Good Life, Brave Death, and Earned Immortality: Features of a Neglected Ancient Virtue Discourse

1 Introduction

In this article, we aim at an enhanced understanding of the virtue discourse of one minority culture – Judaism, typically neglected in presentations of the history of virtue ethics^[1] – in the wider ancient Mediterranean context. How did early Jewish authors conceive of virtue and virtuous life? By delving into this question, we seek to contribute to the emerging conversation on virtue ethics in Hebrew Bible/Old Testament studies.^[2] One way in which this discussion remains unbalanced is that scholars have not yet examined the use of the term ἀρετή in the Greek Jewish literature of the Second Temple period in detail.^[3] Furthermore, the proposed analysis expands our understanding of the variety of ancient Greek culture, as it outlines another cultural register in which Greek ideas of virtue were perceived and transmitted.^[4]

Our analysis covers the occurrences of ἀρετή in the Apocrypha of the Septuagint. We acknowledge that both concepts, the “Septuagint” and the “Apocrypha,” are constructions later than the texts under scrutiny. We use the term “Septuagint” as referring to the corpus that consists of two subsets of texts: (1) the Greek translations of the books that eventually formed the canon of the Hebrew Bible or the Tanakh – another construction that is anachronistic in the context of Second Temple Judaism – and (2) the “Apocrypha,” i.e., the books that were mainly but not exclusively written in Greek and never included in the Tanakh; instead, they belong, in somewhat varying combinations and with different degrees of authority, to the Old Testament(s) of Christian churches.^[5] Our choice to focus on such a relatively narrow corpus in the context of this article is based on practical reasons and aims at allowing sufficient depth of analysis.^[6] However, we discuss avenues for further research on virtue in early Jewish literature in the conclusion.

Within the Apocrypha of the Septuagint, the word ἀρετή appears in the Book of Wisdom, 2 Maccabees, 3 Maccabees, and, in particular, 4 Maccabees (henceforth “our sources”).^[7] The contexts of virtue discourse range from philosophically oriented literature and wisdom poetry to educational historical narratives. In particular, much of the virtue discourse in our sources pertains to the two versions of the story of the Maccabean martyrs found in 2 Maccabees (6:18–7:42) and in 4 Maccabees.^[8]

While the semantic field of ἀρετή is broad, its etymological basic sense is “the excellence of a person or a thing, natural or moral.”^[9] More narrowly, the term can denote a good quality of a human being, and this is the basis for our definition of virtues as moral or intellectual features of an individual (or a community) that are regarded as good and desirable.^[10] Correspondingly, we define virtue (in singular) as the possession of such morally and intellectually good qualities as well as behavior arising from accepted moral or intellectual standards.^[11] Yet, the exact connotations of the term may vary depending on the context. In particular, it should be noted at the outset that for some early Jewish authors, the term ἀρετή tends to have a very broad meaning when it is used in the singular in an abstract sense (i.e., not as referring to any single virtue). In such use, virtue is not consistently only “human” but it may also be associated with the divine.^[12]

This article focuses on the Apocrypha, but it should be noted that the divine dimension of ἀρετή is more visible in those texts of the Septuagint that were translated from Hebrew originals. The ancient translators used the term ἀρετή to render the Hebrew words תהלה (“praise,” “praiseworthy deed”) and חוד (“glory,” “splendor,” “majesty”) on six occasions in prophetic books.^[13] In these cases, ἀρετή denotes God’s glory, praise, or excellent deeds. Similar usage appears in Greek sources ever since Homeric times.^[14] These occurrences are important for the wider semantic scope of ἀρετή in the Septuagint because they do not limit the term’s meaning to desirable human qualities.^[15] Such use of the word in prophetic books shows that its transcendent connotation attested in Greek sources is also taken up by early Jewish authors, and this connotation is further present in the LXX apocrypha, although, as we will show in this article, it is clearly less so. While the term ἀρετή thus does not consistently mean human “virtue” in the Septuagint, the English word “virtue” always stands for ἀρετή in this article, unless otherwise indicated.^[16]

