Difficult alliance. Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and Russia against Sweden during the Great Northern War (1700–1721) – an introduction to the problematic

1 Preface

In years 1698–1700,^[1] in Denmark, there was a number of mutual agreements made by Saxony and Russia, what became a base for the military alliance against Sweden, called the Northern League. Danish king Christian V (and from 1699 his heir Frederick IV), the Saxon elector, and also since 1697 the Polish king Augustus II and Russian Tsar Peter I were intending to defeat Swedish king Charles XII, who was young and seemed to be inexperienced in military tactics. Each of the allies counted on either gaining new or restoring lost territories having currently belonged to Sweden.^[2] The aim of Peter I were Livonia and Estonia, however that stood against the agenda of Augustus II who also intended to take control over these territories. The Polish king in his “Baltic policy” referred to his duty of winning back the lost territories (pol. awulsy), whereby “[…] a certain ambiguity was lying behind. Augustus II intended to settle the war using the Saxon army, what gave him a possibility of making decisions concerning the future of conquered territories independent from the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth.”^[3] Through restoring the lost lands with his son upon the Livonian throne, Augustus wanted to establish long-lasting ties between his dynasty and Poland. These lands were also a promising place to build an independent fleet and take up their own commercial activity outside the Polish port town Gdańsk.

That is how once again there was a conflict in the Baltic region, which – due to its length and a number of countries it included – became known as The Great Northern War 1700–1721.^[4] The alliance against Sweden was joined by the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, where most of the nobility and magnates remained faithful to Augustus II and counted on the alliance with Russia. The participation of Poland in the war seemed inevitable and its official inclusion was sought by both Augustus II and Peter I, as well as by Charles XII. It was confirmed by the constatation made by the tsar’s associate, prince Boris Kurakin: “The bordering countries of Russia, Poland and Sweden together reach agreement with each other, and get at each other; just as they reach the agreement with other together and fight with others together.”^[5]

It had never happened that a Swede was at war with Russia, while Poles at that time were not at war with either a Swede or Russia. In the same manner, when Swedes fight with Poles, it is impossible for Russia not be at war with either of them. During the ongoing conflict, two fundamental periods can be distinguished when the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth was in alliance with Russia against Sweden. Caesura victorious for Peter I was the battle of Poltava on 27th June (8th July) 1709. It was already at the beginning of the war when Charles XII undertook the futile attempt to enforce a monarch upon the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, who was dependent on him, namely the voivode of Poznań, Stanisław Leszczyński. However, the vast majority of nobility remained loyal to the rightful monarch, supporting the alliance with Russia and fighting together against Sweden and Leszczyński’s partisans, even in spite of a transient resignation from the Polish crown by Augustus II in years 1706–1709. The demise of the military power of Sweden after the battle of Poltava did not end the war, but caused a renewal of the alliance against Sweden. With the intention of strengthening his power, Augustus II returned to the Polish throne, what caused the intelligible resistance from the nobility. Simultaneously, between 1710 and 1713, the Russian–Turkish war broke out, and the Sublime Porte, which was an ally of Sweden, managed to stop the expansion of Moscow toward the Black Sea and made demands concerning the withdrawal of the Russian army from the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth.^[6] However, at the north frontline the army of Peter I kept succeeding, by conquering Finland and operating on Swedish Pomerania, in Denmark and on German territories (especially in the Grand Duchy Mecklenburg-Schwerin province).^[7] In the same time, the tsar was interfering in the internal matters of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth with growing strength. The growing position of Russia (steadily bonding with Sweden and Prussia) began to concern its previous allies and other superpowers of the Old Continent. The tsar even undertook an attempt to dethrone the Polish king. Therefore, the relationship between Augustus II and Peter I began growing apart. On 25th December 1718 (5th January 1719), the king of Great Britain and Ireland and simultaneously the Hanoverian elector George I, the emperor Charles I and Augustus II made the anti-Russian alliance in Vienna, which was also supposed to include the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. Due to the political shuffling, the expected conflict between the coalition and Peter I never came to life.^[8] In 1721, in a Finnish town Nystad, Russia made a peace treaty with Sweden, whereat the Treaty was signed without the participation of representatives of Saxony and the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Great Northern War 1700–1721 ended, just as the Polish–Russian alliance. As the ongoing events proved, the alliance turned out significantly challenging for both sides in many respects: military, political, economic and religious.

