Langley’s Great Escape

The year 2022 marks the centennial of the commissioning and the first launchings and landings of aircraft from the US Navy’s first aircraft carrier – the USS Langley. Built as the collier Jupiter a decade earlier, this ship was selected for conversion in 1919 to provide an experimental platform to develop an operational capability for naval aviation to support the battleship-centric fleet. During the ensuing 15 years, Langley not only served as an incubator for flight deck procedures that continue in the fleet today, but also became an operational asset as demonstrated during fleet problems when her planes, in addition to providing scouting services for the battle line, added a new offensive dimension through the use of dive bombers and aircraft designed to deliver torpedoes.^[1]

With more capable purpose-built aircraft carriers joining the fleet in the late 1930s, the Navy peeled back Langley’s forward flight deck and changed the ship’s mission to support the new PBY Catalina seaplanes that were entering service. Following participation in Fleet Problems in her new role in both the Central Pacific and the Caribbean, two sojourns to Alaska to establish new seaplane facilities, and presence at the opening of the New York’s World’s Fair in May 1939, Langley returned to her home port of San Diego. It proved to be a short layover. Confronting an assertive Japan in the Western Pacific, the US deployed Langley to Pearl Harbor in mid-July 1939. Less than 2 months later, triggered by the German invasion of Poland, the commanding officer of Langley, Cdr. Arthur C. Davis received orders to redeploy to the US Naval Base at Cavite near Manila to support a PBY squadron – VP-21 – that was also sent to the Philippines.

The arrival of the Catalinas, supported by Langley, expanded the Asiatic Fleet commander, Adm. Thomas C. Hart’s ability to track Japanese activities throughout the region. To further support an aggressive maritime patrol operation, the Navy converted the post-World War I vintage destroyers Childs and William B. Preston along with the World War I-era minesweeper Heron to support the Asiatic Fleet seaplane force.^[2]

Hart, embarked in Augusta, arrived in Manila on November 25 following months of observing the Sino-Japanese conflict close-up. There, he caught his first glimpse of Langley.

At the time of Augusta’s arrival, Langley and VP-21 were still officially homeported at Pearl Harbor, having been surged forward with the start of war in Europe. In February that forward surge became permanent as the two units were reassigned to Cavite as their new permanent base.^[3]

In June 1940, Cdr. Frank Dechant Wagner reported aboard not only to relieve Davis of command of Langley, but also to take charge as Commander Aircraft, Asiatic Fleet.^[4] With Wagner taking command, events on the other side of the Eurasian continent affected the local geopolitical situation. The German blitzkrieg that began with the invasion of Holland and Belgium on May 10, 1940, led to the fall of France in June. Now, Britain stood alone in the fight against Germany and prepared for a potential invasion presaged by an aerial assault. Needless to say, European garrisons within the Netherlands East Indies, French Indochina, Singapore, and Hong Kong could not expect reinforcements. Making the situation further precarious for the Americans were ongoing negotiations for a Tripartite Pact, signed by Japan, Germany, and Italy on September 27, 1940. With Chinese forces continuing the struggle against Japanese armies on the mainland, concerns of Japanese intentions with regards to the Philippines were only heightened with the capture of a Japanese “spy” on Langley on the evening of October 17 following the intruder’s swim out from the beach and climbing aboard.^[5] Given the increasing tensions, the Americans sent additional aircraft to bolster Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s and Hart’s forces.

In December, just promoted Captain Wagner’s responsibilities increased with the arrival of VP-26 from Hawaii. With the arrival of the second Catalina Squadron, VP-21 and VP-26 were redesignated to VP-101 and VP-102. The two squadrons were combined with a utility squadron of five single engine seaplanes to form Patrol Wing Ten. Wagner would be assigned command of this new organization while retaining his hats in command of Langley and continuing to serve as Hart’s subordinate as Commander Air Squadrons, Asiatic Fleet. With the doubling of size of the Catalina contingent, patrol flights increased over the waters of the East and South China Seas, tracking the movements of Japanese forces.^[6]

