τῷ λόγῳ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν εὔνοιαν "I could rather wish that I might be at a loss for such examples in my speech, for I love my city"). In the context of Demosthenes' and Aeschines' speeches there is nothing that points to the religious dimension of the verb *euchomai* (e. g. a reference to the divine, as in Demosthenes 8.20, or even to a human quality that can only be granted by the divine). It is the context, therefore, that gives *euchomai* a religiously laden dimension, not necessarily its very use *per se*.

and whether they were carried out by the totality of the audience or by a segment of it, is not feasible to determine.[14]

Some meaningful conclusions can be drawn about the use of prayers of this kind: first, that they are used in all oratorical contexts – forensic, symbouleutic and epideictic – but in a rather restrained and coy manner; second, that more instances can be found in public than in private forensic speeches, as it should be noted that there are no instances of *euchomai* prayers whatsoever in the private speeches of Isaeus;[15] and third, that these prayers are used in both prosecution and defence orations. Prayers are used to dramatize and solemnify the moment in court, the Assembly and the contexts of rhetorical *epideixis*, inviting the audience to think that there is much at stake that will be decided by their juridical or political verdict. Political decision-making is not strictly confined to political settings of public speaking, but it is extended both to forensic and epideictic settings, whenever the topics that are discussed present or refer to matters of political importance (e. g. funeral orations and speeches, such as the *Olympic Oration* of Lysias that aims to unite the Greeks and turn them against the Persians and other external enemies). It is understandable, then, why *euchomai* prayers are used in all contexts of Attic oratory, including both defence and prosecution speeches.

Two of the three conclusions that are drawn pose difficulties in understanding the rationale behind them. The first is about the use of prayers in greater numbers in public forensic than in private speeches. This does not seem to be as easily justifiable as one may think. It is true that public speeches are about major issues that concern the *polis*, and this creates the necessary conditions for using prayers in them, with the aim of functioning as a means of engaging the divine in the enterprise of protecting the *polis*. But private cases are equally connected with the public interests – thus, acquiring a heightened level of significance for the civic/political community. We should also bear in mind that public speeches (as, for example, Demosthenes 18 is – see below p. 10) are also about personal matters that are inextricably woven with the civic/collective affairs. As C. Ando and J. Rüpke point out in their important volume *Public and Private in Ancient Mediterranean Law and Religion*, the level of interconnectivity between public

14 In my recent book on religious discourse there is an attempt to examine whether the invited reactions of audiences to religious discourse were actually provoked. I argue that there are sources – they are limited, but still useful – that point to audiences using body, voice and senses (this is what I call "physical-sensory" reactions). See Serafim 2021a, 90–95.

15 As argued in Serafim 2021a, 47, the only instances of religious discourse that can be found in Isaeus' speeches are those made in the formulaic form of an oath that is denoted by the particles νὴ and μά, and the prepositional insertion of invocations to the gods (as, for example, in *Philoctemon* 58, 61; *Apollodorus* 33; *Ciron* 29 and *Hagnias* 35).

and private is heightened in antiquity.[16] E.M. Harris, in the same volume, argues, for example, for the importance that the speakers attribute to matters of family violence (the peak of which was homicide) for the whole community[17] – and for the ancients drawing on religious beliefs about pollution when drafting their laws on homicide.[18] So, the correlation between religion and homicide law is established. A reason I can suggest in an attempt to explain the lighter use of *euchomai* prayers in private than public speeches – unfortunately, not a fully satisfactory one – is that some of the former speeches are not invariably connected with civic/political matters, as speeches on homicide are. This is the case of monetary and inheritance issues – hence, perhaps, the lack not only of prayers, but also of other features of religious discourse in the private orations of Isaeus.

The second issue that is not fully apprehensible is about the restrained use of *euchomai* prayers in the three public speaking contexts. The idea that the ancients generally avoided prayers (and, broadly, religious discourse) because they preferred 'rational' arguments in the institutionalized settings of public speaking and political decision-making does not seem satisfactory to me.[19] It is wrong to argue that religious discourse is irrational. Rationality was not felt to be in conflict with traditional religious ideas.[20] The sparing use of *euchomai* prayers may perhaps be driven by the thought that the overuse of prayers, i. e. the ritualistic 'nudging' of the gods, may seem to be an abuse – hence, an act of impiety. The speakers use prayers whenever they want to underline the solemnity of the moment, the importance of the message they aim to communicate to the audience and the urgency or the value of the decision the people are asked to make. The value of prayers is succinctly emphasized by W. Burkert, who points out that "there is no important ritual without prayers" – thus, prayers are used to denote grand matters.[21] In contrast, overuse may neutralize their potential

16 Ando/Rüpke 2015.

17 Harris 2015, 419–454.

18 Cf. Demosthenes 23.67–68 on *diōmosia*, an oath sworn by the prosecutor, the defendant and the witnesses of each: "every man who brings accusation of such a crime must make oath by invoking destruction upon himself, his kindred, and his household; secondly, that he must not treat this oath as an ordinary oath, but as one which no man swears for any other purpose; for he stands over the entrails of a boar, a ram, and a bull, and they must have been slaughtered by the necessary officers and on the days appointed, so that in respect both of the time and of the functionaries every requirement of solemnity has been satisfied". Also: Antiphon 5.11, 6.6. On religious discourse and homicide cases: Parker 1983; Eucken 1996, 80–81; Petrovic/Petrovic 2016; Plastow 2020; Furley (forthcoming) for an updated examination of the topic in the speeches of Antiphon.

19 Martin 2009, 292–293.

20 Bowden 2016, 543–554; Serafim 2021a, 68.

21 Burkert 1987, 73.

to solemnify matters and underline the significance of the speakers' messages. Higher frequency in using prayers in speeches may also raise suspicion in the audience of exaggerated rhetorical artistry – an accusation that is often levelled against opponents to make them seem deceitful (cf. Aeschines 1.175, 2.156; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Isaeus* 4.23–24; Plutarch, *Demosthenes* 8.4–6).

2 Prayers in forensic oratory

In what follows, I discuss all the explicit and implicit cases of (references to) *euchomai* prayers which I found in the corpus of forensic speeches, with the aim of examining the form they take, the context they are in, the purpose they serve and the potential they have to persuade the target audience. Two speeches of Attic forensic oratory are known for starting with prayers; many speeches start with references to the gods, but Lycurgus' *Against Leocrates* (speech 1) and Demosthenes' *On the Crown* (speech 18) are exceptional in that they each have a *euchomai* prayer in the first section of their exordium:

> *Against Leocrates* 1: δικαίαν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ εὐσεβῆ καὶ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν θεῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς κατηγορίας Λεωκράτους τοῦ κρινομένου ποιήσομαι. **εὔχομαι γὰρ τῇ Ἀθηνᾷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς** καὶ τοῖς ἥρωσι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν ἱδρυμένοις, εἰ μὲν εἰσήγγελκα Λεωκράτη δικαίως καὶ κρίνω τὸν προδόντ' αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς νεὼς καὶ τὰ ἕδη καὶ τὰ τεμένη καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς νόμοις τιμὰς καὶ θυσίας τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν ὑμετέρων προγόνων παραδεδομένας ...
>
> Justice towards you, Athenians, and reverence for the gods, shall mark the opening of my speech against Leocrates, now here on trial. **So I pray to Athena and those other gods** and heroes whose statues are erected in our city and the country round to receive this prayer. If I have done justly to prosecute Leocrates, if he whom I now bring to trial has been a traitor to their temples, shrines and precincts, a traitor to the honours which your laws ordain and the sacrificial rituals which your ancestors have handed down ...
>
> *On the Crown* 1: Πρῶτον μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, **τοῖς θεοῖς εὔχομαι πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις**, ὅσην εὔνοιαν ἔχων ἐγὼ διατελῶ τῇ τε πόλει καὶ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν, τοσαύτην ὑπάρξαι μοι παρ' ὑμῶν εἰς τουτονὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα, ἔπειθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶ μάλισθ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν καὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας εὐσεβείας τε καὶ δόξης, τοῦτο παραστῆσαι τοὺς θεοὺς ὑμῖν, μὴ τὸν ἀντίδικον ...
>
> Let me begin, men of Athens, **by beseeching all the Powers of Heaven that on this trial** I may find in Athenian hearts such benevolence towards me as I have ever cherished for the city and the people of Athens. My next prayer is for you, and for your conscience and honour. May the gods so inspire you that the temper with which you listen to my words shall be guided, not by my adversary ...

