

Research Article

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Arche and *Nous* in Heidegger's and Aristotle's Understanding of *Phronesis*

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Abstract: I offer a novel interpretation concerning Heidegger's appropriation of Aristotelian *phronesis* in terms of the shifting roles that *arche* plays in structuring the disclosive movements proper to Aristotelian and Heideggerian *phronesis*. Specifically, I show that an intriguing ambiguity present in how Aristotle understands *arche*, in the sense of its being both an originaive source of and what grasps first principles, can be leveraged to explain changes in the mediating relation between *nous* and *logos* relevant to Heidegger's appropriations of *phronesis*, which I then employ to explain two additional features thereof: how it differs from Aristotelian *phronesis* and how it changes subtly from its more explicit manifestations in the *Sophist* to its more implicit presence in *Being and Time*. One significant ramification of this *arche*-reading of Heideggerian *phronesis* I also explore is how an understanding of *phronetic* disclosure in terms of *arche* can inform an understanding of the temporality of the disclosure of Dasein's Being in *Being and Time*.

Keywords: Heidegger, Aristotle, Being, *Phronesis*, *Nous*, *Arche*

Heidegger's reading of Aristotelian *phronesis* as a disclosive movement plays a crucial part in the former's broader philosophy concerning how Dasein is disclosed in its Being. This is more directly expressed in his *Sophist* lectures, wherein Heidegger explicitly interprets Aristotle on the subject. However, there are also traces of this reading, in a more transformed capacity, in his *Being and Time* (BT), wherein the notion of *phronetic* movement is less overtly involved.¹ We can therefore talk about Heidegger's reading as involving both explicit and implicit appropriations of *phronesis* – these appropriations amounting to what I call Heideggerian *phronesis*. What, if anything, conceptually connects these appropriations to each other and to Aristotle's original one?

Now, in the literature, Heideggerian *phronesis* has been either criticised for misinterpreting Aristotle or defended for its relative interpretive felicity on the matter.² My aim in this article is to take a step back from this debate and analyse a hitherto largely unexplored conceptual throughline between the *Sophist* (pre-BT) and BT variants of Heideggerian *phronesis*. In doing so, I show not only that Heideggerian *phronesis* differs

¹ A helpful overview on the matter can be found in Pedersen, "On Heidegger's Appropriation," 217. References to Plato's *Sophist* are abbreviated as PS in the text, while those to the 1962 Macquarrie and Robinson translation of *Being and Time* are abbreviated as BT. The few references to the 1996 Stambaugh translation of BT, as well as references to his other works, given in the footnotes are indicated as BT*. Abbreviations for other works by Heidegger are listed in the references. For Aristotle, the pagination (book and line/section) of his *Nicomachean Ethics*, abbreviated in the text as NE, is from the original Greek as indicated in the 1934 Loeb Classical Library English translation, although other English translations were consulted as well, such as the 1984 (*The Complete Works of Aristotle*), 1999 (translated by Terence Irwin), and 2002 (translated by Joe Sachs) translations.

² For instance, the former is espoused by Volpi, "Being and Time," 195; Thanassas, "Phronesis Vs. Sophia," 31; and Vardoulakis, "Toward a Critique," 220, while the latter is espoused by Weidenfeld, "Heidegger's Appropriation," 254; and McManus, "Authenticity, Deliberation," 125.

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substantially from Aristotelian *phronesis*, but that the reasons why they differ help us to trace a plausible genealogy from Aristotelian *phronesis*, to Heideggerian *phronesis*' pre-BT variant, and then to its BT variant that is explainable in terms of a parallel evolution in the work that a singular concept, *arche*, does in informing these three versions of *phronesis*. This analysis of mine is significant for the broader Heideggerian literature not only because it breaches new interpretive grounds in Heideggerian scholarship concerning the role and presence of *phronesis* in his thought, but also because it gives evidence for the claim that, at least in some of its more consequential dimensions, the evolution of Heidegger's thought can be given coherent structural rationale.³

My analysis consists of three points that require substantive exploration in the following sections to fully illustrate their significance:

1. An increased relevance given to *nous*, compared to *logos*, in the disclosive movement proper to Heideggerian *phronesis* when compared to Aristotelian *phronesis*.
2. A change in the relation between *phronesis* and *sophia* is present throughout the aforementioned genealogy from Aristotelian to Heideggerian *phronesis*.
3. A straightforward path from Heideggerian *phronesis* to elements coordinating the disclosure of Dasein's Being, such as its infallibility and temporality.

Points 1 and 2 are needed to make sense of and flesh out the changing role that *arche* plays between Aristotelian and Heideggerian *phronesis*. Point 3 offers further justification to the claim that important parts of Heidegger's thought can be offered a coherent structure when interpreted in terms of *arche*. Therefore, all three points are integral for meeting the aim of this paper. Point 1 gives the proper terms in which point 2, informing my main claim, is best interpreted. Point 3 illustrates a consequence of the aforesaid claim. Giving a brief outline of the overall argument will help set up the rest of the discussion.

In regards to point 1, while both take *phronesis* as a disclosive act, for Aristotle, the close association between *phronesis* and *logos* allows one to understand *phronesis* as a movement that aims at the Good as a proper end for *phronesis*, whereas for Heidegger, his closer association between *phronesis* and *nous* allows him to tether it away from Aristotle's conception of the Good and towards its own, more ontological ends.⁴ Heidegger does this by effecting a subtle shift from the *logos*-mediation intrinsic in the *nous* proper to Aristotelian *phronesis* to how this *logos*-mediation is absent in the *nous* proper to Heideggerian *phronesis*. Therefore, Heidegger's recasting of *phronesis*' ends away from its Aristotelian origins constitutes a change in the *logos*-mediated structure of human *nous*. Coming to grips with what these ends amount to and what roles they play in the disclosure of Dasein's Being will help illustrate how Heidegger's recasting of these ends in BT differs not only from Aristotle's own but also, in a more implicit fashion, from his earlier recasting of *phronesis*' ends in his lecture course on Plato's *Sophist*.

My main claim is that, elaborating on point 2, *sophia* for Aristotle informs the content of *phronesis*' disclosive movement as a movement of ends directed to higher ends that are ultimately given in the *nous* proper to *sophia*, whereas for Heidegger, his opposition to Aristotle is twofold: first, in the *Sophist*, *phronesis*' relation with *sophia* is one wherein *sophia*, far from informing the content of *phronesis*' disclosive movement,

³ I am in part building off of the work done by Brogan (*Heidegger and Aristotle*) and McNeill (*The Glance of the Eye*) regarding their interpretations of the disclosive movements of Heideggerian *phronesis*. For specific focus on *phronesis*' presence in BT, I am indebted to Pedersen's ("On Heidegger's Appropriation") and Weidenfeld's ("Heidegger's appropriation") discussions on the relevance of the Heideggerian concepts of conscience and resoluteness to a proper grasp of the aforesaid presence. However, where my approach differs from theirs is in allocating an *explicit* place of interpretive relevance for *arche* concerning not only *phronesis*' disclosive movements but also its relation to conscience and resoluteness. Importantly, I am not claiming, as Thanassas convincingly criticises, "that Heidegger's philosophy constitutes a uniform, homogeneous corpus and that his thought evolves linearly and uniformly." Thanassas, "Phronesis Vs. Sophia," 33. With respect to his various appropriations of *phronesis*, all I am asserting is that *arche* plays a larger role than traditionally appreciated in informing a narrative of conceptual commonalities about *arche* at work in the transition between these appropriations. I am also not asserting that this role of *arche* is the reason that Heidegger adopted in making the transition, just that, whether he was mindful of it or not, a motivated reading of the transition can be made on the basis of *arche*.

⁴ Weidenfeld, "Heidegger's Appropriation," 266; and Fried, "Retrieving Phronesis," 308.

functions as its *ontological* basis – i.e. *phronetic* disclosures are not *informed* by *sophia*, yet the movement of ends given in *phronesis* are *capacitated* by it, in that such ends still partake in an ontological, hierarchical relation with ends given in *sophia*; second, in *BT*, *phronesis* no longer has such an ontological basis except insofar as it plays its own ontological role for its own disclosures – i.e. the ends of *phronesis* and *sophia* are no longer hierarchically related in *BT*, for they share in the same ontological privilege.

I argue that these shifts in *phronesis*' relation with *sophia* are best comprehended in terms of an analogous change in the functional presence of *arche* in the *Sophist* and *BT*. I cash out this functional change in *arche* through what I call the “dual reading” of *arche*, which relies on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, specifically in 100b7-15, in how *nous* is understood therein as *arche* in the sense of its being both an originative source of and what grasps first principles – i.e. *arche-as-origin* and *arche-as-grasping*, respectively.⁵

Now, why is this changing *phronesis/sophia* relation best seen through the lens of *arche*, and more specifically, its two senses? What is so special about them to afford a kind of conceptual uniformity and coherent structure at least to this dimension of Heidegger's changing thought? Well, I argue that *nous*' *logos*-mediation itself structures a possible disclosive relation in *arche* whereby *arche-as-grasping* is disclosed in terms of *arche-as-origin* and *vice versa*. Interpreting *nous*' *logos*-mediation in this manner better the chances and rationale of having *arche*'s changing disclosive character adequately explain the differences between Aristotelian and Heideggerian *phronesis*, where this difference is specifically taken to be a difference in their relation to *sophia*. The rest of the article is devoted to substantiating this argument and tracing some of its important ramifications.

This is where point 3 comes into play, for it illustrates just such a ramification: understanding *arche*'s dual reading affords a more straightforward path from *phronetic* disclosure to elements coordinating the disclosure of Dasein's Being, such as its infallibility and temporality. I motivate this path by showing how it can explain some unifying relations that others in the literature have already come across between the concepts in *BT* that are most salient to these coordinating elements, such as consciousness, anxiety, guilt, and authenticity.⁶ This functions to substantiate at least some facets of the explanatory potency of my *arche*-centric reading of Heideggerian *phronesis*. However, I do not venture into a comprehensive exegesis for each of these concepts, in part for the sake of space, but also because identifying and fleshing out the role that *arche* plays in shaping Heideggerian *phronesis* in *BT* does not necessitate this.

Indeed, it is only the elements of Heidegger's thought that I take to be most consequential in informing his nuanced appropriations of *phronesis* that I include within the scope of this article. This is why, insofar as other Heideggerian concepts can be of service in this regard, I make use of them accordingly, but mainly when I start discussing *BT* more directly. To begin, though, and to lead into the discussion of Heideggerian *phronesis* viewed from the perspective of *arche*'s ambiguous dual reading, let us commence by comparing Aristotle's and Heidegger's understanding of *phronesis*' ends and relation to *sophia* to attain a better sense of what is at stake in viewing Heideggerian *phronesis* this way.⁷

1 *Phronetic* Ends and *Sophic* Disclosures

Section 1.1 introduces the differences between Aristotle and Heidegger regarding *phronesis* and its ends by first delving into Aristotle's understanding of *phronesis* as a disposition of the soul with particular ends before looking at how Heidegger reads this understanding of Aristotle. Section 1.2 then does the same but with *sophia*, first introducing how Aristotle understands it and then discussing where Heidegger starts to differ.

⁵ This way of conceptualising *nous* and *arche* is not novel – Bowler (refer to his *Heidegger and Aristotle*, 132) for instance is one of the only examples I have been able to find commenting on how this dual reading locates in *nous* a peculiar ambiguity. Nevertheless, exploring the resultant ramifications of *arche*'s dual reading for an understanding of Heideggerian *phronesis* and of the conceptual changes that occur in the transition between both pre-*BT* and later variants thereof is, to my knowledge, novel.

⁶ Most notably these would include Pedersen, “On Heidegger's Appropriation,” 217; and Weidenfeld, “Heidegger's Appropriation,” 254.

⁷ Thank you to a reviewer for pressing me on clarifying the overall structure and value of my analysis.

1.1 The Ends of Phronesis

A clear conception of what constitutes *phronesis* for Aristotle can be attained by adumbrating the different dispositional distinctions he makes concerning the soul. The *logistikon*, the part of the soul that contemplates beings that can be other than they are,⁸ is applied differently in two ways, namely *poiesis* and *praxis*, that express different dispositions of the soul, namely *techne* and *phronesis*, respectively.⁹ If we consider *poiesis/praxis* as actualisations of the dispositions that are *techne/phronesis*, then we can characterise to what ends such dispositions are directed: for *techne* its end is something other than itself, that being the specific object produced by the actualisation of *techne* in *poiesis*, while for *phronesis* its actualisation is its own end, that being the very actualisation of *phronesis* in the act of *praxis*.¹⁰ If we just talk about the ends of the acts of *poiesis* and *praxis*, then they are, respectively, either discernible independently from the act itself or are constitutive of the well-accomplished act itself. This should be intuitive: for *techne* and the productive act of *poiesis*, one can understand an object and evaluate it as well-made without necessarily having to refer back to the very process of making it, while for *phronesis* and the practical action of *praxis*, one can only understand and evaluate the act as well-accomplished by reference to the act itself.¹¹

This is not because acts are in principle unintelligible outside of their actional contexts – i.e. contexts consisting of the person acting, the judgment made in relation to said action, and the sensitive/affective elements grounding that judgment – but that the *evaluation* of phronetic acts specifically is inextricably linked to their actional contexts. Not only does Aristotle already note how this link with one's sensitive and affective elements informs how a *phronetic* judgment can be true,¹² but that this judgment is itself part of the action to which it relates since, according to Smith, “it will have been directed toward this action from the very outset.”¹³ When taking all this into consideration, along with Brogan's reading of Aristotle, wherein “[t]he goodness of the agent determines the quality of an action,”¹⁴ it should now be easier to see how determining whether one has acted well phronetically cannot be done outside the actional context – after all, passing a judgment on a different act would itself constitute part of a separate action, and thus entail the judge's being ensconced within a different actional context altogether that risks alienation from the object of said judgment. Therefore, within this article, talk about acts and the actional *situation* (context + content) in relation to *phronesis* is largely interchangeable.