With war planners forecasting the Japanese seizure of the Philippines at the onset of war, Langley set about making that task a bit more difficult through the distribution of materials to support resistance throughout the archipelago. Electricians Mate 2/c Granville D. Porter recalled spending much time in 1941 in the Sulu Islands anchored at Tawi-Tiwi Bay located near the northeastern tip of Borneo. There, Langley served as a floating hotel for the PBY aircrews that took off from Sangley Point and ventured out over the South China Sea to track Japanese ship movements. During the transits between Manila and Tawi-Tawi, Langley called at various Philippine ports, including Iloilo, Cebu City, and Zamboanga.^[7]

The port calls came to a brief halt when Langley eased into the “Dewey Dock” located at Subic Bay. The 500 foot long, 132 foot wide floating dry dock had been a fixture at Subic Bay’s Olongapo Naval Station for 35 years where it played a critical role in keeping the obsolescent ships that had been assigned to the Western Pacific in service.^[8]

As Langley spent much of July 1941 high and dry, talks between the Vichy French and Japan led to French acquiescence to the Japanese occupation of Indo-China. With Japan brushing aside subsequent American demands for withdrawal from the Southeast Asia that were backed with a boycott of iron, steel, and oil exports, tensions increased. In September 1941, Cdr. Felix B. Stump assumed command of Langley. Prior to arriving in the Far East, Stump had served a year between June 1940 and June 1941 as the Executive Officer of Enterprise. Looking forward to having his own command, he opened a letter from the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, Rear Adm. John Towers who queried him about Langley. Stump, cognizant of the deteriorating relationship with Japan admitted:

I could see the war coming on and I didn’t want to be out there in the Langley. So I wrote back and told him that while I wouldn’t choose the Langley as my first choice, that I was delighted at the opportunity to be captain of the Langley and thanked him for his confidence and that was that.^[9]

Stump relieved Wagner only as the commander of Langley. Wagner retained command of Patrol Wing Ten, served as Commander Aircraft, Asiatic Fleet, and served as Stump’s reporting senior.^[10] Of course, Wagner’s immediate boss was Hart. Stump had been forewarned that Hart could be difficult to work for. However, within a week of arriving, the old man had him join him alone for an amiable meal at the Manila Hotel. Reflecting after the war, Stump observed: “I guess he did crucify some people that deserved crucifixion, but I never worked with anyone I admired more.”^[11] Reading the tea leaves Hart expressed to Wagner and Stump that war would be forthcoming and took measures to protect his nominal combat power. For Wagner and Stump, this meant dispersing the Asiatic Fleet’s four seaplane tenders throughout the Philippine islands.^[12]

In late November, the Catalinas began to look for upticks in Japanese activity in the East and South China Seas. Beginning on December 2, they noted a combination of 20 Japanese merchant ships and troop transports at Cam Ranh Bay which were subsequently bolstered with cruisers and destroyers. On December 4, they had departed, later spotted by British patrol aircraft based in Singapore moving west across the Gulf of Thailand. Meanwhile, other US Navy patrol aircraft began to encounter Japanese aircraft patrolling off Luzon.^[13]

As more contact reports filtered in, Stump maneuvered Langley past the protective minefields and the fortifications at Corregidor that protected Manila Bay to take on fuel. Stump recalled: “I had orders to get my gasoline alongside the gasoline dock and then get away from the dock as fast as possible.”^[14]

Thanks to the International Date Line, for the Philippines, Sunday December 7 would not be a day of infamy. That afternoon, Admiral Hart enjoyed a round of golf with his Chief of Staff Rear Adm. William R. Parnell, at the Manila Golf Club. Working late in that evening at their ashore headquarters, the two men returned to their apartments at the Manila Hotel a short distance away. At 3:00 a.m. the following morning, Hart’s phone rang. Picking up the handset, Hart heard the duty officer explain he had a message he needed to bring over. A few minutes elapsed. When the duty officer arrived, Hart read the following words: “Air Raid on Pearl Harbor. This is no Drill.” Hart immediately drafted a message to the Asiatic Fleet: “Japan started Hostilities. Govern yourselves accordingly.”^[15]

