Home Four Ways We Know the Democratic Peace Correlation Does Not Exist in the State of Knowledge
Article
Licensed
Unlicensed Requires Authentication

Four Ways We Know the Democratic Peace Correlation Does Not Exist in the State of Knowledge

  • Michael Mousseau EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: November 29, 2019
Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy
From the journal Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy Volume 25 Issue 4

Abstract

Multiple studies have shown that when advanced-market “contract-intensive” economy is considered in a regression of fatal militarized interstate disputes, crises, or wars, the democratic peace correlation, the observed dearth of militarized conflict between democratic nations, becomes near zero and insignificant. Defenders of the existence of a correlation of democracy with peace claim these studies contain multiple errors. This article examines the state of evidence behind all claims in this debate. Four crucial facts are identified: (1) There is no report in print that shows democracy significant in a regression of fatal disputes controlling for contractualist economy that is unencumbered with controversial practices; (2) Every empirical defense of democracy has been rebutted, and the rebuttals remain uncontested; (3) There is no democratic peace in the nineteenth century, when there were no contractualist dyads but were democratic dyads; and (4) New analyses with revised direct data on contractualist economy covering 94% of observations over the largest-observed 1920–2010 period show that democracy without contractualist economy has a near-zero correlation with peace. Together, these facts inform us that there are no scientific grounds for deeming the democratic peace correlation as existing in the state of knowledge.

Keywords: capitalist peace; conflict; democratic peace; security

Acknowledgements

I thank Nils Petter Gleditsch, Haavard Hegre, Sean Lynn-Jones, and John A. Vasquez. All data are available at Harvard Dataverse doi.org/10.7910/DVN/YJD6CA.

Appendix

Table 4:

Assertions made in this controversy that are contrary to documented fact.

Asserted fact Documented fact
1 Economic norms theory is “about the pacifying impact of economic interdependence,” and is thus “not a new argument” (Ray, 2013: 199). Repeated by Ray and Dafoe (2018: 197). No supporting citation provided Anyone can read any article on economic norms theory and see that there is nothing about economic interdependence causing peace in this theory. This fact has been clarified repeatedly (Mousseau, 2009: 72–74, 2013: 194)
2 All “dyad-years with an ongoing conflict” were (incorrectly) set to 0 in Mousseau (2013) (Dafoe et al., 2013: 204). Repeated by Ray and Dafoe (2018: 199–200) Anyone can examine Mousseau’s Mousseau (2013) publicly-available data and see that dyad-years with an ongoing conflict were not set to 0. Ongoing years were retained as 0 only if no new MID began: if a new MID began, dyad-years with an ongoing conflict were (correctly) retained as 1 (Mousseau, 2018: 180)
3 Ray and Dafoe (2018: 194–195) assert that economic norms theory assumes, “that policymakers as well as interest groups and the general public will consistently and accurately perceive varying degrees of contract intensity” across nations. This is a “fundamental problem,” they say, because it is “hard to believe” (194); and because it means that the theory cannot be subject to experimental testing (201) Anyone can read any article on economic norms theory and see that there is nothing in this theory about any actor perceiving “varying degrees of contract intensity” across nations. Peace happens from predicted interests among nations, without perceptions of any kind (Mousseau, 2009: 63, 71, 75, 83, 2013: 189). Ray and Dafoe (2018) provide no supporting citation for their assertion that interstate perceptions play a role in economic norms theory
4 Ray and Dafoe (2018: 195–196) assert that economic norms theory does not predict democracy, and that Mousseau “acknowledges that contractualism does not lead to democratic transitions.” Economic norms theory explicitly predicts democracy from contractualist economy (Mousseau, 2009: 63, 70–71, 2013: 186–188). Ray and Dafoe (2018) provide no supporting citation for their contrary assertion
5 Ray and Dafoe (2018: 195–196) assert that Mousseau has “endorsed” the view “that democratic political institutions make contract-intensive economies more likely to emerge” Ray and Dafoe’s assertion is contrary to the very core of economic norms theory, which treats the origins of contractualist economy exogenously (Mousseau, 2009: 59, 2013: 187). Ray and Dafoe (2018) provide no supporting citation for their opposing assertion
6 Ray and Dafoe (2018: 199) assert that Mousseau (2009) (incorrectly) included joiners of ongoing MIDs as events in the dependent variable Anyone can examine Mousseau’s Mousseau (2009) publicly-available data and see that he did not include joiners of ongoing MIDs as events of the dependent variable
Table 5:

Summary statistics and correlations with contractualist economy, 1921–2010.

