China’s People’s Liberation Army: Restructuring and Modernization

1 Introduction

China has a rich history dominated by traditions and prudent men. Since the days of Sun Tzu, its military leadership has always been aware that to defeat an enemy at the nation’s gates, one must maintain a communal armed force, i.e., a military force which is an integral part of ordinary peoples’ lives. However, since the time of the Han dynasty, the military power of the Chinese people has always been intimately associated with the idea of living harmoniously within the realm of Heaven. The latter was “considered a deity.”^[1] The people also needed to be willing to accept the authority of the “Son of Heaven” or Tianzi (Chinese: 天子) (pinyin: Tiānzǐ), which means ultimately a supreme personality that will guide the Chinese masses in times of peace and war.^[2] Arguably, this resolve of being the sole “Son of Heaven” led to the Sino-Soviet split, and later, a brief border war between China and the Soviet Union was fought in 1969, as there can only be one Son of Heaven, not two.^[3] In the early twenty-first century, the concept of “Heaven” in the People’s Republic of China manifested in the embodiment of the Communist Party of China (CPC), and its current economic power and military influence is visible well beyond the shores of mainland China and even of East Asia; it can be felt, for example, in South America and in Africa. It was noted that in October 1949, just after the proclamation of independence, the CPC effectively took control of the “mandate of heaven.”^[4] The CPC’s polar star, Xi Jinping, has emerged as an undisputed, authoritative leader, just as Mao Zedong – who pioneered China’s contemporary military theory.^[5] What Xi has done is to take Mao’s theory of warfare and transform it into a modern conception of a military machine that is both Chinese in concept and Westernized in its pragmatism, its military readiness, and its deployment.^[6]

From the perspective of military analysts and historians, the researchers would state that the CPC with its Central Military Commission (CMC) is a sophisticated parallel to the command and control of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which is under the operational control of the CMC of the CPC Central Committee – the Party’s CMC. Xi chairs CMC which “is the highest military decision-making body in China.”^[7] The overall Chinese leadership has been aware since the Persian Gulf War of the prowess of the American armed forces against the Iraqi Army. It understood then, during that momentous time in history, the urgent need to modernize the Chinese armed forces – much as the Stalin-era Soviet military and political leadership were both impressed with and fearful of the modernization of the emergent Nazi armed forces (Wehrmacht), which included army, air force, and navy echelons.^[8] It can be argued unequivocally that Stalin saw the need to prepare for a major regional war with fascist Germany, just as the Chinese leadership is aware that eventually it will have to wage war against the United States (US). Unless their American adversary implodes from within, leaving disparate fiefdoms across its landscape, or a new military leadership develops within the United States because of a sophisticated insurrection or military coup and a Second American Civil War ensues. We argue that there remains a danger of a war between the two nation-states.^[9] An America with a fascist government and military hierarchy whose ultimate political desire is to destroy socialist China, despite the possibility of thermonuclear war, is still a possibility.^[10]

The Chinese leaders were undoubtedly grim in their early analysis of what awaited them: if they were not prepared to solidify their armed forces with the capability to withstand violent dissent within their borders as well as to fight a war beyond the Great Wall of China, then their demise or ruin was inevitable. Arguably, the Chinese leadership has looked closely at the decisions made prior to the Second World War by Stalin and the Soviet political leadership. Although eager to strike first against the armies of Hitler, Stalin found himself unable to undertake a “first strike” as Lenin had advocated, and tragedy ensued with the loss of 29–30 million Soviet military and civilian lives during the Great Patriotic War.^[11] The Chinese leadership is more than aware of what almost mortally wounded the Soviet Union: namely the failure of the Soviet military leadership to prepare quickly enough by modernizing the armed forces in time and by creating a defensive border force that could have blunted more quickly the Nazi tanks and the thousands of German troops that crossed the Minsk or Pripet Marshes through Poland, and which tore through the heart of Soviet Russia.^[12] The Communist leadership of China knows that if it is not ready to confront the United States, let alone its secondary adversary, India, then it is gambling with its very existence. President Xi and his military council members are not gamblers when it comes to war; they are strategists, who know that to keep Heaven, you have to fight for it. On September 1, 2008, in his speech at Central Party School, it was Xi Jinping who confidently declared that now CPC was a “ruling party” instead of being a “revolutionary party.”^[13] Alternatively, we can well assume that Xi’s “conceptual complexity” is considerably low and is fully determined in the “belief in ability to control events.”^[14]