In those predawn hours, Langley was moored off Sangley Point, the peninsula that jutted out across from the Cavite Naval Station. QM 1/c Walter Frumerie took Hart’s message from the Radio Shack to the commanding officer’s cabin and with some trepidation, knocked on Captain Stump’s door. Awakened, Stump gruffly called out: “What is it?”^[16] With knowledge of the commencement of hostilities, Stump’s next visitor was the Officer of the Deck who told his commanding officer that Captain Wagner had summoned him. Donning his uniform, Stump took a short boat ride rushed over to Wagner’s headquarters on Sangley Point. Wagner told him to anticipate getting the ship underway. Stump rushed back to the ship to set the wheels in motion. His first step was to recall crew members who had been billeted ashore in an old school building at the Cavite Naval Station. There, a master-at-arms attempted to roust a second-class radioman who had just stood the night shift with news the Japanese were now hostile. The sleepy sailor retorted: “Can’t you just hold them off until reveille?”^[17]

Of note, at daybreak, the first naval unit to feel the wrath of the Rising Sun was anchored well to the south off Davao on the south east coast of Mindanao. Japanese aircraft off the Japanese light carrier Ryujo attacked the William B. Preston. While two aircraft moored alongside were destroyed, the former flush deck destroyer escaped undamaged and departed to find a safer haven. However, similar early morning strikes against American military and naval facilities up on Luzon were delayed due to zero visibility at Japanese airfields in Formosa. Ironically, the weather delay worked to the advantage of the Japanese as a general alarm at Clark Field sent American fighters airborne in the morning. They had landed and were being serviced when a wave of enemy aircraft arrived. The attacking Japanese pilots destroyed 12 B-17 Flying and 30 P-40 Warhawks, effectively denuding MacArthur of his air power.^[18]

In Manila, there would be little sign that war had broken out that day. The bad weather on Formosa forced the Japanese to cancel a planned attack on naval facilities in and around the bay. Given the distance of Manila from Formosa, Hart took advantage of the respite to order vulnerable targets such as Langley and oilers Pecos and Trinity south to safety. Besides recalling his crew, Stump rushed to collect provisions that had been awaiting ashore for his ship. Receiving a call from one of his officers who had been sent to Manila to pick up requisitioned life rafts and other supplies, Stump learned that the depot supply officer refused to release the materials as proper paperwork was not available. The Langley skipper exploded: “Well, you go in and tell him that if I can’t get that stuff – that war has broken out, and that we are at war now, and the paperwork doesn’t matter, and if I can’t get that stuff I’ll send a detachment of Marines and take it away from him!” The materials arrived in time for Langley’s departure.^[19]

At 4:52 p.m., tugs pulled the oiler Trinity from her berth to join Langley and Pecos and two submarines on a course to clear Manila Bay. Before departing, Langley’s skipper studied the charts that plotted the location of the minefields. “My orders were to go out through the minefield without a pilot,” recalled Stump. With the departure timed so that the small flotilla would pass through the minefield at dusk, Stump was apprehensive, “I studied the chart of the minefield. There was a buoy we had to hit, an unlighted buoy, which was, if I remember correctly, one mile from the entrance of the minefield.” Sighting the buoy, Stump knew the course to clear the minefields, otherwise he would have to reverse course back to Cavite.^[20]

With Langley in the van, the three slow auxiliaries and two submarines plodded ahead past Corregidor some forty-three and a half years after Admiral Dewey had steamed past in the opposite direction to engage the Spanish Navy. Once past Corregidor, the destroyers John D. Ford and Pope steamed up to serve as escorts. Slowing his advance, Stump ordered the two destroyers ahead to look for the buoy. When it became apparent that they had failed to spot the marker, Stump ordered them back. Slowly advancing into the darkness, Stump took a looking position on one side of the bridge and his navigator peered out from the opposite side. “Fortunately I had a big long flashlight,” recalled Stump, “and we picked it up within 50 yards of us, so we went through and led the rest of them through the minefield.”^[21]

Once through the formation, the submarines detached to conduct other assignments. Stump ordered John D. Ford and Pope to screening positions 2,000 yards ahead to Langley’s port and star bow, and the five-ship formation steamed on a south/southeast heading along the coast of Luzon at a ten-knot pace. By early morning, they entered the Verde passage between Luzon and Mindoro and turned south along the east coast of Mindoro toward the Tablas Strait. Having cleared that passage, at about 1445 on December 9, Langley’s lookouts spotted the cruisers Boise and Houston and their escorts, the destroyers Paul Jones and Barker approaching dead ahead. John D. Ford and Pope handed over their charges and turned back to Manila to escort another escaping flotilla scheduled to depart the next day.^[22]

With Rear Adm. William A. Glassford embarked in Houston, Captain Stump relinquished his designation as the Senior Officer Present Afloat (SOPA). Following the rendezvous, Houston led a column formation with the two destroyers steaming abeam to guard against undersea attack. With the Visayas off in the distance on the port side, Langley, Pecos, and Trinity and their new escorts steamed toward the Sulu Sea en route to Balikpapan Bay on the East Coast of Borneo.