Now, this does not mean that *phronesis*' goal amounts to the specific action in question as a final end that fails to point past itself towards something greater. Indeed, as Vardoulakis interprets Aristotle in NE: 1139a32–33, phronetic “[j]udging determines acting (it instigates the movement of action, not its final end), and judging is determined by desire and rationality toward a certain specific or provisional end.”¹⁵ This end is provisional in relation to the good *life*, which is one way in which *praxis* points beyond its own good acts; but we must also note, as Smith does, that good acts “are not themselves something different from that good life, since a good life is cut from the fabric of good actions – they are what it is made of.”¹⁶ Similarly, in concordance with Brogan's link between agents and their actions, the good life must also be cut from the fabric of good agents as well.¹⁷ In this sense, the ends of *phronesis* point both past themselves, to a good life consisting of good acts/actors, as well as to the acts/actors that fully constitute themselves.

⁸ NE: 1139a5–12.

⁹ NE: 1140a4–8.

¹⁰ NE: 1139b3–4, 1140b7–8. Vardoulakis, “Toward a Critique,” 225–6, makes the same interpretation.

¹¹ One consequence of this, which Bernasconi notes is a point of agreement between Heidegger and Aristotle, is that through *phronesis* one cannot ever be “led into falsehood,” while through *techne* “one can go astray.” Bernasconi, “Heidegger's Destruction,” 135. See also, NE: 1141a5–6.

¹² NE: 1139a20, a31, and a36, and Vardoulakis, “Toward a Critique,” 224–5.

¹³ Smith, “Ethics without the Will,” 74.

¹⁴ Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle*, 145.

¹⁵ Vardoulakis, “Toward a Critique,” 225.

¹⁶ Smith, “Ethics without the Will,” 72.

¹⁷ This may also explain why Heidegger, according to Brogan, reads Aristotle as arguing “that *techne* is concerned with other kinds of beings whereas with *phronesis* one's own Being is in question.” Brogan, “A Response,” 151.

Let us now move on to how Heidegger characterises the ends of *phronesis* differently from Aristotle. According to Vardoulakis, *phronesis* for Heidegger has its end not in some provisional practical act but in “the single, unified [B]eing itself.”¹⁸ We can also arrive at this conclusion by considering both Heidegger's notion that *logos* “possesses, as pre-given from the very first, the unarticulated unitary being,” and his picking up on Aristotle's argument that *phronesis* is both *meta logou* (beyond *logos*) and *dialego* (with *logos*),¹⁹ since by this *phronesis* as *dialego* has as its end that which its *logos* possesses, which is unified Being itself. It is also crucial to note that Heidegger paints Aristotle, at least more explicitly early on in Plato's “*Sophist*,” as espousing the idea that *phronesis* is a mode of disclosure (*aletheia*), which “is itself a mode of Being ... of the beings we call human Dasein.”²⁰ Indeed, this may explain why some have pointed out how Heidegger reads in the *Sophist* Aristotle as understanding that *all* features of the soul that involve *logos* – i.e. *phronesis*, *technē*, *epistēmē*, and *sophia* – are modes of disclosure that “are inseparable from the being-there that is Dasein.”²¹

Therefore, the structure of *phronetic* ends in Aristotle consists of a movement of provisional ends pointing to the final end of the good life, while for Heidegger in the *Sophist* it consists of a disclosive movement of Dasein, a movement that expresses Dasein's Being precisely because this movement, as disclosure, not only *is itself* a mode of the Being of Dasein but also involves *logos*, which already has pre-given within it Being itself – i.e. if disclosure is a mode for Dasein to be then *phronesis*, as a mode of disclosure that structures the movement of ends according *in part* to Being-possessed *logos*, forms part of the structure of Dasein's Being as that which constitutes a particular kind of disclosive understanding of said Being. What this understanding, given in part in disclosure by that which is *dialego*, amounts to and entails, and how this becomes more maturely read in its also being *meta logou*, is taken up more explicitly from Section 4 onwards.

Crucially, *phronesis* is not the only mode of Dasein's Being (e.g. knowing, utilising, judging, appreciating), nor is it the only mode of *disclosing* Dasein's Being – this specifically applies to the discussion of *sophia* in Section 1.2, but we should be able to interpret other modes, like knowing and utilising, as those that are in other ways also disclosive of Dasein's Being. This is why when Heidegger claims that *phronesis* is a mode of Being, we should take that to mean it being one of many modes, and specifically of those modes dealing with disclosive movements of Being.

Let us be clearer on the difference between Heidegger and Aristotle in this regard. On the one hand, for Aristotle, not all movements are equivalent, given that *technē* and *sophia* involve, respectively, inferior and superior dispositions than that of *phronesis*.²² Nonetheless, I follow Smith's interpretation that this pointing functionality of *phronesis* for Aristotle is one of moderation, where “*phronesis qua praxis* [acts as] the ‘golden mean’ between *poiesis* (*technē*) and *theoria* (*epistēmē* and *sophia*), [guarding] against the potential excesses of both.”²³ On the other hand, for Heidegger, Aristotle's understanding of *phronesis* risks what some, including Heidegger, have seen as an overly formal determination of human being, given how the latter for Aristotle must be disclosed by always pointing past itself, to the good life, for positive content – i.e. content that *adds* to what the human being can be disclosed as in terms of the good life.²⁴

This initial tension between Heidegger and Aristotle regarding how to characterise *phronetic* ends is just one of the explananda of the dual reading of *arche* discussed below in Section 2, in that this reading can account for a change in the ends of Heideggerian *phronesis* by grounding it on *arche* as *logos*-unmediated *nous*. Thus, to better appreciate the transition into this reading, let us discuss another explanandum thereof in the form of how Aristotle and Heidegger differently understand the relation between *phronesis* and *sophia*, and specifically between *phronetic* and *sophic* ends.

¹⁸ Vardoulakis, “Toward a Critique,” 231. See also, PS: 51.

¹⁹ PS: 415. See also, Bowler, *Heidegger and Aristotle*, 131–2, 134.

²⁰ PS: 12. See also, 13–5.

²¹ Smith, “Intensifying Phronesis,” 81.

²² NE: 1139a26–30, 1139b5–6. See also, Rosen, “Phronesis or Ontology,” 255; and Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle*, 174–7.

²³ Smith, “Intensifying Phronesis,” 88.

²⁴ PIR: 383. In the literature, this interpretation is also teased out by Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle*, 17; Smith, “Ethics without the Will,” 73; and Sinclair, *Heidegger, Aristotle*, 128.

1.2 Phronesis and Sophia

Now, Aristotle does not deny that the apprehension of being in *phronesis* is unique compared to what *sophia* apprehends – beings that can be otherwise and those that cannot (e.g. transient and universal/eternal beings, respectively) are not equivalent after all. Nevertheless, there is, as Brogan notes, a “philosophical closeness” between the two dispositions that comes about via their involvement with *nous*, an involvement that, as Bowler’s reading of Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics* indicates, is one of *nous* acting for both *phronesis* and *sophia* as their “originative source (*arche*).”²⁵ Brogan also comments similarly when discussing, specifically for *phronesis*, that, for Aristotle, *nous* bases *how* the disclosure of good acts informs the choice to bring about any actional situation “on a [*noetic*] fore-grasp of the good that is the ultimate end for which we act.”²⁶ Taken together, these readings of Aristotle imply that the disclosure of good acts, and therefore of an agent’s being in the actional situation, is positively informed by the same capacity we have to apprehend all manners of beings, even Being itself, in *nous*.

For Heidegger, both *phronesis* and *sophia* are disclosive of Being. Specifically, according to Hohler, *phronesis* reveals Being as the very unfolding of “itself as its own possibilities,” unfolding “in life as the very possibility of that life to become actualized as a particular way to be,” while *sophia* reveals it “as being complete, already finished, where motion has come to full self-presence.”²⁷ This offers another variant of philosophical closeness between the two dispositions due to their involvement with disclosing Being itself. We can even see Heidegger here agreeing with Aristotle that *sophia* is epistemically superior in apprehending Being than *phronesis*, which explains why some have taken BT’s analysis of Dasein’s Being as anticipating the way to understand Being *in general*.²⁸ However, this latter understanding cannot be reducible to a mere *sophic* understanding of Being, at least not for a *sophia* that is rigidly distinct from *phronesis*, for that would risk adopting the very formalism that Heidegger ascribes to Aristotle’s determination of human being, and consequently the disclosure of such being via *phronesis* as always needing to point past itself for positive content. This is because, if our highest extent of apprehending Being is through *sophia*, then the human being disclosed through an inferior *phronesis* will always be beholden in our conception thereof to whatever positive content is gleaned in *sophic* understanding.

In short, we can glean from this interpretation of Heidegger’s understanding of the closeness between *phronesis* and *sophia* how they mutually resemble each other at ontological levels proper to the analysis of Being.²⁹ It is a dissolution of the *sophia/phronesis* distinction at the highest, properly ontological level since, if *sophia* is meant to uncover Being *past* how it merely appears to us, then at the highest levels of analysis, there would be nothing left to point past to from what is already being apprehended. This allows for *phronesis* to resemble *sophia* in the way that acts/human beings are disclosed in the actional situation, because if at the highest levels one fully grasps a being that can be otherwise, then this feature of being other would be constitutive of that being that can be otherwise, but in a way that *cannot* be otherwise, for being other would be fundamental to the Being that such beings possess in themselves. In other words, apprehending the pointing past would itself be the disclosure of Dasein’s Being at the highest properly ontological level. We can also talk about *sophia* resembling *phronesis* since the disclosure of Dasein’s Being to itself through this apprehension of the pointing past would not require one to go past what is being disclosed *in the moment*.³⁰ If

²⁵ Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle*, 174; Bowler, *Heidegger and Aristotle*, 132.

²⁶ Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle*, 145. See also, NE: 1094a17, 1112b12.

²⁷ Hohler, “Phronēsis Transformed,” 362–3. This interpretation is found in PIR: 355ff.

²⁸ This, for instance, is the interpretation of Brogan, “A Response,” 152.

²⁹ This observation recalls how some in the literature interpret Heidegger in *BT* as espousing a conflation between theory and practice, or, more specifically, a dual reconfiguration of theory as *praxis* and of *phronesis* as ultimately theoretical. For instance, Thanassas, “Phronesis Vs. Sophia,” 41ff.; and McNeill, *The Glance of the Eye*, 129.

³⁰ I am thus following the instinct, as tacitly present in Warnek’s questioning of whether Heidegger’s destructive reading of *sophia* warrants a return to Plato’s reading of *phronesis*, that the exact hierarchy of the *phronesis/sophia* relation for Heidegger cannot be neatly adjudicated. Warnek, “Impossible Philosophy,” 91. There are opposing views to this. For instance, comments in the literature about this specific hierarchy issue have leaned either towards *phronesis* being above *sophia* (e.g. Volpi, “Dasein as *praxis*,” 105) or

we go with the understanding that *BT*'s analysis of *Dasein* is preparatory for analysing the meaning of Being itself, then actualising *praxis/theoria* at this stage would be “autotelic,” according to McNeill,³¹ because the apprehension of Being would be transformed into a pointing past that at the fundamental level points *back* to Being itself.

Now, Heidegger does regard the *arche* (originative source) of *phronesis*, which he reads as the *hou heneka*, the “for the sake of which” of action, as also its *telos/end*.³² This is different from *sophia*, wherein the *telos* and *arche* seem to be more mutually separable – this is reasonable given that, for *phronesis*, action and agent are inextricably interlinked, while for *sophia*, the theoretical act of understanding beings is supposed to go beyond their appearance to what allows for them to be disclosed as something more. In a sense, going by Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle in the *Sophist*, *sophic telos* is associated with the *arche* as disclosive of beings as a whole – as giving beings their Being – not of whatever *arche* is disclosive of beings at the particular moment.³³

My analysis here remains consistent with these facts if they are meant to represent *phronesis* and *sophia* but not at the highest ontological level, for at this highest level it is questionable whether Heidegger would even consider the *arche* of beings' particularities as all that differently conceivable in *sophic* understanding from the *arche* of beings' wholeness. *Arche* for Heidegger, therefore, attains a greater role within his analysis, specifically, of *sophia*. This concords with what Thanassas acknowledges as Heidegger's identification of *sophia* “on the basis of its” *arche* in opposition to Aristotle's identification of it with its *telos*, which ultimately allows *sophia* to gain “practical significance” in Heidegger while being distinct from *phronesis* in Aristotle.³⁴ Now, while I do agree here, I am not convinced by Thanassas' claim that, at the foundational explanatory level, Heidegger's approach is based on his recognition “that theory, as an activity of life, remains a form of *praxis*.”³⁵ Based on the preceding considerations of the *sophia/phronesis* relation, and associating theory with *sophia* and *praxis* with *phronesis*, I argue instead that the practicality Heidegger affords theory is based more on the fact that, at the highest ontological level, theory resembles *praxis* more in how the latter must be sensitive to the actional situation in the *moment* of its disclosure and less in how the former must be also sensitive to what is revealed *past* said moment.