2 Before the Battle of Poltava

The beginning of the war was not favorable for the Northern League countries. In August 1700, the coalition was already left by Denmark, which after the strenuous military action of Swedish army was forced to sign the peace Treaty in Travendal. The operations of the rest of the allies also ended up as a failure. The Russian army that had been modernized by Peter I in November 1700 was defeated at the battle of Narva River,^[9] and in 1701 the Saxon armies were forced to retreat from Livonia and abandon attempts to conquer Riga, which was defended by the general of governor Erik Dahlberg.^[10] Both events encouraged king Charles’ decision to strike the stronger of the opponents and enter the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth in order to beat the Saxon army on Polish territory. From a strategic point of view, as well as the contemporary rules of the waging war, this decision was right in every way:

1. Charles XII succeeded to divide armies of his adversaries effectively enough so they were highly unlikely to take any military actions with joined forces. However, such actions took place anyway. It was proved by agreements of the Treaty which was signed by Augustus II and Peter I on 26th February (9th March) 1701 in Birże, where the binding alliance was confirmed and it was decided that the allies will continue the fight with Swedes together. The tsar promised the king a military support and a subsidy “for the royal army” in the amount of 200,000 thalers. Settlements undertaken during the council of war on 28th February (11th March) with the participation of monarchs, supplemented the pact, according to which, the Russian military corps in force of 20,000 people were supposed to come to Saxons’ aid at the battle of Riga. However, the tsar’s main army was supposed to engage the enemy forces in the area of Narva and Pskovo-Pechersky monastery. Another step for Augustus II, after the targeted conquest of Riga, was the siege of Narva, along with Russians, and a protection against a potential Swedish strike at Moscow.^[11]

2. Charles’ intention of going after Augustus was also to take advantage of the difficult internal situation in Lithuania, where it came to an open civil war among the nobility houses of: Radziwiłłowie, Wiśniowieccy, Ogińscy, Kotłowie and Pociejowie, which were supported by the middle nobility – the anti-Russian faction called republicants (pol. republikanci) – and the Sapieha family who was all-powerful in that region. In these circumstances, the latter had turned to the Swedish monarch for guardianship which begun the collaboration between both parties.^[12] This event was another bargaining chip in the fight with Augustus II.

3. After the defeat at Narva, the forces of Peter I were in dispersion and Charles XII assumed that the restoration of the Russian army is not going to happen anytime soon. He counted on using this time to defeat Augustus II and solidify his position in the Baltic region through conquering Kurland – the seigniory of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth – and striking again his main opponent, Russia. The decision of the Swedish monarch to move his army to Poland doubtlessly helped Peter I in strengthening his military power and allowed him to move on to the offensive in the Baltic region.^[13]

Nevertheless, from the very beginning the tsar had to operate in close military cooperation with Augustus II. Between 1699 and 1700, the king formed new regiments of the infantry and dragoons (29 units altogether). However, the soldiers as well as commanding and engineering staff lacked sufficient training and experience. Therefore, it was only the experienced officers and engineers who were sent by the elector to the area of Narva: among others, major general Augustus, the baron von Langen and the military engineer general lieutenant Ludwig von Hallart. Augustus II recommended Peter I to engage a renowned and talented officer, field marshal Charles Eugène de Croÿ, who then became the commander of the Russian army at Narva.^[14] It was crucial for the tsar to keep the alliance with the elector for a number of reasons, but mainly the strategy, because he was positive that Russia was not yet ready to fight the war with Sweden on its own. Therefore, while leading independent military operations was not an option, the forces flanking second front at the same time were of invaluable importance for the tsar’s army. For that reason, Peter I made a strenuous effort to convince Poland to fight on the allied side. The record of these attempts was found in the classified Treaty signed in the Lithuanian town Birże, where the tsar pointed out that “[…] nothing more friendly do we desire than along with the alliance with the Polish king the whole Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth joined, and thereby His Royal Highness is willing to show his great effort and strain in order to achieve this aim.”^[15] The accession of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth to the war had several significant advantages: it notably strengthened the coalition; prevented Augustus II to withdraw (which was what he had undertaken in 1701 after his failures at the very beginning of the war);^[16] it considerably enlarged the battleground; and last but not least, another army entered the war.