Our aim is not to form a general theory of virtue in Jewish antiquity, but to demonstrate two theses. First, the virtue discourse in the Apocrypha pertains to three motifs: (1) paideia or training in virtue, (2) courage and endurance in extreme situations, and (3) the postmortem rewards for virtuous suffering and death. We argue that these motifs, which form the key auxiliary concepts in our study, form a continuum. Training in virtue begins in childhood and continues until the last moments of life. During one’s life, virtue expresses itself as courage through both military bravery and fearless suffering. Finally, the continuum extends beyond death, as the virtuous expect to be rewarded in the eschatological future, regardless of whether the eschatology involved be collective or individual.^[17]

Our second main thesis is that a virtuous Jew has the characteristics of a virtuous Greek. What is more, the Jews attain their high level of virtue through their own way of life and the Mosaic legislation. Their (Greek) antagonists, on the other hand, are portrayed as enemies of virtue(s), which is/are defined in distinctly Greek terms, especially in 4 Maccabees but also in the Book of Wisdom. Thus, Jews emerge as the models of Greek virtue. In the martyr narratives, it is remarkable that the protagonists are not just adult men, as could be expected. The Jewish training in virtue also produces old, young, and female heroes who face suffering and death in defense of virtue and their laws in an equally brave way. Both the old and female protagonists provide for the young ones an example of, and access to, virtue. Finally, our sources explicate that virtue is relevant beyond this life, as the heroes reap a major transcendental reward for their endurance: immortality.^[18]

2 Motif 1: Practice makes perfect: Training in virtue

Since virtues are desirable qualities to be acquired, it is hardly surprising that ἀρετή is associated with practice and exercise, the (re)formation of a person toward moral and intellectual ideals. Thus, the idea of training in virtue appears or is implied in all our sources. To be sure, the ideals of good upbringing and (moral) guidance are strongly present in various texts throughout the Septuagint, as they are in the Hebrew Bible.^[19] However, only in our sources is this traditional notion explicitly linked with the umbrella concept of ἀρετή.^[20] In what follows, we discuss the notion of training in virtue in our sources by addressing four themes. These include: (1) the lifelong nature of training found in the depictions of old men, (2) the various functions of being trained/disciplined and the role of suffering in them, (3) the relationship between training and individual virtues, and (4) the effects of the common training on the mutual affection of family members in 4 Maccabees, which brings out the hierarchy of, and potential conflict between, different virtues in the narrative.

3 Motif 2: Courage: Excellence in action and “passion”

The idea of virtue manifesting itself in one particular cardinal virtue, bravery, is forcefully present in our sources, and more so than what could be inferred by just looking at the occurrences of the word ἀνδρεία in them. This term appears seven times in 4 Maccabees and once in the Book of Wisdom. In addition, several other – both cognate and non-cognate – terms are used to refer to the quality of bravery (see below).^[46] In Greco-Roman ideals of masculinity, manly courage (ἀνδρεία) was crucial and had two main dimensions that we might call the active and the “passive” one.^[47] In the former sense, ἀνδρεία denotes bravery and steadfastness in warfare; in the latter, endurance and unyielding conduct under duress.^[48] In this section, we explore the links between these two types of courage and virtue(s), beginning with 2 Maccabees, where both types are attested, and then continuing with 4 Maccabees that mainly deals with courage in the context of martyrdom, not warfare; its discourse on bravery thus falls within the “passive” category. Yet, 4 Maccabees, too, manifests two facets of courage, particular and general.

2 Maccabees links success in battle with general virtuousness. Commenting on the battle between Timothy and Judas, 2 Macc 10:28 stresses how the latter’s army had “as the guarantor of success and of virtuous victory (νίκης μετ᾿ ἀρετῆς) their reliance on the Lord.” The verse presents virtue as contributing decisively to the triumph of the army; virtue takes the place of divine interventions that occur elsewhere in the book (e.g., 9:5–10), nearly serving as a weapon of the victors. However, the quality of virtue is not specified and the ideal of courage is left implicit. The bravery of soldiers and military victory in defense of Judaism are explicitly linked with each other in 2:21–22, which refers to “those who behaved themselves manfully (ἀνδραγαθήσασιν) for Judaism … and re-established the laws that were about to be abolished.” In 14:18, the Jews’ bravery has a preemptive effect on the hostile governor of Judea: “Nicanor, hearing of the manliness (ἀνδραγαθίαν) of Judas and his troops and their courage (εὐψυχίαν) in battle for their country, shrank from deciding the issue by bloodshed.” Finally, 15:17 explicates the close connection between virtue and courage: “Encouraged (παρακληθέντες) by the words of Judas, so noble and so effective in arousing virtue (ἀρετήν) and awaking courage (ἐπανδρῶσαι)^[49] in the souls of the young, they determined not to encamp but to attack nobly (γενναίως), and to decide the matter by fighting hand to hand with all courage (εὐανδρίας), because the city and the holy things and the temple were in danger.”

