**Appendix Table A1. Citizenship and Development: OLS Results**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Dependent variable: Log of real GDP per capita in 2014 | | | | | | |
|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Latitude | 0.002 | 0.002 | -0.001 | 0.002 | -0.001 | -0.002 | -0.002 |
|  | [0.005] | [0.005] | [0.004] | [0.006] | [0.005] | [0.004] | [0.004] |
| Jusoli | 0.678 | 0.614 | 0.299 | 0.680 | 0.542 | 0.283 |  |
|  | [0.204]\*\*\* | [0.195]\*\*\* | [0.160]\* | [0.202]\*\*\* | [0.202]\*\*\* | [0.158]\* |  |
| Citizenship law |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.179 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | [0.082]\*\* |
| Rule of law | 0.609 | 0.647 | 0.162 | 0.539 | 0.373 | 0.051 | 0.059 |
|  | [0.114]\*\*\* | [0.131]\*\*\* | [0.131] | [0.131]\*\*\* | [0.144]\*\* | [0.128] | [0.127] |
| (Rule of law)\*Jusoli |  | -0.148 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | [0.283] |  |  |  |  |  |
| Education (log) |  |  | 0.956 |  |  | 0.892 | 0.902 |
|  |  |  | [0.097]\*\*\* |  |  | [0.108]\*\*\* | [0.107]\*\*\* |
| Trade openness (log) |  |  |  | 0.328 |  | 0.409 | 0.441 |
|  |  |  |  | [0.216] |  | [0.183]\*\* | [0.181]\*\* |
| Private sector credit ratio (log) |  |  |  |  | 0.409 | 0.043 | 0.046 |
|  |  |  |  |  | [0.125]\*\*\* | [0.107] | [0.108] |
| Constant | 7.813 | 7.836 | 4.356 | 6.444 | 6.599 | 2.729 | 2.301 |
|  | [0.122]\*\*\* | [0.125]\*\*\* | [0.366]\*\*\* | [0.959]\*\*\* | [0.411]\*\*\* | [0.778]\*\*\* | [0.786]\*\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 105 | 105 | 98 | 100 | 99 | 91 | 91 |
| R-squared | 0.28 | 0.28 | 0.60 | 0.31 | 0.36 | 0.65 | 0.65 |

Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%

Education is proxied by the secondary school enrolment rate

Jusoli is a dummy variable taking 1 when a *jus soli* law is applicable, and zero otherwise

Citizenship law is a categorical variable equal to 1 if jus sanguinis is applicable in the country, 2 if a mixed regime (both *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis*) is applicable, and 3 if *jus soli* is applicable.

Rule of law, education, private sector credit ratio and trade openness are averaged over 1990-1999

**Appendix Table A2. First-Stage Regressions to Instrument the *Jus Soli* Variable**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Dependent variable: Just Soli Dummy variable | Pooling |
| (1) |
|  |  |
| Citizenship law of the colonial power before the country’s independence |  |
| Mixed regime | 0.108 |
|  | [0.065]\* |
| Jus soli | 0.487 |
|  | [0.064]\*\*\* |
| Latitude | 0.003 |
|  | [0.002] |
| Rule of law | -0.085 |
|  | [0.060] |
| Education (log) | 0.121 |
|  | [0.050]\*\* |
| Trade openness (log) | 0.089 |
|  | [0.040]\*\* |
| Private sector credit ratio (log) | 0.024 |
|  | [0.041] |
| Constant | -0.963 |
|  | [0.236]\*\*\* |
|  |  |
| Observations | 238 |
| R-squared | 0.26 |
| Sargan-Hansen (p-value) | 0.38 |

Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%

Education is proxied by the secondary school enrolment rate

Jusoli is a dummy variable taking 1 when a *jus soli* law is applicable, and zero otherwise

Rule of law, education, private sector credit ratio and trade openness are lagged one period

**Appendix Figure A1. Migrant Integration and Citizenship Law, 2014**



**Appendix Figure A2. SCM Results: Real GDP per Capita (log) in Treated and Control Units, 1960–2014**

|  |
| --- |
|  |

Source: Authors’ calculations.

**Appendix Figure A3. Placebo Tests: Treatment effect for Treated Units and Donor Pool, 1960–2014**

|  |
| --- |
|  |

Source: Authors’ calculations.

