Europäisierungsforschung. Sie liegt jedoch sicherlich auch in der Tatsache begründet, dass sich die Autorin durch die Anlage ihres Forschungsdesigns konsequent auf die Ebene der politischen Parteien konzentriert und somit die Einstellungen, Sichtweisen und Identitätskonstruktionen der nationalen Bevölkerungen größtenteils ausblendet. Schließlich folge die Erweiterungspolitik der EU weniger einem großen Masterplan, sondern sei als Ergebnis eines inkrementellen Lernprozesses zu verstehen. Auch diese Erkenntnis ist nicht unbedingt neu. Braniff weist jedoch zu Recht darauf hin, dass bislang kaum gesicherte Forschungsergebnisse darüber vorliegen, wie sich dieser Lernprozess innerhalb des europäischen Institutionengefüges vollzieht.

Zusammengefasst liefert Máire Braniff ein eindrucksvolles Beispiel dafür, welchen analytischen Mehrwert eine Verknüpfung der Europäisierungsforschung mit der Literatur über Konflikttransformation leisten kann. In empirischen Arbeiten wird dieses Potenzial leider viel zu selten ausgeschöpft. Daher bieten die Erkenntnisse aus den beiden von der Autorin untersuchten Fällen wichtige Anknüpfungspunkte für eine weitere systematische Erforschung und wissenschaftliche Aufarbeitung des EU-Einflusses auf Konflikte.

Oliver Schwarz (Duisburg/Essen)

Mark Biondich, The Balkans: Revolution, War, and Political Violence since 1878. New York: Oxford University Press 2011. Series: Zones of Violence. xvi, 384 pp., ISBN 978-0-19-929905-8, $ 99.00

In this impressive work, Mark Biondich addresses what is, perhaps, the most oft-asked question about the modern Balkans: Is the region exceptional in its proclivity to institutional change and violence? Biondich's response is, in essence, "no". While his rejection of essentialist and primordial accounts of violence in the Balkans is consistent with the current mainstream, Biondich's work goes beyond a number of recent studies, in two ways. First, *The Balkans* is a genuinely comparative study, which examines the whole of Europe's post-Ottoman space (rather than focusing primarily on the Western Balkans, for example). Second, it addresses each of the key institutional eras of modern Balkan history (post-Ottoman state-building, inter-war authoritarianism, communist dictatorships, and post-communist transitions), rather than studying any one of these periods in isolation. By comparing episodes of violence in the Balkans across states, and across time, Biondich is able to offer readers both an illuminating description of the dynamics of violence seen on the peninsula since 1878, and a rewarding explanatory framework for understanding the causes of that violence.

In terms of his description of the dynamics of violence, there are two recurrent themes throughout the book. In a twist on the famous work of Charles Tilly, Biondich's first broad observation is that war has made nations in the Balkans (and emerging nation states have, in turn, made war). Seen this way, the wars of Yugoslav succession and their associated processes of ethnic cleansing are understood as the final steps in a painful and protracted process of state-building and national homogenization that began in the nineteenth century. Biondich's second descriptive claim is that the violent techniques employed on the peninsula have not been "pre-modern" or "primitive", as is commonly assumed. To the contrary, they have been dangerously modern. Both the willingness of post-Ottoman states to contract the services of brigands in support of irredentist goals, for example, and the Greek-Turkish population exchanges that followed the Lausanne Convention were early incarna-

tions of techniques that many European states would later employ with deadly consequences. It is, as such, simply wrong to think of the Balkans as being out of step with its northern and western European neighbours.

In terms of the causes of violence in the Balkans, Biondich offers a nuanced argument, which attends to the interaction of three causal factors. He first argues that the decisions of elites have mattered. Where governing elites have seen strategic benefit in fomenting nationalist sentiment and encouraging the use of violence in support of political ends, ethno-nationalist violence has tended to follow – as it did in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. At the same time, Biondich is careful to recognize that the incentives for elites to instrumentalize violence have often been shaped by the interventions of Europe's Great Powers. The actions and interests of Nazi Germany paved the way for the rise to power of the brutal Ustaša regime in Croatia and the extremist Legionary movement in Romania, for example. But even where national elites have had an interest in mobilizing support for violence, and those interests have been backed by one or more of the Great Powers, the conditioned willingness of "ordinary men" to participate in acts of mass violence has remained a key factor in the translation of interests into action. On occasion, that willingness may have had more to do with greed, revenge, or the folly of youth than the master-level cleavages under which wars have been fought, but it has still been a necessary condition for collective violence.

In addressing these broad themes, Biondich divides his work into four empirical chapters, in addition to the thematic introductory and concluding chapters that bookend the work.