“Passive” courage, too, is discussed in 2 Maccabees, in the context of virtuous death.^[50] First, it is manifested by the martyr Eleazar, who “bravely (ἀνδρείως) [gave up his] life” and so left “an example of nobility (ὑπόδειγμα γενναιότητος) and a memorial of virtue (μνημόσυνον ἀρετῆς)” (6:27, similarly 6:31). Second, ch. 14 recounts the death of Razis, one of the elders in Jerusalem, who “had risked body and life for Judaism with all possible zeal” (14:38). When Nicanor’s soldiers come to arrest him, Razis, “preferring to die nobly (εὐγενῶς),” tries to commit suicide by falling on his sword, but does not quite succeed (14:41–42). Then, “he nobly (γενναίως) ran up on the wall, and in a manly manner (ἀνδρωδῶς), threw himself down into the masses.” This is a good example of “passive” courage manifesting itself through active but not aggressive deeds. The author does not explicitly link Razis’s conduct with ἀρετή, but the concept of nobility is connected to virtue elsewhere in the book (6:31; 15:17).

Unlike in 2 Maccabees, military operations play a minor role in 4 Maccabees, where bravery is linked with martyrdom. Even so, courage has two facets in this book, as well: it can denote either particular or generic virtue. As for the former, the author presents courage as the virtue that is specifically impeded by anger, fear, and pain (θυμοῦ τε καὶ φόβου καὶ πόνου; 1:4).^[51] Similarly, bravery is presented as a distinct virtue in a speech by Eleazar (5:16–38), who portrays Judaism as a philosophical way of life. He begins by setting out the basis of the position held by him and the other martyrs: they are “convinced to lead a way of life in accordance with divine law” (5:16). Using pedagogical language, he then itemizes the more specific contents of such a life and presents a modified list of the cardinal virtues:

You scoff at our philosophy as though our living by it were not sensible. But it teaches us self-control (σωφροσύνην ἐκδιδάσκει) so that we overcome all pleasures and desires, and it also exercises us in courage (ἀνδρείαν ἐξασκεῖ) so that we endure all pains willingly (πάντα πόνον ἐκουσίως ὑπομένειν); it trains us in justice (δικαιοσύνην παιδεύει) so that in all our dealings we act impartially, and it teaches us piety (εὐσέβειαν ἐκδιδάσκει) so that we worship (σέβειν) the only living God in a way that befits his greatness.^[52] (4 Macc 5:22–24)

Thus, Jewish philosophy equips its practitioners with particular virtues honored by the Greeks, self-control, courage, and justice, as well as piety.^[53] The latter enables one to worship God in an appropriate manner, which resonates with the association between virtue and religious practice observed above regarding 3 Maccabees 6 where the prayer of the virtuous Eleazar acts as a game-changer. Training in virtue thus enhances one’s capacity to undertake the right kind of religious practice. Later, in 4 Macc 15:10, the brothers are further depicted as living out their philosophy: “just, self-controlled, courageous, lofty-spirited (μεγαλόψυχοι), full of brotherly love and of such love for their mother that they obeyed her and kept the ordinances even unto death.”^[54]

Elsewhere in the book, courage gets the role of representing generic virtue.^[55] This is understandable in that the main “passion” to be conquered by the martyrs, pain (πόνος), is one of the specific forces in opposition to courage (4 Macc 1:4).^[56] In 1:7–8, the author states, “I could show you on the basis of many and diverse considerations that reason is absolute ruler of the passions, but I can demonstrate it much better from the bravery (ἀνδραγαθίας) of those who died for the sake of virtue: Eleazar, the seven brothers and their mother.” Apart from the story of the martyrs, the author shows much effort in demonstrating his thesis by means of biblical stories (see 2:1–6, 15–20; 3:6–18).^[57] Overall, the author creates a continuum between ancestral figures of the past and the more contemporary case of the martyrs that may have had strong appeal because of the popular theme of noble death.^[58] Presenting wisdom and courage together as parallel attributes of a good person, 4 Macc 7:23 also reinforces the latter’s universal significance: “For only the wise and courageous person is a master of their passions.”