The purpose of these two examples of *euchomai* prayers is the same, despite the difference in the cases they are part of – Lycurgus' speech is a prosecution, whereas that of Demosthenes is a defence. Both speakers try to justify the need to deliver their speech – because they care about the *polis*, its glorified past and its citizens, some of whom are present in the court in the capacity of judges or onlookers – thus, securing for themselves the *eunoia*, "goodwill", of the audience and making a plea for a fair hearing (cf. Isocrates 12.137, epideictic speech).[22] Prayers (as well as other aspects of religious discourse, such as oaths) are thought to be used as a means of presenting the character of whoever uses them in a favourable light, and to help him elicit trust and secure an unimpeded channel of communication with the audience – this is what I call 'positive *ēthopoiia*' ('ethos of sympathy' is also expedient in describing the creation of a *persona* oriented to the expectations of the audience).[23] As argued recently in *Religious Discourse in Attic Oratory and Politics*, "the messages of a pious man, whose words show that he is respectful to and reveres the gods, are more easily accepted by the audience, and the speaker renders himself more credible and persuasive, even when there is a lack of proofs".[24]

We should not forget that Demosthenes 18 is an extensive *apologia pro vita sua*, an emotionally intense recapitulation of the speaker's life, public service and political legacy. Demosthenes had, therefore, to find the ways that would allow him to present an audience-appealing *persona* not only to those present in the law-court, but also to his fellows in the city and the whole of Greece. One of these ways that Demosthenes comes up with is religious discourse: much attention is paid to the role of the gods and the divine in determining human actions and affairs (references are evenly distributed throughout the speech; cf. in §§ 97, 192–195, 198, 200, 207–208, 253, 289–290, 300), indicating the purpose of the speaker to refute the accusations that Aeschines levelled against him of being wrong in judgment about the handling of the kingdom of Macedon, and of bring-

22 Isocrates 12.137: "now I have expressed myself as to the kind of auditors I would pray that I might have (οἵους μὲν οὖν εὐξαίμην ἄν) for what I shall say …".

23 Serafim 2017, 26. On the 'ethos of sympathy': Wisse 1989. 34, 58–59; Amossy 2001, 6–7; Riggsby 2004, 181.

24 Serafim 2021a, 65; cf. Martin 2009, 259 who argues that oaths are used to enhance the speaker's credibility. Something similar is implied in Demosthenes 23.67–68 with regard to the value of *diōmosia* oath. Interdisciplinary scholarship, most drawing on social psychology and anthropology, indicates through experimentation that people tend to believe and trust whoever uses religious discourse in their speech, especially when he or she takes an oath or prays to the gods. See, for example, Ellingsen/Johannesson 2004, 397–420; Charness/Dufwenberg 2006, 1579–1601; Vanberg 2008, 1467–1480; Ibrahim 2009, 475–498; Jacquemet/Luchini/Shogren/Zylbersztejn 2013, 1–20.

ing destruction upon Athens. Given this self-defending and policy-acquitting purpose that is facilitated by religious discourse, it may not be surprising that the speech starts with a prayer to the gods. It is a noticeable way for the speaker to plead for the goodwill and fair hearing of the law-court audience, and to present himself as a pious man, whose only concern was about the good and the prosperity of the city and its people (in his words, ὅσην εὔνοιαν ἔχων ἐγὼ διατελῶ τῇ τε πόλει καὶ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν).[25]

These two examples of *euchomai* prayers have, arguably, the unspoken purpose of instilling a sense of apprehension in the audience, whose members are reminded that the gods are omnipresent and omniscient, and that they themselves are being inspected in court (cf. Dinarchus 1.64 where there is a direct and explicit invocation to the gods, who are summoned by the speaker as witnesses in the case, and Demosthenes 25.11 with a reference to Justice, an omnipresent and omniscient goddess).[26] As has been argued, "references to the gods in both contexts allow the speakers to instil fear in the judges that they would be accountable to the divine, if they decide to cast their vote favourably for the speakers' opponents. [...] Since Aristotle, encouraging particular cognitive dispositions (*Rhetoric* 1356a1–4) and appealing to emotions have been recognized as two of the most effective links that the speaker can create with the audience".[27] Through fear, Lycurgus and Demosthenes try to control, influence and persuade the audience.

Another unspoken purpose of the *euchomai* prayers in the speeches of Lycurgus and Demosthenes that are cited above is to triangulate relations in court by generating unity or division among the members of the audience: the Athenian judges and onlookers are invited to recognize themselves as belonging to the same group as the speaker, since they all share and cherish the same values – i. e.

25 On the interconnection between religion and patriotism: n. 27.

26 Dinarchus 1.64: "I summon as my witnesses (μαρτύρομαι), Athenians, the awful goddesses and their abode, the heroes of the land, Athena Polias, and those other gods who have obtained our city and countryside as their home, to show that when the people has consigned to you for punishment one who, against his country's interests, has accepted a part of the <imported money>, one who has defiled and ruined the city's prosperity and betrayed that country". Demosthenes 25.11: "before you cast your votes, each of the judges must reflect that he is being watched by hallowed and inexorable Justice (τὴν ἀπαραίτητον καὶ σεμνὴν Δίκην), who, as Orpheus, that prophet of our most sacred mysteries, tells us, sits beside the throne of Zeus and oversees all the works of men. Each must keep watch and ward lest he shame that goddess". On the techniques of calling upon the gods to act as witnesses in the classical Athenian law-court, see Polinskaya 2012, 23–37; Martin 2009; Serafim 2021a, esp. Chapters 1 and 2 on the role of the divinized *phēmē* in providing evidence for the validity of Aeschines' accusations against Timarchus of being a male prostitute (1.127–129).

27 Serafim 2021a, 97, 100.

piety and patriotism. It is important to note, first, that religion was considered an emblematic feature of Athens, its constitution and institutions (cf. Lycurgus 1.15, 79)[28] and a part of public speaking processes (cf. Aeschines 1.23 and Demosthenes 24.20),[29] and second, that religion and patriotism were closely entwined in the classical period.[30] The speakers, through such (even implicit) references to a religious and political *koinon* they and their fellows in the *polis* belong to, present themselves in a favourable way. Their piety and good service to the city are qualities highlighted in order to send the message to the target audience in trials and political conventions that they deserve to be treated with respect and fairness. Those who do not belong to the religious and civic/political group are the speakers' opponents, who are presented or connoted as being the enemies of the audience. Leocrates is accused of committing a double crime against both the *polis* and the divine, and Aeschines is presented, many times in Demosthenes 18, as being inimical towards the civic community. This is a prime example of what I call "negative *ēthopoiia*".[31]

The connection between *euchomai* prayers and the affairs of the *polis* is also apparent elsewhere in Attic forensic oratory. Prayers can be seen as a means of appealing to the sense of civic pride that the Athenians had, eliciting all sorts of cognitive/emotional reactions, depending on the (immediate or general) context and the purposes of the speaker. In Aeschines 1.116, for example, the goodwill of the audience is the issue at stake (and what the *euchomai* prayer aims for): "two points of my plea remain, and I pray to all the gods and goddesses that I may be enabled to speak regarding them as I have planned to do, for the public good (εὔχομαι τοῖς θεοῖς πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως ὡς προῄρημαι); and I should

28 Lycurgus 1.15: the Athenians should realize that "[they] would be held to have neglected the virtues which chiefly distinguish [them] from the rest of mankind, piety towards the gods, reverence for [their] ancestors and ambition for [their] country, if this man were to escape punishment at [their] hands". Lycurgus 1.79: "There is a further point which you should notice, gentlemen. The power which keeps our democracy together is the oath. [...] But the gods no one who broke his oath would deceive. No one would escape their vengeance. If the perjured man does not suffer himself, at least his children and all his family are overtaken by dire misfortunes".