The story begins with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of territories that were national in name, but not in ethnic make-up. That disconnect, when set within the context of a European state system that increasingly privileged a match between ethno-nation and state, created incentives for elites across the Balkans to pursue projects of national homogenization. Chapter Two sees Biondich apply this framework to his respective treatments of early state-building efforts in the region, the outbreak of the Balkans Wars of 1912/13, and the impact of the First World War on the geography of the Balkans. In what is perhaps the most richly comparative of all chapters, particular attention is given to the "Macedonian Question" as a focal point for early (and on-going) rivalry between Balkan states.

Chapter Three attends to post-war experiments with democracy in the region, the gradual drift toward royal dictatorships, and the emergence of right-wing authoritarian regimes during the Second World War. It is perhaps unfortunate that Biondich initially sets aside his deft skill for cross-case comparison and, instead, presents what is essentially a series of brief country studies of post-war political evolutions. He soon picks up his comparative lenses again, however, in his strong treatment of right-wing extremism in Romania and Croatia. While the crimes of the Ustaša regime are well known, Romania's contribution to the Holocaust has received comparatively little public attention. Biondich's attempt to redress this shortcoming is, as such, welcome.

Chapter Four is titled "National Communism and Political Violence, 1945-1989", although, in practice, the author gives more attention to the first of these concerns than he does to the second. Biondich's core argument is engaging; far from putting a lid on nationalism, Nicolae Ceaușescu, Todor Zhivkov and Enver Hoxha actively fomented nationalist sentiment, particularly when the performance legitimacy of their regimes began to dissolve alongside the economic

crises of the 1970s and 1980s. Biondich's focus on nationalism, however, arguably comes at the expense of the author giving sufficient attention to the use of state terror during the initial installation of communist regimes in the region. Given his argument that Balkan violence has been fundamentally modern, Biondich may have wished to attend to the use of violence in communist re-education schemes – such as Romania's "Pitești Experiment" (1949-52) – since few instances of institutionalized violence have been as painfully modern as these attempts to use force in the construction of a so-called "new [socialist] man".

Biondich narrows the scope of his final empirical chapter to a particular focus on violence that accompanied the dissolution of Yugoslavia. While his account does not deviate significantly from other contemporary narratives, Biondich does make excellent use of contemporary data on the Yugoslav wars, which has been made available through the investigations and prosecutions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. This data allows him to offer the reader a series of short narratives of particular episodes of ethnic cleansing that took place in Bosnia and Croatia. He concludes the chapter with an important (and often neglected) discussion of why war struck post-socialist Yugoslavia, but not Romania or Bulgaria, despite the fact that both of these states featured large ethnic minorities. His counterintuitive explanation is that the particular interweaving of nationalism and communism in Romania and Bulgaria acted as a brake on nationalist manipulation in the 1990s, since it meant that the de-legitimization of communism in those states was also partially accompanied by a de-legitimization of nationalism as an ideology.

As readers move their way through Biondich's conclusion to the book, they may be struck by a certain irony that lies at the heart of the work. Specifically, although the book forms part of an OUP series on "Zones of Violence", the author's core claim is that the Balkans do not, in fact, constitute a zone that is exceptional in its degree or form of violent conflict. Ultimately, this irony reflects a quirk of the publishing process rather than a critique of the work, however, and it does little to detract from the merits of the book.

Overall, *The Balkans* is a most welcome addition to existing literature on state-formation, nationalism, and violence in the Balkans. The breath of the study is impressive; by drawing on a vast body of primary and secondary sources, Biondich leaves few conceptual stones unturned. Moreover, Biondich is a skilled writer, who manages to convey complex arguments to his audience in an accessible and engaging fashion. The book should, as such, not only appeal to professional students of the Balkans and to students of political violence, it should also appeal to those in the wider public who have an interest in understanding how and why the Balkans are simply one of Europe's many "zones of violence".

John Gledhill (Oxford)

Josip Glaurdić, The Hour of Europe. Western Powers and the Break-Up of Yugoslavia. New Haven, London: Yale University Press 2011. 418 S., ISBN 978-0-300-16629-3, € 42,–

Josip Glaurdić präsentiert mit seinem Buch ein beeindruckendes Entwicklungsnarrativ der Jugoslawienkrise von Ende der 1980er bis Anfang der 1990er Jahre. Mit einem engen und dicht erzählten Fokus auf die Zeit zwischen 1987 und 1992 beschreibt und erklärt er den Einfluss, den einzelne westliche Mächte, die Europäische Gemeinschaft und die Vereinten Nationen auf die Auflösung der jugoslawischen Fö-