Steaming at night through Sulu Sea, Langley’s four 3 inch anti-aircraft guns suddenly opened up on a celestial target. A few hundred yards away on the bridge of the Pecos, the Commanding Officer, Cdr. E. Paul Abernethy and his Filipino steward assessed the situation. His steward quizzically asked: “Captain, who for Langley shoot at Venus.” On the Langley’s flight deck, Gunnery Warrant Officer H. E. Anderson, noting the target angle of the bright overhead object was not changing, came to the same realization. Langley’s guns fell quiet.^[23]

That Langley’s crew being jittery about the potency of Japanese naval aviation was well justified. Following the shocking loss of the American battle line at Pearl Harbor, news of the Japanese air assault on the Royal Navy’s Force Z, sinking Prince of Wales and Repulse on December 10, only served to reinforce the revolutionary nature of air power.^[24]

Given the effectiveness of Japanese naval aviation against two heavily armed British capital ships, it’s not difficult to imagine the vulnerability of an aircraft tender, two oilers, and four combatant escorts transiting the Sulu Sea. However, the concentration of Japanese naval activity off Malaya and Luzon assured the safety of the small American flotilla that bore on toward the Celebes Sea east of Borneo. The only threat appeared on the distant horizon late on the 10th as Langley lookouts caught a glimpse of something ominous. Stump recalled: “I was in a position where I could see something they (Houston and Boise) couldn’t see. Over to the westward, up against the clouds, I could see the distant silhouettes of warships.” Stump sent the sighting report to Glassford. The rear admiral veered his combatants in the direction of what appeared to be a cruiser and destroyer but took no action, earning the resentment of many in the crew embarked in Houston. Looking back decades later, historian John Prados questioned the veracity of the sighting, given the known location of Japanese surface combatants at the time. However, if the sighting was true, Prados forgave Glassford for any hesitancy to engage. To close would have meant a night engagement where the Japanese would prove more proficient. More significant, such a duel would alert other Japanese forces in the region of the escaping Americans.^[25]

Once in the Celebes Sea, Glassford broke off with his cruisers to circle back north to escort another group of escaping ships. Captain Stump, as the SOPA, reassumed command and the small flotilla passed into the Makassar Strait between Borneo and Celebes on December 13. Pecos and escort Paul Jones departed the convoy for Balikpapan for fuel and the remaining ships joined up with the old cruiser Marblehead and followed, arriving at Balikpapan on the morning of the 14th. As Trinity took on oil, Langley and Marblehead anchored out in the harbor. By the end of the day, the second escaping flotilla from Manila had arrived with their cruiser and destroyer escorts. Over the next 2 days, other refugee ships of the Asiatic Fleet arrived to receive a gulp of fuel with the aircraft tenders William B. Preston and Heron arriving on the 16th.^[26]

On the afternoon of December 16, as Langley and Trinity escorted by Marblehead and the destroyers Stewart and Parrott departed Balikpapan and headed south to Java. Whereas the other smaller aircraft tenders would operate in and around Java for the next few weeks to support the operation of Patrol Wing Ten, the former aircraft carrier was considered too vulnerable to air attack and thus continued on to Australia.^[27]

En route, the escaping formation stopped at Surabaja (Surabaya) on the northern coast of East Java. For the local population, the arrival of the American ships seemed a Godsend. Langley radio electrician Charles Snay recalled the Dutch ex-patriots “all considered themselves saved now that a United States carrier was in port.” Though the departure of Langley probably caused renewed concern, the arrival of Rear Admiral Glassford in Houston to establish an advanced command post at Surabaja must have provided some reassurance. Meanwhile, the supporting service base would be placed at Darwin, Australia, hundreds of miles to the southeast.^[28]