**Annex 1. Country Samples and Descriptive Statistics**

**Country Sample for the Cross-Section and Panel Regressions**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| *Jus soli* | Mixed regime | *Jus sanguinis* |
| Argentina | Benin | Algeria |
| Belize | Burkina Faso | Angola |
| Bolivia | Cabo Verde | Bangladesh |
| Brazil | Cambodia | Bhutan |
| Costa Rica | Cameroon | Botswana |
| Cuba | Central African Republic | Burundi |
| Dominican Republic | Chad | Comoros |
| Ecuador | Colombia | Cote d'Ivoire |
| El Salvador | Congo, Rep. | Djibouti |
| Equatorial Guinea | Egypt, Arab Rep. | Dominica |
| Grenada | Gabon | Eritrea |
| Guatemala | Ghana | Ethiopia |
| Guinea-Bissau | Guinea | Fiji |
| Guyana | Iran, Islamic Rep. | Gambia, The |
| Honduras | Mali | Haiti |
| Jamaica | Mauritania | India |
| Lesotho | Morocco | Indonesia |
| Mauritius | Mozambique | Iraq |
| Mexico | Peru | Jordan |
| Nepal | Rwanda | Kenya |
| Nicaragua | Sao Tome and Principe | Kiribati |
| Niger | Senegal | Lao PDR |
| Pakistan | Sierra Leone | Lebanon |
| Panama | South Africa | Liberia |
| Paraguay | Togo | Libya |
| Samoa | Tunisia | Madagascar |
| St. Lucia | Uganda | Malawi |
| St Vincent and the Grenadines | Vanuatu | Malaysia |
| Venezuela, RB |  | Maldives |
| Zambia |  | Micronesia, Fed. Sts. |
|  |  | Mongolia |
|  |  | Myanmar |
|  |  | Namibia |
|  |  | Nigeria |
|  |  | Papua New Guinea |
|  |  | Philippines |
|  |  | Solomon Islands |
|  |  | Sri Lanka |
|  |  | Sudan |
|  |  | Suriname |
|  |  | Swaziland |
|  |  | Tanzania |
|  |  | Thailand |
|  |  | Tonga |
|  |  | Vietnam |
|  |  | Yemen, Rep. |
|  |  | Zimbabwe |

**Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix of Main Variables**

**Summary Statistics**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable | Obs. | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Log of real GDP per capita (end of period) | 331 | 7.62 | 1.04 | 5.41 | 9.89 |
| Latitude | 331 | 6.64 | 17.64 | -36.68 | 47.49 |
| Jus soli dummy | 331 | 0.31 | 0.46 | 0 | 1 |
| Rule of law | 331 | -0.50 | 0.62 | -1.84 | 1.01 |
| Education (log) | 331 | 3.88 | 0.64 | 1.68 | 4.70 |
| Trade openness (log) | 331 | 4.23 | 0.62 | -1.52 | 6.09 |
| Private sector credit ratio (log) | 331 | 3.00 | 0.90 | 0.51 | 4.98 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

**Correlation Matrix**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable |  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Log of real GDP per capita (end of period) | (1) | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Latitude | (2) | -0.04 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Jus soli dummy | (3) | 0.36 | -0.08 | 1 |  |  |  |  |
| Rule of law | (4) | 0.41 | -0.04 | 0.11 | 1 |  |  |  |
| Education (log) | (5) | 0.75 | 0.03 | 0.27 | 0.45 | 1 |  |  |
| Trade openness (log) | (6) | 0.28 | -0.06 | 0.08 | 0.29 | 0.18 | 1 |  |
| Private sector credit ratio (log) | (7) | 0.51 | 0.07 | 0.20 | 0.63 | 0.63 | 0.25 | 1 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

**Country Sample for the Synthetic Control Method**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Citizenship Law in 2014 | |
|  | *Jus soli* | *Jus sanguinis* |
| Citizenship law in 1948  (*Jus soli*) | Argentina  Brazil  Costa Rica  Dominican Republic  Ecuador  Guatemala  Honduras  Lesotho  Mexico  Nepal  Nicaragua  Pakistan  Panama  Paraguay  Zambia | Bangladesh  Fiji  Gambia  India  Kenya  Malawi  Malaysia  Namibia  Nigeria  Tanzania  Zimbabwe |

**Annex 2. Variable Definitions and Sources**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Variables | Definition | Sources |
|  |  |  |
| Real GDP per capita (end of period) | The ratio of real GDP divided by the size of the population, and measured at the end of each period | International Monetary Fund |
| Latitude | Absolute value measure of latitude, which is the distance from the equator | Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) |
| Jus soli dummy | Takes 1 in countries where birthright citizenship is followed, and zero otherwise | Authors |
| Rule of law | This index captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society | Worldwide Governance Indicators |
| Education | Secondary school enrollment rate | World Development Indicators |
| Government consumption ratio to GDP | Ratio of government current expenditures to GDP | World Development Indicators |
| Ethno-linguistic fractionalization | Measures diversity in countries as the probability that two randomly chosen people belong to unlike groups | Alesina and others (2003) |
| Protection of property rights | Measures the degree to which a country’s laws protect private property rights and the degree to which its government enforces those laws | The Heritage Foundation |
| Marriage and Naturalization | Index obtained from a principal component analysis of: (i) a dummy variable taking 1 if citizenship can be obtained through marriage and 0 otherwise; (ii) a dummy variable taking 1 if there are no restrictions for women with regard to the right to pass their nationality to a spouse of a child, and 0 otherwise; (ii) the number of years of residency required before being eligible to apply for naturalization; (iv) a dummy variable taking 1 when a country’s naturalization law does not require renunciation of other citizenship, and; (v) the number of other conditions required for naturalization (including language skills and income threshold). The higher the score, the less restrictive is the acquisition of nationality by marriage and naturalization. | Authors |
| Index of human capital | An index based on the average years of schooling and an assumed rate of return to education | Penn World Tables |
| Population | Population size in millions | World Development Indicators |
| Real capital stock | Capital stock levels in 2005 constant prices | Penn World Tables |
| Trade openness (percent of GDP) | Sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of GDP | World Development Indicators |
| Private credit ratio (percent of GDP) | The private credit ratio is the total amount of credit by deposit money banks to the private sector divided by GDP | Financial Development and Structure Dataset |
|  |  |  |