29 Aeschines 1.23: "after the purifying sacrifice has been carried round and the herald has offered the traditional prayers (ὁ κῆρυξ τὰς πατρίους εὐχὰς εὔξηται), the presiding officers are commanded to declare to be next in order the discussion of matters pertaining to the national religion, the reception of heralds and ambassadors, and the discussion of secular matters". Demosthenes 24.20: "in the first presidency and on the eleventh day thereof, in the Assembly, the Herald having read prayers (ἐπειδὰν εὔξηται ὁ κῆρυξ), a vote shall be taken on the laws".

30 On patriotism and religion, see Chroust 1954, 280–288; Nathanson 1993, 34–35; Serafim 2021a, 125–133; and Crowley (forthcoming), 1–18.

31 Serafim 2017, 26.

like you to give attention to what I am about to say, and to follow me with willing mind". It is interesting to note that the wording here sustains relations and generates a sense of unity and division: the 'I' in *euchomai* turns to a tacit 'We' through the reference to the *polis*. Aeschines implies that the accusations that he brought against Timarchus – indeed, in 1.116 he accuses him of being a debased man not only because he wasted his patrimony and abused his body, but also because he proved to be hostile towards his fellow citizens – were all driven by his care for the city. This changes the personal character of the adversarial case into a speech composed and delivered because of the speaker's favour towards the city, which is the declared purpose of Aeschines from the first sections of the exordium of his speech 1.[32] To present himself as the pious defender of the city is to attempt to influence the law-court audience cognitively/emotionally and affect their verdict in a way favourable to himself.[33]

Aside from prayers that are actually delivered by the speakers, there are also *references to (explicit or implicit) prayers* that are uttered by other people. References to prayers are used masterfully to corroborate the argumentation of the speaker. A good parallel to Lycurgus 1.1 and Demosthenes 18.1, which serves the same triangulating purpose, can be found in Dinarchus 1.65, where the speaker presents himself as a good citizen who cares for the *polis* and its people, while at the same time demolishing his opponent, who is presented as the enemy of the civic/political community.

> [A] *οἱ μὲν ἐχθροὶ καὶ κακόνοι τῇ πόλει* ζῆν ἂν βούλοιντο, συμφορὰν ἡγούμενοι τῆς πόλεως εἶναι, [B] *ὅσοι δὲ εὖνοι τοῖς ὑμετέροις πράγμασι*, καὶ μεταπεσούσης τῆς τύχης ἐλπίζουσιν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἂν τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματ' ἐλθεῖν, τὴν ἀξίαν δίκην δόντα τῶν πεπραγμένων ἀπολωλέναι βούλονται, **καὶ ταῦτ' εὔχονται τοῖς θεοῖς**: [C] *οὓς κἀγὼ συμπαρακαλῶ* σῶσαι τὴν πατρίδα, κινδυνεύουσαν ὁρῶν ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας, ὑπὲρ παίδων, ὑπὲρ γυναικῶν, ὑπὲρ δόξης, ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων.
>
> Enemies, and those who bear the city ill will, would wish him alive, counting this a disaster for Athens; but all who favour your concerns and hope that with a turn of fortune the city's prospects may improve want this man dead and pay the penalty merited by his conduct,

32 Aeschines 1.1–2: "I have never, fellow citizens, brought indictment against any Athenian, nor vexed any man when he was rendering account of his office; but in all such matters I have, as I believe, shown myself a quiet and modest man. But when I saw that the city was being seriously injured by the defendant, Timarchus, who, though disqualified by law, was speaking in your assemblies, and when I myself was made a victim of his blackmailing attack—the nature of the attack I will show in the course of my speech— I decided that it would be a most shameful thing if I failed to come to the defence of the whole city and its laws, and to your defence and my own".
33 On the persuasive potential of the speaker's presentation as a defender or advisor of the *polis*, see also Demosthenes 18.169–173; Serafim 2015, 96–108 discusses this passage.

> and this is what they pray to the gods for. I also join in praying the gods to save our city, which I see to be in danger of forfeiting its safety, its women and children, its honour, and every other thing of worth.

Two features of this passage make it important in the enterprise of triangulating relations in court and sustaining persuasion. The first feature is the masterly use of persons: I divided the passage into three parts, A–B–C, each of which presents a (group of) person(s) acting. In A, the enemies of the *polis* wish Dinarchus' adversary, Demosthenes, farewell; in B, the people who care about the city pray to the gods for his destruction. It is to this group that the speaker belongs, as he says plainly in part C of the passage. The difference in the wishes, purposes and actions of people in A, B and C create a 'They' – 'We' pattern of relations in court: 'They', i. e. the enemies and, implicitly, Demosthenes who is corroborated by them, turn against 'We', i. e. people who support and care about Athens, the speaker himself and the Athenians *en masse*, who are implicitly denoted by the reference to τὴν πατρίδα. The translation "our city" is not mistaken: the particle has, in this context, a possessive quality,[34] acting as an indication of the whole civic/political community that comes together and stands up to the enemy. Modern *social identity theory* underlines the persuasiveness of the ways and means of creating in-group and out-group relations, i. e. their effectiveness in influencing the behaviour and the decision-making capacity of the target audiences.[35] The second prominent feature of this passage is the synergy it attempts to establish between the gods and the Athenians: the action of people in B and C – i. e. the very prayer to the gods – points to the attempt to have the gods involved in matters that concern the humans in their capacity as citizens. Dinarchus tries, arguably, to send the message to his fellows who are against Demosthenes that they are not alone: they have the support of the gods, as Demosthenes is the mutual enemy of both the gods and humans alike.

Let us read Demosthenes 22.77 to see another example of how references to prayers acquire a patriotic orientation: "they conquered their enemies; they fulfilled the prayers of every sound-hearted man (καὶ ἃ πᾶς τις ἂν εὖ φρονῶν εὔξαιτο) by establishing concord throughout the city; and so they have bequeathed to us their imperishable glory, and excluded from the market-place men whose habits of life were what yours have always been". Here Demosthenes, in the peroration of his oration against Androtion, refers to the ancestors of the Athenians and

34 The article, according to Smyth 1984[3], 287 (§ 1121) has possessive qualities "when there is no doubt as to the possessor".

35 Tajfel/Turner 1979; Miller/Gurin/Gurin/Malanchuk 1981, 494–511; Conover 1984, 760–785; Lau 1989, 220–223; Huddy 2003, 511–558.

their (military but also cultural) battles against, and victories over, their enemies. These are harmonized with the prayers of the good citizens, through which a desire to see the city in concord and prosperity is expressed (on concord as an important prerequisite for the city's well-being, cf. Lysias 18.18, where another *euchomai* prayer is used).[36] This is what the ancestors did to be able – as they were – to bequeath a glorious city to the next generations. Before stating, in the next and last section of the speech, § 78, his final appeal to the audience not to put up with or, worse, imitate Androtion because this would be an act of impiety ("... Androtion is the repairer of your processional plate. Androtion! Gracious Heavens! [ὦ γῆ καὶ θεοί] Do you think impiety [ἀσέβημα] could go further than that?), Demosthenes makes yet another link between patriotism and religion. The patriotism of the ancestors, who listened to the prayers of sane men and good citizens, is the safeguard of the *polis* – and the landmark of civic behaviour that the Athenians (in or out of the court) should follow. The reference to prayer, the ancestors and the glorified political community aims to underline the solemnity of the moment in court and the gravity of the judges' duty to protect the city and unequivocally show that they revere the divine.