As the new year arrived at Darwin, Australia, so too did Langley. Also on that first day, Admiral Hart emerged from the submarine USS Shark at Surabaja. With Hart’s arrival from Manila, the need for military cooperation between the United States, Australia, and the colonial powers of Britain and the Netherlands whose government now lay in exile in London was obvious. Integrating staffs and command reporting responsibilities proved challenging, but on January 15, American, British, Dutch, Australian Command (ABDACOM) was activated under the overall command of Field Marshall Sir Archibald Wavell with Admiral Hart being designated as the naval component commander. To assist with air operations, Hart detached Stump, who had just clipped on eagle collar devices at the start of the year, from Langley to join his staff. Stump’s relief, Cdr. Robert P. McConnell, fleeted up from the executive officer billet. McConnell had joined Langley the previous June.^[29]

Having escaped from the Philippines, McConnell and Langley coordinated with the Royal Australian Air Force to support anti-submarine patrols off the northern coast of Australia. Besides servicing a few remaining PBY Catalinas from Patrol Wing Ten, Langley also maintained a complement of SOC Seagulls, O2SU Kingfishers, and J2F Ducks. One notable success story would be the role Langley’s aircraft played in sinking the large mine-laying submarine I-124.

On January 20, Trinity evaded three torpedoes fired by the I-123 as the oiler approached Darwin. Reacting, the Royal Australian Navy dispatched three corvettes with Langley aircraft providing overhead surveillance. With I-123 having cleared the area, the Australians came upon I-124 which fired a torpedo at the HMAS Deloraine. Evading the war shot, the corvette dropped depth charges and noted evidence of oil and bubbles. Additional depth charges forced the Japanese submarine to broach the surface, and another depth charge blast combined with a bomb dropped from a Langley Kingfisher near the conning tower proved to be fatal as the submarine descended for one final time.^[30]

Unfortunately, such victories were rare in early 1942. With the British desiring to defend Singapore, the Dutch wanting to retain Java, and the Australians concerned about defending their own homeland, the allies were spread thin across a long defensive line that covered hundreds of islands and thousands of miles. The Japanese, having secured a network of airfields across the region, could concentrate air and naval power and strike at will – which they did.

Samuel Eliot Morison labeled the Japanese strategic plan “The Octopus” in which the enemy could extend tentacles down on targets of their choosing by pursuing a deliberate piecemeal strategy to secure the crown jewel of the Dutch East Indies by capturing positions to the west and east of the island. To the west, the Japanese 25th Army continued to push down the Malay Peninsula toward Singapore which would fall on February 15. With the British defenders fighting for Singapore’s survival, the Japanese were free to put troops ashore across the strait on Sumatra on February 13 to eventually establish an airbase at Palembang and secure additional oil fields, approximately 250 miles to the northwest of Batavia (present day Jakarta) on the western end of Java. A week later the Japanese occupied Bali located off the east end of Java and seized Timor located several hundred miles further east. Located northwest of Darwin, Timor straddled air and sea passages to the besieged Dutch island.^[31]

Looking at the situation from Washington, President Roosevelt, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, and Adm. Ernest King recognized the checkmate. Relations between the allied commanders in the southwestern Pacific in the face of continuing operational reverses – the standard euphemism for defeat – were hardly cordial. Hart and Rear Adm. Karl Doorman of the Royal Netherlands Navy often disagreed with Doorman being the more cautious. In Washington, the Netherlands Ambassador, arguing on behalf of Hubertus van Mook, the senior minister in the Dutch East Indies, passionately argued that since the survival of Java was at stake, command of the allied sea forces needed to come under Dutch control. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill supported the Dutch position. Roosevelt relented despite his realization that Java was a lost cause. Furthermore, his close advisor Harry Hopkins, who chaired the Munition Assignments Board, committed to send 35 Army Air Force fighters to Java by the close of February with additional 64 planes to arrive in March. Unfortunately, the politics of inter-allied cooperation would portend grave consequences for Langley and other American naval forces in the region.^[32]

The only reserve of allied fighters in the region was P-40s based in Australia. An initial attempt to reinforce the Dutch airfield in Java occurred in mid-January when Army pilots who had flown over the Philippines flew 17 P-40s in a long series of hops from northwestward Brisbane to the base at Blimbling – a distance of some 3,600 miles. Unfortunately, many of these aircraft were soon lost in combat, prompting the call for more planes. Between January 29 and February 11, three squadrons attempted to make the shuttle trip from Eastern Australia to Java. Flown by less experienced pilots, 60% of the aircraft were lost along the way.^[33]

