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Sanctions against North Korea: A Descriptive Analysis of their Economic Impact (2000–2020)

  • Simone Zani EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: January 23, 2023
Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy
From the journal Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy Volume 28 Issue 4

Abstract

This article examines the economic impact of sanctions on North Korea from 2000 to 2020. More specifically, it analyzes the trend of the main economic indicators—namely, GDP and trade—using statistical data from trading partners and international organizations in an effort to evaluate the overall effectiveness of this policy tool. After providing a brief overview on the evolution of the North Korean nuclear program, the first section frames the different types of sanctions imposed on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by the leading senders over the years. The second part focuses entirely on the analysis of the economic impact of these measures. The descriptive evidence suggests that the sanctions remarkably impacted the North Korean economy and trade. However, the ability of North Korea to establish an efficient mechanism of sanctions busting, backed particularly by China and Russia, has undermined the effectiveness of these sanctions.

Keywords: North Korea; sanctions; nuclear program; sanctions busting
Jel Classification: F51; F53; H56
Corresponding author: Simone Zani, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Largo A. Gemelli, 1, Milano 20123, Italy, E-mail:
Appendix

Table 7:

Sanctions imposed against North Korea.

Economic sanctions Military restrictions

  1. Prohibition on the export and import of:

    1. arms and military components;

    2. dual-use goods and technologies.

  2. ban on the import and export of:

    1. trade machinery (from military equipment to industrial machinery)

    2. vehicles (tanks, artillery, combat aircraft, helicopters, and vessels).

  3. ban on:

    1. provision of military training or assistance to or by North Korea;

    2. construction of military facilities;

    3. maintenance or refurbishment of military equipment by North Korea;

    4. scientific and technical cooperation with North Korea;

    5. teaching or specialized training in disciplines that could contribute to the proliferation of nuclear activities.
Restrictions on goods and other services

  1. Ban on the import and export of:

    1. luxury goods

    2. all condensates and natural gas liquids;

    3. machinery and electrical equipment;

    4. seafood, wood, and agricultural products;

    5. textiles and statues;

    6. gold, diamonds, and precious metals (iron, iron ore, copper, steel, nickel, silver zinc, earth, stone, magnesite, and magnesia among others);

  2. prohibition to provide services in the chemical, mining, and refining industry to the DPRK;

  3. restrictions on fishing rights;

  4. cap on North Korean labor exports;

  5. cap on North Korean imports of minerals such as coal, oil, and refined petroleum products.
Restrictions on transport and services

  1. Transport restrictions on aircraft and vessels;

  2. obligation to inspect them and subsequently seize and dispose of illicit shipments;

  3. denial to provide bunkering or supply services.
Financial and smart sanctions Restrictions on financial activities

  1. Prohibition on:

    1. provision of financial assistance, concessional loans, and investments to the DPRK;

    2. financial transactions;

    3. establishing bank relationships;

    4. delivery of new DPRK-denominated banknotes and coinage to the central bank of the DPRK;

    5. trade in public bonds with the North Korean government;

    6. freeze of assets of North Korean public bodies and entities.
Targeted sanctions

  1. Restrictions related to listed persons and entities contributing to the DPRK proliferation activities or assisting in the evasion of sanctions:

    1. Freeze of all assets and economic resources;

    2. travel bans;

    3. expulsion of DPRK nationals and persons working at their direction;
Diplomatic restrictions

  1. condemnation of North Korea;

  2. cancellation of government engagements;

  3. withdrawal of consular personnel;

  4. enhanced vigilance over DPRK diplomats.

  1. Source: UN Security Council 1718 Sanctions Committee; EU Sanctions Map; U.S. Department of the Treasury | Sanctions Programs and Country Information.

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Received: 2022-12-29
Revised: 2023-01-10
Accepted: 2023-01-10
Published Online: 2023-01-23

© 2023 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Frontmatter
  2. Research Articles
  3. Is It Right to Fight? Evidence from Russia and Ukraine
  4. Public Support for UN Missions and Attacks on Peacekeepers: Evidence From the Democratic Republic of the Congo
  5. Sanctions against North Korea: A Descriptive Analysis of their Economic Impact (2000–2020)
https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2022-0042
Keywords for this article
North Korea; sanctions; nuclear program; sanctions busting

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Frontmatter
  2. Research Articles
  3. Is It Right to Fight? Evidence from Russia and Ukraine
  4. Public Support for UN Missions and Attacks on Peacekeepers: Evidence From the Democratic Republic of the Congo
  5. Sanctions against North Korea: A Descriptive Analysis of their Economic Impact (2000–2020)
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