Some have taken this to be where Heidegger misinterprets Aristotle. Rosen, for example, argues that the Heideggerian assumption “that the [Aristotelian] grounding of the superiority of theory to practice in the superiority of eternal to transient beings is the same as the ontological grounding of ethics” misconstrues Aristotle's insistence that “[e]thics is grounded in the *endoksa*, ... [in] common sense, not the meaning of Being.”³⁶ Common sense is mediated in part by the *nous*, but what is *noetically* grasped and aimed at in *sophia* is instead “the happiness or blessedness (*eudaimonia*) of the life of theoretical contemplation.”³⁷ Moreover, there is evidence already pointing to Aristotle's ambivalence towards the status of *sophia* as sufficient for the highest of goods, where its “adequacy” in this manner “remains confronted with the complementarity of [*phronesis*] as an indispensable part of virtue as a whole.”³⁸ McNeill also observes that, even in Book IX of the *Metaphysics*, “where we find the most rigorous determination of *praxis*, [Aristotle] gives no grounds

sophia being above *phronesis* (e.g. Gonzalez, “On the Way,” 26) for Heidegger, while those more generally about the *phronesis/sophia* relation include both that Heidegger assimilates *phronesis* into *sophia* (e.g. Gonzalez, “Good and Evil,” 154) and that he assimilates *sophia* into *phronesis* (e.g. Rosen, “Phronesis or Ontology,” 256). I argue, as is more fully indicated at the end of Section 1.3, that much of this variation can be deflated by a clearer understanding of what may be at play in Heidegger's recasting of *phronesis*, and specifically of its ends, away from its original Aristotelian context.

31 McNeill, *The Glance of the Eye*, 129.

32 PS: 101. This sense of *arche* being the *telos* of *phronesis* can more or less naturally transition from the sense of *arche* being the *hou heneka* of *phronesis*, insofar as we read whatever we act for the sake of as also the end for which we act as well. Notwithstanding, others have also noted how Heidegger is reading *arche* as *phronesis'* *telos*. These include Pedersen, “On Heidegger's Appropriation,” 224; and Vardoulakis, “Toward a Critique,” 232.

33 Useful discussion can be found in Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle*, 176; and Hohler, “Phronēsis Transformed,” 350.

34 Thanassas, “Phronesis Vs. Sophia,” 59.

35 Ibid., 41.

36 Rosen, “Phronesis or Ontology,” 256.

37 Ibid., 249. See also, NE: 1098a17-18.

38 Thanassas, “Phronesis Vs. Sophia,” 44. See also, NE: 1144a2-5.

whatsoever for preferring the vision of *theoria* over the vision we find in *phronesis*, or for that matter in rudimentary sense-perception.”³⁹ This evidence fits well with Aristotle’s understanding of *nous* as permeating the movements of both *phronesis* and *sophia*, granting them a somewhat equal standing regarding what can be gleaned from both, *but* in a way that still preserves their mutual distinction.

1.3 Setting Up

I have devoted space for the above discussion because I argue that the *phronesis/sophia* indistinction in Heidegger is only justified given Heidegger’s recasting of *phronesis*’ ends. In particular, *phronesis* having its *arche* and *telos* be the same concerning the disclosure of Dasein’s Being implies that such a disposition would resemble *sophia*. Otherwise, if instead we interpret *phronesis*’ ends as Aristotle does, where their accomplishment is beholden to a *noetic* fore-grasp of and common sense about the Good informing the situation at hand, then *phronesis* would never be able to reach the heights of the properly ontological level as Heidegger considers it.⁴⁰ This is because the disclosure of good acts in the actional situation would perennially be dependent for its positive content on something *past* the situation itself.

In other words, if, by an analysis of *phronesis*, how Dasein is disclosed in its can-be-otherwise is always inform-able by one’s *noetic* grasp of an even higher, more perfect truth, then how Heideggerian *phronesis*, the fuller expression of which is to be found in how he appropriates it throughout *BT*, grasps the cannot-be-otherwise of Dasein as its very can-be-otherwise at the properly ontological level can no longer be the logical endpoint of said analysis. This *sophia/phronesis* indistinction in Heidegger is thus different from an Aristotelian ambivalence towards these dispositions by virtue of an appreciation of how keeping *phronetic* ends within an Aristotelian context does not allow for *phronesis* to meet *sophia* on equal ontological grounds at the highest levels.

This analysis of Heidegger’s recasting of *phronesis*’ ends is meant to be broadly applicable, in that it should be able to explain the disclosure of Dasein regardless of what this disclosure can manifest specifically as. As an example, let us take Rosen’s view that *phronesis* discloses Dasein’s cannot-be-otherwise by way of exhibiting “the underlying ontological structure of the epitactic dimension of human existence” as its very can-be-otherwise⁴¹ – i.e. what cannot be otherwise for Dasein being disclosed as the fundamental way in which we are variously commanded to act in life. Now, this is to interpret the disclosing of Dasein’s cannot-be-otherwise *fundamentally* as an exhibition of the very modality in which human existence calls us to action as what underlines Dasein’s can-be-otherwise. However, this interpretation can only be valid on account of Heidegger’s recasting of *phronesis*’ ends, else some other higher *noetically* grasped level would provide positive content for these ends. If so, then we revoke from Heideggerian *phronesis* its fundamental exhibitory role in human existence given that the changing contours of Dasein’s can-be-otherwise become exhibitable by reference not to the *phronetic* grasp of life’s fundamental call to act that is Dasein’s cannot-be-otherwise but instead to a higher level of content that removes from the can-be-otherwise all marks of finality of a cannot-be-otherwise.

Now, one other example I explore below, starting in Section 4, to substantiate this same analysis is the treatment Heidegger gives of Dasein specifically in *BT*, especially in terms of the dimensions of the infallibility and temporality of the disclosure of Dasein’s Being. This treatment involves a plethora of different concepts, and so, as a first attempt at approximating substantiation for my analysis, I leverage it to explain one facet of

³⁹ McNeill, *The Glance of the Eye*, 128–9.

⁴⁰ Again, as in Note 3, I am not claiming that this conclusion follows from the assumption that Heidegger’s thought remains homogenous and expresses a uniform temporal development throughout his life. However, I do want to open up conceptual space to argue for what may be at work in some of Heidegger’s various appropriations of *phronesis* that can explain the transition from the *phronesis/sophia* relation present in the *Sophist* to how that same relation resembles more of an indistinction in *BT*. This argument is given fuller content at the end of Section 1.3.

⁴¹ Rosen, “Phronesis or Ontology,” 255.

said disclosure, that being the relation between Dasein's finitude and Dasein's openness to its own possibilisation.

In *BT*, Dasein is open to its own possibilisation, to "its current factual potentiality-for-Being," where Dasein "brings itself to itself and face to face with itself" in its openness to its genuine possibilities for Being.⁴² How this relates to Dasein in the disclosure of its own finitude is in how, as succinctly put by Zickmund, Dasein's openness to its own possibilisation can only emerge "from Dasein's having faced its final possibility, its own null basis."⁴³ My analysis of Heidegger's recasting of *phronesis*' ends, which for Dasein's Being discloses its cannot-be-otherwise as its very can-be-otherwise, can explain this openness of Dasein as follows: the fact that being aware of one's own mortality and finitude, of one's own-most potentiality for destruction, naturally leads to one's openness to Dasein's possibilisation can only be justified on the true grasping of the cannot-be-otherwise of the Being of Dasein as its can-be-otherwise. This is because, otherwise, coming to grips with one's own mortality would be situated too closely to Dasein's Being's cannot-be-otherwise, and not viewing the latter as its can-be-otherwise is to already foreclose on possibilities for Dasein to be, even that of one's death. This is to not be open to Dasein's possibilisation – i.e. to not be open to the can-be-otherwise as fundamentally ontological – because the possibility would thereby remain of Dasein's Being being disclosed, like how the actional situation is disclosed in Aristotelian *phronesis*, in terms of some higher, more perfect truth positively informing, and thus biasing, the *noetic* fore-grasping of the disclosure of one's *immortality*.⁴⁴

This suffices to give preliminary justification to my approach of understanding Heidegger's recasting of *phronesis*' ends, but this is certainly not the end of the analysis of Heideggerian *phronesis* in general, especially if it aims to connect its various explicit and implicit instantiations in Heidegger's works. Fleshing out this analysis thus follows this threefold proposal: (1) understanding Heidegger's recasting of *phronesis*' ends is best served by analysing his take on the structure of human *nous*, and establishing plausible motivation for the former hinges on the warrant of the latter. (2) This warrant can be feasibly grounded on a dual interpretation of *arche* as *arche*-as-origin and *arche*-as-grasping that denies *nous*' *logos*-mediation, contra Aristotle; and (3) this grounding not only helps more directly explain elements of the disclosure of Dasein's Being as it is presented in *BT*, such as its infallibility and temporality, in terms of *phronesis* but also presents important implications for how the *phronesis/sophia* relation may be changing between Heidegger's different works.

Therefore, it behoves us to first analyse the structure of *nous* for Aristotle, specifically what we as finite living beings engage in, before discussing, in Section 3, how to interpret Heidegger as implicitly reappropriating it to inform the movement of his variant of *phronesis*, at least in a pre-*BT* stage. I then proceed to outline first the roles that *phronesis* and *arche* play in *BT* (Sections 4 and 5, respectively) and then subsequently how they infer the infallibility and temporality of Dasein's disclosure therein (Section 6). I finally offer concluding remarks in Section 7. More precisely, Section 2 sets up the justification of parts 1 and 2 of my threefold proposal given in Section 3, while part 3 is substantiated in Sections 4–6.

2 Aristotelian *Nous* and *Arche*

Aristotelian *nous* is primarily bipolar in two respects: in its structure and object. On the one hand, structurally, in interpreting the section of his *Posterior Analytics* in 100b7-15 where Aristotle comments on the nature of intuition (*nous*) in relation to scientific knowledge, *nous* is *arche* in terms of *both* an originative source *and* that which apprehends first principles. Bowler, for instance, notes how this dual reading of *arche* instils

⁴² *BT*: 355, 357.

⁴³ Zickmund, "Deliberation, *Phrônesis*," 412.

⁴⁴ I briefly set out a related account of how Heideggerian *phronesis* derives Dasein's being-towards-death, its diachronic finitude, in Note 132, but with a greater emphasis on the specific role of *arche*'s dual reading in this derivation.

an ambiguity in *nous* ... [that Aristotle finds necessary], but only inasmuch as it is realized in human beings, namely *Zoon echon logon*. In other words, it is because *logon* is essential to human beings that our *nous* is *dianoëin*, i.e., a thinking through or thinking by means of *nous*. More specifically, *nous* is realized in human beings only in so far as it is mediated by and through discourse (*logos*).⁴⁵

Bowler then goes on to note that this dual reading also makes *sophia* and *phronesis*, given their *arche* in *nous*, “both *dialego* and *dianoëin*, i.e. they are mediated both by *logos* and *nous*.”⁴⁶ This intimacy between *logos* and *nous*, and the consequent *logos*-mediation of *nous*, is conditioned specifically on our being human; more specifically, according to Heidegger, it is conditioned on *nous* being found “in the human soul,” a soul that “is determined by *logos*,” “the assertion of something as something,” such that *our nous* becomes *dia-noetic*.⁴⁷ We will see in Section 3 how the specific way in which Heidegger critiques Aristotelian *nous*’ *logos*-mediation – what I argue can be gleaned from making precise where Heidegger may be locating this *logos*-mediation in *nous* – gives *arche*’s dual reading a distinct flavour when applied to Heidegger and qualifies how exactly and to what extent he might be agreeing with Aristotle.

On the other hand, in terms of the objects of *phronesis* – i.e. looking at *phronesis* objectually – we have already encountered *The Sophist*’s interpretation that *phronesis* is dependent on a *noetic* grasping of beings as a whole, what Brogan terms, a “seeing of *katholou*.”⁴⁸ This interpreted dependence of *phronesis* on a *noetic* grasping is more explicitly directed to the *nous* that governs *sophia* (*sophic nous*), going by Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* Θ, 1–2. However, as some correctly interpret Aristotle to be claiming, the properly *noetic* function of *phronesis* (*phronetic nous*) is, in part, instead to apprehend “the ultimate and contingent particulars upon which practical deliberation and reasoning is based,”⁴⁹ or, “the situation’s essential features in their singularity.”⁵⁰ The essential singularity of the actional situation, this *eschaton*, is what *phronetic nous* discloses to us *instantaneously* for our acts to be immediately sensitive to the *noetically* disclosed content.⁵¹ This also explains why, according to McNeill, “[t]he [Aristotelian] practical good [i.e. the well-actualised actional situation] has the temporal sense of the *kairos*, the appropriate moment for action.”⁵² Nonetheless, insofar as this actional moment constitutes the actional situation, the disclosure of the situation’s full particularity can only be enacted via the act itself and not prior to it.

With this, we can more effectively interpret Brogan’s insightful characterisation of the *nous* involved in Aristotelian *phronesis* and *sophia* when he claims that,

[w]hile *phronesis* is a *noetic* view that holds in view the particular being that appears in the fullness of its being at the moment, *sophia* looks beyond the *eschaton* ... to the *katholou*, to beings as a whole, to the *archai* that are always there, not just in the moment, but whenever the being is.⁵³

Here, *phronetic* and *sophic nous* both grasp something essential about beings that, respectively, can and cannot be otherwise. Furthermore, while *sophia* “remains faithful to the particularity of [B]eing,” the type of beings that are *phronesis*’ objects that can be otherwise cannot afford *phronetic nous* its capacity to grasp their Being that remains in themselves throughout all their particular moments, because only *sophic nous* can accomplish this on account of its object being “beings that have their [B]eing in themselves.”⁵⁴

Nonetheless, how does the aforementioned ambiguity in *nous* as *arche* change up the characterisation of the grasping of *phronetic nous*? By this ambiguity, what the grasping entails is a discourse (*sophic/phronetic*) that both holds in view a being’s essential features while also having this *noetic* view/sight be its very

⁴⁵ Bowler, *Heidegger and Aristotle*, 132.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 134.

⁴⁷ PS: 41.

⁴⁸ Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle*, 175.

⁴⁹ Sinclair, *Heidegger, Aristotle*, 130. See also, NE: 1143b3.

⁵⁰ Hohler, “Phronēsis Transformed,” 353.

⁵¹ NE: 1142a25–30.

⁵² McNeill, *The Glance of the Eye*, 117. See also, NE: 1096a26.