The implementation of these plans took several years. Signing of the Russian–Polish agreement in the large measure was possible due to the complicated internal situation of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. Sapieha family entering the alliance with Charles XII induced the republicants of Lithuania to seek help from the tsar. On 10th (21st) January 1702, Canon of Wilno Krzysztof Białłozor came to Moscow to ask the tsar for sending the military support troops which, along with the Lithuanian army, would accede to the fight with Swedes and the Sapiehas. The appropriate arrangement was signed on 23th March (3rd April) 1702 in Preobrazhenskyoe. The tsar promised the military help and money for the display of the army (50,000 rubles) over which the lead was supposed to be taken by the Field Lithuanian Hetman Grzegorz Antoni Ogiński.^[17] The second Lithuanian–Russian settlement was signed on 28th June (9th of July) 1703 in the camp near Shlisselburg, where Krzysztof Białłozor along with other Lithuanian delegates confirmed the previous settlements, supplementing them with the clause that Lithuania would stay in the alliance without the situation of the Crown (Poland), even in case of the declaration of war against Russia by the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth.^[18] The third settlement was signed on 2nd (13th) December of the same year in Jaworów,^[19] and on 29th November (10th December) Peter I confirmed the previously established agreement with Augustus II.^[20]

Meanwhile, Charles XII was on the front foot in the Crown, including the defeat of Augustus II at the battle of Kliszów on 8th (19th) July 1702.^[21] He has also established connection with the opposition presenting the project of dethronement of the Saxon. This proposal did not meet in favor with most of Polish nobility who decided to stay with the legitimate ruler and not to agree for any territorial concessions. The nobility was willing to look for help abroad, namely in Russia, and the royal army undertook the subsidiary warfare with Swedes (the army was intended to be extended up to 48,000 soldiers). The decisive moment for all the current and future situations turned out to be the year 1704. In February the Warsaw Confederation was formed, bringing together the opponents of Augustus II, who began negotiations for peace and alliance with Sweden. In July, a minor group of the nobility, with the assistance of the Swedish army, announced Stanisław Leszczyński the king. In consequence of this action was the formation of the Sandomierz Confederation in May 1704 by the supporters of Augustus II. The nobility in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth was perfectly aware of the difference between the affairs of the king as the Saxon elector and “affairs of the Polish crown”; however, it was impossible to separate the “Saxon elector from … the Polish king,” therefore, they acknowledged the need of remaining by the side of Augustus II, because that constituted the survival of the country.^[22] From now on, nothing stood on the way of seeking the agreement with Peter I for a defense against Charles XII and his partisans. On 19th (30th) August 1704, at the walls of Narwa, which had just been conquered by the Russians, there was signed a Treaty between the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and Russia. The offensive and defensive alliance was supposed to last until the end of the war and both sides agreed to fight and make peace together. The tsar promised to retrieve the lost part of Livonia and incorporate it to Polish lands and guaranteed the annual subsidy of 200,000 rubles for the purpose of increasing the number of soldiers up to 48,000. Besides, 12,000 Russian soldiers were to arrive to enhance the Polish forces. What is more, Peter I promised to assist in the fight against the Cossack uprising which was led by Semen Palij and kept going from 1702 in the Bracław and Kijów provinces, and part of Volhynia and Podolia.^[23] The subject of the affiliation of Livonia and returning this territory back to Poland was also mentioned in the “taking the inhabitants of Livonia under protection” manifesto, issued by the tsar in August.^[24]

It is worth mentioning that the 1702–1703 Treaty between Lithuanian republicants and Russia stood against the terms of Polish–Lithuania union. Therefore, the Narva Treaty, signed on the behalf of the whole nation of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, was an obstacle for the future separatist deals between Lithuania and Russia, which assured the unity of the country. However, the unity of Poland was endangered by extremely complicated internal affairs, due to the presence of “two governments, two covenants” since 1704.^[25] Simultaneously, the formal nature of the Narva Treaty shall not be omitted; the mutual agreement on the issue of military cooperation between Augustus II and Peter I had been established much earlier that the pact itself was signed. The information about the troops sent to Lithuania in numbers of 15,000 cavalry, 12,000 infantries and 4,000 Cossacks, which had to collaborate with 18,000 soldiers of the “royal army from Saxony,” was found in the correspondence from 27th April (8th May) 1704 between the Great Crown Treasurer Jan Przebendowski and the Great Crown Hetman Adam Sieniawski.^[26]