Variable Obs. Mean Std. Min Max Correlation with both contractualist
Both contractualista 456,329 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 1.00
Both contractualist or axialb 536,962 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 1.00
Democracyc 575,928 −3.62 6.11 −10.00 10.00 0.40
Capability ratiod 575,928 2.02 1.52 0.00 9.87 −0.02
Major powere 575,928 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.14
Contiguityf 575,928 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 0.06
Distancef 575,928 8.21 0.80 1.61 9.42 −0.10
System sizeg 575,928 −1.77 0.49 −2.13 0.00 0.02

  1. aSee Table 1 for list of contractualist nations. Axial periods treated as missing.

  2. bSee Table 1 for list of axial nations. Includes mixed with one state contractualist and one state axial.

  3. cPolity2 variable, lower of both states, Polity IV data, v. 2013 (Marshall et al., 2012).

  4. dCorrelates of War National Materials Capability index, higher/lower, logged (Singer, Bremer, & Stuckey, 1972).

  5. eAt least one state is identified by the Correlates of War as a major power: Great Britain, France, Russia/USSR; and various years for China, Germany, Italy, and Japan (Small & Singer, 1982).

  6. fContiguity 150 miles or less of open water. Inter-capital distance logged (Stinnett, Tir, Diehl, Schafer, & Gochman, 2002).

  7. g(Hegre, 2008).

References

Beck, T., & Webb, I. (2003). Economic, demographic, and institutional determinants of life insurance consumption across countries. World Bank Economic Review, 17(1), 51–88.10.1093/wber/lhg011Search in Google Scholar

Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (2010). Financial institutions and markets across countries and over time: The updated financial development and structure database. World Bank Economic Review, 24(1), 77–92.10.1093/wber/lhp016Search in Google Scholar

Blalock Jr., H. M. (1979). Social statistics, (2nd ed.) New York: McGraw-Hill.Search in Google Scholar

Boehmer, C., & Daube, M. (2013). The curvilinear effects of economic development on domestic terrorism. Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, 19(3), 359–368.10.1515/peps-2013-0043Search in Google Scholar

Clinton, W. J. (1994). State of the union address to congress. https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/16126.Search in Google Scholar

Dafoe, A. (2011). Statistical critiques of the democratic peace: Caveat emptor. American Journal of Political Science, 55(2), 247–262.10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00487.xSearch in Google Scholar

Dafoe, A. & Russett, B. M. (2013). Democracy and capitalism: Interwoven strands of the liberal peace. Schneider, G. & N. P. Gleditsch (Eds.), The capitalist peace: The origins and prospects of a liberal idea. New York: Routledge .Search in Google Scholar

Dafoe, A., Oneal, J. R., & Russett, B. (2013). The democratic peace: Weighing the evidence and cautious inference. International Studies Quarterly, 57, 201–214.10.1111/isqu.12055Search in Google Scholar

Enia, J. (2017). Do contracts save lives? The relationship between contract intensive economies and natural disaster fatalities. Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy, 9(1), 60–81.10.1002/rhc3.12130Search in Google Scholar

Gartzke, E. (2007). The capitalist peace. American Journal of Political Science, 51(1), 166–191.10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00244.xSearch in Google Scholar

Gibler, D. M. (2007). Bordering on peace: Democracy, territorial issues, and conflict. International Studies Quarterly, 51(3), 509–532.10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00462.xSearch in Google Scholar

Gibler, D. M. (2012). The territorial peace: Borders, state development, and international conflict. Reprint edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9781139060233Search in Google Scholar