⁵³ Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle*, 176.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 176–7.

origination. Additionally, given that achieving *nous* in human beings is mediated by *logos*, the origination for both *phronesis* and *sophia* comes discursively – i.e. *nous* constitutes a dialogical movement oscillating between *arche*-as-origination and *arche*-as-grasping – whereby what occurs is a continuation from this origination grasping of a being's essentiality that projects or *moves* towards some end.⁵⁵ This would be either the *eudaimonic* state of theoretical contemplation of Being for *sophia* or the well-accomplished actualisation of the actional situation for *phronesis*, all while they hold in view that original *noetic* grasping of, respectively, the Being of whatever being is contemplated about in the context of its whole or the full particularity of the actional situation being disclosed.

To clarify the conceptual hierarchy here, let us summarise. Since *sophia* is sensitive to particular beings that cannot be otherwise, yet projects past them to an end conditioned by their Being as a whole *noetically* grasped, we can interpret *sophia* as disclosing individual beings *in terms of* their Being, wherein this in-terms-of disclosure belongs to *sophia* properly – this is simply what it means to grasp beings that cannot be otherwise for Aristotle. This follows a typical subject-predicate disclosure logic wherein the predicate conceptually extends at least to the point of the subject – e.g. “I am myself” – but also past it – e.g. me being revealed as a mammal entails something true about mammals (predicate) that I (subject) alone cannot conceptually exhaust, for more mammals obtain than just me. For *phronesis*, given that it is sensitive primarily to particular beings (acts) that can be otherwise as they are disclosed in their particular fullness within the actional situation, then whatever in-terms-of disclosure *properly* belongs to *phronesis* will not find jurisdiction outside the situation at hand – i.e. *phronesis* discloses individual beings *in terms of* their full particularity within the actional situation at hand *noetically* grasped, which is what it means to grasp beings that can be otherwise for Aristotle, insofar as that grasping *properly* belongs to *phronesis*. This also follows the above subject–predicate disclosive logic, as agents and acts may inform what the actional situation is about without each *independently* exhausting the latter's content.

Now, we have already seen from above, as Pedersen does, that for Aristotle, “all particular goods aimed at in action ultimately refer back to a highest good [NE: 1094a17] that turns out to be living well in general, namely, to live in such a way that one is *eudaimon*.”⁵⁶ Obviously, this deals with a *eudaimonia* other than that of theoretical contemplation (*sophia*), and thus expresses the highest good of the good life consisting of good acts/agents. However, given that this is an end for beings that can be otherwise, it can only be properly grasped in *phronetic*, not *sophic*, *nous*. Indeed, *phronetic nous* grasps not just actional–situational particularity, but also the various goods, both provisional and final goods, to which actions can be directed. Therefore, we may say that *phronesis*, besides disclosing beings in terms of their actional–situational particularity, also discloses them in more perfect (because hierarchical) terms of the goods toward which their acts are oriented.⁵⁷

Crucially, what the dialogic constitution of *nous*, structurally speaking, implies in Aristotle is that *noetic* grasping (*arche*) originates (again, *arche*) a *sophic* and/or *phronetic* movement of *more perfect* in-terms-of

⁵⁵ Bowler, *Heidegger and Aristotle*, 134–5, 137, sees this ‘projectionary’ interpretation of the *nous/logos* relation in Aristotle as very productive for Heidegger's own conception of the character of ends towards which *phronesis* projects. See, PS: 150. See also, Grant, “The Unnamed Origin,” 74, for a helpful discussion.

⁵⁶ Pedersen, “On Heidegger's Appropriation,” 221.

⁵⁷ We can further understand what is taking place here by noting an important relation between *sophic* and *phronetic nous* on which Heidegger clues in when he discusses how *phronetic* disclosure of Being in Aristotle must be informed by *sophic* understanding. First, the final end of *phronesis* is specifically the good life for *the human being*, but we can certainly permit one's conceptualisation of life and/or the Good *itself*, which are amenable to being grasped in *sophic nous* given their universal, eternal character. The Good for Aristotle, according to McNeill, not only “informs the actions of the *phronimos* [but] is [also] accessible in its explicitness only to the philosopher whose *theoria* contemplates life (being) itself as such.” McNeill, *The Glance of the Eye*, 118. I interpret this to mean that the Good matters for how the actional situation is disclosed in its accommodation of act-directing goods, but without *sophic nous* this Good is left conceptually implicit in the specificity of its very mattering for our own lives. This still permits the type of separation between *theoria* and *praxis* that, by Rosen's interpretation of Aristotle, “makes possible the perfect happiness of a finite human life” without need for referencing the intrinsic good of “[t]heoretical contemplation” of the Good. Rosen, “Phronesis or Ontology,” 261. This is because the underlying dispositions of *sophia* and *phronesis* are properly within the domain of human knowledge/action, which is distinct from the real (ontological) connections between life, the Good, and the good human life. In short, one can live well without needing to explicitly know how its truth is sourced if this truth could still act as a source (*arche*) for the good life regardless.

disclosures of beings. This string of disclosures represents, really, a string of different instances of *nous*, which is how one may conceive of *nous*, both structurally and objectually, as logos-mediated: objectually, we have the in-terms-of disclosure itself, linking one type of *noetic* grasp to another in *logos* – a discursive, disclosive movement between the grasped action-orienting good and the fullness of situational particularity – while structurally, the relation of moving from one in-terms-of disclosure to the next is also *logos*-mediated; after all, the *logos* that conditions *nous* dually as an originative grasping is presumably at work along the breadth of epistemological access one may have to the hierarchy of ends.

With this, we have a good basis for outlining Aristotle's movement of *phronesis*, which we need for competent juxtaposing against Heidegger's own appropriation thereof. Holding in view the good to which one directs their action, the actional situation becomes disclosed in terms of said good, wherein the disclosure itself comes about in the moment of action itself. Now, since action is involved, there must also be a corresponding intention/decision to act alongside a reasoning about the means appropriate for achieving the good. This intention motivates reasoning that accommodates the aimed-at good to the actional situation so that the situation is properly disclosed, actionally, in terms of this good.⁵⁸ Nonetheless, with the actional situation being constituted the way that it is – i.e. by action, agent, and evaluation of action (Section 1) – it should come as no surprise that both the intention to and reasoning about the act also comprise it, since intention and reason are features of agents desiring to act. Grant provides a relatedly exact description, wherein “[t]he *phronimos* is the wise person who [acts well and] knows from a prior disposition, state or character (*hexis*), through a process of deliberation (*bouleusis*), to execute an anticipated moral desire or intention (*prohairesis*) at the appropriate moment (*kairos*).”⁵⁹ Deliberation here belongs to what *phronetic logos* properly is – as opposed to the apprehension proper to *phronetic nous* – characterised as what is, one, brought upon by a desire/intention for a chosen good of action, and two, projected toward this good, provisional or final, out of a sensitivity, in which it also participates, about the actional situation's particularity.⁶⁰ *Phronesis*' movement, for Aristotle, is consequently quite involved, and going by our analysis above, deliberation simply is what capacitates our movement, as a function of *actional situational* sensitivity, through the hierarchy of ends that we apprehend in various in-terms-of disclosures; after all, acting well at any given moment does not necessarily foreclose on deliberation's utility to help us be better.

Furthermore, the aforesaid dual grasping function of *phronetic nous* affords *phronesis* a unique feature not found in *sophia*, that being its capacity to specify goods directing one's acts. Going by how good agents and their acts constitute the end of the good life, Hohler, for instance, interprets Aristotle's expression in NE: 1112b12, concerning deliberation about means as already presuming/accepting an end, as indicative of “the notion of the means as a constitutive element of the [end],” in that even “if the final end [of the good life] is not open to debate, its concretization or specification is.”⁶¹ *Phronesis* therefore also functions as a clarification of *what* can constitute, action-situationally, the hierarchy of goods for action summited by that of the good life, even if what is priorly grasped of the good life is *that* it is *phronesis*' final end – i.e. the good agent's being, while disclosed in the actional situation in view of some action-orienting good, is itself, and therefore that good as well, set in greater relief by the disclosure.⁶²

3 Heideggerian *Logos* and *Nous*

With this adumbration at hand of Aristotelian *phronesis* viewed through the lens of *arche* dually read as *originative grasping*, we are now better equipped to pinpoint its significance for a Heideggerian *phronesis*. Specifically, we will see that it being different from Aristotle's own notion functions in part as an evaluation of

⁵⁸ This outline is based loosely on NE: 1144a-b. See also, Rosen, “Phronesis or Ontology,” 249; and Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle*, 145, for additional discussion.

⁵⁹ Grant, “The Unnamed Origin,” 65.

⁶⁰ See, McNeill, *The Glance of the Eye*, 118, for a commensurate discussion.

⁶¹ Hohler, “Phronēsis Transformed,” 356.

⁶² We can now see how Heidegger appropriates this notion, sans any mention of the good, when comprehending Dasein as, through *phronesis*, coming “back to itself” (BT: 435). Smith, “Ethics without the Will,” 73, offers a similar interpretation.

the status of *nous'* *logos*-mediation, specifically of *phronetic nous*. Section 3.1 locates this mediation as a structural feature of *phronetic nous* for Aristotle, which I argue is absent in Heidegger's reading of Aristotle (what I call Heideggerian *phronesis* in a pre-BT stage), while Section 3.2 corroborates this attribution of absence by deploying it to arrive at much of what Heidegger acknowledges as proper functions of Aristotelian *phronesis*. Section 3.3 then considers how all this motivates Heidegger's recasting of *phronetic* ends away from its Aristotelian context in light of where Heideggerian *phronesis*, at least in this pre-BT stage, differs from Aristotelian *phronesis* concerning the structural *logos*-mediation of *phronesis*.

3.1 The Status of *Nous'* *Logos*-Mediation

To contextualise Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotelian *nous*, let us first make sense of his remark in the *Sophist* that *logos* can grasp beings as "unitary pregiven whole[s]" because it "possesses, as pregiven from the very first, the unarticulated unitary being."⁶³ In evaluating the relation between *phronesis* and deliberation (*bouleuesthai*), Heidegger remarks that *phronesis* is carried out in deliberation *with logos*, or, "in speech, in the discussion of something."⁶⁴ This discussion takes the form of a "*something as something*,"⁶⁵ which resembles the aforementioned in-terms-of disclosure proper to Aristotelian *phronesis*. Indeed, *phronesis* being conditioned by *logos* structures the disclosure of individual beings, wherein them being apprehended in their situational particularity comes in the form of them being apprehended in part as predicated on, as Zickmund indicates, the facets of this unarticulated unitary being that "are brought to the fore."⁶⁶ Since we, as beings that can be otherwise, are privy to this mode of *logos*, we attain epistemic access to that in terms of which individual beings are disclosed to us *phronetically*. These specifically are the *archai/teloi* on which *phronesis* discloses beings as predicated, so they must be grasped instead by *phronetic nous*, not by what is involved in *logos* as deliberation-cum-speech.⁶⁷

How Heidegger starts to differ, in his interpretation of Aristotle, from Aristotle's thought as has been characterised above is in a shift of focus: instead of emphasising *phronesis'* relation to the good orienting our actions, there is greater attention paid to its sensitivity to the *eschaton*, the particular moment of action. In disclosing itself as its own *arche*, as its own "for the sake of which,"⁶⁸ human being essentially becomes revealed *in terms of its ownmost Being*. This in-terms-of structure fails to have the same sense as in Aristotle, wherein deliberation involves the entire movement from intention to actualisation, because the structure, as Heidegger notes, is significant for *phronesis* inasmuch as it is involved in the *kairos*, "the entirety of circumstances, the how, when whither, and about which."⁶⁹ This primacy of disclosure-in-the-moment for human being is not equivalent to *phronesis'* sensitivity to the actional situation's full particularity in Aristotle, because while both involve *nous*, they are being differently characterised: Aristotelian *phronetic nous* is *logos*-mediated, while for Heidegger, according to Brogan, "*phronesis* is a revealing, an *aletheuein* that is without *logos*."⁷⁰ Even if Brogan is specifically referencing *phronetic nous* here, this still diverges significantly from interpretations of Aristotle that have him arguing for a *logos*-mediation of human *nous*.

To clarify, Heidegger in the *Sophist* does not wholesale eschew the relevance of *logos* for *phronesis*. Indeed, as Pedersen correctly argues, the disclosure of the actional situation in terms of, say, the *arche* "is a form of *logos*."⁷¹ The dia-noetic feature of *phronesis* consists in a *noetic* grasping of both particularity and actional goods, but how they are brought to bear on each other in the disclosure of the actional situation as

⁶³ PS: 415.

⁶⁴ PS: 99.

⁶⁵ PS: 99.

⁶⁶ Zickmund, "Deliberation, Phronesis," 411. Heidegger illustrates this with his example of a creaking wagon in PS: 415.

⁶⁷ See, PS: 99-100, and AM: 129.

⁶⁸ PS: 101.

⁶⁹ BCari.: 115.

⁷⁰ Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle*, 175.

⁷¹ Pedersen, "On Heidegger's Appropriation," 226.

accommodating such goods constitutes *phronesis*' dia-logic aspect.⁷² As such, going from Aristotle's understanding that grasping at action-orienting goods – *that* it is such a good – does not foreclose upon deliberation's capacity to specify or concretise them further – *what* such a good is – we can interpret Heidegger as locating both the disclosure of a good's thatness and whatness within the deliberative movement instantiated by the *kairos* itself. *Phronetic nous* therefore grasps the fullness of situational particularity already with respect to the aforesaid in-terms-of structure.⁷³

Pointing out how *phronesis* is both mediated and unmediated by *logos* is in keeping with traditional interpretations of Heidegger's adoption of Aristotle. However, speculating about precisely locating where in *phronesis* both *logos*'s mediation and un-mediation act is uniquely significant, for it lends a deeper appreciation of how *arche*'s dual reading informs a lot of how Heidegger interprets Aristotle and how he adapts it for his later thought in *BT*.⁷⁴

Therefore, I think we can understand Brogan's characterisation of non-(*logos*-mediated) *nous* in Heidegger with reference to how *nous* is conditioned *structurally*, not *objectually*, in that while the disclosive relation between *archai* (the good and the situation) is dialogic, the relation between *arche*'s two senses is not – i.e. the relation between *nous* as *arche-cum-origin* and as *arche-cum*-(grasping of first principles) is not conditioned nor mediated dialogically, contra Aristotle. This entails *nous itself* not being dialogically conditioned for Heidegger, even if the connection between different *noetically* grasped objects is.