In our analysis of the contemporary military prowess of the People’s Republic of China, we address the issues not much through a dogmatic application of military theory but instead by looking at recent essays or articles that have arrived at certain conclusions or made particular observations regarding the Chinese military infrastructure. Nevertheless, understanding that even the observations in these journals or periodicals that we cited are not facts set in stone, the military theory will keep on gaining buoyancy to strengthen the analysis. In his early years, Mao Zedong would quote authors, philosophers, and poets in his military theory and allude to them in his poetry when writing about military periods in his own life, without losing the inner core of his final analysis of the art of war as he perceived it during and after the Chinese Revolution.^[15]

2 Restructuring and enhanced capabilities

In terms of the substance of the PLA Army, it is undergoing a creative buildup, meaning that its military commanders are more focused on quality troops than on simple numbers of servicemen and servicewomen on the battlefield. Regarding China’s military modernization, it was noted that (Figure 1):

The army is the largest service and was long considered the most important, but its prominence has waned as Beijing seeks to develop an integrated fighting force with first-rate naval and air capabilities. As the other services expanded, the army shrunk to around 975,000 troops, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Reforms have focused on streamlining its top-heavy command structure; creating smaller, more agile units; and empowering lower-level commanders. The army is also upgrading its weapons. Its lightweight Type 15 tank, for example, came into service in 2018 and allows for engagement in high-altitude areas, such as Tibet.^[16]

Figure 1

An illustration of PLA’s major ground deployments.

We imply that the Chinese military^[17] command is more concerned with smaller infantry units and creating lighter tanks (bringing to mind the light French tanks that could outrun the heavier German tanks during the invasion of 1940, but which lacked their firepower). But such light tanks will not necessarily be a powerful weapon against the more powerful American, technologically advanced tanks. These light tanks are not on par with the modern Russian T-14 Armata, which is “based on a modular combat platform, which can also serve as a basis for other armoured variants such as heavy infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) and armoured personnel carrier (APC).”^[18] However, the PLA has a powerful heavy tank that is equal in fighting power to the T-90 or the American M1A2 SEP Abrams tank, in that “In comparison to older Chinese-made tanks, the MBT has improved capabilities in terms of protection, power and mobility. It has a crew of three. ZTZ 99 was made to compete with western tanks, while its technology is used to improvise the more economical ZTZ 96. Regiments in China’s Shenyang and Beijing military areas currently deploy the MBT Z.”^[19] What is factual in terms of actual combat experience is that the Russian T-72 and T-90 tanks have seen major combat just as the American Abrams tank has, whereas the Russian T-14 Armata and the Chinese ZTZ-96 have not been properly put to the test yet on the world’s battlefields. We therefore observe that the decisive factor will be the readiness of the PLA, with its modernized air force and navy giving support both in retreat and offensive attacks, depending on what the context requires at a given moment.

Just over a few years ago, the US Department of Defense (DoD) was quoted by the Brookings Institute recalling its report of 20 years earlier:

DoD’s 2000 report assessed that the PLA was slowly and unevenly adapting to the trends in modern warfare. The PLA’s force structure and capabilities focused largely on waging large-scale land warfare along China’s borders. The PLA’s ground, air, and naval forces were sizable but mostly obsolete. Its conventional missiles were generally of short range and modest accuracy. The PLA’s emergent cyber capabilities were rudimentary; its use of information technology was well behind the curve; and its nominal space capabilities were based on outdated technologies for the day.^[20]

In this description of the capabilities of the PLA, there was almost a complete dismissal of the fighting ability of the Chinese infantrymen, which should have included an evaluation of its Marine Special Forces. The report had implied that the PLA was basically a mainland Chinese army whose mission was to defend or wage war along its borders and went on to belittle the PLA further by stating with a certain arrogance that:

Even if the PRC could produce or acquire modern weapons, the PLA lacked the joint organizations and training needed to field them effectively. The report assessed that the PLA’s organizational obstacles were severe enough that if left unaddressed they would “inhibit the PLA’s maturation into a world-class military force.”^[21]

However, Brookings noted, the latest DoD report acknowledged that:

The PRC has marshalled the resources, technology, and political will over the past two decades to strengthen and modernize the PLA in nearly every respect.^[22]

Benjamin Brimelow likewise acknowledged the reforms and wrote, with less bellicose language and more precision:

China’s 11 military regions were restructured into five, the ballistic-missile force became its own branch of the armed forces, and the PLA marine corps, which had been disbanded in 1957, was re-established.

Xi also created the PLA’s Strategic Support Force to support the PLA’s cyber warfare, space warfare, and electronic warfare operations, and the Joint Staff Department, which acts as a command organ between all branches of the PLA and the CMC. Also, “Xi has increased the PLA’s budget in an effort to create a world-class military by the year 2050. China is now the second biggest spender on defense in the world, behind the US, and the largest in Asia.”^[23] It was noted that in 2020 alone, China had an increment of almost 12 billion USD to its defence budget (Figure 2).^[24]

Figure 2

The steadily growing China’s defence budget.

What we imply in the above quote is^[25] that China’s CPC leadership and its military leadership are not standing by idly waiting to be destroyed by outside or indeed enemies from within. It is instead advancing – slowly but steadily – in creating an army, air force, and navy that will equal and eventually exceed the present US armed forces in their sophistication, readiness, and deadliness. While the American army, air force, and navy comprise volunteers, the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China are conscripted and are doctrinally trained so that they have a serious commitment to the health and sovereignty of Chinese motherland. The history of the Chinese Armed Forces is still imbued with the aspirations of the military virtues of the era of Mao, although the principles have been changed in accordance with the context of the present period of world history. It would be naïve to think that Chinese troops have the same divisions, disunity, and deep racism that continue to exist within the modern US Army.^[26] Even though, there are thousands of American military personnel, men and women who are sincerely dedicated to the preservation of the United States, despite dissent within the ranks as revealed by the attempted insurrection on January 6, 2021.^[27] There were active and former military men and women involved in the violent acts at the Capitol, a clear signal of disunity within the American armed forces as well, although the National Guard seemed committed to preventing the Trump regime from gaining the initiative in creating a populist fascist government (Figure 3).

Figure 3

An illustration of PLA Air Force and PLA Navy deployments.

It is with great caution that we would like to make an observation that China’s navy, which has now assumed ascendancy as the world’s largest navy, is not necessarily totally capable of defending mainland China or defeating its adversaries on the high seas. However, the American newspaper, The New York Times, has been calm in its assessment of Chinese naval power, explaining it in a balanced way (Figure 4):

A modernization program focused on naval and missile forces has shifted the balance of power in the Pacific in ways the United States and its allies are only beginning to digest. While China lags in projecting firepower on a global scale, it can now challenge American military supremacy in the places that matter most to it: the waters around Taiwan and in the disputed South China Sea. That means a growing section of the Pacific Ocean – where the United States has operated unchallenged since the naval battles of World War II – is once ^[28]again contested territory, with Chinese warships and aircraft regularly bumping up against those of the United States and its allies.^[29]

Figure 4

An illustration of PLA Navy’s major deployments and inventory.

We would say that although the PLA Navy has carried out great improvements in its bolstering of its aircraft carriers, anti-missile ships, guided missile warships, and nuclear submarines, it still lags seriously behind the US Navy in terms of quality naval ships, partly because it has yet to achieve strike capabilities comparable to the Seawolf and Virginia class submarines that the United States has not only in the Pacific region, but also in other far-off oceans^[30] and seas as well.^[31] We would suggest that perhaps the strategic goal of the Chinese Navy high command is to create large quantities of submarines so as to defeat a potential adversary with more advanced submarine technology. We are reminded in this instance of how Soviet tank designers were able to create and mass-produce T-34 tanks which moved faster on the battlefield and were able to withstand enemy shell hits because of their unique cup-turret design and sloped armour. Although the T-34 was not as sophisticated as the Panzerkampfwagen V or Panther and Tiger tanks created by the German military engineers during the Second World War, Soviet engineers – like modern China’s military engineers – were pragmatic in their weapon designs.^[32] In any case, the two nations, the United States and the People’s Republic of China, may engage as naval powers in a battle of wills over the disputed islands in the Paracels, and a major naval battle there in the future will decide who not only controls the South China Sea but also all the Pacific Ocean territories as well.

