The Effect of Farmer-Pastoralist Violence on State-Level Internal Revenue Generation in Nigeria: A Modified Synthetic Control Analysis Approach
-
Topher McDougal
,
Talia Hagerty
,
Lisa Inks
Abstract
Nigeria’s ethnically and religiously diverse Middle Belt has experienced recurrent eruptions of violence over the past several decades. Disputes between pastoralists and farmers arise from disagreements over access to farmland, grazing areas, stock routes, and water points for both animals and households. Although relatively low in intensity, this form of violence is widespread, persistent, and arguably increasing in its incidence. This study seeks to answer the question: How has farmer-pastoralist conflict affected state internally-generated revenues (IGR)? The literature on the effect of violence on sub-national fiscal capacity is slim to none. We use a synthetic control approach to model how IGR for four conflict-affected states – Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa, and Plateau – would have developed in the absence of violence. To account for the endogeneity criticism commonly leveled at such synthetic control analyses, we then use a fixed-effects IV model to estimate IGR losses predicted by the synthetic control analysis as a function of farmer-pastoralist fatalities. Our conservative estimates for percentage reduction to annual state IGR growth for the four states are 0%, 1.2%, 2.6%, and 12.1% respectively, implying that IGR is likely much more sensitive to conflict than GDP. In total, the four study states of Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa, and Plateau are estimated to have lost between US$719,000 and US$2.3 million in 2010 US dollars, or 22–47% of their potential IGR collection during the period of intense.
Appendix
A Violent event dataset creation
In order to construct a dataset for the entire study period, data from ACLED was supplemented with data from the UCDP GED Point Dataset prior to 1997. The datasets were combined based on the variables that correspond to each other, dropping those variables that do not have a counterpart in the other dataset (UCDP GED contains more variables than ACLED, and both datasets contain variables not in the other). For event date, the UCDP GED variable date_end, indicating the end date of the event, was used because we assume this is the date at which the “felt effects” of the event will be most significant in the surrounding area and because the data was temporally discounted in the analysis. UCDP GED variable type_of_violence corresponds to the ACLED variable EVENT_TYPE and UCDP GED variable best_est was used for the fatalities variable, dropping from both datasets events resulting in zero fatalities. Inclusion and exclusion criteria for data points are outlined in Table 10.
Data inclusion and exclusion criteria for construction of spatially-lagged violence variable.
| Inclusion criteria | Exclusion criteria | |
|---|---|---|
| ACLED Data | ||
| 1. | Event occurs in one of the four Middle Belt states: Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa, or Plateau | Event does not occur in one of the four Middle Belt states |
| 2. | Event has associated latitude and longitude coordinates | Event does not have associated latitude and longitude coordinates |
| 3. | Primary event actor can be considered a conflict actor in famer-pastoralist conflict | Primary event actor cannot be considered a conflict actor in famer-pastoralist conflict, including Boko Haram |
| 4. | Secondary event actor can be considered a conflict actor in farmer-pastoralist conflict | Secondary event actor cannot be considered a conflict actor in farmer-pastoralist conflict |
| 5. | Event has at least one recorded fatality | Event does not have any recorded fatalities |
| 6. | Coded as Event Type: Riot and identified as a relevant event by MC | Coded as Event Type: Riot and identified as not a relevant event by MC |
| 7. | Inter1 is coded as 1, 3, 4, 5, or 7 | Inter1 is coded as 2, 6, or 8 |
| 8. | Inter2 is coded as 1, 3, 4, 5, or 7 | Inter2 is coded as 2, 6, or 8 |
| UCDP GED Data | ||
| 1. | Event occurs in one of the four Middle Belt states: Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa, or Plateau | Event does not occur in one of the four Middle Belt states |
| 2. | Event has associated latitude and longitude coordinates | Event does not have associated latitude and longitude coordinates |
| 3. | Primary event actor can be considered a conflict actor in famer-pastoralist conflict | Primary event actor cannot be considered a conflict actor in famer-pastoralist conflict, including Boko Haram |
| 4. | Secondary event actor can be considered a conflict actor in farmer-pastoralist conflict | Secondary event actor cannot be considered a conflict actor in farmer-pastoralist conflict |
| 5. | Event has at least one recorded fatality | Event does not have any recorded fatalities |
| 6. | Coded as Type of Violence 2 or 3 | Coded as Type of Violence 1 |
MC program staff coded each group or actor name that appeared in either dataset in the four Middle Belt states as relevant, not relevant, and possibly relevant actors in farmer-pastoralist conflict. In the case of Possibly Relevant actors (usually government entities or ethnic groups), these actors were included in the datasets and then events (observations) were cleaned so that all events with excluded actors listed as primary actors were removed and then events with excluded actors listed as secondary actors were removed. The result is that any possibly relevant actors were included only in events during which they interacted with other farmer-pastoralist conflict actors. Some events in the ACLED dataset are ascribed to unidentified actors. Events involving unidentified actors were coded as included (relevant to farmer-pastoralist conflict) or excluded (not relevant to farmer-pastoralist conflict) by MC staff. Table 11 details the coding for specific actors.