In accordance with the nature of “passive” courage, bravery is linked with another generally virtuous property of the martyrs often praised in 4 Maccabees (e.g., 5:23 above): endurance. The martyrs are said to have “won, by their courage and endurance (ὑπομονή), the admiration not merely of all people but even of their abusers, [and] conquered the tyrant by their endurance” (1:11). Similarly, according to 15:30, cited above, the mother of the seven brothers was “more noble than males in perseverance (καρτερίαν), more manly than men in endurance (ἀνδρῶν πρὸς ὑπομονὴν ἀνδρειοτέρα).”

The anticipation concerning the admiration of the martyrs by their abusers (4 Macc 1:11) is fulfilled when the narrative’s chief villain acknowledges the martyrs’ “passive” courage. The way this is done both highlights the generally virtuous character of bravery and links it with active courage: “When the tyrant Antiochus saw the courage of their virtue and their endurance under the tortures, he proclaimed them to his soldiers as an example for their own endurance” (17:23). Paradoxically, the martyrs’ refusal to obey the king demonstrates their exemplarity – to him!^[59] The following verse takes this notion to such a height as to undermine the whole point of the martyrs’ resistance: Antiochus “made [his soldiers] noble and courageous (γενναίους καὶ ἀνδρείους) for fighting on foot and for siege, and pillaged and conquered all his foes” (17:24). In our sources, these verses come closest to expressing the idea of the martyrs as more Greek (in terms of virtue) than the Greeks themselves. Indeed, only a few verses later the author notes that in the end, it was the Jews who “pillaged their enemies” (18:4) – Antiochus’s supposedly invincible troops – and refers to Antiochus’ punishment (18:5).

As we have seen, 2 Maccabees and 4 Maccabees bear witness to a versatile discourse on the virtue of courage. While they mention numerous particular virtues, courage plays the most prominent role of all, being connected both to military campaigns in an active sense and to martyrdom in a “passive” one. Apart from featuring as a specific virtue, courage at times represents generic virtue.

4 Motif 3: Rewarding suffering and death through immortality

Training in virtue is a lifelong project. As regards the end of one’s life, the relevance of ἀρετή extends to the hereafter according to 2 Maccabees, 4 Maccabees, and the Book of Wisdom.^[60] Each of them, though in varying ways, connects virtue with immortality and life after physical death.^[61] The pursuit of virtue is presented as akin to a competition with rewards beyond this world, even though the books’ eschatological visions are considerably different in terms of both clarity and content. In this section, we discuss the theme of the reward for virtue in our sources, beginning with 2 Maccabees and proceeding through 4 Maccabees to the Book of Wisdom. Although each book has something in common with the other two, the Book of Wisdom clearly stands apart in its allusive language. This necessitates a slightly longer discussion of this book.

The martyrs of 2 Maccabees are said to face their torture and eventual death because of “God’s laws” (ὑπὲρ τῶν αὐτοῦ νόμων, 7:9; similarly 6:28, 7:11, 7:23, 7:37). We have already noted that Eleazar, after having died “nobly for the revered and holy laws,” is said to have left “in his death an example of nobility and a memorial of virtue, not only to the young but also to the great body of his nation” (6:28, 31). However, although Eleazar believes in life after death (he says that he will go to Hades in 6:23), no expectation of a postmortem reward is made explicit.

The other martyrs are more forthcoming, expressing their belief in the resurrection of the body. When the second brother is about to die, he addresses the king (2 Macc 7:9): “You accursed wretch, you dismiss us from this present life, but the king of the universe will raise us up to an everlasting revival of life (εἰς αἰώνιον ἀναβίωσιν ζωῆς ἡμᾶς ἀναστήσει), because we have died for his laws.” The third brother “put out his tongue and courageously stretched forth his hands and said nobly, ‘I got these from heaven, and because of his laws I disdain them, and from him I hope to get them back again’” (7:10–11). The last one declares to the tyrant that his brothers “have fallen, having endured under the divine covenant brief pain for everlasting life (ἀενάου ζωῆς)” (7:36).^[62] Even if virtue is only mentioned in the case of Eleazar and the everlasting life in the case of the boys, the narrative implies the idea of virtue being rewarded with an eternal life. It is unclear, however, whether this life only refers to what follows the resurrection, or whether it is considered to begin with the martyrs’ death.^[63]