We have attempted in this article to cover the probabilities or capabilities of the People’s Republic of China’s emerging military strength, which we would more modestly call military maturity rather than being “world class.” It is its modern missile capabilities which we think will be the major deciding factor should a Third World War break out. The American journalist that we mentioned earlier in this article, Brimelow, said this about Chinese missile capabilities:

The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) has become one of the most intimidating missile forces in the world. China never signed the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and was never subject to its limits, so it has been free to invest heavily in ballistic missiles.^[33]

It is the powerful and continual growth of high-velocity and long-range ballistic missiles within the Chinese arsenal, including the in-depth deployment of intercontinental missiles across mainland China, that the United States, as well as its allies, should actually fear, because it is missile firepower with nuclear warheads that will be the deciding factor should a Third World War emerge on the world’s stage. It is to be remembered here that China’s Second Artillery Force was so capable, and its role was so crucial that it transformed into PLARF.^[34]

3 Active defence – A new military doctrine and strategic thought

In May 2015, the Chinese State Council Information Office issued an important document calling for “Active Defence,”^[35] that highlighted the basic contours of PLA military strategy.^[36] The above-mentioned reorganization and restructuring of the PLA was actually carried out by the virtue of such a military doctrine that attested China’s historical strategic thought and Mao’s concepts. Later, in July 2019, another official publication clarified China’s military strategic thought, as it clearly acknowledged that the “Global Military Competition Is Intensifying.”^[37] It was noted that with the publication of “Chinese People’s Liberation Army Joint Operations Outline (中国人民解放军联合作战纲要(试行)” in November 2020, the PLA prepared itself for the “joint operations, combat support, national defense mobilization, and political work.”^[38] Alternatively, it is safe to assume that with such a doctrinal awakening and strategic thought, the PLA is truly poised to become a “world-class” armed force by 2049. The latter was advocated by President Xi in his 2017 speech at the 19th Party Congress.^[39]

4 Analysis and afterthought

The contest for military ascendancy or military parity is not simply a competition between the United States and China, as there are multiple other rivalries across the world’s continents. As China, Russia, and other nation-states in the Middle East and South America continue to resist the American hegemonic project for economic and military superiority, the political and military tensions will increase between these two major competing forces. Also, because of various other international social factors, including the breakdown of cultural and economic structures that the pandemic in 2020 destroyed on a worldwide basis, there will be a desire to assert the hitherto hidden agenda for emerging nation-states’ independence rather than submitting to the status quo of the self-destructive imperialist powers. A boldness will emerge in which these nation-states will no longer want to be second-best to Western Europe or to North America.

Since the Long March, in which the nucleus of the PLA emerged under the guidance of Chairman, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, the first Premier of the People’s Republic of China, there have been at times both steps forward and reversals in terms of the qualitative and quantitative achievements that China’s military strength represents. China showed its resilience and determination in fighting American military forces during the Korean War, revealing that its troops were not intimidated by American troops. Later, during the Vietnam War, Chinese military advisers played a major role in strategy and tactics in helping General Giap and his field commanders to fight a sophisticated war of independence against US military forces, particularly at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. In 2014, a retired Vietnamese Professor, Dao Nguyen Cat, was interviewed by the Xinhua news agency, and “on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of Vietnam’s victory in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, Cat said that with the rare support of Chinese forces, the Vietnamese troops were able to successfully drive away the French colonial forces from the province of Dien Bien Phu, 300 km northwest of the capital Hanoi.”^[40] Professor Cat, who served as an official of Vietnam’s Central Propaganda Committee at Dien Bien Phu Campaign, was quoted as saying “Definitely without China’s support, we would have failed to defeat the French colonial masters… They not only gave training courses from the command posts but also went directly to the battlefield to talk with our soldiers. They supplied Vietnam not only weapons but also with food ….”^[41] The military advisers and military supplies given by the leadership of the PLA at that time in history, regarding the Vietnam War, known by the Vietnamese people as The American War, reveal that Chinese leadership was moving forward in honing their military skills beyond their borders.