Conflict actors coded for relevance to farmer-pastoralist conflict.
| UCDP GED primary actors | Relevance code | ACLED primary actors | Relevance code |
|---|---|---|---|
| Christians (Nigeria) | Yes | Alago Ethnic Militia | Yes |
| Fulani | Yes | Bassa Ethnic Militia | Yes |
| Fulani, Hausa | Yes | Berom Ethnic Militia | Yes |
| Hausa | Yes | Biro Ethnic Militia | Yes |
| Hausa, Fulani | Yes | Christian Militia | Yes |
| Tarok | Yes | Christian Youth Sect | Yes |
| Azara | No | Civilians | Yes |
| Gamai | No | Eggon Ethnic Militia | Yes |
| Igbo | No | Fulani Ethnic Militia | Yes |
| Kwala | No | Hausa Ethnic Militia | Yes |
| Supporters of PDP | No | Idoma Ethnic Militia | Yes |
| Government of Nigeria | Maybe | Kafanchan Communal Militia | Yes |
| Anaguta, Afisare, Birom | Yes | Kogi Header Militia | Yes |
| Anaguta, Birom | Yes | Koro Ethnic Militia | Yes |
| Birom | Yes | Muslim Militia | Yes |
| Fulani | Yes | Muslim Youth Sect | Yes |
| Hausa | Yes | Protesters | Yes |
| Kataf | Yes | Rioters | Yes |
| Muslims (Nigeria) | Yes | Shiite Islamist Militia | Yes |
| Ninzam | Yes | Sunni Islamist Militia | Yes |
| Pan | Yes | Tarok Ethnic Militia | Yes |
| Tarok | Yes | Tiv Ethnic Militia | Yes |
| Tiv | Yes | Vigilante Militia | Yes |
| Civilians | Yes | AC: Action Congress | No |
| Supporters of ANPP | No | ANPP: All Nigeria People’s Party | No |
| Afor | Maybe | Ayele Communal Militia | No |
| Black Axe Student Militia | No | ||
| Boko Haram | No | ||
| CNC: Congress for National Consensus Party | No | ||
| MEND: Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta | No | ||
| Mercenaries (Ivory Coast) | No | ||
| Militia (Students) | No | ||
| Okada Motorcycle Militia | No | ||
| PDP: People’s Democratic Party | No | ||
| RTEAN: Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria | No | ||
| Gindiri Ethnic Militia | Maybe | ||
| Kaningkon Ethnic Militia | Maybe | ||
| Kundum Ethnic Militia | Maybe | ||
| Military Forces of Nigeria (1999–2007) | Maybe | ||
| Military Forces of Nigeria (2007–2010) | Maybe | ||
| Military Forces of Nigeria (2010–) | Maybe | ||
| Minda Ethnic Group | Maybe | ||
| Panyam Communal Militia | Maybe | ||
| Police Forces of Nigeria (1993–1998) | Maybe | ||
| Police Forces of Nigeria (1999–2007) | Maybe | ||
| Police Forces of Nigeria (2007–2010) | Maybe | ||
| Police Forces of Nigeria (2010–) | Maybe | ||
| Udeni-Gida Communal Militia | Maybe | ||
| Ukan Ethnic Militia | Maybe | ||
| Agatu Ethnic Militia | Yes | ||
| Alago Ethnic Militia | Yes | ||
| Berom Ethnic Group | Yes | ||
| Berom Ethnic Militia | Yes | ||
| Chala Ethnic Militia | Yes | ||
| Changai Communal Militia | Yes | ||
| Christian Militia | Yes | ||
| Civilians (International) | Yes | ||
| Civilians (Nigeria) | Yes | ||
| Ebira Ethnic Militia | Yes | ||
| Eggon Ethnic Militia | Yes | ||
| Fulani Ethnic Militia | Yes | ||
| Hausa Ethnic Militia | Yes | ||
| Jukun Ethnic Militia | Yes | ||