Keep in mind that this is all still Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle, but this reading of Heidegger's understanding of *phronesis* as *logos*-mediated objectually but not structurally already helps explain much of what Heidegger acknowledges as proper functions of Aristotelian *phronesis*: its sensitivity to the *kairos*, function of disclosing novelty, and possession of unitary Being. I discuss each individually to corroborate this reading of Heideggerian *phronesis*, as it is still, pre-*BT*, closely connected to the original Aristotelian context.

3.2 The Relation Between *Arche* and *Phronesis*

First, structural *logos*-mediation of *nous* entails a type of thinking about *arche* (origin) with *arche* (grasping). Concerning Aristotelian *sophia*, this culminates in “the tautological movement of thought thinking itself,”⁷⁵ which is denied for *phronesis* given its inferior disclosive status. For Heidegger, *nous* resembles more so a mere instantaneous grasping, one that is not guaranteed to originate further disclosive instances past the moment of initial origination, because *nous* as either *arche-as-origin* or *arche-as-grasping* is no longer being disclosed in terms of either a grasping or as origination, respectively. What this means is significant because recall that, as discussed in Section 2, *logos*' in-terms-of disclosure can consist in the predicate conceptually extending past the predicated subject – e.g. for Heidegger, *logos* reveals *facets* of unitary Being whenever beings are disclosed *phronetically* – so, for instance, *arche-as-grasping* not being disclosed also as an *arche-as-origin* entails that what content such grasping is revealed as does not extend past this as-grasping modality to some greater content proper to its as-origin qualification. *Nous*, as *phronesis*' origin, is thus not relevant past the moment of disclosure; hence, as Grant correctly observes, the relevance Heidegger ascribes to the *kairos* as being “essential to *praxis* as its purpose and culmination.”⁷⁶

⁷² PS: 148. McNeill, *The Glance of the Eye*, 114–5, offers useful discussion here.

⁷³ This does not mean that all action occurs instantaneously. Action can still take time, but how it unfolds situationally is ultimately beholden to the *kairotic* disclosure of its *directedness* towards whatever good it is in terms of – i.e. however the actional situation is realised, it cannot ever not be disclosed in its directedness, as a *potentiality*, towards accommodating a good. We can see this present in PS: 150, which McNeill, *The Glance of the Eye*, 125, teases out as well. This is later developed into Dasein's authentic *futural* temporality in *BT*. Refer to Section 6.2.

⁷⁴ Again, this should be read in line with what is found in Note 3.

⁷⁵ Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle*, 177.

⁷⁶ Grant, “The Unnamed Origin,” 72. Although what is significant about *arche-as-origin* not being disclosed in terms of some broader *arche-as-grasping* can be discussed, such as what it looks like when an origin says nothing about grasplings outside the

Second, to establish *phronesis*' function of disclosing novelty, Rosen's comments on Aristotle and Heidegger are salutary. First, Aristotelian *phronesis* can be described as a form of "knowledge of how to adapt the ends [orienting an act] into a correct command of the calculative reason concerning the correct act to perform under the relevant circumstances of the situation about which we deliberate now."⁷⁷ For Heidegger in the *Sophist*, Rosen also notes that *phronetic* disclosure is a "type of uncovering" that cannot "be forgotten, ... because it is always new (i.e. appropriate to the circumstances, not a universal rule)."⁷⁸ After all, in line with the golden mean analogy given in Section 1.1, "*phronesis* cannot be systematised like a *techne*," nor can it be universalised like in *sophia*.⁷⁹ Now, the novelty inherent in Aristotelian *phronesis* is given in the actional situation, specifically in how it is disclosed through a chosen path of action, which is a know-how about adapting ends to specific actional situations. Nonetheless, this knowledge is based on "the regularity of nature, of the stability of human motivation, of practical likelihoods, and so on," meaning that it is "dependent upon the general knowledge of human nature, and so of human affairs," in order to "establish the good in each case."⁸⁰

It is therefore useful for our purpose of establishing the novelty of *phronetic* disclosure from an absent structural *logos*-mediation for *phronesis* if we read Heidegger's stance on the novelty of *phronetic* disclosure in terms of how such disclosure turns novel if it is no longer being constituted by a more general human knowledge. This is because bounding the desired novelty of the disclosure by such knowledge corresponds to precisely the "grasping-as-origin" type of disclosure of *arche* that Heidegger rejects – i.e. *arche*-as-grasping may originate the actional situation's disclosure, but not to the extent that this indicates some more foundational epistemic origin past the situation at hand. This can also explain why Rosen considers Heidegger as "over-interpret[ing] Aristotle's very succinct remark about the novelty of *phronesis*,"⁸¹ because, for Aristotle, *arche*-as-grasping, when also disclosed as *arche*-as-origin, affords what is held in *phronetic nous* its positive content, which is sourced from a broader knowledge bounding *phronetic* disclosure. This bounding functionality concords with Aristotle's insistence that *phronesis* accords with the appropriate *logos*.⁸²

Third, *phronesis* no longer being *logos*-mediated mandates for *phronetic logos* its possession of unitary Being. On the one hand, the consideration that facets of Being are made explicit in the actional situation's disclosure is how Heidegger can claim a *logos*-mediation for *phronesis* but not for *nous*, because the situation being disclosed in terms of such facets characterises a *logos*-mediation between the various *noetic* graspings of the *archai* constituting the situation and the action-orienting good that belongs to Being. On the other, without *phronesis* being conditioned by general knowledge of matters past the situation at hand, this disclosure cannot therefore rely on *phronetic nous* grasping *archai* outside of what is proper to *phronesis* itself – i.e. what *phronesis* discloses must be self-contained, in a way, within its appropriate movements as they matter for the *kairos*. This is why *logos* possesses unitary Being, because *phronesis* must safeguard the truth of its "in-terms-of" disclosures, relating the above two *noetically* grasped objects, without having to refer to content past what is relevant to *phronesis*, that being the situation at hand.⁸³

originative moment itself, there is similarity to what could be said about *arche*-as-grasping not being disclosed in terms of some broader *arche*-as-origin – after all, a present origin not saying something about future graspings attains at least some symmetry with a present grasping not saying something about past origins – thus, to save space, only the latter in-terms-of disclosure will be explicitly applied to my analysis here. However, there is asymmetry in what these "grasping" and "origin" modalities of *arche* separately *explain*, which I touch upon once they become relevant in Section 6.2.

⁷⁷ Rosen, "Phronesis or Ontology," 250.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 251. See also, PS: 54.

⁷⁹ Smith, "Intensifying Phronesis," 89.

⁸⁰ Rosen, "Phronesis or Ontology," 254, 252. A justificatory picture about Heidegger's warrant for rejecting the place of knowledge of general affairs in deliberating about right action is given in Section 6.2, wherein we see how the Heideggerian sense of *arche*-as-grasping attenuates the relevance of the past to one's understanding of human Dasein.

⁸¹ Ibid., 251.

⁸² See, NE: 1138b24, 1140b4-6, 1144b21-23.

⁸³ A similar interpretation is taken by McNeill, *The Glance of the Eye*, 126. See also my Larrauri Pertierra, "Fallibility and Infallibility in Heidegger's and Aristotle's Conception of *Phronesis*" for a more detailed discussion of the fallibility and infallibility of, respectively, Aristotelian and Heideggerian *phronetic* disclosure.

This is not to say that *phronesis* capacitates one's understanding of Being itself, for we have not yet mentioned the *logos* proper to *sophia*, which comprehends Being as applied to beings that cannot be otherwise. Instead, *phronesis* in Heidegger's reading of Aristotle safeguards the truth of its disclosures by properly comprehending the Being of beings that can be otherwise via a sensitivity to how they are grasped in the situation as *wholly novel* instances of some orienting good of action that does not require, for its positive content, a view of what is outside of the situation itself – e.g. what *sophic nous* apprehends. It should therefore be unsurprising that Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotelian *phronesis* is taken in terms of the latter being not only limited by the above sense given to its *nous*,⁸⁴ but also dependent in a radically *ontological* way on the theoretical insight of *sophic nous*.⁸⁵ This is because, if *phronesis* no longer *contentfully* depends for its *noetic* graspings on the *archai* of beings as a whole (*katholou*) that subsist past any one instantiation of situational particularity, then its dependence must be, rather, ontological in nature – i.e. a grounding of one's very capacity to grasp in *phronetic nous* instead of any particular content of what is grasped. In short, Aristotle's notion that *phronetic* disclosure can be achieved while being informed by the good that is grasped in *sophic nous* without having to *explicitly* refer to this good, as stated in the previous Section, is reread by Heidegger ontologically – i.e. this informing functionality cannot be by positive content but by a content-nonspecific capacitating functionality – because the absence of *arche*'s structural *logos*-mediation precludes *arche*-as-grasping's situational realisation linking contentfully to some *supra*-situational *arche*-as-origin, which would otherwise occur for Heidegger if he did not deny *arche* being disclosed in a grasping-as-origin manner.⁸⁶

3.3 *Arche* and The Ends of *Phronesis*

Heidegger's recasting of *phronesis*' ends can now be motivated as follows. In Aristotle, *phronesis*' *teloic* structure consists of a series of ends that are instrumental to, and also contain the final end of the good life. These ends are made manifest as actional situations, the disclosure of which is based on how one adapts them to a chosen action-orienting good through deliberation. Now, the grasping-as-origin disclosure of *arche*, in extending *arche*-as-origin past situational instantiations of *arche*-as-grasping, functions to link *phronesis*'s origin in part to the final end, whereby *noetic* grasping of content concerning the good life becomes originaive of *phronetic* deliberation that establishes ends in service of such a life. By negating this disclosive modality of *arche*, Heidegger resists extending *arche* past *teloic* particularity in the disclosure of the actional situation, thereby undergirding a stronger association between *arche* and *telos* wholesale. This association also persists despite *sophic nous* being an ontological source for *phronesis*, since the former provides no positive content to the latter, thus manifesting a *phronesis* that is limited by way of its ends no longer being instrumental for the attaining of the final end – an instrumentality that would otherwise obtain given a *positively contentful* fore-grasp of the good life towards which one might *phronetically* move. With instrumentality removed from *phronesis*, its disclosive movements become infallible expressions of one's Being instead of what may be progressing to some higher, more perfect good. *Sophic nous* provides the ontological grounds for *phronesis*, while *phronesis*' *telos* and *arche* both equally take part in it.

It is integral to my aim here that *arche*'s dual reading makes sense of this outcome, for then the role of *arche* in *BT* becomes all the clearer. Note, first, that *phronesis*' ontological basis on *sophia* is conditioned on an absent structural *logos*-mediation of *phronetic nous* between *arche*-as-grasping and *arche*-as-origin – i.e. objectually there is present a mediation between different *archai* since you have a good being disclosed in terms of a higher good, but the latter is not provided any positive content by *sophia* since the lack of structural

⁸⁴ Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle*, 175, espouses a similar interpretation regarding the *Sophist*.

⁸⁵ McNeill, *The Glance of the Eye*, 108, makes the same claim as well.

⁸⁶ Without such contentful linking we can also see why Heidegger ascribes to deliberation the goal of manifesting “an authentic openness of resolve” to act (PS: 150), which may even just be constitutive of the grasping of situational particularity in *phronetic nous* (FCM: 224).

logos-mediation means that *arche*-as-grasping does not go past itself to some supra-*phronetic arche*-as-origin. This ontological basis still permits a relation between *phronetic* and *sophic nous* though, but only if this relation is not a predicative one – e.g. you can have *phronesis'* *arche*-as-origin be at a lower rung in the hierarchy than *sophia's arche*-as-origin, but you cannot have the former's *arche*-as-origin be *disclosed* as the latter's *arche*-as-grasping since that would instead represent a *contentful* basis of *phronesis* on *sophia* as opposed to merely an ontological one. However, *phronesis* no longer having this ontological basis on *sophia* happens only if one denies this hierarchical relation, because having a *phronesis* that is distinct from *sophia*, such that the hierarchy persists, suffices to have one at least ontologically grounded on the other. In other words, *arche's* dual reading is needed to understand the difference between not only a contentful and merely ontological basing relation, but also an ontological basing relation and a lack thereof – i.e. specifying the hierarchy of the ontological basing relation requires a disambiguation between *arche*-as-origin and *arche*-as-grasping, because not only does this disambiguation allow one to specify both *arche*-as-grasping as not structurally related (*logos*-unmediated) to *arche*-as-origin and the different *phronetic archai* as objectually related (*logos*-mediated) to each other, but it also avoids conflation of the difference between an absent ontological basis and a present one with the difference between an absent ontological basis and a contentful basis.