Unfortunately, General Wavell as ABDACOM proceeded in early February under the illusion that help could be coming in the form of an American fleet carrier. Having made the request to the American Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington at the end of January, Wavell envisioned the carrier ferrying aircraft to Java and serving as the centerpiece of a multinational combat force that would operate from Darwin. During the second week of February, he misinterpreted a message from Washington that a carrier was forthcoming. However, with the loss of the battlefleet at Pearl Harbor on December 7 and the crippling of Saratoga on January 11 by Japanese submarine I-6, a diversion of one of the US Navy’s few remaining flattops to resupply Java would have left American positions in the Central Pacific horribly exposed. As subsequent cables from Washington recalibrated Wavell to understand no carrier would be heading his way, he took the initiative on February 9 to notify the Combined Chiefs of Staff that he intended to use the British aircraft transport ship Athene and Langley to haul badly needed aircraft to beleaguered Java.^[34]

To meet this commitment, Langley departed Darwin for Freemantle on February 11 leaving behind most of the aircraft she had been servicing behind at the northern Australian port. The move proved fortuitous for the moment. With Langley safely berthed in that western Australian port, on February 19, Darwin bore the brunt of a heavy Japanese air assault.^[35]

As the Japanese moved to seize islands to the flanks of Java, the Dutch colony’s last hope of holding depended on receipt of aircraft needed to defend the surrounding skies. Given the air bridge was becoming untenable, Java’s survival now depended on Langley delivering Army P-40 Warhawks with additional crated aircraft arriving in cargo ships. A day after the Langley had left Darwin, the American cargo ships Holbrook and Sea Witch, Australian cargo ships Duntroon and Katoomba, and the American cruiser Phoenix departed Melbourne. Of the 33 crated P-40s, 27 were loaded on the Sea Witch. After a 5-day cruise along the southern shores of Australia, the convoy arrived at Freemantle on February 19.^[36]

Thus, the plan envisioned Convoy MS-5 and Langley departing for Java with a cache of over 60 P-40s, their aircrews, ammunition, and the spare parts needed to keep the airplanes aloft. However, during the early days of February, the American and British assessment of the situation only grew more pessimistic. On February 14, Japanese forces landed near Palembang, Sumatra, some 200 miles northwest of the Western end of Java. Given the situation, Vice Admiral Glassford, the Commander of the US Naval Forces Southwest Pacific and Deputy Commander of ABDAFLOAT, decided to move his administrative headquarters to Tjilatjap on the southern Java coast. The next day, February 15, Singapore fell. Subsequently, Admiral Hart departed Java having been ordered home. This left Dutch Admiral Helfrich in command.^[37]

Seeing Java as a lost cause, General Wavell refocused on protecting the British Empire, especially India. Thus, 2 days after the fall of Singapore on February 17, the Deputy Commander of the Combined ABDA Command, American Lt. Gen. George H. Brett ordered convoy MS-5, which by then was a day away from Fremantle, to India. Wavell subsequently informed both his superiors in Washington and London of the move to divert the convoy on February 21.^[38]

Had that directive stood up, Langley today might have wound up in San Diego as a historic museum ship. However, on the day of the aircraft tender’s scheduled departure from Freemantle, Wavell received strong pushback from Dutch leaders during a conference on Java, and the Dutch government in exile in London and ambassador in Washington made the case to their British and American peers “that the situation in Java was not irretrievable.”^[39] Apparently, Dutch pressure in London and Washington swayed the political leadership to compromise, and news of the compromise was quickly transmitted to the waterfront. The war diary of Phoenix recorded that at the pre-sail meeting held on the 21st, it had been decided to send Langley and Sea Witch to Tjilatjap, Java without escort.^[40]

With orders to proceed to Java, the only question remained where would Langley and Sea Witch disembark their cargo. Having moved his administrative headquarters to Tjilatjap, Glassford envisioned the ships offloading their valuable cargoes, which would be towed through cleared streets to an open field where they would be flown off to airfields around the island.^[41]