References to implicit prayers that may also have a patriotic and *polis*-oriented dimension – perhaps in a more abstract way than the prayer in Demosthenes 22.77 – can be found elsewhere in Attic oratory. A good example is in Aeschines 1.133–134:

> εἰ γὰρ τὴν τοῦ σώματος εὐπρέπειαν ταύτην τινὲς διαβάλλοντες συμφορὰν τοῖς ἔχουσι καταστήσουσιν, οὐ ταὐτὰ κοινῇ ψηφιεῖσθαί φησιν ὑμᾶς καὶ ἰδίᾳ **εὔχεσθαι** [...] εἰ τοὺς μὲν υἱεῖς τοὺς μηδέπω γεγονότας **ἅπαντες εὔχεσθε** οἱ μέλλοντες παιδοποιεῖσθαι καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς τὰς ἰδέας φῦναι καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἀξίους ...
>
> For he says that if certain men by slandering this beauty of body shall cause beauty to be a misfortune to those who possess it, then in your public verdict you will contradict your personal prayers [...] for when you are about to beget children, you pray one and all that your sons still unborn may be fair and beautiful in person, and worthy of the city ...

In this passage, future parents are presented as praying to be granted beautiful and virtuous children, who are worthy of, and beneficial to, the city. It is the ideal of being καλὸς κἀγαθὸς that gives the prayer a patriotic dimension, since to have good children is considered one of the blessings the *polis* enjoys, and one that can underline and preserve its glory and secure its leading role in Greek affairs (cf.

36 Lysias 18.18: "for you still remembered the disasters that had occurred, and you prayed to the gods to restore the city to unanimity (τοῖς θεοῖς εἰς ὁμόνοιαν ηὔχεσθε καταστῆναι τὴν πόλιν)".

Pericles' *Funeral Oration*, as cited in Thucydides 2.44).[37] There is no immediate and clear mention of the divine in the context of Aeschines' speech, but it is only from the gods that the gift of beauty can come (cf. Homer, *Odyssey* 8.457–460, 6.18; *Iliad* 6.156–157; Homeric *Hymn* 5.77; Hesiod, *Catalogue of Women* 120.4), as it is from them that people acquire goodness (cf. Demosthenes 20.67, where the speaker is presented as praying to the gods to allow Athens to prosper by having the best citizens)[38] and children are born (cf. Demosthenes 43.12).[39] The reference in Aeschines 1.133–134, despite giving the impression that is out of context in a speech that is used by Aeschines to accuse Timarchus of being ineligible to speak publicly, is a seamless part of the argumentative line of the speaker: it is used as a means of anticipating and refuting the arguments of Timarchus, who would allegedly try to distort the arguments that Aeschines uses.[40]

Implicit references to *euchomai* prayers also refer to, or capitalize on, systems of thought, such as, for example, that the divine intervenes in and determines human affairs (cf. Demosthenes 20.25).[41] They may also refer to the private affairs of individuals, as Antiphon 6.1 indicates:

> ἥδιστον μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντι μὴ γενέσθαι μηδένα κίνδυνον περὶ τοῦ σώματος, **καὶ εὐχόμενος ἄν τις ταῦτα εὔξαιτο**: εἰ <δ'> ἄρα τις καὶ ἀναγκάζοιτο κινδυνεύειν, τοῦτο γοῦν ὑπάρχειν, ὅπερ μέγιστον ἐγὼ νομίζω ἐν πράγματι τοιούτῳ, αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ συνειδέναι μηδὲν ἐξημαρτηκότι, ἀλλ' εἴ τις καὶ συμφορὰ γίγνοιτο, ἄνευ κακότητος καὶ αἰσχύνης γίγνεσθαι, καὶ **τύχῃ μᾶλλον** ἢ ἀδικίᾳ.
>
> True happiness for one who is but human, gentlemen of the jury, would mean a life in which his person is threatened by no peril: **and well might that be the burden of our prayers.** But well too might we pray that if we must perforce face danger, we may have at least the one consolation which is to my mind the greatest of blessings at such an hour, a clear con-

37 Pericles' *Funeral Oration* (Thucydides 2.44): "Some of you are of an age at which they may hope to have other children, and they ought to bear their sorrow better; not only will the children who may hereafter be born make them forget their own lost ones, but the city will be doubly a gainer. She will not be left desolate, and she will be safer. For a man's counsel cannot have equal weight or worth, when he alone has no children to risk in the general danger".

38 Demosthenes 20.67: "For my prayer (εὐξαίμην ἂν ἔγωγε) would ever be that Athens may abound in all blessings, but especially that the best men and the most numerous benefactors of this city may be her own citizens".

39 In Demosthenes 43.12, Eubulides is presented as praying to the gods that a son may come to his family (μάλιστα μὲν ηὔχετο τοῖς θεοῖς υἱὸν αὐτῷ γενέσθαι).

40 Aeschines 1.136: "Now as for me, I neither find fault with love that is honourable, nor do I say that those who surpass in beauty are prostitutes".

41 Demosthenes 20.25: "For myself indeed, I pray Heaven (ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ εὔχομαι τοῖς θεοῖς) that, if so it may be, our wealth also may increase, but if not, then at least that our reputation for good faith and constancy may remain sure".

> science; so that if disaster should after all befall us, it will be due to no iniquity of ours and bring no shame; **it will be the result of *tuchē*** rather than of wrongdoing.

In a speech that revolves around the accusation that the chorus leader poisoned a *choreutēs*, a young chorus member, Antiphon starts by pointing out that this would have happened because of *tuchē*, not by design. Some translators refer to *tuchē* as "chance", implying perhaps that the act of poisoning was done inadvertently, because of a mistake.[42] It is important, however, to mention that *tuchē* in ancient thought is considered a divine agent that operates unseen, influencing or determining human lives.[43] This reference to the role of *tuchē* in human affairs links well with the point made at the beginning of § 1, where we are told that we, humans, cannot be sure about our lives, but need to ask the god to provide us with the desired happiness. The reference to a *euchomai* prayer is used (or perhaps, in this case, abused) to support the argumentative line of the speaker regarding the innocence of the chorus leader who is accused of committing homicide. The use of prayers with the purpose of rallying the support of the judges can also be found elsewhere, as in Andocides 1.149 and in Demosthenes 18.8.[44]

In other cases, as in Antiphon 1.19, references to prayers are made with the purpose of incriminating individuals and provoking a cognitive/emotional reaction against them:

> ἡ δὲ παλλακὴ τοῦ Φιλόνεω τὴν σπονδὴν ἅμα ἐγχέουσα **ἐκείνοις εὐχομένοις** ἃ οὐκ ἔμελλε τελεῖσθαι, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἐνέχει τὸ φάρμακον.
>
> But Philoneos' mistress, who poured the wine for the libation, **while they offered their prayers** – prayers never to be answered, gentlemen – poured in the poison with it.

42 Maidment 1941.

43 Herodotus 1.32; Sophocles, *Oedipus Tyrannus* 263, 442, 1080–1082; Pindar, *Olympian* 12.1–9; Demosthenes, *The Second Olynthiac* 22: "for fortune weighs heavily in the scale – nay, fortune is everything, in all human affairs"; *On the Peace* 11–2, where Demosthenes claims that good fortune "is more powerful than all the cleverness and wisdom on earth"; Aeschines 2.118, 131. On fate in *Oedipus Tyrannus*: Sheehan 2012, 37–45. On the "dramatic simile of life", Kokolakis 1960. On *tuchē* in Demosthenes 18, Martin 2009, 92–101.