The Narva Treaty was a turning point in the course of the war under discussion. Since that moment, the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, where military operations had already been in motion, became an official part in the conflict. The cooperation between Russian, Saxon and Polish forces was thought to bring significant benefits. Polish nobility also hoped to stop the Swedes from plundering their lands. Charles’ XVII assurance to hold his soldiers from pillaging was an obvious lie because all they left behind was damaged or destroyed. Such was a reminiscence of Jan Florian Drobysz Tuszyński, a politician from Żytomierz: “[…] the Swedish king was marching with his army straight to Kraków which he then plundered to the grounds, damaging even churches and monasteries.”^[27] Everything was stolen, up to the poor houses of peasants, and as mentioned by the chronicles at the Convent of the Norbertine Sisters in Imbramowice, even the oats and fry fish from the ponds.^[28] One of the commanders to order the plunders was general major Magnus Stenbock.^[29]

Despite the military efforts made by the Russian, Saxon and Polish united armies in the territory of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth in the years 1704–1706, it was the Swedes and Stanisław Leszczyński who were the victorious side. In July 1705, the Saxonian–Polish corps was defeated while attempting to take Warsaw.^[30] In January 1706, Charles XII held main Russian forces in Grodno. Only the evacuation conducted efficiently enough and quick march toward Kijów were able to save it from the imminent doom.^[31] On 2nd (13th) February 1706, the Saxonian Army that had been regrouped by Augustus II, along with the supporting Russian troops, suffered a major defeat at the battle of Wschowa (Fraustadt).^[32] That is why the victory attained by the allies over Sweden on 18th (29th) October at the battle of Kalisz was bittersweet.^[33] Nevertheless, it did not have any significant impact on the current political situation because before this battle Augustus’ envoys had accepted the peace Treaty imposed by Charles XII and Stanisław Leszczyński in Altranstädt by Leipzig. Augustus II abdicated from the Polish throne pursuant thereto, however he kept the royal title. Moreover, the Saxonians were to pay a high compensation for Sweden, and what is more important, to break the agreement with Peter I.^[34]

Augustus’ decision puts his supporters, Confederates of Sandomierz, in a very difficult situation. However, in spite of this circumstance they decided to remain loyal to Russia, what has in turn confirmed and supplemented the requirements of the Narew Treaty. The solid stance of the Confederates forced the tsar to ratify the rights of nobility and promise to hold his troops in Polish lands from pillaging, raping and stealing goods. Peter I was the one to stay in control, just like Charles XII trying to take under his “protection” the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. In 1707, he ordered the Sandomierz Confederates to announce interregnum, while he attempted to enforce a leader who would be dependent on him. The list of candidates to succeed to the throne included prince of Transylvania Ferenc Rákóczi,^[35] a leader of the anti-Habsburg uprising in Hungary, and an ambitious Great Crown Hetman Adam Sieniawski.^[36] As pointed out by Ernst Carlson in 1706–1707 the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth became utterly dependent on the tsar. Russian troops kept plundering its impoverished provinces and it was Peter I who decided whom to place upon the Polish throne.^[37]

However, tsar’s plans had never been followed through, and the allies began preparing for the attack of Charles XII they anticipated; while garrisoning in Saxony, his army got reinforced. That same year, 33,000 Swedish soldiers headed into the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth,^[38] beginning a major offensive against Peter I and Sandomierz Confederates. There was no doubt that all operational decisions were made by the tsar without any influence from Poles.^[39] Therefore, the arrangements made by Peter I with his supporters among the nobility in Żółkiew at the beginning of this year, regarding common fight against Swedes, were supposed to be a confirmation of the previous alliance. The imminent events emphasized the abovementioned deal. Russian army had operated on Polish territory in collaboration with Sandomierz Confederates^[40] until the stern action undertaken by Charles XII, they began the retreat. Tsar’s strategic idea was to resist only within the Russian borders, especially that it was in compliance with the decisions made in Żółkiew which were approved by the Confederate representatives.^[41] Peter I was bracing himself for by the enemy attacking his own country.^[42] Therefore, he was preparing his army for a retreat from the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and equipping the garrisons in Ukraine and Lithuania, where the Swedes were most likely to attack – with food.^[43] Moreover, he had already started reinforcing Russian fortresses much earlier, especially Moscow itself. According to Jarosław Porazinski, “[…] when the explicit peril of Swedish invasion in Russia was acknowledged during the war meeting in Żółkiew, the concept of making the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth a foreground for the defense of Russia, with the sole purpose of conducting destructive actions.”^[44]