Hegre, H. (2008). Gravitating toward war: Preponderance may pacify, but power kills. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 52(4), 566–589.10.1177/0022002708316738Search in Google Scholar

Jenke, L., & Gelpi, C. (2017). Theme and variations: historical contingencies in the causal model of interstate conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61(10), 2262–2284.10.1177/0022002715615190Search in Google Scholar

Krieger, T., & Meierrieks, D. (2015). The rise of market-capitalism and the roots of anti-American terrorism. Journal of Peace Research, 52(1), 46–61.10.2139/ssrn.2358390Search in Google Scholar

Maoz, Z., Johnson, P. L., Kaplan, J., Ogunkoya, F., & Shreve, A. (2019). The dyadic militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) dataset version 3.0: Logic, characteristics, and comparisons to alternative datasets. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 63(3), 811–835.10.1177/0022002718784158Search in Google Scholar

Marshall, M. G., Gurr, T. R., & Jaggers, K. (2012). POLITY– IV PROJECT: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800–2012, dataset users’ manual. Center for Systemic Peace and Societal-Systems Research Inc.Search in Google Scholar

Meierrieks, D. (2012). Rooted in urban poverty? Failed modernization and terrorism. Peace Economics. Peace Science, and Public Policy, 18(3), 1–9.10.1515/peps-2012-0009Search in Google Scholar

Mousseau, M. (2000). Market prosperity, democratic consolidation, and democratic peace. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44, 472–507.10.1177/0022002700044004004Search in Google Scholar

Mousseau, M. (2009). The social market roots of democratic peace. International Security, 33, 52–86.10.1162/isec.2009.33.4.52Search in Google Scholar

Mousseau, M. (2013). The democratic peace unraveled: It’s the economy. International Studies Quarterly, 57, 186–197.10.1111/isqu.12003Search in Google Scholar

Mousseau, M. (2018). Grasping the scientific evidence: The contractualist peace supersedes the democratic peace. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 35(2), 175–192.10.1177/0738894215616408Search in Google Scholar

Mousseau, M. (2019). The end of war: How a robust marketplace and liberal hegemony are leading to perpetual world peace. International Security, 44(1), 160–196.10.1162/isec_a_00352Search in Google Scholar

Mousseau, M., Orsun, O. F., Ungerer, J. L. & Mousseau, D. (2013a). Capitalism and peace: It’s keynes, not hayek. Schneider, G. & N. Petter Gleditsch (Eds.), The capitalist peace: The origins and prospects of a liberal idea. New York: Routledge.Search in Google Scholar

Mousseau, M., Orsun, O. F. & Ungerer, J. L. (2013b). Does the market-capitalist peace supersede the democratic peace? The evidence still says yes. Schneider, G. & N. P. Gleditsch (Eds.), The Capitalist peace: The origins and prospects of a liberal idea. New York: Routledge.Search in Google Scholar

North, D. C., Wallis, J. J., & Weingast, B. R. (2009). Violence and social orders: A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history. New York: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511575839Search in Google Scholar

Oneal, J., & Russett, B. (2005). Rule of three, let it be? When more really is better. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 22, 293–310.10.1080/07388940500339209Search in Google Scholar

Palmer, G., D’Orazio, V., Kenwick, M. R., & McManus, R. W. (2019). Updating the militarized interstate dispute data: A response to Gibler, Miller, and Little. International Studies Quarterly, forthcoming. doi-org.eres.qnl.qa/10.1093/isq/sqz045.10.1093/isq/sqz045Search in Google Scholar

Powell, J., & Chacha, M. (2016). Investing in stability: Economic interdependence, coups d’e´tat, and the capitalist peace. Journal of Peace Research, 53(4), 525–538.10.1177/0022343316638588Search in Google Scholar

Ray, J. L. (2013). War on democratic peace. International Studies Quarterly, 57, 198–200.10.1111/isqu.12029Search in Google Scholar