4 Maccabees, too, attests to ideas of afterlife rewards, which are explicated and emphasized to a greater degree than in 2 Maccabees. Likewise, the causal relationship between the martyrs’ fate and their eschatological hope is more straightforward, and the concepts of immortality and incorruptibility are introduced. Notably, 4 Maccabees presents multiple answers to the question of the reason for which the martyrs suffer and die. While these answers are not intended as synonymous, they are surely regarded as being compatible with each other. They further bring out virtue’s transcendent dimension: in addition to their willingness to suffer and die for the sake of “the ancestral law” (ὑπὲρ τοῦ πατρῴου νόμου; 16:16) and of virtue (1:8, 7:22, 11:2; cf. 12:14), the martyrs also do it for the sake of piety (εὐσεβεία; 13:27, 16:17, 17:7, 18:3), nobility (καλοκἀγαθία; 1:10), endurance (ὑπομονή; 17:17–18), and even God (9:8, 16:25).^[64] We may thus conclude that the author implies these concepts to have something essential in common; they form a constellation of interlinked values with a transcendent dimension, used by the author to bolster his main thesis. For him, voluntary suffering because of them is a supreme example of one’s mastery over passions.^[65]

In 4 Macc 9:8, the brothers explicitly declare to Antiochus their expectation of a reward: “For we, through this suffering and endurance, shall gain the prizes of virtue (τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἆθλα) and shall be with God, for whose sake (δι᾿ ὅν) we suffer.” The martyrs’ agony is both a contest and a test: When “virtue test[ed] (δοκιμάζουσα) them for their perseverance (ὑπομονῆς), … who did not marvel at the athletes contending for the divine law code (τοὺς τῆς θείας νομοθεσίας ἀθλητάς)?” (17:12, 16). The idea of striving for virtue as a contest has parallels in both Greek and Hellenistic Jewish literature.^[66] The idea of reaching God as the reward for virtue (9:8) is further elaborated as incorporeal immortality toward the end of the book.^[67] In this context, the author personifies virtue and godliness:^[68]

Truly the contest carried on by them was divine, for then virtue, testing (δοκιμάζουσα) them for their perseverance, offered rewards (ἠθλοθέτει). Victory meant incorruptibility in long-lasting life (ἀφθαρσία ἐν ζωῇ πολυχρονίῳ). … Godliness (θεοσέβεια) won the victory and crowned (στεφανοῦσα) its own athletes. … The tyrant himself and all his council marveled at their endurance, for which (δι᾿ ἣν) they now stand before the divine throne and live the life of the blessed age (τὸν μακάριον βιοῦσιν αἰῶνα).” (4 Macc 17:11–12, 15, 17–18)

The notion of immortality as the reward for virtue is even more explicit in 4 Macc 14:5, where the author describes the martyrs as having “hastened to meet death through the tortures as though running on the path to immortality (ἐπ᾿ ἀθανασίας ὁδόν).”^[69] In 15:3, the concept of eusebeia, closely linked with virtue in the treatise, is characterized as a quality that “saves to everlasting life with God (τὴν σῴζουσαν εἰς αἰωνίαν ζωὴν κατὰ θεόν).” The same idea reappears in 16:13, now highlighting the role of the mother, who gave her sons “a new birth to immortality (εἰς ἀθανασίαν), [as] she rather implored and urged them on to death for the sake of piety.”