Peter I constantly promised August II and the Sandomierz Confederates that Russian troops would not plunder Poland. However, in spite of these declarations, it was impossible to control all of his leaders and maintain discipline on the entire field of operations. Both regular and temporary troops (Cossacks and Kalmyks) were making much trouble in Lithuania during the Swedish offensive in Russia. When Swedes attacked Russian army, the retreating troops adopted a well-known “scorched earth” tactic, effects of which were initially visible on Polish and Lithuanis terrains.^[45] It is important to remember that all other armies: Swedes, Stanisław Leszczyński, Saxons and Confederates were using the same method. Peter’s desperate need to keep the alliance with Augustus II and the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth should also be emphasized.^[46]

Another factor important in his actions was the finances, namely annual expenses from years 1701–1708, which came from maintaining the supporting armies (from Lithuania, Saxony and the Crown), inciting Lithanian’s leaders against Sweden (Grzegorz Ogiński and Chancellor Karol Radziwiłł), and the Russian representative, prince Vasily Dolgorukov, to give them away and use for personal needs. The tsar ordained a considerable amount of money (sometimes in the form of goods or sables), ranging from few hundreds to over three million rubles. For instance, at the beginning of the war in 1702, the war expenses were distributed among the Lithuanian army for the offensive against Swedes (40,000 rubles); “leaders” in Gdańsk (550 rubles); and Grzegorz Ogiński organizing the incitement against Swedes, together with Michał Wiśniowiecki (17,400 rubles) – a total of 57,950 rubles. The following year the number increased to 165,847 rubles – 155,980 cash for the Lithuanian troops and 6,867 in sables; and 3,000 for the king. The true generosity, or rather a sane judgment of the current situation, the tsar showed in 1705 in the total of 680,385 rubles (when the entire country’s expense was 3,339,943 rubles) distributed between the subsidies for Saxon, Lithuanian and Polish armies; the king and representative of the Lithuanian nobility; and Jan Reinhold von Patkul, a general representing Augustus II.^[47] As an example, in 1707 the tsar paid out two regiments of dragoons (pol. chorągwie dragońskie): the contingent of Janusz Wiśniowiecki, the governor of Krakow province; and Jan Koniecpolski, the governor of Bracław province.^[48] In the light of these events, it is worth mentioning that the money which Peter I promised to his supporters, for example on 1701 when he decided to give the Saxon army 200,000 talars, did not really exist.^[49]

3 On the way to Nysad

The venture of Charles XII toward Russia ended up a major defeat at the battle of Poltava 27th June (8th July) 1709.^[50] With a handful of survivors and Ivan Mazepa, Hetman of Zaporizhian Host, who had chosen his side during the offensive, he retreated to Turkey. The previous strength of Swedish army was broken, but the war continued. It did not accelerate even when Russians conquered the key fortresses of the Baltic region: Riga, Dünamünde, Pärnu, Vyborg, Arensburg and Kexholm.^[51] On the other side, the anti-Swedish alliance got reinforced and enhanced (in the person of the elector of Brandenburg), which raised hopes for the imminent end of the conflict.^[52] As declared by Jan Przebendowski in the letter to Adam Sieniawski from June (3rd August) 1709, this four-sided alliance was not at all “contra the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth”; on the contrary, it was leading to “a long-awaited peace” and served its salvation.^[53] Saxon and Russian troops entering the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth forced Stanisław Leszczyński and his supporters to retreat. The restitution of Augustus II went quickly and smoothly. The elector had a support of the tsar, the courts of Copenhagen and Berlin, and endorsement of the majority of Polish nobility. The remaining issue dependent mostly on The Holy See, which was also approving. The pope, Clemens XI, who had been informed about the return of Augustus II priorly, he reassured the congregation of cardinals about his support for the king during the special meeting on 5th (16th) September 1709. On 10th (21st) September 1709, the pope sent a brief in which he expressed his friendship and full support.^[54]

