How Much are Iranian Men Willing to Pay for Exemption from Military Service?
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Mohammad Hossein Fatemi
Abstract
Compulsory military service, due to its timing in the lives of men (at a young age, which is the key period for increasing human capital) and its length (in many cases, about a year and a half to two years), implies a significant cost (explicit or implicit) for them. Individual costs incurred as a result of compulsory military service is an important aspect to consider when measuring the economic and social costs of enforcing conscription. Compulsory military service has been a part of Iranian government policy since 1925. Accordingly, an attempt to estimate the cost for men in Iran is the main subject of this paper. We will estimate the willingness of men to pay for exemption from compulsory military service based on the dichotomous choice contingent valuation model (One-and-One-Half Bounded approach). The mean of willingness to pay is estimated at 1.61 billion Rials (38,000 USD) while the median of willingness to pay is 1.64 billion Rials. A calculation of the median of willingness to pay for sub-groups of respondents shows that individuals with an income of more than 70 million Rials (1670 USD) per month have the highest median of willingness to pay, followed by those with a Ph.D. degree, and finally, undergraduates are individuals with the lowest median of willingness to pay.
Appendix
Questionnaire
The questionnaire consisted of 7 questions (one question for each bid interval). Each respondent answered 1 out of 7 questions randomly. The questions were as follows:
1. Suppose exemption from military service is possible by paying between 300 and 500 million Rials. Suppose the service is in the form of martial (not prescript) and lasts 24 months; Are you willing to pay 500 million Rials for exemption? (Suppose it is possible to pay in installments within 3 years – 14 million Rials per month). (Yes / No)
[If the answer to question 1 is No, the respondent will be directed to the next question as follows:]
1.1. With the same conditions as before, are you willing to pay 300 million Rials? (In case of installment payment, 8.4 million Rials per month). (Yes/No)
2. Suppose exemption from military service is possible by paying between 500 and 700 million Rials. Suppose the service is in the form of martial (not prescript) and lasts 24 months; Are you willing to pay 500 million Rials for exemption? (Suppose it is possible to pay in installments within 3 years – 14 million Rials per month). (Yes/No)
[If the answer to question 2 is Yes, the respondent will be directed to the next question as follows:]
2.1. With the same conditions as before, are you willing to pay 700 million Rials? (In case of installment payment, 20 million Rials per month). (Yes/No)
3. Suppose exemption from military service is possible by paying between 700 and 1000 million Rials. Suppose the service is in the form of martial (not prescript) and lasts 24 months; Are you willing to pay 1000 million Rials for exemption? (Suppose it is possible to pay in installments within 3 years – 28 million Rials per month). (Yes/No)
[If the answer to question 3 is No, the respondent will be directed to the next question as follows:]
3.1. With the same conditions as before, are you willing to pay 700 million Rials? (In case of installment payment, 20 million Rials per month). (Yes/No)
4. Suppose exemption from military service is possible by paying between 1 and 1.3 billion Rials. Suppose the service is in the form of martial (not prescript) and lasts 24 months; Are you willing to pay 1 billion Rials for exemption? (Suppose it is possible to pay in installments within 3 years - 28 million Rials per month). (Yes/No)
[If the answer to question 4 is Yes, the respondent will be directed to the next question as follows:]
4.1. With the same conditions as before, are you willing to pay 1.3 billion Rials? (In case of installment payment, 36 million Rials per month). (Yes/No)
5. Suppose exemption from military service is possible by paying between 1.3 and 1.6 billion Rials. Suppose the service is in the form of martial (not prescript) and lasts 24 months; Are you willing to pay 1.6 billion Rials for exemption? (Suppose it is possible to pay in installments within 3 years – 44 million Rials per month). (Yes/No)
[If the answer to question 5 is No, the respondent will be directed to the next question as follows:]
5.1. With the same conditions as before, are you willing to pay 1.3 billion Rials? (In case of installment payment, 36 million Rials per month). (Yes/No)
6. Suppose exemption from military service is possible by paying between 1.6 and 2 billion Rials. Suppose the service is in the form of martial (not prescript) and lasts 24 months; Are you willing to pay 1.6 billion Rials for exemption? (Suppose it is possible to pay in installments within 3 years – 44 million Rials per month). (Yes/No)
[If the answer to question 6 is Yes, the respondent will be directed to the next question as follows:]
6.1. With the same conditions as before, are you willing to pay 2 billion Rials? (In case of installment payment, 55 million Rials per month). (Yes/No)
7. Suppose exemption from military service is possible by paying between 2 and 2.5 billion Rials. Suppose the service is in the form of martial (not prescript) and lasts 24 months; Are you willing to pay 2.5 billion Rials for exemption? (Suppose it is possible to pay in installments within 3 years – 70 million Rials per month). (Yes/No)
[If the answer to question 7 is No, the respondent will be directed to the next question as follows:]
7.1. With the same conditions as before, are you willing to pay 2 billion Rials? (In case of installment payment, 55 million Rials per month). (Yes/No)
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Editorial
- Fifth Walter Isard Annual Award for the Best Article in Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy
- Letters and Proceedings
- The Effect of the Spanish Civil War on City Shares
- Research Articles
- How Much are Iranian Men Willing to Pay for Exemption from Military Service?
- Spillovers Between Russia’s and Turkey’s Geopolitical Risk During the 2000–2021 Putin Administration
- Defence Spending and Economic Growth in South Africa: Evidence from Cointegration and Co-Feature Analysis
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Editorial
- Fifth Walter Isard Annual Award for the Best Article in Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy
- Letters and Proceedings
- The Effect of the Spanish Civil War on City Shares
- Research Articles
- How Much are Iranian Men Willing to Pay for Exemption from Military Service?
- Spillovers Between Russia’s and Turkey’s Geopolitical Risk During the 2000–2021 Putin Administration
- Defence Spending and Economic Growth in South Africa: Evidence from Cointegration and Co-Feature Analysis