Langley departed Freemantle on February 22 at mid-day. By the early afternoon, the India-bound MS-5 convoy consisting of the US Army Transport Willard A. Holbrook, the Australian troop transports Duntroon and Katoomba, and the Langley and Sea Witch surged westward at 12.5 knots in a column formation under the watchful guns of the cruiser Phoenix. After several hours, the column turned to the northwest toward the Asian subcontinent. The plan envisioned the two Java-bound ships to stay with the convoy until the 25th to deceive the Japanese of their destination. By changing course near the Cocos Islands, the chart track enabled the two ships to cover the northward dog leg toward Tjilatjap under the cover of darkness to arrive on the morning of the 28th.^[42]

The next 3 days proved uneventful. Mild weather and calm seas enabled Langley maintain a 13-knot speed of advance as McConnell’s officers of the deck executed a zigzag plan to foil any submarine torpedo targeting solutions. For main armament, McConnell’s ship depended on four recently installed 3 inch 50 caliber anti-aircraft guns and four ancient 5 inch 51 caliber deck guns only suited to fend off low-approaching torpedo planes.^[43]

Still on track to approach his destination under the cover of darkness, during the morning hours on February 26, Commander McConnell received news that the Dutch would be sending aircraft and the “destroyer” Willem van der Zaan to “act as escort.” Sure enough, that afternoon at 3 p.m., Langley’s lookouts spotted two Dutch Catalina aircraft. With one of the aircraft signaling that the surface escort was some 20 miles away on a westward bearing, McConnell adjusted the course accordingly. Upon rendezvous, McConnell discovered Willem van der Zaan was actually a 1,300-ton minesweeper with boiler problems that limited her speed of 10 knots. Realizing that a slower speed of advance would expose him to more daylight the following day, McConnell declined the Dutch escort offer and forged ahead on a zigzag pattern at 13 knots. However, during the evening, McConnell received a radio message from Vice Admiral Glassford that he took to be a directive to allow the Dutch Catalinas and the minesweeper to serve as an escort. An annoyed McConnell reversed course to allow for a re-rendezvous. With the two ships reunited before midnight, McConnell then received orders for a morning rendezvous with the oiler Pecos and the destroyers Edsall and Whipple. ^[44]

Knowing the daylight trek ahead would be perilous, McConnell sent his crew back to General Quarters before daylight. At 0720, lookouts once again spotted the Dutch patrol craft and to their delight they were hovering over Whipple and Edsall.^[45]

Unfortunately, the added combat power provided by the two escorts was mitigated by time expended. McConnell’s worst fears began to unfold at 9:00 a.m. when a lookout on Edsall spotted a high-flying aircraft. Though Japanese carriers were in the vicinity, it was Japanese shore-based naval aviation that appeared at 20 minutes before noon. A first formation consisting of nine Mitsubishi G4M “Betty” bombers stood clear of the American ships, continuing on to a position where they would attack from astern. Instead, a second formation of seven Bettys approached at 15,000 feet, an elevation beyond the effective range of Langley’s guns. Yet, despite the enemy being unreachable, McConnell ordered his gun crews to commence firing. With American shells harmlessly bursting below their fuselages, the Japanese approached the attack as if it was target practice. As the formation made their pass at 11:54 a.m., the Japanese planes released their loads. McConnell patiently waited. With the planes reaching an angle of elevation of 80 degrees, the Langley’s skipper ordered hard right rudder. The maneuver worked through two explosions within 100 feet causing shock waves to run though the hull. The three-decade old riveted hull did not take kindly to the thumping. Water sprayed into the engine room through the seams created in the plating, threatening to short out Langley’s electric drive propulsion. Yet, the damage control teams used all of the tools at their disposal and managed to stem the flooding and bilge pumps began to win the struggle to remove excess water.^[46]

The cagey Langley skipper then maneuvered to evade the initial flight of nine Bettys. McConnell would write: “[…] no bombs were dropped. The antiaircraft fire was well placed and the ship maneuvered radically on the last stage of the approach so it was possible that the bombers’ set up was not satisfactory.” The flight leader of the nine Bettys opted to make a second approach. On this second approach at 12:12 p.m. the Japanese adjusted to McConnell’s tactics and landed five bombs into the superstructure and scored two damaging near-misses on the port side and a near-miss on the starboard side.^[47]