44 Andocides 1.149: "It is you who must act as my father and my brothers and my children. It is with you that I seek refuge. It is to you that I turn with my entreaties and my prayers (εἰς ὑμᾶς καταφεύγω καὶ ἀντιβολῶ καὶ ἱκετεύω). You must plead with yourselves for my life and save it". Demosthenes 18.8: "it appears that I have today to render account of the whole of my private life as well as of my public transactions. I must therefore renew my appeal to the gods; and in your presence I now beseech them (βούλομαι πάλιν τοὺς θεοὺς παρακαλέσαι, καὶ ἐναντίον ὑμῶν εὔχομαι), first that I may find in your hearts such benevolence towards me as I have ever cherished for Athens".

The mistress, and, by implication, her apparent ally, the stepmother, who manipulated her to achieve the evil goal of poisoning her husband, are presented here not only as guilty of homicide but also of impiety. They are responsible for not allowing their husbands to finish the rituals of praying to the gods, when those praying make a request and wait to receive an answer from the divine – that is why the death of the men is called "impious" (§ 21: ἀθέως).[45] The two women are presented as disrupting the ethical etiquette of ritualistic communication between the supplicant and his divine audience – thus, deserving to be punished by the judges for impiety (this is clearly said in § 21 where the speaker asks the judges to assume the role of the avengers of the dead man), as it is implied they will be by the gods (cf. § 25: "in pitying him [the murdered man] you would be acting more justly and more righteously in the eyes of gods and men"). Those convicted for religious offences regularly received the death penalty in Athens (cf. Andocides 1.68; Demosthenes 24.7) or they saw their right to enter the temples of the gods repealed (cf. Andocides 1.33; Demosthenes 23.40 where there is a reference to the homicide law of Draco; *IG* I^3 104).[46] Given this unrelenting toughness of the laws and the people towards anyone committing impiety, the references to the speakers' opponents – as the two women are in Antiphon 1 – aim to influence the thoughts and emotions (especially, anger) of the audience in a way that would be detrimental for the targeted individuals (cf. Demosthenes 25.99).[47]

The exploitation of (references to) prayers for the creation of an inimical cognitive/emotional disposition in the audience is also evident in other foren-

45 Wohl 2010, 45, among others (e. g. Due 1980, 20–21), argues that the Demosthenic diction in describing the unfulfilled prayer and the "impious (ἀθέως) and inglorious (ἀκλεῶς) death" (§ 21) of the poisoned men, has implications for tragedy, and that the stepmother is by name a tragic person – a new killing Clytemnestra. This may be true inasmuch as Gagarin 2002, 147 also argues that Clytemnestra in the speech follows the practice of women, as they are mostly described in theatrical genres (especially, tragedy), to kill by poisoning. I am, however, a bit hesitant to accept that, because of the two adverbs describing the death of the poisoned men, the scene with the unfulfilled prayers is tragically coloured. These two words (in adjectival forms) are used elsewhere in oratory (I found out the following attestations: Aeschines 1.158: ἀκλεέστατα διεφθαρκότα; Lysias 6.32: ἀθεωτέρους, 13.45: ἀκλεεστάτῳ ὀλέθρῳ), in passages where there is no (necessary) recollection of or implications for tragic diction, themes and imagery. The argument of scholars that Antiphon 1 has tragic overtones is, in my view, a still controversial topic, which calls for further investigation.

46 On impiety in the Athenian legal system: Cohen 1989, 99–107; O'Sullivan 1997, 136–152; Filonik 2013, 11–96.

47 Demosthenes 25.99: "How on the first of each month will you climb the Acropolis and pray for blessings on the State and on yourselves (ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τοῖς θεοῖς εὔξεσθε), when the defendant and his worthy father are registered there, and you have given your verdict clean against your oaths and the documents there preserved?"

sic speeches, as, for example, in Demosthenes 54.16 and Lysias 25.22, where the speakers pray that their adversaries meet with divine retribution;[48] Demosthenes 19.128, where Aeschines is presented as sharing the prayers of Philip when the latter celebrated the destruction of the allies of the Athenians;[49] and 20.49, where there is an implicitly ironic, but still evidently scathing, reference to Leptines falsely assuming the role of the city's benefactor.[50] The purpose of incriminating individuals is also served by the passage in Demosthenes 19.71:

> πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἄτοπον καὶ ὑπερφυὲς ἂν πεποιηκότες ὑμεῖς εἴητε, εἰ ἃ προστάττετε, μᾶλλον δ' ἀξιοῦτε ποιεῖν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν τοὺς θεούς, ταῦτ' αὐτοὶ κύριοι γεγενημένοι τήμερον μὴ ποιήσαιτε, **ἀλλ' ὃν ἐκείνοις εὔχεσθ' ἐξώλη ποιεῖν αὐτὸν καὶ γένος καὶ οἰκίαν, τοῦτον ἀφείητ' αὐτοί;** μηδαμῶς: ὃς γὰρ ἂν ὑμᾶς λάθῃ, τοῦτον ἀφίετε τοῖς θεοῖς κολάζειν: ὃν δ' ἂν αὐτοὶ λάβητε, μηκέτ' ἐκείνοις περὶ τούτου προστάττετε.
>
> Would you not have acted absurdly and preposterously if today, when the power is in your own hands, you should preclude yourselves from doing what you enjoin, or rather require, the gods to do on your behalf; **if you should yourselves release a man whom you have implored them to extirpate along with his household and his kindred?** Never! Leave the undetected sinner to the justice of the gods; but about the sinner whom you have caught yourselves, lay no further injunctions on them.

Demosthenes, in this passage, asks the audience to consider if they would acquit a man, for whose doom they pray. It is notable that language here resembles that of *diōmosia* oath, as presented by Demosthenes himself in 23.67–68: an individual takes the oath "by invoking destruction upon himself, his kindred and his household" (κατ' ἐξωλείας αὐτοῦ καὶ γένους καὶ οἰκίας).[51] Resemblance between the prayer in 19.71 and *diōmosia* oath is designed to reinforce the message that Demosthenes aims to communicate to the audience: that it is imperative his political rival to get punished. Indeed, the speaker's argument is formed carefully to

48 Demosthenes 54.16: "I only pray the gods (καὶ ἔγωγ' εὔχομαι τοῖς θεοῖς) that these things and all things like them may recoil upon Conon and his sons". Lysias 25.22: "you immediately began to look forward to your return and the punishment of your enemies. For it was your prayer to the gods (ταῦτα γὰρ τοῖς θεοῖς ηὔχεσθε) that those men should do the things that you saw them doing, since you believed that the villainy of the Thirty would be far more useful for your salvation than the resources of the exiles for your return".

49 Demosthenes 19.128: "[Aeschines] was a guest at the banquet, and took part in the libations and prayers (μετεῖχε καὶ εὐχῶν) with which Philip thanked Heaven for the destruction of the fortresses, the territory, and the armies of your allies".

50 Demosthenes 20.49: "Now if any of you is persuaded that our city is far from needing such a benefactor today, let him pray Heaven it may be so, and I will join in that prayer (ταῦτα μὲν εὐχέσθω τοῖς θεοῖς, κἀγὼ συνεύχομαι)".

51 On *diōmosia*: p. 7, n. 27.

strengthen this message: he implies that while the divine volition is for Aeschines to be punished, the gods do not represent the inevitable punishing agents. It was the duty of the judges to cast their verdict in accordance with the will of the gods – that is to vote against Aeschines. In so doing, Demosthenes emphasizes the importance of human action, pointing out that divine intervention is not a substitute for the duty of humans (in this case, the judges) to make decisions in order to protect and defend their city.[52] As he himself points out in *Olynthiac* 2.23, "foreign policy is also affected by the decisive actions or the idleness of people, despite the (un)favourable predisposition of the gods".[53] This also recalls the significance of self-initiative, which echoes a Greek perception expressed in several sources.[54]

3 Prayers in symbouleutic and epideictic oratory

Beyond the similarly low frequency of using *euchomai* prayers in forensic, symbouleutic and epideictic orations, the patterns of denoting and exploiting them to the best rhetorical effect are similar in all contexts of public speaking. Prayers in symbouleutic oratory are used, for example, as a means of incriminating political adversaries for serious unpatriotic misconducts. An example can be found in Demosthenes 8.20:

> εἶθ' ἃ **Φίλιππος ἂν εὔξαιτο τοῖς θεοῖς**, ταῦθ' ἡμῶν τινες ἐνθάδε πράττουσιν; εἶτ' ἔτι ζητεῖτε πόθεν τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἀπόλωλεν ἅπαντα;
>
> And what **Philip would pray the gods to vouchsafe him**, are some of us here trying to achieve? And do you still ask how our interests are sacrificed everywhere?