However, making an alliance with Augustus II and then the Sandomierz Confederates, Peter I had to honor the Holy See’s stance. The situation was even more complicated, because the tsar was also intending to maintain good relations with the pope, which in turn was connected with keeping his allies: Augustus II and the Sandomierz Confederates. What is more, owing to this fact Peter I was gaining a possibility to press the internal affairs of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth even harder. At this point, it is important to mention that it was not an easy task for the nuncios to fulfill their duties in the country torn by war, where the episcopate did not see eye to eye with its authorities (primate Michał Radziejowski got involved with z Charles XII). Both Francesco Pignatelli (1700–1703) and Orazio Filippo Spada (1704–1706) remained with Augustus II (even beyond the Polish borders) and expressed their support toward the Sandomierz Confederates. These actions were connected with the policy of The Holy See which was counting on the ecclesial union. For his part, in his country he maintained benevolence with the catholic issues, namely the missionaries travelling through his lands to China, Mongolia or Transcaucasian countries. Although insincerely, he promised to open Russia up for the teachings of catholic priests.^[55] Acting for the benefit of the Polish–Russian alliance, Clemens XI made an attempt to withhold the coronation of Stanisław Leszczyński, issuing a message, on 31st May (10th June) 1705 in Rome, to forbid the primate Radziejowski from leading the coronation.^[56]

The controversial decisions and actions of Peter I toward catholic hierarchs and priests, which were causing an obvious agitation among Polish society (and, as a consequence, they could have an impact on the previous alliance with the Sandomierz Confederates), was a shadow over the relationship between The Holy See and Russia. The abovementioned message issued by Clemens XI turned out to not to make any difference, because the coronation of Leszczyński was conducted anyways by the grand enemy of Augustus II, the Archbishop of Lviv, Konstanty Zieliński. At the beginning of 1707, acing on tsar’s orders, Russian general Carl Rönne arrested the hierarch and imprisoned him in Moscow, where he died 2 years later.^[57] Similar fate befell on the bishop of Łuck’s diocese, Dionizy Żabokrzycki, who left the Orthodox Church and accepted the union in 1702. His arrest and imprisonment in Russia in 1709 (after he had been in hiding) were under the pretext of his alleged cooperation with Sweden and support for hetman Mazepa. Augustus II and the nuncio of the pope were pleading for his release, yet it came to no avail, even after the intervention by the pope himself. Peter I was unperturbed. The hierarch died in Moscow in 1715.^[58] Apart from that, the entire Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth was disturbed by the events from 30th June (11th July) 1705 that took place during the Uniate Council of St. Sofia in Polotsk: the church was defiled and four Basilian monks were murdered in the presence of the tsar.^[59] What was appalling the most was a fact that Peter I himself was witnessing this gruesome incident.^[60]

Augustus’ return on the throne took place in the shadow of Peter I, due to the fact that it was the tsar who was “welcomed as a savior of Polish freedom.”^[61] During the Sejm in January (February) 1710 in Warsaw, the monarch gained the support of the Sandomierz Confederates who confirmed the agreements that had been established for at the time of the alliance.^[62] It was also then that the Treaty of 1686 (pol. pokój Grzymułtowskiego), legislating the eternal peace between Russia and the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, got finally ratified. The meaning of that Treaty the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth was deprived of vast Eastern territories.^[63] Peter I thought himself to be a decisive entity and therefore, tried to be an arbitrary for the internal affairs in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. In this regard, at the beginning of 1711 he announced a message proclaiming his mercy for all followers of Augustus II who would decide to come back and recognize him a king. For the safety of those who return he appointed prince Grigorij Dolgoruki an “extraordinary plenipotent deputy.”^[64]