The idea of an eschatological reward for virtue is also attested in the Book of Wisdom.^[70] In this treatise, immortality, alongside being such a reward, is a teleological goal based on God’s act of creation, as is explicated by the author’s comment on the reasoning of the wicked (2:22–23): “They did not know divine mysteries, nor hoped for the wages of holiness, nor recognized the reward for blameless souls (γέρας ψυχῶν ἀμώμων). Because God created human beings for incorruption (ἐπ’ ἀφθαρσίᾳ) and made them the image of his own nature.” Yet, this creation-based notion of incorruption – which we take to be synonymous with immortality – is not highlighted by the author, who instead emphasizes a desirable way of living.^[71] In chs. 3–4, for example, the author focuses on sexual ethics. After noting, “the children of adulterers will not reach maturity, and the offspring of unlawful intercourse will perish” (3:16), he writes: “Better is childlessness with virtue (μετὰ ἀρετῆς), for in the memory of it is immortality (ἀθανασία γάρ ἐστιν ἐν μνήμῃ αὐτῆς), because it [apparently: virtue] is recognized both by God and by human beings” (4:1). The motif of virtuous childlessness continues the thought expressed in 3:13, which states that the avoidance of a forbidden kind of intercourse will eventually be rewarded.

Regarding the souls of the just, the author states that even if their death seemed like destruction (σύντριμμα) (Wis 3:3), “their hope is full of immortality” (3:4). He continues in a way that resonates with both 2 Maccabees and 4 Maccabees, although an explicit reference to martyrdom is lacking: “and having been disciplined a little (ὀλίγα παιδευθέντες), they will be greatly benefited, because God tested (ἐπείρασεν) them and found them worthy of himself; as gold in the furnace, he tested (ἐδοκίμασεν) them, and as a sacrificial whole burnt offering, he accepted them” (3:5–6). This comes very close to the aforementioned idea of brief suffering, taking place “to rebuke and discipline us” (2 Macc 7:19) and abundantly compensated for by God (2 Macc 7:33, 36; also 6:12, 16; 10:4). A similar reference to testing, but without a mention of the suffering’s brevity, was also noted above in 4 Macc 17:11.^[72] Thus, according to the Book of Wisdom, as well, virtue will be rewarded after this life, upon the eschatological examination to which the book refers in several verses.^[73]

Yet, the author does not make the relationship between virtue and immortality entirely clear. What does it mean, for example, that immortality is “in the memory” of virtue, as Wis 4:1 states? Verse 8:13, too, refers to both immortality and memory: “Because of her [Wisdom], I will have immortality (ἕξω δι᾿ αὐτὴν ἀθανασίαν) and will leave behind an everlasting memorial (μνήμην αἰώνιον) for those who come after me.”^[74] While these statements obviously mean that the virtuous will be remembered, their immortality is rather constituted by the ongoing existence of their souls, as is suggested by reading Wis 4:1 (“Better is childlessness with virtue, for in the memory of it is immortality”) together with 4:6: “For children born of unlawful intercourse are witness of evil against their parents when they are examined (ἐν ἐξετασμῷ).” The author refers to an eschatological future, which suggests that according to 4:1, the virtuous but childless will not be forgotten, but rewarded with immortality at the time of judgment.

The same perspective may help us interpret the book’s final occurrence of ἀρετή, which concludes the remorseful speech put in the mouth of the impious (Wis 5:4–13): “So (οὕτως) we, as soon as we were born, ceased to be (γεννηθέντες ἐξελίπομεν), and we had no sign of virtue (ἀρετῆς μὲν σημεῖον) to show but were consumed in our wickedness (ἐν δὲ τῇ κακίᾳ ἡμῶν κατεδαπανήθημεν).” This statement comes after three metaphors in 5:10–12 that begin with “like” (ὡς), describing how a boat, a bird, and an arrow leave no trace in the medium in which they travel. A similar idea appears in 4:19, “the memory of [the impious] will perish,” and such a destiny is the obvious counterpoint for the immortality of the virtuous.^[75]

However, if there is nothing more to Wis 5:13 than the idea of destroying the wicked, the three metaphors play no role. We argue that a more complete picture of the role of virtue in the avoidance of the eschatological “consumption” emerges when the metaphors are considered. That of the arrow is closest to what is said of the impious in that the metaphor contains an explicit counterpart for “as soon as we were born, ceased to be,” namely: “the air, thus cut through, immediately comes together.” This explains why the arrow left no trace in the air. Since the question is of why virtue left no mark in those who were (or became) impious, the air corresponds, in this parallelism, to these persons, whereas the passing of the arrow corresponds to virtue. Likewise, the air being cut through is the counterpart for the impious being born, and its coming together is that for their ceasing to be.^[76]

This analysis makes it evident that the gist of Wis 5:10–13 is that the impious were not able to retain anything from an initial “injection” of virtue, which corresponds to the creation-based chance to gain the teleological immortality mentioned in 2:23. This potentiality materializes when justice and virtue are exercised. The failure of the impious to live up to this prospect is expressed in, for example, 5:6: “We strayed, it seems, from the path of truth, and were not illumined by the light of justice (δικαιοσύνης).”^[77] The arrow of virtue, shot by God, traveled right through them with no enduring effect, and their “life will pass away as the traces of a cloud and will be scattered as mist” (2:4). In an eschatological perspective, neglecting virtue does not pay off (5:8), whereas its practice is rewarded (5:15).