The reversal of military progress came during the 1960s and late 1970s in the form of territorial disputes. First, in March 1969, there was a military clash between the Soviet Union and China: a 7-month undeclared military conflict that occurred near Zhenbao (Damansky) Island on the Ussuri (Wusuli) River, near Manchuria.^[42] The conflict between the two Communist nation-states would eventually result in a ceasefire, which led to a return to the status quo; however, a balanced history is yet to be written on how the two parties viewed each other as ideological threats, all this taking place during the period of the Cultural Revolution. Second, the Sino-Vietnamese War was a border war fought between China and Vietnam in early 1979. Rightly or wrongly, China created an offensive attack in response to Vietnam’s actions against the Khmer Rouge in 1978, ending the dominance of the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge. What is regrettable but not surprising is that two socialist nation-states were unable through diplomacy to decide how to end their dispute regarding the Khmer Rouge’s various mistakes in its destruction of thousands of lives that could have contributed to the Communist cause in Southeast Asia. However, China then began to gain influence, sending economic aid and military advisors to Africa, including Cuba and Venezuela – which reveals the wise and ancient observation by Sun Tzu who said “To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” The CPC knows how to achieve a military strategy without going to war.

5 Sino-Indian Clash in Ladakh

In May 2020, there was an actual hand-to-hand struggle between Chinese and Indian troops at locations along the Sino-Indian border, including near the disputed Pangong Lake in Ladakh and the Tibet Autonomous Region, and near the border between Sikkim and the Tibet Autonomous Region. During the last days of May 2020, Chinese forces objected to Indian road construction in the Galwan River valley, and there then ensued violent verbal exchanges between the two military camps, resulting in deaths and taking of prisoners on both sides. Although we will not attempt to describe in any detail how each side viewed the territorial dispute, we will say that the complexities between China and India only reinforce why China is so protective of its borders and why India has chosen the United States as its major ally. We have read similar accounts in ancient historical texts: Thucydides wrote about it in The War of The Peloponnesians And The Athenians, therefore we should not be surprised that in our own day, these small conflicts can lead to greater military buildup and to territorial jealousies which ensnare two parties or various parties into an eventual war that cannot be quelled, but which rather leads to disaster.

6 Conclusion

It would not be ambitious to conclude that the transformation of the PLA from a purely peasant force to a fully functional and highly structured armed force was a landmark event of the twentieth century. However, its current restructuring and modernization is one of the key milestones that would have a decisive impact on China’s role in the international affairs. It is worthy to note that the PLA with all of its branches and specialized units has emerged to be a contender and comparable to any world-class armed force. Surely, because of the PLA’s enhanced capabilities and structural reformation, the Sino-American strategic rivalry is taking much hike or perhaps unnecessary attention. However, it is a fact that enhanced capabilities along with overtly aggressive military doctrines from both sides is heating up the temperature in the Asia-Pacific. It is incumbent upon both parties to maintain hotlines and carefully observe rules of engagement to prevent any miscalculation and inadvertent escalation.

It can be assessed and estimated that in the post-COVID-19 world, the Sino-American cooperation and coordination would be of pivotal importance. The role of both armed forces in delivering relief would also be a one of its kind event. However, such a hypothetical scenario could transform the fate of many nations and states.

In conclusion, it is worthy to quote the eminent Marxist historian, Domenico Losurdo, who wrote about the People’s Republic of China that “The foundations of the People’s Republic of China, following an epic national liberation struggle, certainly did not result in an immediate end to the situation of danger.”^[43] However, the Chinese PLA successfully challenged the US hegemony in Asia, and for its resisting role during the Korean War, the US General Douglas MacArthur suggested “to drop fifty atomic bombs” on Chinese urban population.^[44] This makes clear that the epic struggle of the modern Chinese people and the PLA has not yet reached its zenith in world history.