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Trade and Conflicts: Do Preferential Trade Agreements Matter?

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Veröffentlicht/Copyright: 17. Oktober 2015
Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy
Aus der Zeitschrift Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy Band 21 Heft 4

Abstract

A long debate continues whether international trade institutions (specifically preferential trade agreements [PTAs]) affect security relations between states. Contradicting theories and empirical claims are put forward by realists and liberals. The former posit that the institutions are epiphenomenal and possess no power to constrain state behavior whereas the latter claim that the institutions are likely to promote cooperation by supplying forums for consultation, arbitration and adjudication, thus reducing the risk of war between states. This study identifies an important channel through which the legal dimension of trade agreements (hence dispute settlement mechanisms [DSMs] in PTAs) may have pacifying effects on the outbreaks of war. DSMs of PTAs do have strong implications for militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), although not directly, but through low-level of foreign policy disputes, such as economic sanctions. If economic sanctions are believed to escalate to violent conflict, PTA DSMs may reduce the probability of war by mitigating the escalation of economic sanctions. However, the level of legalism differs among DSMs in PTAs. The present study first confirms empirically that sanction disputes escalate to militarized disputes and further, addresses the selection issue by using bivariate probit model. I find a sizeable impact of medium level of legalism reducing the sanctions escalation into war whereas high level of legalism, in which the state sovereignty is limited, do reduce the probability of sanctions but have no impact on war probability. Further, the interstate political cooperation proves to be a strong determinant for highly legalistic PTAs but not in the case of medium level of legalism.

Keywords: international relations; trade agreements; dispute settlement mechanisms; war
Corresponding author: Arslan Tariq Rana, Laboratoire d’Economie d’Orléans (LEO) UMR 7322 – CNRS, Faculté de Droit, d’Economie et de Gestion Rue de Blois – BP 26739, 45067, Orléans Cedex 2, France, E-mail:

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Published Online: 2015-10-17
Published in Print: 2015-12-1

©2015 by De Gruyter

Artikel in diesem Heft

  1. Frontmatter
  2. Editorial
  3. Introduction to the Proceedings of the 15th Jan Tinbergen European Peace Science Conference
  4. Articles
  5. Can We Stop Talking about Somali Piracy Now? A Personal Review of Somali Piracy Studies
  6. Civil Conflicts, Economic Shocks and Night-time Lights
  7. Climate and Conflict: Whence the Weather?
  8. Security Perception after the Completion of UN Peacekeeping in Timor-Leste
  9. The Impact of US Military Spending on Public Debt in Europe (1992–2013): A Note
  10. Sustaining Civil Peace: A Configurational Comparative Analysis
  11. Military Expenditures and Free-Riding in NATO
  12. Non-governmental Organisations and Democracy: An Empirical Analysis
  13. Choosing to Intervene: US Domestic Politics and Moral Imperatives
  14. United States Arms Transfer Decision-Making: Determinants of Sales versus Aid
  15. Post-Somalia Syndrome: Does it Exist?
  16. How Free Media Protects Energy Infrastructure?
  17. Viva la Revolución, or: Do Revolutions Lead to More Democracy?
  18. State Power, State Capacity, and Development
  19. Trade and Conflicts: Do Preferential Trade Agreements Matter?
https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2015-0029
Schlagwörter für diesen Artikel
international relations; trade agreements; dispute settlement mechanisms; war

Artikel in diesem Heft

  1. Frontmatter
  2. Editorial
  3. Introduction to the Proceedings of the 15th Jan Tinbergen European Peace Science Conference
  4. Articles
  5. Can We Stop Talking about Somali Piracy Now? A Personal Review of Somali Piracy Studies
  6. Civil Conflicts, Economic Shocks and Night-time Lights
  7. Climate and Conflict: Whence the Weather?
  8. Security Perception after the Completion of UN Peacekeeping in Timor-Leste
  9. The Impact of US Military Spending on Public Debt in Europe (1992–2013): A Note
  10. Sustaining Civil Peace: A Configurational Comparative Analysis
  11. Military Expenditures and Free-Riding in NATO
  12. Non-governmental Organisations and Democracy: An Empirical Analysis
  13. Choosing to Intervene: US Domestic Politics and Moral Imperatives
  14. United States Arms Transfer Decision-Making: Determinants of Sales versus Aid
  15. Post-Somalia Syndrome: Does it Exist?
  16. How Free Media Protects Energy Infrastructure?
  17. Viva la Revolución, or: Do Revolutions Lead to More Democracy?
  18. State Power, State Capacity, and Development
  19. Trade and Conflicts: Do Preferential Trade Agreements Matter?
Heruntergeladen am 24.4.2026 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/peps-2015-0029/html?lang=de
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