Let us remind ourselves of parts 1 and 2 of my threefold proposal given in Section 1: (1) understanding Heidegger's recasting of *phronesis'* ends away from its Aristotelian origin is best served by analysing his take on the structure of human *nous*, and establishing plausible motivation for the former hinges on the warrant of the latter. (2) This warrant can be feasibly grounded on a dual interpretation of *arche* as *arche*-as-origin and *arche*-as-grasping that denies *nous'* *logos*-mediation, contra Aristotle. Setting up the motivation for part 1 necessitated an understanding of *phronesis'* grounding in *nous*, but specifically in a *nous* no longer conditioned by a *logos* mediation, at least structurally speaking. This is because expounding on how *nous* is both mediated and unmediated by *logos*, itself demanding a prior notion of how *arche's* ambiguous dual reading as origina-tive grasping entails differences in the content of *phronetic* disclosures that depend on whether "origin" and "grasp" are themselves *logos*-mediated or not, serves as explanatory grounds for the particular character Heidegger ascribes to *phronetic* ends. This thereby grants warrant to part 2 in the form of the important explanatory work delegated to this very ambiguity present in *arche*, one that is left largely unaddressed in Aristotle's works since the potential is left unexplored therein for employing this ambiguity to viably differentiate between a contentful and merely ontological grounding of *phronesis* in *sophia*. I now move to justify part 3 of my proposal, that the abovementioned explanatory grounds provided by *arche's* ambiguity serve as further explanatory grounds, in *BT*, for both how Heidegger's earlier reappropriation of Aristotelian *phronesis* as ontologically, but not contentfully grounded in *sophia* is further reappropriated as differently related to *sophia* and how the infallibility and temporality of Dasein's disclosure can be adequately inferred from this latter reappropriation of *phronesis*.

The general outline of my argument for part 3 is as follows: we can, in *BT*, allocate to Heideggerian *phronesis*, or to what transformed elements of *phronesis* are present therein, a similar ontological role previously granted to Heidegger's understanding of Aristotelian *sophic nous*, particularly in the *Sophist*. This allocation interprets at least part of *BT's* analysis of Dasein as an account of transformed *phronesis* consisting in a mode of disclosure of the Being of Dasein to itself that most infallibly apprehends the meaning of such Being. If this is the case, then it is thus to *BT* that our analysis must take us, because there one can find traces of not only *phronesis*, but of, I argue, an *arche* that informs the disclosure of Dasein's Being – i.e. the disclosure of *arche* that bases Dasein's Being as a kind of openness to its own possibilities, as its very possibilisation.

Specifically, understanding *arche's* role there necessitates its dual reading, as *phronesis* now playing an ontological role in Dasein's disclosure makes sense only if *arche*-as-origin and *arche*-as-grasping are disambiguated. This is because the difference between these as-origin and as-grasping modalities is what highlights in exactly what sense the *arche* of *phronesis*, although no longer grasped in terms of some higher and more perfect truth, can still exhibit a hierarchical ontological relation to the *arche* of *sophia*, which thus helps to conceive of what takes place when *phronesis'* *arche* is ontologically self-sufficient, in a way, for Dasein's disclosure. Hence, *arche's* dual reading is integral to understanding its role in *BT*.

Finally, when viewed through the lens of *arche*'s dual reading, the Being of Dasein as its very possibilisation can explain Heidegger's attitude concerning Dasein's relation to time, with "time" here being expressed as the type of temporality most relevant to the infallible disclosure of *phronesis*' *arche*, and with "relevant" expressing what precludes *needless* limitation of said disclosure. Effectively, I claim that we can understand *phronesis* in *BT* as capacitating an infallible apprehension of the meaning of Dasein's Being that is obtained via precluding *needless* limitation of its disclosure, with the reason why being traceable to how *arche*'s dual reading works in Heidegger's understanding of the temporality of the disclosure of Dasein's Being.

Section 4 discusses the ontological role of *phronesis* in *BT*, while Section 5 expands the discussion to bring in *arche*'s place in *BT*. Section 6 then leverages the discussion to explain how the temporality of the disclosure of Dasein's Being in *phronesis* can be gleaned from the role of *arche* in *BT*.

4 *Phronesis in Being and Time*

To clarify the role in *BT* that *arche* attains, it behoves us to initially adumbrate what relevance *phronesis* has therein. Many have noted elements of *phronesis* at play, particularly throughout division 1 of *BT*. Pedersen, for example, claims that the "articulation of the structure of agency," whereby Dasein is resolved in its openness to its own-most possibilities of Being, its possibilisation, "in the experience of being guilty just is Heidegger's transformed conception of *phronesis*."⁸⁷ This claim is fleshed out below, but as a disclaimer, I am not necessarily agreeing with Pedersen's interpretation here, nor am I even implying that there necessarily is an interpretation of the place of *phronesis* in *BT* that either can be principledly established or is otherwise uncontentious. I merely focus on Pedersen's claim as a plausible means of showcasing how *phronesis*' place in *BT* can be unearthed by coordinating a number of other concepts involved therein, which serves to portray a view of Heideggerian *phronesis* that sees it as more significant to the project of *BT* than is usually realised, especially once we start discussing the role *arche* plays in linking *phronesis* with other facets of how Dasein is treated there.

I therefore devote this section to motivating Pedersen's claim by interpreting it in terms of an analysis of the concepts of inauthentic/authentic self-understanding, conscience, readiness, resoluteness, anxiety, and guilt. It may seem that I am devoting unnecessary space to this analysis, but the space is indeed needed to better frame the picture of how the difference in *arche*'s role between the *Sophist* and *BT* conditions within the latter the revocation of *phronesis*' ontological grounding in *sophia* that is present within the former, and of the ramification of this on what can be inferred about the temporality of Dasein's disclosure.

First, Weidenfeld correctly notes that, in *BT*, human action is "structured in a meaningful way around a set of self-understandings – what Heidegger calls the for-the-sake-of-which (*worumwillen*) – that are not explicit" but still tacitly orient our actions.⁸⁸ These self-understandings' orienting functionality informs what Heidegger calls circumspection (*umsicht*), which we can trace back somewhat to how he interprets Aristotelian deliberation in the *Sophist*,⁸⁹ and involves the entirety of sensations, emotions, and thoughts that populate a given situation in our everyday dealings with beings in that situation. This early interpretation already associates with it Dasein's risking involvement of its self-understandings with concerns of everyday import⁹⁰ – what Heidegger later calls an inauthentic way of living⁹¹ – that obfuscate how these self-understandings are to be understood in relation to their own movements/potentialities rather than to what may be imposed on them from outside. Such imposition from the outside belongs to the propensities of what Heidegger calls *das Man*.⁹²

⁸⁷ Pedersen, "On Heidegger's Appropriation," 235. Some other who note *phronesis*' relevance in *BT* also include Bernasconi, "Heidegger's Destruction," 127; and Weidenfeld, "Heidegger's Appropriation," 254.

⁸⁸ Weidenfeld, "Heidegger's Appropriation," 256.

⁸⁹ *BT*: 216; *PS*: 112.

⁹⁰ *PS*: 37. See, also, Smith, "Intensifying Phronesis," 88.

⁹¹ *BT**: 121.

⁹² *PS*: 118-9.

This is a propensity to in part, at least in *BT* according to Weidenfeld, bound one's self-understandings within "social roles provided by our cultural context ... that are taken up unreflectively" as manipulable rules, foregoing any need for actional-situational sensitivity⁹³ – i.e. *status-quo* cultural structures and norms that are appealed to for one's self-understanding as opposed to what may be newly called for in different situations.

Das Man acts, therefore, as a blockade to Dasein's own possibilisation, instead informing possibilities to be taken up that are not its own. Now, generally, we cannot wholesale escape being conditioned by *das Man*, insofar as we cannot completely deny ourselves a socio-cultural conditioning, but even when limited as such, Dasein can take up these possibilities as its own. After all, and as also noted in McNeill and Grant,⁹⁴ just because one's choice (*prohairesis*) concords with extant cultural conditions does not entail it being done for the sake of these conditions – indeed, choosing instead to act with a sensitivity to situational particularities, and not to present structures of historico-cultural intelligibility, is to respect the possibilities borne out of Dasein's own movements. This is because, ensconced as we are within actional situations, possibilities projected out of a situational sensitivity *away* from, say, quotidian social norms become disclosed in terms *not* of these norms but of real situational particularities that are inextricably linked to our Being as actors whose actions are situationally enmeshed. Our self-understandings, therefore, authentically become our own once we orient ourselves according to how our Being is disclosed without imposition on such disclosure from structures outside the actional situation. This mode of disclosure without external imposition is what Heidegger regards as leaving bare "the clarity of action itself, a hunting for real possibilities."⁹⁵ This disclosure may recapitulate these structures or not, but even if they do, they will be constituted as real possibilities towards which our actions can be newly oriented. Consequently, this is not to escape from sociocultural conditioning altogether, but instead, as Smith puts it, "to inhabit [it] in a way that enables the intensification of the ... possibilities for things to become otherwise."⁹⁶

Relatedly, in *BT*, according to Weidenfeld, "[t]o be authentic is a matter of modifying the for-the-sake-of-which's made available by one's cultural background. This higher form of intelligibility relies on seeing *through* [*das Man*]," which signals a transformation of circumspection, earlier on in *BT* as *umsicht*, to "what Heidegger refers to as "conscience" (*Gewissen*)."⁹⁷ Dasein's authentic possibilisation, borne out through actional-situationally sensitive choices, can thus be partly analysed in terms of a conscience that allows one to see situational possibilities as real actional possibilities based on *novel* demands, not those contingent upon the extant norms of *das Man*. Having a conscience can subsequently be read as attending to a call to be authentic by projecting certain possibilities, grounded in the world, that are indicative of a possible world in which Dasein can live.⁹⁸

Nevertheless, having a conscience does not guarantee that one will act on all situationally disclosed possibilities. Indeed, as Pedersen discusses in relation to Heidegger's notion of the *thrownness* of Dasein, while "it is the nature of being human that we must always appropriate or take over the situation into which we have been thrown by taking up certain possible ways of being provided by the situation," this comes at the expense of excluding other "concrete possible ways of being."⁹⁹ This implies that, since we could always be acting otherwise in any given situation, the disclosure of Dasein's Being always exhibits a perennial incompleteness, a potentiality to be other than it is.¹⁰⁰ The outline of Aristotelian *phronesis* in Sections 1.1 and 2 surely accords with this interpretation, which explains why Hohler locates this feature of Dasein's incompleteness in the early Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle, where Dasein is disclosed as "something that is not yet this or that being."¹⁰¹

⁹³ Weidenfeld, "Heidegger's Appropriation," 257. See also, *BT*: 334.

⁹⁴ McNeill, *The Time of Life*, 92; Grant, "The Unnamed Origin," 73.

⁹⁵ MFL: 158.

⁹⁶ Smith, "Intensifying Phronesis," 101.

⁹⁷ Weidenfeld, "Heidegger's Appropriation," 258. See also, *BT*: 314-20.

⁹⁸ This interpretation of the connections between *das Man*, circumspection, and conscience can also be gleaned from how Bowler, *Heidegger and Aristotle*, 133; and Zoller, "Heidegger on Aristotelian Phronesis," 789, regard these issues.

⁹⁹ Pedersen, "On Heidegger's Appropriation," 231.

¹⁰⁰ *BT*: 329-31.

¹⁰¹ Hohler, "Phronēsis Transformed," 361.

Still, a choice must be made – *phronesis*, after all, hinges on the carrying through of action. So, what *phronesis* discloses is this (yet-to-be)-ness of Dasein, which forms the basis of one's attitude towards the fact that choices must be made – i.e. Dasein's (yet-to-be)-ness grounds one's "concrete readiness for going about one's business, a readiness that *phronesis* constitutively lights up [in a manner whereby the (yet-to-be)-ness] is highlighted only because of a readiness."¹⁰² This is because, by not pre-empting any choice's content through appealing to extant norms, what is left over is the mere act of choosing, whose inevitability is identified with the very readiness to choose – after all, even hesitating to act can be construed as an authentic choice if the hesitation is not borne out of a concern for different standards imposed on the actional situation. Conscience therefore necessarily attends the other half of Dasein's possibilisation, that being what Heidegger in *BT* calls *resoluteness*, or, as Weidenfeld calls it, "the initial deliberation and choice to make choices."¹⁰³

Resoluteness constitutes a disclosure and projection of real, grounded possibilities that are determined through an appropriation thereof by Dasein as a function of its readiness to act/choose.¹⁰⁴ Resoluteness is not the choice itself nor the readiness to choose, but simply an openness to engage with possibilities borne out of one's readiness to make a choice, expressing a response to novel demands of the situation via a sensitivity to its particularities without any fore-grasp of them as genuinely beholden to the auspices of social norms.¹⁰⁵ Pedersen thus aptly remarks that "resoluteness can at least partially be thought of as an openness to hearing the call of conscience," where this openness is more fundamentally analysable in terms of an openness to real possibilities, those being what we are inevitably oriented towards in our readiness to choose – a readiness "that reveals the ontological structure of agency as such."¹⁰⁶ Consequently, because this readiness is *Dasein's*, and the disclosed possibilities are its own, resoluteness reveals to Dasein *itself*, or, more precisely, "its current factual potentiality-for-Being, [i.e.,] itself [as] this revealing and Being-revealed."¹⁰⁷ As such, resoluteness makes Dasein's Being intelligible as its own possibilisation.

The relation to *phronesis* becomes more explicit once we understand that, according to Weidenfeld, "[f]or Heidegger, resoluteness and deliberation are equiprimordial ... because the *logos* of *phronesis* is oriented toward a resolution and only makes its appearance in being-resolved." The deliberation partly constituting the actional situation inextricably attends not only a resolvedness to act but whatever deliberative content is expressed through being resolved, entailing that "[t]he meaning of the situation only comes to be in the light of our resolution," "that the meaning of our action can only come to be in the acting itself."¹⁰⁸ Of importance here is that resoluteness does not mean a readiness to act *on*, or *after apprehending* a set of possibilities, but rather it stands as a foundational orientation in which Dasein's readiness to act in the situation discloses to Dasein that very situation as the possibilities that can inform its life. Resoluteness clarifies the meaning of the situation because only through being resolute, being open to possibilities borne out of a readiness to choose, do the possibilities for Dasein become disclosed in terms of their involvement with the Being of Dasein as actional-situationally constituted – i.e. resoluteness as a mode of actional-situational sensitivity lets the disclosive movements of the situation proceed out of itself as real possibilities for the situation to be, but since Dasein's acts are situational realities, and the situation is itself not only properly actional but disclosive to the extent that it tacitly (or otherwise) structures Dasein's self-understandings, then what are disclosed are not only possibilities for Dasein to be but *the most authentic* of situational possibilities at the time.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Weidenfeld, "Heidegger's Appropriation," 262. See also, *BT*: 314.