Ray, J. L., & Dafoe, A. (2018). Democratic peace versus contractualism. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 35(2), 193–203.10.1177/0738894216683648Search in Google Scholar

Russett, B. (2005). Bushwhacking the democratic peace. International Studies Perspectives, 6, 395–408.10.1007/978-1-137-10058-0_14Search in Google Scholar

Singer, J. D., Bremer, S. A., & Stuckey, J. (1972). Capability distribution, uncertainty, and major power war, 1820–1965. In B. Russett (Ed.), Peace, war, and numbers. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE.Search in Google Scholar

Small, M., & Singer, J. D. (1982). Resort to arms: International and civil wars, 1816–1980. (2nd ed.) Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE.Search in Google Scholar

Stinnett, D. M., Tir, J., Diehl, P. F., Schafer, P., & Gochman, C. (2002). The correlates of war (COW) project direct contiguity data, Version 3.0. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 19, 59–67.10.1177/073889420201900203Search in Google Scholar

Wright, T., & Moorthy, S. (2018). Refugees, economic capacity, and host state repression. International Interactions, 44(1), 132–155.10.1080/03050629.2017.1273915Search in Google Scholar

Yuan, Y. (2014). Sensitivity analysis in multiple imputation for missing data. Paper SAS270-2014. SAS Institute.Search in Google Scholar
Published Online: 2019-11-29

© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Editorial
  2. Introduction to the Proceedings of the 19th Jan Tinbergen European Peace Science Conference
  3. Letters and Proceedings
  4. Let’s Call their Bluff: The Politics of Econometric Methodology
  5. Winner of the 2019 Lewis Fry Richardson Award, Jean-Paul Azam
  6. Introducing the “Religious Minorities at Risk” Dataset
  7. Introducing the Human Rights Violations Dataset for the Kurdish Conflict in Turkey, 1990–2018
  8. The Civilian Side of Peacekeeping: New Research Avenues
  9. The Security and Justice Approach in Liberia’s Peace Process: Mechanistic Evidence and Local Perception
  10. Violence and Avoidance Behavior: The Case of the Mexican Drug War
  11. Four Ways We Know the Democratic Peace Correlation Does Not Exist in the State of Knowledge
  12. Israel’s Foreign Aid to Africa & UN Voting: An Empirical Examination
  13. Could the literature on the economic determinants of sanctions be biased?
  14. Trade and Military Alliances: Evidence from NATO
  15. The United States and European Defense Cooperation European Strategic Autonomy and Fighter Aircraft Procurement Decisions
https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2019-0023
Keywords for this article
capitalist peace; conflict; democratic peace; security

Articles in the same Issue

  1. Editorial
  2. Introduction to the Proceedings of the 19th Jan Tinbergen European Peace Science Conference
  3. Letters and Proceedings
  4. Let’s Call their Bluff: The Politics of Econometric Methodology
  5. Winner of the 2019 Lewis Fry Richardson Award, Jean-Paul Azam
  6. Introducing the “Religious Minorities at Risk” Dataset
  7. Introducing the Human Rights Violations Dataset for the Kurdish Conflict in Turkey, 1990–2018
  8. The Civilian Side of Peacekeeping: New Research Avenues
  9. The Security and Justice Approach in Liberia’s Peace Process: Mechanistic Evidence and Local Perception
  10. Violence and Avoidance Behavior: The Case of the Mexican Drug War
  11. Four Ways We Know the Democratic Peace Correlation Does Not Exist in the State of Knowledge
  12. Israel’s Foreign Aid to Africa & UN Voting: An Empirical Examination
  13. Could the literature on the economic determinants of sanctions be biased?
  14. Trade and Military Alliances: Evidence from NATO
  15. The United States and European Defense Cooperation European Strategic Autonomy and Fighter Aircraft Procurement Decisions
Sign up now to receive a 20% welcome discount
Institutional Access
How does access work?
Have an idea on how to improve our website?
Please write us.
© 2025 De Gruyter Brill
Downloaded on 29.9.2025 from https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/peps-2019-0023/html?lang=en
Scroll to top button