52 Several sources underline the idea that divine intervention does not replace or undermine human determination. A key-fact for the accomplishment of εὐδαιμονία ("well-being") is one's actions: cf. Plato, *Republic* 388a-b; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1099a31–1099b7, 1099b20–25, 1100b8–11. Useful secondary sources include Nussbaum 1986, 318–323, 332, 380–381; Mogyorodi 1996, 359; Wallace 2007, 139.

53 Serafim 2021a, 43.

54 For example, Aeschylus (fr. 395) notes, φιλεῖ δὲ τῷ κάμνοντι συσπεύδειν θεός "god loves to aid the man who toils"; Sophocles fr. 407: οὐκ ἔστι τοῖς μὴ δρῶσι σύμμαχος τύχη "good luck never accompanies those who do not work". Aesop (6th century BC) also underlines the significance of action in his notable phrase σὺν Ἀθηνᾷ καὶ χεῖρα κίνει "along with Athena, move also your hand" (*Fables* 30: *Shipwrecker*; cf. *Proverbs* 36).

Two groups of individuals are here contrasted by means of two interrelated actions: foreign enemies, represented by Philip of Macedon, are praying to the gods to destroy the Athenians, while domestic enemies (ἡμῶν τινες) are carrying out these requests on behalf of the foreigners. Demosthenes implicitly yet masterfully merges these two groups of enemies, foreign and domestic, into one, aiming to set his political adversaries, both within and outside of the *polis*, against the Athenians *en masse*. That is why, in the preceding section (§ 18), he apostrophizes the audience by their ethnic/civic identity: ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.[55] The Athenians – individually and all together – are invited to realize that they are under attack by enemies, and that they should make their final decision, having in mind their duty to protect their beloved city. The creation of two oppositional groups 'They' and 'We', as this last one is presented implicitly through a reference to the matters of the *polis* (τὰ τῆς πόλεως), is a technique used frequently in forensic speeches. Demosthenes tries to create an ethnic/civic and emotional community, which binds his fellows together with one another, while also estranging the opponents from the group. It should also not be forgotten that Demosthenes presents Philip as praying to the divine; this is evidently to instil fear in the Athenians and rally their support for, and active engagement with, his plans for anti-Macedonian actions. After all, they "have far greater claims than he upon the favour of the gods" (2.22), if they act decisively, making and implementing decisions. This serves the same purpose as Demosthenes 19.71, a forensic speech.

As in forensic speeches, *euchomai* prayers in symbouleutic and epideictic speeches also aim to ask for divine retribution against the collective or individual wrongdoers. In Demosthenes 14.39, the first political oration of Demosthenes (*On the Navy*, 354/3 BC, delivered to the Assembly with the purpose of warning the citizens of the dangers that the Persians posed for the Athenians), we read:

> ἀλλ' ὅτι, εἰ μὲν μὴ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὁμοίως αἰσχρὸν ἦν τὸ ψεύδεσθαι καὶ ἐπιορκεῖν ὥσπερ ἐκείνῳ καλόν, πάλαι ἂν ἐπ' αὐτὸν ὑμεῖς ἐπορεύεσθε, νῦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν ποιήσαιτε ὑμῶν ἕνεκ' αὐτῶν, **εὔχεσθε δὲ πᾶσι τοῖς θεοῖς τὴν αὐτὴν λαβεῖν παράνοιαν ἐκεῖνον ἥνπερ ποτὲ τοὺς προγόνους αὐτοῦ.** καὶ ταῦτ' ἂν ἐπίῃ σκοπεῖν αὐτῷ, οὐκ ὀλιγώρως ὑμᾶς βουλευομένους εὑρήσει.
>
> But that if falsehood and perjury were not as disgraceful in the eyes of the Greeks as they are respectable in his, you would long ago have marched against him; that as it is, you will not for your own sakes do this, **but you pray to all the gods that he may be smitten with the same paranoia as were his ancestors of old.** And if it comes into his mind to reflect on this; he will find that your resolutions are not carelessly taken.

55 On the addresses to the audience: Martin 2006, 75–98; Serafim 2017, 26–41; 2021, 71–98.

Demosthenes talks about the Persian king (ἐκεῖνον), saying that the Athenians pray for him to be afflicted with paranoia. Two are the notable features of this passage: first, that Demosthenes 14, despite being symbouleutic in oratorical form, has the censorious vigor of forensic speeches, where the speaker attacks his opponents (as Demosthenes here, when implicitly accusing the Persian king of a tendency towards falsehoods and perjuries) and wishes for their destruction. The second feature of this passage that is worthy of further discussion is the use of the medically-flavoured term paranoia, "lunacy" or "madness" – a sort of mental illness, as *paraphrosynē* similarly is, in medical, dramatic and philosophical texts (cf. ps.-Demosthenes, *Against Olympiodorus* 52–56, where the speaker's brother-in-law is accused of wasting his money because of insanity).[56] The connection between religious discourse and medical terminology is pronounced in forensic oratory, whenever the purpose of the speaker is to demolish his opponent (cf. Demosthenes 9.54 where the term paranoia is also used,[57] 18.324,[58] 19.259, 262).[59] The stark difference between forensic contexts and 14.39 is that in the former there is no prayer, but only invocations to the gods or "informal oaths" (see below on p. 31). The use of a *euchomai* prayer in 14.39, in order for the speaker to ask for the mental destruction of a foreign enemy of Athens, heightens the dramatic tone

56 In Attic law there was *dikē/graphē paranoias*, with which a (mostly senile) individual is accused of wasting his property because of mental disorders. On paranoia and mental illnesses in general: Lewis 1970; Ahonen 2014; Thumiger 2017. On comic and tragic tropes of madness: Padel 1995; Singer 2018, 289–335. On mental illnesses in oratory and comedy: Kazantzidis 2021, 107–123.

57 Demosthenes 9.54: "And that, by Zeus and the other gods (μὰ τὸν Δία καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους θεούς), you will never be able to do; but you have reached such a height of folly or of madness (μωρίας ἢ παρανοίας) or – I know not what to call it, for this fear too has often haunted me, that some demon is driving you to your doom, that from love of calumny or envy or ribaldry, or whatever your motive may be, you clamour for a speech from these hirelings, some of whom would not even disclaim that title, and you derive amusement from their vituperations". The term paranoia is also used in Demosthenes 19.260, but there are no features of religious discourse there.

58 Demosthenes 18.324: "No, all you gods, may none of you grant their wish. Best would be to inspire better thoughts and intentions even in them, but if they are indeed incurable, destroy every last one of them utterly and thoroughly on earth and sea. And grant the rest of us as soon as possible release from the fears that threaten and salvation that endures".