¹⁰⁴ *BT*: 345, 435.

¹⁰⁵ *BT*: 317. A similar interpretation can be found in Weidenfeld, "Heidegger's Appropriation," 274n41.

¹⁰⁶ Pedersen, "On Heidegger's Appropriation," 233.

¹⁰⁷ *BT*: 355. Italics mine. See also, *BT*: 357.

¹⁰⁸ Weidenfeld, "Heidegger's Appropriation," 261. We can see clearly how different this is to Aristotle's understanding of deliberation for *phronesis* in *NE*: 1141b9-10, which Blattner, "Authenticity and Resoluteness," 332, also catches on to.

¹⁰⁹ It is important to understand that Heidegger is not espousing some arbitrary subjectivism here, but a way of Being that allows for the authentic coming into Being of other beings. Vogel, *The Fragile "we,"* 71; McMullin, *Time and the Shared World*, 226; and Zoller, "Heidegger on Aristotelian Phronesis," 787, all offer relevant discussions on this matter.

This manner of conceiving of Dasein's meaning as its situationally grounded possibilisation highlights what Heidegger ascribes to Dasein's existence as its character of "not-being-at-home."¹¹⁰ This character not only grants the possibility for Dasein to be otherwise, what Smith terms as the grounds for possibilities "in which [Dasein] may be-at-home"¹¹¹ – insofar as one can only be at home when possibilities are at least determinately disclosed – but it accomplishes this in terms of real potentialities for living only because, in initially being conditioned by extant norms and social structures, one discloses their own potentiality-for-being by questioning such conditioning and thereby exposing one as no longer at home. This 'homelessness' of Dasein's existence can also be linked, as Brogan does, to a sense of "the worry or affliction of [B]eing,"¹¹² which recalls Heidegger's sense of an *anxiety* through which it is possible "for Dasein to project itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-Being,"¹¹³ where anxiety can thus be taken to mean an attuning towards situational possibilities for Dasein to be otherwise that are no longer being disclosed in terms of extant norms but as *novel* possibilities that unsettle familiarity – after all, one may anxiously question only when the situation is regarded *anew* and not familiarly accommodable within the purview of existing norms.

In short, anxiety acts as the affective marker for resoluteness, which, as discussed above, encompasses one's disclosed situational possibilities and the readiness/choice to make choices for oneself that grounds them. Dreyfus gives an apt summary along such lines:

Dasein must arrive at a way of dealing with things and people that incorporates the insight gained in anxiety that no possibilities have intrinsic significance – i.e., that they have no essential relation to the self, nor can they be given any – yet makes that insight the basis for an active life.¹¹⁴

Anxiety, as a foundational attunement to possibilisation, consequently expresses something like the null content basis that has been discussed in relation to Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotelian *phronesis* in Section 1.3, which goes to show the extent to which treatments of concepts in Heidegger's earlier works can be seen as setting the stage for how other concepts are treated in his later works.

Now, anxiety does not just merely attune us, in our resoluteness, to Dasein's possibilisation, as it also holds in relief for us an equally significant orientation to those disclosed possibilities that end up not becoming actualised. This orientation, as Pedersen describes, is perspectival, wherein we come to "understand ourselves as guilty [of the] tendency to cover over the structure of [B]eing by being absorbed in the world of our everyday concern,"¹¹⁵ by closing off possibilities that could have otherwise been realised in act had we chosen them instead. According to Heidegger, it is in this state of "Being-guilty" that one is "ready for anxiety," because Being-guilty just is "Dasein's most primordial potentiality-for-Being," a potentiality that Dasein always already is.¹¹⁶ This is meant to be an ontological analysis of the disclosure of Dasein's Being, meaning that it aims to ascribe to the disclosure of the actional situation a foundational possibilising structure, so it is no wonder that guilt involves the closing off of possibilities in act, for not actualising a possibility is foundational to choosing in action to actualise another possibility.¹¹⁷

We can now use what we have discussed above to explain *why* Pedersen claims that the "articulation of the structure of agency in the experience of being guilty just is Heidegger's transformed conception of *phronesis*."¹¹⁸ Note that, one, *phronesis* discloses Dasein's Being in the *actional* situation, and two, anxiety's relation to guilt is one of affective indication of being resolved in a readiness to act out of an openness to Dasein's potentiality-for-Being that is necessarily closed off by realising the very choice to act. From this, Heidegger's earlier notion of *phronetic* deliberation being a simple overview-grasping of the situation as a

¹¹⁰ BT*: 176.

¹¹¹ Smith, "Intensifying Phronesis," 96.

¹¹² Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle*, 18.

¹¹³ BT: 322.

¹¹⁴ Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World*, 144.

¹¹⁵ Pedersen, "On Heidegger's Appropriation," 234.

¹¹⁶ BT: 343, 334.

¹¹⁷ BT: §§58-60.

¹¹⁸ Pedersen, "On Heidegger's Appropriation," 235.

whole, in its full particularity in the *kairos*,¹¹⁹ is thus in *BT* made explicit as a deliberation consisting in a grasping that associates the actional situation with a potency and directedness towards possibilities of being for Dasein (anxiety) that one cannot help but single out from (guilt) through acting. Interpreting Heideggerian *phronesis* as recontextualised in *BT* through the lens of guilt is then a justified move if the disclosure of Dasein's Being in the actional situation both unearths and is constituted by Dasein's potentiality-for-Being as *bounded* by this foundational attunement of anxiety (openness) and guilt (closedness) that structures our acting in the world.

One can certainly criticise whether Pedersen is right in his tight link between *phronesis* and guilt. Perhaps it makes more sense to bound one's openness to Dasein's potentiality-for-Being by something else other than this dipole of anxiety and guilt. Given the content-absence of such openness, this would motivate different interpretations of how *phronetic* disclosure of Dasein's Being is *structured*, not *content-ified* – i.e. how the disclosure can be explicated in its very ontological structure, in the grounds of its very possibility. There are other such interpretations in the literature,¹²⁰ but it would not really serve our purpose to go over them all. Instead, it is sufficient to note that there is a way to identify *phronesis* in *BT* that ascribes to the disclosure of Dasein's Being a *minimal* structure – one that attains no unnecessary assumptions for the disclosure to evince both an open orientation and sensitivity to the actional situation. By “no unnecessary assumptions,” I mean that the understanding of action the structure/disclosure affords ought to not introduce more ontology to the explication of the grounds for this action's possibility than what is needed to capture, for a structure of agency, its independence from content, or even from other structures, past the actional situation – i.e. to not introduce needless limitation in the situational disclosure of Dasein's Being. I am not claiming that Pedersen's account offers this minimal structure, but I argue that it is useful for illustrating how incorporating *arche* into the account does give a plausible basis for such a structure.

One way of showing how delineating *arche*'s role in *BT* helps clarify this minimal structure of the *phronetic* disclosure of Dasein's Being, and how it need not needlessly limit said disclosure, is by demonstrating how *arche* permits the derivation of the temporality and infallibility that the disclosure of Dasein's Being attains there from *phronesis* alone. This is because the account of *arche* that does so will have explained something integral to Dasein with appropriate parsimony – i.e. with minimal appeal past what concepts are already directly expressed in *BT*. Indeed, by delineating *arche*'s role in *BT*, I can illustrate how one does not have to go much past anxiety/guilt to explain the infallibility/temporality of the disclosure of Dasein's Being as *elements* of *phronetic* disclosure. I begin this task by discussing *arche*'s role in *BT* in the next section.

5 *Arche* in *Being and Time*

Remembering that *phronesis* as *logos*-mediated entails the disclosure of the *noetically* grasped particularity of the actional situation in terms of the *noetically* grasped action-orienting good (Section 2), both of which are *arche*, the disclosure of Dasein in *BT* becomes *phronetic* inasmuch as this *noetic* functionality applies. The

¹¹⁹ PS: 108-12, 114, and PIR: 381.

¹²⁰ McManus, “Authenticity, Deliberation,” 125, for instance regards Heideggerian *phronesis* in *BT* as constitutive of an all-things-considered judgment that manifests in action, wherein all the salient possibilities, disclosed by one's sensitivity to the situation at hand, for one's actions must be considered for the chosen act to be one that evidences *phronetic* judgment. At least through McManus' interpretation, *phronesis* is distanced somewhat from anxiety/guilt since, instead of focusing on how one's open orientation to the disclosure of Dasein necessarily closes off through the action alternative possibilities of being, there is increased focus on what shape *phronetic* judgment must take for there to be authentic action at all. Here, engaging in all-things-considered judgment is constitutive of *phronesis* because not doing so forecloses upon a possibility for Dasein to be that could have been disclosed in the actional situation as a *legitimate possibility* for action had one at least considered it for action. This links *phronesis* more with an orientation for action that is borne out of a felt need to engage in all-things-considered judgment – i.e. this felt need structures one's very openness to Dasein's potentiality-for-Being, where this openness is parameterised/constrained not by an experience of guilt but by a felt need for all-things-considered judgement.

question is, what is being disclosed in terms of what? Dasein's particularisation, via the determination of actional-situational possibilities, is an open orientation, yet it remains grounded in the world, whereby disclosure must follow from the situation itself without imposition of outside structures. The answer can therefore come by looking at inauthentic modes of disclosure – i.e. facts about the situation being disclosed in terms of extant norms that can accommodate them. Authentic disclosure then would be more in line with these facts being *taken up* by Dasein in a way that determines its own possibilities for living, such that disclosure of these facts comes about in terms of them being taken up, which amounts to a disclosure in terms of one's openness to letting these possibilities be so determined. In effect, the situation, in its full particularity, is disclosed in terms of Dasein's foundational attunement (anxiety/guilt) to the situation being disclosed as Dasein's possibilities for living, where these possibilities are authentic possibilities for Dasein because they are taken up. *Phronesis'* *arche*, dually read as its originative source *and* the *noetic* grasping thereof, is thus this attunement since it opens up, projects, and determines the *authentic* possibility-trajectory of Dasein's life – i.e. it lets one understand what *can be otherwise* for Dasein.

Comparing this with what takes place in the *Sophist* is salutary. There, Heidegger reads *phronesis* as implicitly possessing unitary Being, whose features become explicit in *phronesis'* in-terms-of disclosure of the actional situation (Sections 2 and 3.2). With *phronesis'* transformation in *BT*, however, where Dasein's Being is its possibilisation, we can now describe the situation being disclosed in terms of this possibilisation – what the situation means is what it *can* mean, bounded by the aforesaid attunement, for Dasein. Moreover, what the situation is disclosed in terms of *does* orient action, but in *BT*, one is oriented towards authentically disclosing Dasein's Being only when action expresses this attuned orientation to being determined out of a sight for possibilities grounded in one's resoluteness. Therefore, while, in the *Sophist*, action orientation is obtained through a grasped good that an agent accommodates in the actional situation, in *BT*, although there are numerous similarities, the relevant difference is that the grasped good transforms into a grasped *orientation* (attunement). Relatedly, while, in the *Sophist*, Heidegger considers *sophic nous* as providing *phronesis* its ontological grounds, thereby limiting *phronesis* by removing its instrumentality for accomplishing the final end of the good life, in *BT*, Heidegger's transformed *phronesis* is no longer limited in this way precisely because what it helps to disclose are no longer “goods” in the traditional sense of possessing positive content, but content-non-specific orientations.

We can thus ascribe, as I argued for at the end of Section 3.3, to *phronesis* a similar ontological role previously granted to *sophic nous*, given that, one, the reason why *phronesis* in the *Sophist* is only ontologically, and not contentfully grounded in *sophia* is because whatever content is *phronetically* disclosed as *arche* is not positively informed by either some higher good amenable to being *sophic-noetically* grasped or a *phronetic-noetic* fore-grasping thereof; and two, the reason why *phronesis* does not already play this ontological role there is because its disclosures are still intelligible in terms of goods with *positive* content that can be inferior to goods grasped in *sophic nous*, with these latter goods themselves merely capacitating *phronetic* disclosure without outright determining the disclosure's content (Section 3.2). For *phronesis*, or, specifically *phronetic nous*, playing this ontological role amounts to the fact that Dasein's foundational attuned orientation to its Being is *phronetic*, or that it is equiprimordially *phronetic* and *sophic* – i.e. a *phronesis* and *sophia* that no longer enter into a hierarchical relation since the former is not ontologically grounded in the latter – hence why, as noted in Section 1.2, many in the literature interpret Heidegger in *BT* to be espousing a conflation of theory and practice. In other words, *arche* in the *Sophist* and *BT* plays different roles because the *kinds* of *archai* that are the focus in each are different: while *phronesis* in the *Sophist* discloses one kind of *archai* (goods), thereby being grounded ontologically in *sophia* since the latter also discloses the same general type of more perfect *archai*, *phronesis* in *BT* discloses an entirely different kind of *archai* (orientations), thereby revoking its very ontological grounding relation to *sophia* – at least to a *sophia* conceived as distinct from *phronesis* – given this categorical shift in the kinds of *archai* being disclosed in both.

We now have the groundwork for leveraging this novel *phronesis/sophia* relation to substantiate the claim made in Section 3.3, that *phronesis* in *BT* can be understood in terms of an infallible apprehension of the meaning of Dasein's Being obtained via precluding *needless* limitation of its disclosure, with the reason why being traceable to how *arche* dually read as originative grasping works in Heidegger's understanding of the temporality of the disclosure of Dasein's Being. There are two important components to address: what about

arche allows *phronesis* to avoid needlessly limiting the disclosure of Dasein's Being, and what the *arche* denotes about the temporality of such disclosure and why. When regarding *arche*'s dual reading, how these components can be adequately addressed becomes clear.