The return of Augustus II meant Saxon and Russian amies re-entering Poland along with their usual policy of pillaging and seizure of goods. It was the latter that tormented Poles in 1709–1710.^[65] Their presence in the Crown and Lithuania gave rise to the renewal of military actions between Russia and Turkey, which made the Southern parts of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth grounds for Russian preparations for the foreplanned offensive toward Danube River in 1710.^[66] The war campaign of Peter I ended up a failure that same year and his safe return from the enemy territory was guaranteed by the arrangement, which had not yet been a peace Treaty, concluded at the Prut River. The Treaty under negotiations stood on the way of the king’s plans for the operations in the Black Sea region. Russia committed itself to returning the lands taken from Turkey in 1696; staying out of the “polish affairs”; and acknowledging the sultan a “protector” of the Zaporoshian Cossacks. The tsar also agreed for a free return of Charles XII to Sweden.^[67] The Turkish party decided to take advantage of the Russian defeat and change the terms of the Karlovice Treaty from 1699 which had given the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth back the once lost Right-bank Ukraine and Podolia Governorate. The intention of the sultan was to take control over Ukraine with the purpose of giving it to the Cossacks lead by the successor of Mazepa, hetman Pylyp Orlyk. In such circumstances, the threat of mutual war was only strengthening the alliance between Augustus II and Peter I, which was what the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth was in fact condemned to. For that reason, in 1713 by order of the king, Polish deputy in Istanbul, Stanisław Chomętowski, was to support Russian diplomats in negotiating the terms of the peace Treaty – the Russian–Turkish war ended in June 1713 in Adrianople.^[68] It echoed the Prut Treaty, whereby the sultan demanded from Peter the withdrawal of his troops from the Polish territory within 2 months and moreover, they were not allowed to re-enter these territories while marching toward the Swedish Pomerania.^[69]

Regarding the “Polish affairs,” the Adrianople Treaty followed all terms immaculately.^[70] In 1713, the tsar withdrew his troops from the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, focusing on the defense of Southern borders and mainly on strengthening Kijów, concerned about the threat of Turkish attack.^[71] The departure of Russians was attested by the hetmans (Adam Sieniawski and Stanisław Rzewuski, among others) and Polish and Lithuanian nobility (royal chancellor Jan Szembek, governor of Bełz province Stefan Potocki and deputy chancellor Kazimierz Czartoryski).^[72] That, in turn, encouraged Augustus II to re-enter the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth with the Saxon army and the Russian troops marched across its territory toward Denmark and German Reich, therefore, soon the arrangements of the Adrianople Treaty became a dead letter. Once again Poles suffered from the plundering of their lands. The tsar explained himself for ordering these actions with the Turkish threat.^[73] One of the cities to suffer the most was Gdańsk, which got under Augustus’ control after the battle at Poltava.^[74] In October 1713, the tsar accused Gdańsk of the hostile attitude toward Russia and forced the city to pay the contribution of 300,000 gulden.^[75] During his stay in Gdańsk in 1716, Peter I imposed the city an official agreement with Russia (which was approved by Augustus II at their meeting on 2nd (13th) of March)^[76] on the premises of the predicted severance of the trade relations with Sweden and a need to stand against its fleet.^[77] Gdańsk unsuccessfully attempted to postpone fulfilling these terms. In 1717 the Treaty got renewed^[78] and in May 1718 Russian troops flanked the city and remained there until 1719, when Gdańsk finally paid the tsar the demanded contribution.^[79] These actions were supposed to weaken the trade position of Gdańsk and, simultaneously, strengthening St. Petersburg as a main Russian port in the Baltic region. In fact, Peter I intended to subdue Gdańsk, in order to make it a storage place for the foreign goods being transported to Russia.^[80] That in turn was out of question for both Augustus II and the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Over the year, the growing position of Russia – which was guaranteed by its massive and well-functioning army – in the whole of Europe,^[81] began to concern its previous allies. Augustus II was also trying to empower himself, but his absolutist plans were unexceptional for the nobility, who were uneasy by the presence of the Saxon troops and transferring the foreign affairs policy to their hands; Saxon politicians already began interfering into Polish internal matters. In the light of above, Peter I tried to present himself as a savior of the war-torn Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and, by the end of 1714, in his letter to Augustus II, he demanded the withdrawal of troops from Poland.^[82] The king’s policy and horrid behavior of his soldiers resulted in the rise of anti-Saxon Confederation in November 1715 in Tarnogród. Augustus’ attitude, his attempts to conspire with Charles XII and defuse the internal conflict within the country were intolerable for the tsar, who decided to take action: he promised the Confederates aid in getting rid of Saxon army and even the dethroning of Augustus II. The Tarnogród Confederates agreed to his proposition which made the tsar – who had so far been an ally of Sandomierz Confederates in the fight against Sweden and Leszczyński – a protector of the nobility. What is more, in 1717 he even became a guarantor of the agreement between Augustus II and the Tarnogród Confederates. What strengthened the position of Peter I was his army which was stationing in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. However, it was only a seeming success and already in 1718, the Polish king and the nobility agreed to stand against Russia together. Once again, the tsar was ordered to withdraw his army. Current international situation was facilitating these events. The British King, the Elector of Hanover George I and the Emperor Charles I were uneasy about the growing political, economic and military influence and strength of Peter in the Reich, and at the same time his military success in the war with Sweden. In 1719 the Russian army permanently left the Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and, accompanied by the troops of its leader, Duke Karl Leopold (the husband of Peter’s niece, Katarina Ivanovna) crossed the Polish border. As noticed by Jan Przebendowski, the latter were more troublesome for the local peoples than the Russian soldiers.^[83]

