NATO and the Western Balkans. From Neutral Spectator to Proactive Peacemaker

The end of the Cold War was a new beginning for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It was not evident that the organization, whose raison d’être had been the collective defence against the Warsaw Pact, would continue to exist after the collapse of its main adversary. NATO had to reform in order to remain relevant, and there were not many options according to author Niall Mulchinock. It had to go out-of-area or out of office. The 1990s witnessed the first out-of-area operations of NATO, in the Western Balkans, a transformation that was not without controversy.

Mulchinock analyses this transformation against the background of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. His key focus is on ‘how the significant decisions/turning points in the Western Balkans, from 1991 onwards, impacted on these new developments’ (1), which would lead to NATO’s first out-of-area operations. In his in-depth study, Mulchinock employs three levels of analysis. The first is an analysis of individual NATO member state positions, most importantly the positions of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. This level is most extensively analysed throughout the book. Occasionally, positions of smaller member states such as Denmark are also included, but Mulchinock usually limits his analysis to the four most influential NATO members. The second level of analysis is NATO’s interaction with other organizations, such as the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the United Nations (UN). Of these international organizations, NATO’s relation to the UN is the most important. Mulchinock argues that NATO followed UN policy in the first years after the end of the Cold War, but started to develop its own strategies as the UN mission in Bosnia, UNPROFOR, failed and lost credibility. During the later peacekeeping missions, NATO’s cooperation with the EU gained prominence. The third level of analysis concerns the NATO secretary-general and asks how his role evolved over time. During the first years after the collapse of the so-called Eastern bloc, NATO Secretary-General Manfred Wörner played an important role in guiding NATO through this difficult period. Mulchinock expresses his admiration for Wörner and his role in making sure NATO would not meet the same fate as the Warsaw Pact. The tenures of Willy Claes and Javier Solana, who oversaw the first out-of-area deployments for NATO, are also discussed, albeit in less detail.

The structure of the book is not immediately obvious. This is mostly due to the lack of a comprehensive introduction. The first chapter is limited to a short introduction, the three levels of analysis, and an overview of the following chapters. Mulchinock does not set out his aims or how his work relates/contributes to the existing literature on NATO’s development during the 1990s and its role during the Yugoslav wars. The introduction also fails to refer to any coherence binding the chapters together. And, in fact, they do appear to be separate articles that do not form an entity as a book. However, the concluding chapter does provide some overarching conclusions, and is a good summary of the findings of each chapter.

The book consists of eight chapters, including the introduction and conclusion. Chapters Two to Four deal with the Yugoslav wars of dissolution from 1990 to 1999 and NATO’s involvement in international military interventions during those wars. The first decade of NATO after the end of the Cold War was a challenging one, with the realities on the ground evolving faster than the opinions and ideas about NATO of the politicians involved. Mulchinock accurately explores the (dis)agreements amongst member states, the perceived role of NATO within the international community and the (sometimes decisive) role of the secretary-general. The three levels of analysis allow the author to discuss and clarify the development of NATO without losing focus.

Chapter Four ends with Operation Deliberate Force, the air campaign conducted by NATO in concert with UNPROFOR ground operations. This operation was a reaction to the mass killings in Srebrenica, Bosnia, and ended on 20 September 1995. Chapter Five begins in December 1995 with IFOR, NATO’s peace enforcing mission in Bosnia. Surprisingly, Mulchinock does not analyse the period September–December 1995 and the discussions about the mandate of the IFOR mission. An exploration of the Dutch case would have been especially revealing here. The Dutch contribution to UNPROFOR played a central part in the Srebrenica tragedy, as it was Dutch forces who were tasked with defending the ‘safe area’. Despite the shock this failed mission brought about in the Netherlands, a few months later the Dutch government committed Dutch troops to the NATO-led IFOR mission to Bosnia. Mulchinock, unfortunately, does not discuss these quite substantial developments.

In Chapters Five to Seven, the aftermath of the Yugoslav wars in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia and the deployment of NATO-led peace enforcing and, later, peacekeeping missions are analysed. In these chapters, the author seems to abandon the three mentioned analytical levels. In Chapter Five, when discussing the transition from the IFOR mission to the SFOR mission, Mulchinock analyses only the discussions within the Clinton administration, without including the position of other member states. With the exception of Chapter Seven on Macedonia, the role of the secretaries-general is not discussed at all. Thus, the chapters focus mostly on the successes and failures of the missions and of NATO’s cooperation with other international organizations.

Mulchinock’s extensive use of primary and secondary sources is to be commended. He bases most of his analysis on primary sources, such as official documents, press releases, autobiographies, and interviews. These sources provide a telling insight into the discussions at NATO headquarters and in the domestic politics of the discussed member states. However, all of the sources used are in the English language, with the exception of a few articles from German and French newspapers. This raises questions on the thoroughness with which the German and French cases were analysed.

Mulchinock does not explain his selection of sources. This would have been especially welcome with regard to the interviews he conducted with former US ambassador to NATO, Dr Robert Hunter, and former British foreign secretary, Lord Hurd of Westwell. Both Hunter and Lord Hurd were representatives of NATO member states, who were tied to their own domestic agendas. It is therefore important to be aware of the fact that they are not independent observers. Mulchinock appears at times to lose sight of this. For example, when discussing Britain’s position on Bosnia in 1994, he relies heavily on statements made by Robert Hunter, without taking into account his position in US domestic politics or the US position in the war in Bosnia.

As a matter of fact, the author himself is not an unbiased academic either. Mulchinock has opinions on NATO’s role in the Balkans and the people responsible for it, and is not afraid to express them. Nevertheless, the author’s expertise on the subject is undeniable. The book is a fascinating read for anyone interested in NATO or the Yugoslav wars. It is a comprehensive study of NATO’s adjustment to the post-Cold War world, its almost reluctant involvement in the military interventions in Yugoslavia, and its subsequent leading role in peacekeeping missions.