59 Demosthenes 19.259: "For a terrible disease, men of Athens, has fallen upon Greece, a serious one needing some very good luck and care on your part". 19.262: "By Demeter (νὴ τὴν Δήμητρα), if I am to speak as a sane man, we stand in need of the utmost vigilance, when this infection, moving in its circuit, has invaded our own city. Therefore, take your precautions now, while we are still secure. Let the men who have brought it here be punished with infamy. If not, beware lest you discern the wisdom of my words too late, when you have lost the power of doing what you ought". On the synergetic use of religious discourse and medical terminology: Serafim 2021a, Chapter 3.

of the passage and capitalize on the popular belief (most propagated in tragedy, as, for example, in Euripides' *Hippolytus* 237–238 and *Heracles* 835–837) that the gods, who intervene in and distort human lives, cause mental illnesses. The attribution of mental illnesses to the divine agents aims, arguably, to sustain and propagate the speaker's view that the Persian king was doomed to fail and be destroyed, as his ancestors during the Persian Wars were. Hence, the Athenians would have been encouraged to take up a war against their foreign enemies, if assured they had the gods by their own side (a pattern of argumentation that is frequently attested in symbouleutic orations, as in Demosthenes' *Olynthiac* 1.10; 2.1, 22 and *Philippic* 1.12, 37, 45; 4.24, 31, where the gods are presented as being protecting Athens).

Prayers also present ideas about the intervention of the gods and the divine in human affairs, as in Isocrates 5.68,[60] and are linked to political processes and outcomes, as in Isocrates 12.244 where there is a reference to people praying to receive a share in political power.[61] In epideictic speeches, prayers are also used to ask the gods to bestow physical talents upon humans, exactly as it is argued that speakers of forensic speeches do (see above, pp. 14–15). Two telling examples can be found in the Isocratic corpus of speeches. Isocrates 12.7 refers to health: "for I have had my share of the greatest goods of life – the things which all men would pray the gods to have as their portion (ὧν ἅπαντες ἂν εὔξαιντο μεταλαβεῖν): first of all, I have enjoyed health both of body and of soul"; and Isocrates 15.246 refers to political power: "there is no one of them who would not pray the gods (τοῖς μὲν θεοῖς οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ὅστις οὐκ ἂν εὔξαιτο) to bestow the power of eloquence upon himself, first of all, and failing that, upon his sons and his own kin". We should not forget that *Peithō*, the persuasive power of *logos*, has a divine status, as attested in ancient literature (cf. Isocrates' *Antidosis* 249; Pausanias 1.22.3; Hesiod's *Theogony* 349, *Work and Days* 73; Aeschylus' *Suppliant Women* 1041; and Herodotus 8.111).

It is also interesting to note that *euchomai* prayers in epideictic oratory work as a means of asking for, and trying to secure, fair hearing for speakers, exactly

60 Demosthenes 20.25: "for myself indeed, I pray Heaven (ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ εὔχομαι τοῖς θεοῖς) that, if so it may be, our wealth also may increase, but if not, then at least that our reputation for good faith and constancy may remain sure". Isocrates 5.68: "Nay, if some god were to give you the choice of the interests and the occupations in which you would wish to spend your life (ἀλλ' εἴ τις θεῶν αἵρεσίν σοι δοίη μετὰ ποίας ἂν ἐπιμελείας καὶ διατριβῆς εὔξαιο τὸν βίον διαγαγεῖν)".
61 Isocrates 12.244: "it is true that those who hold such power are the objects of abuse and execration but no man is so constituted by nature that he would not pray to the gods to be granted this power, preferably for himself (ὅστις οὐκ ἂν εὔξαιτο τοῖς θεοῖς μάλιστα μὲν αὐτὸς τυχεῖν τῆς ἐξουσίας ταύτης)".

as prayers are used in forensic oratory (notably in Lycurgus 1.1 and Demosthenes 18.1 that have been discussed at the beginning of the previous subsection of this paper). Let us read Isocrates 12.137 (this is the so-called *Panathenaicus*, a speech composed to be an address to Panathenaea):

> **οἵους μὲν οὖν εὐξαίμην ἂν εἶναι τοὺς ἀκουσομένους τῶν ἐμῶν**, εἴρηκα, δέδοικα δὲ μὴ τοιούτων γενομένων πολὺ καταδεέστερον εἴπω τῶν πραγμάτων περὶ ὧν μέλλω ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς λόγους. ὅμως δ᾽ οὕτως ὅπως ἂν οἷός τ᾽ ὦ πειράσομαι διαλεχθῆναι περὶ αὐτῶν.
>
> **Now I have expressed myself as to the kind of auditors I would pray that I might have** for what I shall say, but I am afraid that were I given such an audience I might fall far below the subject upon which I am to speak. Nevertheless, in such manner as I can, I shall attempt to discourse upon it.

The *euchomai* prayer that is presented in this text as a speech-act – "I would pray" means, in fact, "I pray" – enables the speaker to talk about the ideal audience he desires to have. The qualities of the ideal audience are described in the previous section, § 136: "most of all am I concerned with those who, in preference to any other, will gladly listen to a discourse which celebrates the virtues of men and the ways of a well-governed state". This audience should reward the speaker and celebrate with him, when speaking about the magnificence of Athens and the great accomplishments of their ancestors. The plea for fair hearing is not as clear and pronounced as those two made in Lycurgus 1 and Demosthenes 18, but it is, as the pleas in forensic speeches, accompanied by a prayer that underlines and reinforces the message of Isocrates. The fact that he uses a prayer to express his will to get an ideal audience is important for another reason: because it indicates that epideictic orators, despite delivering speeches of ceremonial character, are as much interested in persuasion as their colleagues in the forensic institutional settings for public speaking are.[62]

4 Conclusions

This paper has explored the use of *euchomai* prayers in the transmitted forensic, symbouleutic and epideictic orations of Attic oratory. It attempts to explain the sparing use of these prayers in Attic oratory, find out the form they take and the purposes they serve, and discuss them in the context of passages where they are found, with the purpose of shedding light on the ways in which the speak-

62 On persuasion in epideictic oratory: Webb 2003, 127–136.

ers exploit them to the best rhetorical and persuasive effect. It has been argued that the use of *euchomai* prayers as a means for the speakers of consolidating the goodwill of the audience, presenting characters, incriminating opponents, referring to patriotism and the duties of the good citizens, arousing emotions (specifically, fear as, for example, in the passages where the judges in the law-court are invited to think of themselves as being inspected by gods, or anger as in the case of referring to the alleged misdeeds of opponents) and generating unity and division among those involved in legal, symbouleutic or epideictic contexts of public speaking, underlines their effectiveness in influencing the cognitive/emotional attitude of the Athenians towards their fellows and their enemies, and in determining the processes and outcomes that concern the direction of the *polis*. Nothing said to, or about, the gods is trivial in speeches, where communicating with, engaging and influencing the audience is of paramount importance. The gods help the speakers win over the people around them.

Beyond the conclusions that are drawn in this paper about the use of prayers in forensic, symbouleutic and epideictic oratory, it might be interesting for the reader to be offered some insights into how prayers are used in other genres, both verse (epic and drama where many instances of prayers can be found) and prose (historiography). I recognize two broad categories of features that gauge the level of similarity and difference between oratory and other genres: language and target audience-purposes-outcome. Let us start with language: as in oratory, so in other genres, there are prayers that are denoted not only by the verb *euchomai*, but also by other means such as, for example, simple vocatives (as in Euripides' *Phoenissae* 1365–1369, 1373–1376;[63] Homer, *Iliad* 1.503–510;[64] Antiphon 6.40;[65]

63 Euripides' *Phoenissae* 1365–1369, the prayer of Polynices: "O Lady Hera (ὦ πότνι' Ἥρα), for I am yours, since I have married the daughter of Adrastus and dwell in your land, grant that I may slay my brother, and give my right hand, which is set against him, the victory, stained with his blood"; 1373–1376, the prayer of Eteocles: "Daughter of Zeus (ὦ Διὸς κόρη), grant that this arm may launch the spear of victory against my brother's breast and slay him who has come to sack my country".

64 Homer, *Iliad* 1.503–510: "Father Zeus (Ζεῦ πάτερ), if ever amid the immortals I gave you aid by word or deed, grant me this prayer: do honour to my son, who is doomed to a speedy death beyond all other men; yet now Agamemnon, king of men, has dishonoured him, for he has taken and keeps his prize by his own arrogant act. But honour him, Olympian Zeus, lord of counsel; and give might to the Trojans, until the Achaeans do honour to my son, and magnify him with recompense".

