Hegel On Knowledge of What We Are Doing
-
Jens Rometsch
Abstract
Philosophical interests in knowledge tend to focus exclusively on knowledge of things or facts in the world and our knowledge of that knowledge. I will argue that knowledge of what we are doing should be an integral part of those interests. It is too rarely discussed to which extent an account of knowledge of our own non-epistemic activities might be necessary in order to get the full picture of how we relate to facts in trying to know them. (2.) Hegel’s epistemology in the philosophy of subjective spirit is an interesting exception to this rule: A certain type of knowledge of what we are doing serves as a partial justification for his entire philosophical project, although in Hegel it rests obscure in what sense we can actually have that type of knowledge.
© 2012 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co.
Articles in the same Issue
- Masthead
- Hegel On Knowledge of What We Are Doing
- Rigidity, Reference, and Contingent Identity
- Pantheismus und Pantheismuskritik in Schellings Freiheitsschrift
- A Kantian Conception of Trust
- Coining collective identities: the multitude in De cive and Tractatus politicus
- Pluralism and Objectivism: Cornerstones for Interpersonal Comparisons
- On Thomas Pogge’s Theory of Global Justice. Why We Are Not Collectively Responsible for the Global Distribution of Benefits and Burdens between Individuals
Articles in the same Issue
- Masthead
- Hegel On Knowledge of What We Are Doing
- Rigidity, Reference, and Contingent Identity
- Pantheismus und Pantheismuskritik in Schellings Freiheitsschrift
- A Kantian Conception of Trust
- Coining collective identities: the multitude in De cive and Tractatus politicus
- Pluralism and Objectivism: Cornerstones for Interpersonal Comparisons
- On Thomas Pogge’s Theory of Global Justice. Why We Are Not Collectively Responsible for the Global Distribution of Benefits and Burdens between Individuals