6 Transformed *Phronesis* in *Being and Time*

6.1 Infallible Disclosure of Dasein's Being

First, much of the first component has already been discussed. The truth of *phronetic* disclosures is safeguarded by Heidegger's attribution to *phronesis* of its possession of unitary Being given its absent instrumentality for achieving the final end. This entails that whatever content relations these disclosures have concerning any other higher, more perfect ends are irrelevant to *phronesis* itself – hence its constitution as a content-non-specific orientation/attunement. The reason, therefore, that resoluteness in *BT* is how Dasein is brought back “to itself” as its very “revealing and Being-revealed”¹²¹ is because what is revealed about the actional situation is always in terms of this resoluteness (attunement), this *arche* of *phronesis*, out of which Dasein's possibilities-for-Being are revealed. How this is expressed is by resoluteness entering into an objectual *logos*-mediated relation with the actional situation, whereby nothing about this resoluteness is prefigured in content by some higher, more truthful *arche*-as-origin movement as which the *arche*-as-grasping of *phronetic* disclosure is revealed.

Disclosures simply cannot be wrong because whatever is disclosed cannot be adjudicated by content grasped about what is external to single instances of situational disclosure, and to say otherwise would be to pre-empt how the situation would disclose possibilities about such adjudication – i.e. to needlessly limit Dasein's disclosure is to prefigure situational content, thereby bounding what possibilities to take seriously. Now, Aristotle also argues for the calculations of the *phronimos* being infallible, but they are so only by not being *intentional* errors since Aristotelian *phronesis* does permit faults outside one's intentions.¹²² For Heidegger, *phronetic* calculations, by way of one's resoluteness/guilt, are infallible *both intentionally and not*, because all that matters is whether the proper attunement obtains, not whether some unintended content relation to higher goods is present as well.¹²³

6.2 The Temporality of the Disclosure of Dasein's Being

Related to the second component, what this implies about the temporality for *phronetic* disclosure should already be apparent to the careful reader:¹²⁴ what has occurred in the *past* to instantiate what Aristotle would consider proper content relations are not by this account of Heideggerian *phronesis* as significant as one's attunement grounding the disclosure of what one can possibly be in the *future*. Why? Because of *phronesis' arche*, which is Dasein's possibilisation and its attuned openness to its own possibilities, wherein this attunement is one of anxiety and guilt about the instability of any actional situation's meaning and not being able to live all it could amount to, respectively. Why anxiety and guilt play such integral roles in *phronesis* is because the relative safety of having the past inform what the actional situation could be disclosed as is denied for

¹²¹ BT: 357, 355.

¹²² We can glean this from NE: 1140b25. Furthermore, Hohler, “Phronēsis Transformed,” 351, for instance, makes this interpretation as well.

¹²³ We can glean this from PS: 35-6. Furthermore, Rosen, “Phronesis or Ontology,” 264–5; and Vardoulakis, “Toward a Critique,” §4, for instance, make this interpretation as well.

¹²⁴ Heidegger motivates a link between *phronesis* and time in his claim that *phronetic* judgements are “a possibility open only to those living entities which can understand time.” BCanc.: 229.

Dasein, so all that is left are, one, a disclosed field of possibilities that has a foothold in the now, the *kairos*, while also attaining a sight to the future, and two, one's affective comportment (anxiety/guilt) capacitating such possibilities.

Sinclair's brief sketch of the temporality of Dasein's disclosure is salutary here. Past and future, for Heidegger, are read in specific ways: the past, the *having-been*, "occurs as *repetition* (*Wiederholung*), according to which *Dasein* assumes and takes up its past expressly as a source of possibility for its existence as a being-futural." The future is not synonymous with futural – the future is implied by the past, but it mainly "consists in Dasein's apprehension of the finitude of its own temporal existence." These modalities of repetition and apprehension, which Sinclair translates respectively from Heidegger's notions of *Wiederholung* and *Vorlaufen*, are staged in the present moment – really in every present moment of disclosure – and it "is the unity of the authentic appropriation of the present, past, and future [that] is, in fact, predominantly futural."¹²⁵

However, we have already discussed how Dasein's existence is the very "condition of possibility" for Dasein to be otherwise,¹²⁶ which forms part of its possibilisation, so the past can be understood as the mere condition for the *possibility* of this possibilisation. This implies that *phronesis* does not require that the past repeats in terms of disclosing the same *content*, because what is important is not contentful repetition of the past but instead taking up the past in the futural ontologising of its very modality *as repetition*. By reading repetition as contentful repetition, we can therefore see how McNeill relates to our discussion here when he comments how "anxious, anticipatory resolve ... brings us ... face to face only with the *possibility* of retrieval or repetition."¹²⁷ It should thus be easy to see how the temporality of Dasein's disclosure, as its very possibilisation, is also inextricably linked with anxiety, since anxiety temporalises its disclosure by one's openness being held "toward the world as such *in its already having been*," or, "toward the world as such *as possibility*, in the dimension of possibility out of which any particular possibility can first come to presence."¹²⁸ This holding of one's openness toward the past *in* its ontologising capacity regarding future possibilities of Dasein's Being is a way of grounding this openness in the *now* of situational particularity that has both a *look* toward the past but primarily through this look we get a *view* towards the future, which is essentially the grounded possibilisation of Dasein and a mark of its finitude.¹²⁹

We must ask, "why this temporality for Dasein's disclosure; why not others?", in which case the answer already lies in our characterisation of *arche*'s disclosure outlined in Section 2. Remember that, for Aristotelian *phronesis*, the ambiguity of *arche* leads to one sense (*arche*-as-grasping) being disclosed in terms of another (*arche*-as-origin). Heideggerian *phronesis* amounts to a denial of this, opting instead to not have the disclosure of one overstep into content that could persist past any one disclosive instance, lest *arche*-as-grasping be disclosed in terms of some broader *arche*-as-origin. The grasping and origin modalities of *arche* are therefore equivalent in a way wherein *arche* is simply equiprimordially both this grasping and the origin being grasped, thereby mirroring in *BT* what is said about Dasein being both a revealing and Being-revealed.

Indeed, the temporality of Dasein's disclosure, whereby the past is seen as merely the possibility of Dasein's possibilisation, is explainable with respect to this characterisation of *arche*'s dual modality. *Arche*-as-origin provides a singular origin for *phronesis* that needs to be renewed any time *arche* is disclosed, while *arche*-as-grasping indicates a movement and directionality for said grasping, a movement from potency to act.¹³⁰ However, does a grasping that grasps itself – i.e. itself as this grasping and not as anything broader – entail a futural temporality for *arche*'s disclosure? I say yes, for what is grasped, if not some broader origin (e.g. having to do with past content), can only be either a null set or one with content. It is not a null set,¹³¹ so it

¹²⁵ Sinclair, *Heidegger, Aristotle*, 131. This analysis can be viewed as drawing upon material from *BT*: 372-3, 385-6.

¹²⁶ Smith, "Intensifying Phronesis," 96.

¹²⁷ McNeill, *The Glance of the Eye*, 98.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 132. Italics mine.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 134.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 125–6, where McNeill cites Heidegger's discussion in *PIR* on the movement belonging to *phronesis* as evidence for how Heidegger generally considers disclosive movements in terms of this Aristotelian potency/act language.

¹³¹ The actuality of our nullity/death, as Thanassas, "Phronesis Vs. Sophia," 49, insightfully explains, is precluded for us at any moment, by its remaining merely a possibility for some other moment, whenever we grasp/apprehend/disclose to ourselves.

must be positively content-filled; but if the content is not bound by the past, then what is permitted is a bounding by either the present (in this case, the present situation) or the future.¹³²

However, this fact of already being content-bound by either the present or the future already highlights part of anxiety's and guilt's functionalities in *BT*, those that express not only a sight to future possibilities for life, but a sight that is grounded in a sensitivity to the present situation at hand and one that originates from a questioning of the norms involved in *das Man*'s social conditioning through a concern for the situation as *novel*, as not necessarily intelligible solely in terms of said norms. The past thus matters for Dasein's possibilisation only when it is appropriated for the sake of viewing anew the situation, or when the past, as repetition, is employed to renew one's resolute choice to choose for oneself in the present – a choice borne out of an openness to Dasein's possibilisation (anxiety) that is closed off by singling out one possibility over others in action (guilt) – for otherwise any other approach utilising the past would deny Dasein's possibilisation by virtue of having the past inform one's choice – i.e. the past would contribute to *das Man*'s conditioning and needlessly limit the disclosure of Dasein's Being – instead of having one's resoluteness in making a choice condition how the past is taken up in disclosing one's possibilities for being.¹³³

How *arche*-as-grasping gives rise to this part of anxiety's functionality is, in my view, foundational, in that *why* the past does not matter to situational disclosure in the same way as it does in Aristotle is *because* of *arche*-as-grasping, not the other way around. This is because situational possibilities that are interpretable in terms of past regularities *disclosively* influencing present possibilities are safeguarded only whenever *arche*-as-grasping is disclosed in those terms of *arche*-as-origin that already conceive of the past as mattering in that way – i.e. the past being disclosed as already within the purview of an origin that extends past any singular instance of grasping.¹³⁴

Additionally, this also illustrates how *arche*-as-origin gives rise to this part of guilt's functionality in a manner that is just as foundational. Without being disclosed as some broader *arche*-as-grasping, the *arche*-as-origin of any instance of *phronetic* disclosure exists only as long as the disclosive moment of which it is the *arche* does – i.e. arising at one's openness to Dasein's possibilisation and ending once the chosen act closes off alternative possibilities for Dasein to be. In other words, *arche*-as-origin is concurrently both what structures an instance of grasping and what finalises it. This is integral to how guilt arises, for without this broader disclosure of *arche*-as-origin, there is no structural link to a further instance of grasping, such that the meaning of *arche*-as-origin is tied in part not to some other opening of Dasein's disclosure, but to the closing of whatever moment of disclosure just so happens to be presently, which is how guilt functions in necessarily closing off

132 Moreover, *arche*-as-grasping plays a role, I argue, in establishing an integral aspect of the futural temporality of Dasein's disclosure, that being its diachronic finitude, its being-towards-death. McManus, "Authenticity, Deliberation," 150, offers similar discussion as well. First, Heidegger does criticise the inauthentic for acting as if their death does not matter that much in their decision-making. We can see relevant comments made in his works, HCT: 315-7, WDR: 167, and, CT: 69. However, this does not mean that death is a certainty for Dasein. After all, death being a disclosed situational possibility is consistent with resisting inauthentic behaviour. In other words, Dasein is finite because being-towards-death entails death as one of its possibilities-for-being. See, WDR: 168. Now, I argue that being-towards-death leads naturally from *arche*, specifically from the equiprimordiality between *arche*-as-grasping and *arche*-as-origin. What this amounts to is showing how, from *arche*'s grasping and origin modalities, we can attain diachronic finitude. As has already been argued above, *arche*-as-grasping and *arche*-as-origin both entail a grasping that grasps itself. We can then imagine that grasping at the possibility of one's death is surely not foreclosed upon in this case – it remains as one of the situational possibilities to be potentially disclosed. However, this is not the only disclosable possibility concerning mortality: the disclosure of one's possible *immortality* is also not precluded – i.e., denying immortality from the outset would be to prefigure content for situational disclosure. This means that inauthentic life amounts to acting as if one's immortality potential is more situationally prominent than one's potential for death. Consequently, the authentic life would include one's resistance towards situationally prefiguring this prominence. This is one way of getting being-towards-death as one of Dasein's perennial possibilities-for-being simply from this understanding of *arche*.

133 If we read this conditioning as a situating of *determinate presence*, then we can make sense of McNeill's interpretation of "[t]he temporalizing of anxiety," where "every determinate coming to presence is held suspended within an inevitable indeterminacy." McNeill, *The Glance of the Eye*, 134.

134 Relatedly, in interpreting Heidegger's comments on the relation between moral justification and its relevance towards the ethical situation in his BC*Ar*., 100, 102, 110, Zoller discusses how "[d]iscourses of moral justification that point toward a 'ground' of behavior in advance of the situation would seem by their very nature to point toward [a] non-situation." Zoller, "Heidegger on Aristotelian Phronesis," 782.

alternative possibilities of action. Therefore, we can see how *phronesis*, through *arche*'s dual reading, offers a straightforward path to the temporality of the disclosure of Dasein's Being in *BT*.

7 Conclusion

How we can see *arche* playing an important role in giving an interpretive account of the different stages of Heideggerian *phronesis* is by understanding where Heideggerian *phronesis* differs from Aristotle in light of *arche*'s dual reading as both *arche*-as-origin and *arche*-as-grasping. Specifically, Heideggerian *phronesis* concurs with Aristotle's understanding that *phronesis* is *logos*-mediated, but there is a deviation from the Aristotelian understanding in terms of an absent *logos* mediation for *phronetic nous* in the structural sense, wherein *arche*-as-grasping is no longer being disclosed as some broader, more extensive *arche*-as-origin. This serves three purposes: one, by specifying the work these dual modalities of *arche* perform for Heideggerian *phronesis*, we can better read Heidegger's recasting of *phronesis*' ends away from its original Aristotelian context in a way that clarifies its relation to the Heideggerian notions that *phronesis*' *arche* is its *telos* and that *phronesis* is inseparably linked with *sophia* at the highest ontological levels; two, by seeing how *arche*'s dual reading plays into differentiating *phronesis*' contentful role for Aristotle from its ontological role for Heidegger in *BT*, the various appropriations Heidegger makes of *phronesis* both in the *Sophist* and *BT* can be given their proper place: expressing a change in the role Heidegger ascribes to *arche* between these works; and three, the dual reading of *arche* allows for the infallibility and temporality of Dasein's disclosure, at least in *BT*, to develop more directly from concepts already present there – e.g. anxiety, guilt, consciousness, and resoluteness – such that what this temporality involves is an infallible grasping, attuned by anxiety/guilt, of the meaning of Dasein's Being that does not needlessly limit its disclosure.

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