In summary, virtue is not exclusively a matter of this-worldly ethics, but has a postmortem dimension. 4 Maccabees and the Book of Wisdom portray this in terms of (the soul’s) immortality, while 2 Maccabees envisages another type of eternal life via bodily resurrection. The latter feature creates an indirect link to the Book of Wisdom in that resurrection usually, albeit not explicitly in 2 Maccabees, implies a collective eschatology and the end of history unfolding through a divine intervention and a judgment. Such an event is envisaged in the Book of Wisdom, and the final reward for virtue is suspended until the visitation. Our analyses thus demonstrate that early Jewish writings with considerably different ideas of eschatology and the afterlife share the idea of a transcendent reward for virtue.

5 Conquering the Greeks with their own virtues

The Greco-Roman notion of ideal masculinity stressed one’s capacity to master both oneself and others, and adult men were expected to do this better than women, children, or slaves. Thus, the outcome in 2 Maccabees and 4 Maccabees is against the odds. On the one hand, the protagonists – who do not represent typical hegemonic masculinity, considering the old age of Eleazar, the young age of the sons, and the female gender of the mother – surpass what is expected of them. On the other, Antiochus the Greek Hellenistic king brings disgrace to himself by not being able to master even himself.^[78]

The king’s lack of self-control is a noteworthy feature that appears in all three books of the Maccabees we have discussed in this article. In 2 Maccabees, Antiochus is twice said to have become enraged (ἔκθυμος) by what one of the martyrs says to him (7:3, 39). In 3 Macc 3:1, Ptolemy, upon learning that most Jews would not yield to his will, became so enraged (ἐξεχόλησεν) that he ordered the genocide of all the Jews in Egypt. Finally, in 4 Maccabees, “the bitter tyrant of the Greeks” was “not only indignant (ἐχαλέπαινεν) … but also infuriated (ὠργίσθη)” at the martyrs’ perseverance (9:10) and thus acted with “seething rage (ζέουσι θυμοῖς)” (18:20).

4 Macc 9:10 is one of the few places in that book where Greekness is explicitly given a negative connotation; Antiochus’ Greekness is also explicit in 8:8 where he urges the brothers to “embrace a Greek way of life.” The raging, “virtue-hating (μισα´ρετος) and misanthropic” (11:4) king must have been seen as betraying his Greekness by anyone who took that attribute to imply anything in terms of virtue.^[79] However, the authors of both 2 Maccabees and 4 Maccabees make it abundantly clear that such an assumption of congenital Greek virtuousness would have no validity.

The anti-Greek sentiment of 2 Maccabees (4:10–15, 6:9, 11:24–25) is stronger than that of 4 Maccabees. Yet, it should not go unnoticed that 2 Maccabees does seem to reflect an implicit desire to hold on to some kind of ideal Greekness that the Jews’ Seleucid adversaries are denied when they (2:21, 5:22, 10:4, 15:2) and their Jewish henchman Jason (4:25) are called “barbarian.”^[80] Hence, the category of Greekness is somewhat ambiguous in these texts. Despite the use of Greek virtue terminology, being Greek is no guarantor of virtue, as the king’s attack against the virtuous Jews and his unrestrained conduct show.

It is also worth noting that the claims of 2 Maccabees and 4 Maccabees are not identical. If we simplify the setup of these treatises as (i) against the Greeks (ii) with Greek means, we can note that the idea of opposing Greeks (i) is clearly more pronounced in 2 Maccabees than it is in 4 Maccabees, while the reverse is true regarding the idea of using Greek means (ii). This difference in approach is exemplified by much of what has been discussed in this article, especially as regards the sources’ explicit comments on the Greeks, the frequency of the word ἀρετή and other ethical terminology, or the “canon” of the so-called cardinal virtues.