65 Antiphon 6.40: "The crowning point was reached in the Council-chamber in front of the Council—Zeus and all gods (ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ θεοὶ πάντες)—when Philocrates here himself joined me on the tribune and conversed with me, his hand on my arm, addressing me by my name as I addressed him by his".

and Demosthenes 6.37, 18.285).[66] The main distinction we should draw is about the level of solemnity non-*euchomai* prayers seem to come with: while in verse genres prayers by vocatives present formal religious requests to the gods, and they are even answered by them in some texts, as in the case of the two prayers in Euripides' *Phoenissae* and Homer's *Iliad*, in oratory these seem to simply be references to gods, not prayers, and certainly not as grave as *euchomai* prayers. These references may be important in engaging the audience and honing its interest and attention, especially in long and complicated speeches, as Demosthenes 18 is, and in allowing the speaker to imply that he tells the truth. That is particularly true in the cases where the orator describes or refers to events or past words and actions of himself and other individuals, dicta whose reliability may need to be corroborated by references to the gods. For, as scholars argue, oaths and prayers are two of "the most widespread and effective ways of drawing attention or eliciting trust in interpersonal and intercultural communications".[67] But vocatives in oratory, unlike verse genres, do not count as formal prayers and do not have the wide spectrum of the cognitive/emotional functions of *euchomai* dicta that are discussed in this paper.

The same lack of solemnity applies, arguably, to the utterance of religious dicta by means of the particles νή and μά that are used in both oratory (cf. Dinarchus 3.15; Demosthenes 9.65, 10.7, 18.13, 41.20, 42.6; and Lysias 6.7) and historiography (Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* 2.2.14 in a saying attributed to Aglaitidas and quoted in direct speech). These seem to me to be used as folklore catchphrases, usual in everyday parlance (A.H. Sommerstein calls them "informal oaths", and argues that they have conversational value, i. e. they are used in texts, such as comedy and the Platonic works, which present colloquial conversations between individuals),[68] which aim at enhancing the (real or alleged) truth of individuals' speeches or sayings, but not in as solemn way as *euchomai* prayers. Similar is the argument of A. Willi who, examining the diction of oaths in Aristophanes' plays, argues that informal oaths, what he calls "assertive idioms", unlike prayers, "often *imply* [emphasis is not mine] a passing request for assistance".[69] It is also noticeable that scholars on the Greek orators mostly under-examine and down-

66 Demosthenes 6.37: "Enough has now been said by way of reminder. May all the gods (ὦ πάντες θεοί) forbid that my warnings should ever be brought to the sternest test"; 18.285: "Then you came forward, and Pythocles with you—and, Zeus and gods (ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ θεοί), how coarsely and impudently you spoke!—making the very same charges that you have repeated today; but, for all your scurrility, they appointed me nevertheless".

67 Ibrahim 2009, 475–498. See further Serafim 2021a, 65–67.

68 Sommerstein/Torrance 2014, 315–318.

69 Willi 2003, 13.

play the role and significance that informal oaths have in the art of composing and persuasively delivering a speech.[70]

Similarities and differences in the use of prayers between oratory and other genres also concern the audience: in poetry, a prayer is directed to a specific god or a divine audience, as in the case of the two prayers in Euripides' *Phoenissae* and the one in Homer's *Iliad* that have been cited above. In prayers that are incorporated in oratory (and historiography), there is a secular audience beyond the divine one: prayers (and other religious discourse features) are both directed to the gods and to the people, whose mental perception and emotions they have the potential to affect. This is due to the divergent literary etiquettes of genres: prayers in verse genres act as continuators of the plot. The epicist or the playwright knows it suffices for him to describe the divine entity the prayer is directed to, the request and the outcome, in order for the audience to understand how the plot unfolds in the rest of the work. In the texts of oratory that we have examined above, however, a human agent is praying to a divine one, but the purpose of the prayer is actually to create a specific cognitive/emotional disposition in the audience towards the speaker or his opponents. It is important, therefore, for the speaker or the logographer to think about the possible reactions of the audience – as it is important for us, readers and researchers, to examine how the features of a prayer may have affected the audience, and certainly, what the aim of the speaker is.

The outcome of the prayer in oratory, furthermore, is not described, as it is in poetry, in which the deity to which the prayer is directed answers (e. g. in the case of the prayer of Thetis to Zeus in the *Iliad* 1.503–510, Zeus replies to what he listened earlier, lines: 517–527),[71] or the outcome is given in the context of the work (e. g. the messenger in Euripides' *Phoenissae* refers to the killing of Polynices and Eteocles – hence, describing the "answer" the gods implicitly gave to the prayers they listened to).[72] In oratory, it is up to us, the readers, to decide what the invited effect of the prayer might have been on the audience (i. e. how the judges and onlookers may have reacted cognitively/emotionally and by voting to

70 See, for example, MacDowell 2000 – a commentary on Demosthenes 19.

71 It is interesting that Zeus uses not only words to reply to the prayer of Thetis, but also non-verbal indications of his decision (528: ἐπ' ὀφρύσι νεῦσε "he bowed his dark brow").

72 Cf. Euripides, *Orestes*: the prayer of Electra to Zeus to help Orestes and Pylades to kill Helen (1299–1300) is shown to be futile when we learn that Helen is alive and that Apollo saved her, following the instructions of Zeus (1629–1637). The prayer of Electra, which is called "unanswered" by Mikalson 1989, 83–84, is, in fact, implicitly answered in the play, since we know by Euripides himself that Zeus did not satisfy the request of Electra. This is also the case with other "unanswered" prayers, as, for example, those of Hecuba and Polyxena in Euripides' *Hecuba* (77 and 96–97), which the audience knows from the beginning they are doomed to fail.

prayers), and, using other sources that indicate the outcome of the trial, to conclude if a request that is conveyed by a prayer had been satisfied. We know, for example, that the prayer of Demosthenes in 18.1 to receive a fair hearing from the judges was satisfied: the speaker won an overwhelming victory over Aeschines (as sources inform us, e. g. Plutarch, *Demosthenes* 24.2.9–10) – and this unambiguous outcome of the case indicates that the Athenians showed unwavering support and *eunoia* for the speaker.

This paper creates the framework, and offers the methodological tools necessary, for further examination of prayers and other religious or ritualistic dicta in the speeches of the Ten Attic orators. Despite the advances that have been made in scholarship about the examination of these (and other) features of the intricate interconnection between oratory and religion, much work is still necessary. Future research may elaborate on the examination of other verbal means of praying or invoking to the gods and the divine beyond the use of the verb *euchomai*. An intriguing example is the use of the verbs *parakalō* and *hiketeuō*, as, for example, in Aeschines 2.180: the two verbs and the prayers/invocations to the gods that they denote aim to solemnify the matters and highlight the significance of the speakers' requests. They have, in other words, the same reinforcing capacity as *euchomai* prayers have in the texts of Attic oratory that have been discussed in this paper.[73] But then why does Aeschines not choose to use *euchomai* prayers instead? Is there any lexical, semantic or semiotic difference between *euchomai*, on the one hand, and *parakalō* and *hiketeuō*, on the other?

It is hoped that this paper, its discussion about *euchomai* prayers, its conclusions about using these dicta in oratory and the comparisons it makes between *euchomai* prayers and other forms of prayers in oratory, and about the use of prayers in oratory and other genres, would ignite further research interest among scholars. Research is endless: nobody can say that, by investigating a feature of ancient passages, a complete picture of what we want to know will be formed. There will always be more nuanced approaches than those suggested in the past. To be infinite is, in this case, to be appealing.

73 Some first insights into the matter can be found in Martin 2009 and Serafim 2021a, 101–102.

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