| Lafia Ethnic Militia | Yes | ||
| Miango Ethnic Militia | Yes | ||
| Muslim Militia | Yes | ||
| Panyam Communal Militia | Yes | ||
| Protesters | Yes | ||
| Rioters | Yes | ||
| Shiite Islamist Militia | Yes | ||
| Sunni Islamist Militia | Yes | ||
| Tarok Ethnic Militia | Yes | ||
| Tiv Ethnic Militia | Yes | ||
| ANPP: All Nigeria People’s Party | No | ||
| Boko Haram | No | ||
| Igbo Ethnic Militia | No | ||
| NURTW: National Union of Road Transport Workers | No | ||
| PDP: People’s Democratic Party | No | ||
| Unidentified Ethnic Militia | No | ||
| Doemak Ethnic Militia | Maybe | ||
| Fansuwa Ethnic Militia | Maybe | ||
| Iggah Communal Militia | Maybe | ||
| Ipaav Ethnic Militia | Maybe | ||
| Kparev Ethnic Group | Maybe | ||
| Kurama Ethnic Militia | Maybe | ||
| Kwala Ethnic Militia | Maybe | ||
| Military Forces of Nigeria (1999–2007) | Maybe | ||
| Military Forces of Nigeria (2007–2010) | Maybe | ||
| Military Forces of Nigeria (2010–) | Maybe | ||
| Nassarawa Gwom Communal Militia | Maybe | ||
| Nyeswe Ethnic Militia | Maybe | ||
| Police Forces of Nigeria (1993–1998) | Maybe | ||
| Police Forces of Nigeria (1998–1999) | Maybe | ||
| Police Forces of Nigeria (1999–2007) | Maybe | ||
| Police Forces of Nigeria (2007–2010) | Maybe | ||
| Police Forces of Nigeria (2010–) | Maybe | ||
| Udeni-Gida Communal Militia | Maybe |
MC staff also coded as included or excluded events in the ACLED dataset attributed to unidentified actors or events coded as Riots. Events identified as excluded based on MC’s assessment were dropped from the dataset.
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©2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- 1st Walter Isard Annual Award for the Best Article in Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy
- Rules for Dividing a Disputed Resource in the Context of the Classical Liberal Argument for Peace
- Patterns of Rebellion: A Model with Three Heterogeneous Challengers
- External Territorial Threats and Tolerance of Corruption: A Private/Government Distinction
- The Effect of Farmer-Pastoralist Violence on State-Level Internal Revenue Generation in Nigeria: A Modified Synthetic Control Analysis Approach
- Causal Linkages between Terrorism and Economic Growth: Evidence from the Four Provinces of Pakistan
Articles in the same Issue
- 1st Walter Isard Annual Award for the Best Article in Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy
- Rules for Dividing a Disputed Resource in the Context of the Classical Liberal Argument for Peace
- Patterns of Rebellion: A Model with Three Heterogeneous Challengers
- External Territorial Threats and Tolerance of Corruption: A Private/Government Distinction
- The Effect of Farmer-Pastoralist Violence on State-Level Internal Revenue Generation in Nigeria: A Modified Synthetic Control Analysis Approach
- Causal Linkages between Terrorism and Economic Growth: Evidence from the Four Provinces of Pakistan