The author of the Book of Wisdom does not mention Greeks explicitly but, despite some elements of universalism, primarily associates virtue with his own group that serves as an exemplar to others. This can be seen, for example, in the words attributed to Solomon in Wis 8:14–15: “I will govern peoples, and nations will be subject to me; dread tyrants (τύραννοι φρικτοί) will fear me when they hear of me; among the multitude I will show myself good, and in war courageous.” Winston considers “the apocalyptic vengeance” in ch. 5 to be a veiled attack on “the hated Alexandrians and Romans” of the author’s own day.^[81] This veiledness makes the Book of Wisdom’s anti-Greek (and anti-Roman) character even less conspicuous than that of 4 Maccabees; with regard to their debt to Greek philosophical discourse, these works are quite comparable.

6 Conclusions

This article has analyzed the often-neglected virtue discourse in the Apocrypha of the Septuagint, where term ἀρετή occurs in 2 Maccabees, 3 Maccabees, 4 Maccabees, and the Book of Wisdom. In these texts, the implementation of virtue produces desirable ways of living and dying.^[82] The virtue discourse in these sources revolves around the motifs of (1) training in and teaching of virtue, (2) the manifestation of virtue through both active and “passive” forms of courage, and (3) postmortem rewards for toil, suffering, and death. Regarding these, we emphasize the following three observations:

First, while all our sources speak of learning virtue, they see the relation between paideia and virtue differently. 2 Maccabees understands the term in a disciplinary sense and links it with the suffering, virtuously endured, effected by the conflict discussed in the book. 4 Maccabees, in turn, uses the term as referring to training that directly contributes to virtue. Finally, the Book of Wisdom features both aspects. It should also be noted that in 4 Maccabees, training in virtue has effects that stand in a hierarchical relation in the situation of torture insofar as the martyrs’ enhanced familial affection has to give way to their endurance.

Second, virtue emerges as exceptional courage, both in terms of active military bravery and success and in terms of “passive” willingness to endure torture and death for the sake of a worthy cause.^[83] At times, courage is elevated to the status of a generic virtue, as especially befits the narratives of the Maccabean martyrs. At other times, the quality of courage is listed among the cardinal (and other) virtues. As regards one’s access to and capacity to perform virtue, it is notable that women, youth, and old men are cast as capable of acting with courage as well as exemplifying and teaching virtue.

Third, virtue pertains to the afterlife, as those who practice it are said to be rewarded with eternal life, either through immortality of the soul or bodily resurrection. Our sources differ regarding their conceptions of afterlife, but they all testify to virtue’s transcendent dimension as a seamless part of early Jewish thought. In 4 Maccabees and the Book of Wisdom, the divine status of ἀρετή is further reminiscent of the conception of “God’s virtue(s)” attested in the prophetic books of the Septuagint.

As we have shown, the authors employed ἀρετή in multiple contexts – philosophy, wisdom, narrative – thus teaching their audiences about desirable qualities and ideal ways of living. For them, ἀρετή was about exemplary human qualities such as the cardinal virtues, or the virtues of piety and endurance, but it was also associated with religious practice, divine instruction, afterlife expectations, and, ultimately, the virtue of God. All our sources use Greek virtue discourse to defend the Jewish law, whether against explicitly or implicitly Greek (and Roman) enemies who are surpassed by the Jews as the representatives of the Greek virtue ideals. For the Jewish protagonists, complete virtue is only possible through an adherence to the Jewish tradition and the Mosaic law.

While this article foregrounds features of a previously ignored ancient virtue discourse, it has only been able to cover a part of the Greek writings produced by Jews in the Second Temple period. In order to enhance the scholarly understanding of the features of Jewish virtue ethics found in these writings, further research should be directed at the so-called Pseudepigrapha as well as the corpora of Philo and Josephus. While the Apocrypha demonstrate both thematic unity and variety within ancient Jewish virtue discourse, it is to be expected that investigation of other corpora will add to our understanding of Jewish virtue discourse, including further features of virtue-oriented justification of the Jewish way of life (e.g., the Letter of Aristeas) or the manifestation of virtue(s) in the history of the Jews (e.g., Josephus).