The growing power of Russia was especially disturbing Augustus II and the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. That is why the Vienna alliance came into existence, in order to suppress the growth of Peter’s power in Central-Eastern Europe. That made the tsar to finally gave in: but even though he withdrew his armies from the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, he made it clear that it was out of question to return the lands on the Baltic coast that had been taken from Sweden. That is how the Polish–Russian covenant from the Great Northern War 1700–1721 went down to history.

4 Conclusions

There is no doubt that during the Great Northern War (1700–1721), the anti-Swedish Polish–Russian alliance was formed, which, due to the complicated international situation at that time as well as equally complex internal issues of Poland, turned out to be exceedingly difficult for both sides. Although the decisions about alliances and war were made by the rulers of foreign countries without the will or awareness of the Commonwealth’s nobility, one of the signatories of the anti-Swedish was the Polish sovereign. Both Augustus II and Peter I expected to involve the Polish–Lithuanian army to fight on their sides. Thus, when Charles XII entered the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and tried to subjugate it by proposing his candidate for the king, the vast majority of the nobility opted for the legally elected Augustus II, which naturally made it Russia’s ally. Paradoxically, this alliance contributed to the survival of Poland since from the beginning of the war, Lithuania pursued its own foreign policy. By forming its own alliance with Peter I, Lithuania impinged on the foundations of its union with Poland. Considering the military, the joint fight against Sweden as well as Leszczyński’s forces was beneficial for both the Polish and Russian sides. The former was aware of the weakness of its own army, whereas the latter required support not only at the front but also in organizing the modernization of its armed forces. Therefore, Peter I devoted great sums of state expenditure to certain operations of both military and political nature to maintain the alliance. It was also in the interest of Augustus II who hoped to seize certain lands by the Baltic Sea owing to Russia. Such territorial acquisitions would strongly relate his dynasty to the Polish throne. Another issue connecting Poland and Russia was the “Turkish problem” as Istanbul sought to take control of the Ukrainian territories divided between the two countries.

Over the years, the Polish–Russian alliance was transforming into a union in which Russia became the stronger party. The tsarist army was stationed on the territory of the Commonwealth where it pursued the policy of contribution and requisition, on a par with the Swedish and Saxon armies as well as their own troops. The victories along the Baltic Sea coast and the one in Poltava in 1710 resulted in the tsar becoming an arbiter in Polish internal affairs due to the strengthening of his position. Under the new circumstances, there weren’t any prospects that Russia would hand over Baltic lands that had once belonged to the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. Furthermore, Peter I united Russia with its fief, Courland, throughout the marriage of his niece, Anna Ivanovna, to Prince Frederick Wilhelm Kettler. The Russian sovereign attempted to weaken Poland economically by exerting strong pressure on Gdańsk. The actions of the tsar meant that at the end of the war there was nothing left of the former alliance and the current Russia’s ally was becoming a potential enemy.