Of the five-bomb salvo that struck the ship, bomb #1 landed four feet from the starboard side on the main deck at frame 68 where several of the ship’s boats were stored. The resultant gaping ten foot hole on the main cut into communication lines and steering control from the forward deckhouse to after steering. The second bomb punctured the port side of the elevator that was situated on the forward part of what remained of the former aircraft carrier’s flight deck. The third bomb hit close by on the port after-corner of the elevator setting main deck stowed P-40s as well as McConnell’s gig ablaze.^[48]

The fourth bomb landed further back on the port side hitting the stack sponson. Wood splinters shattered several of the planes parked in the vicinity and killing/wounding numerous sailors at their topside General Quarters stations. A fierce fire ensued. However, with water cut off due to a busted fire main, the flames could not be contested.^[49] With water seeping in, thanks to hull damage sustained by the near-misses, Langley listed 10 degrees to port. Strafing Japanese fighters exacerbated the damage above but at least gave Langley’s gunners something to shoot back at. One of those triggering rounds was McConnell himself, operating one of the 50 cal. machine guns “as coolly as if he were shooting ducks.”^[50]

Low on fuel, the enemy aircraft departed over the horizon to leave Langley to lick her wounds. With steering control restored to the bridge and damage control teams struggling to overcome the flames, about the best McConnell could hope was to steam north to beach along the Java coast. To correct the list, sailors pushed damaged P-40s over the side and McConnell ordered counter flooding. Down below, Langley’s electric motors were protected by a barricade against water. Unfortunately, as the bilge pumps were no longer able to stem the seepage, water breached the barricade – causing the two motors to short out. Faced with having no propulsion and not wanting to expose the two escorting destroyers – that ultimately would serve as a means of survival – to additional air attacks, at 1:32 p.m., McConnell ordered the crew to abandon the ship. Remarkably, most of the crew were able to make it to Whipple which had skillfully positioned herself off the starboard side or the Edsall, which placed a motor launch and motor whaleboat in the water to pick up other stragglers.^[51]

With the crew having departed, McConnell and his executive officer were the last two men off the ship. McConnell went directly to the Whipple where he was greeted by the Commander of Destroyer Division Fifty-Seven, Cdr. Edwin. M. Crouch, and the Whipple’s Commanding Officer, Lt. Cdr. Eugene S. Karpe. With the surviving crew and attached aviation personnel picked up by the Edsall and Whipple, the aircraft tender remained afloat with an increasing list. So as not to allow capture by the Japanese, Commander Crouch ordered the abandoned Langley to be sunk. Whipple initially fired nine four inch shells into the airplane tender’s starboard side. With the desired effect achieved, Lieutenant Commander Karpe unleashed two torpedoes at the doomed airplane tender. The resulting rush of water into the hull brought the demise to America’s first aircraft carrier. Settling by the bow, Langley seemed set to take the deep plunge into history. Langley’s great escape had come to an end. Today, she remains on the seabed some 74 miles south of her intended destination of Tjilatjap, Java.^[52]

Hindsight being always 20/20, Signalman Paul St. Pierre who served for many years as the historian of the Covered Wagon Association lamented:

It is a mystery why someone did not think at the time of the loading of the planes at Freemantle, Australia, to build a makeshift extension of the flight deck that was removed when she was converted to a seaplane tender in late 1936, and make her operational as a carrier again. The planes were completely assembled and armed and ready to go. With a tailhook put onto the P-40s, the landing arresting system reactivated, and a little training of the Army Air Force pilots, they would have been able to take off when the Langley was attacked and could have knocked down those Jap bombers.^[53]

More practically, St. Pierre further asserts, the makeshift carrier could have launched the P-40s without having to steam into harms’ way and then continue on to survive the war. Retired Adm. Joseph M. Reeves, who served as the plank-owning skipper of the collier Jupiter and later used that converted hull named Langley as his flagship to explore the potential of carrier-based naval aviation, might have appreciated St. Pierre’s sentiments had he lived long enough to read them. This is not to say the creativity did not exist in early 1942 to attempt to fly Army planes off of Navy ships. Of note, less than 2 months after Langley’s loss, Army medium bombers would lift off from another American carrier to attack the Japanese homeland. Unfortunately, factors, including changing higher-level decisions regarding Langley’s ultimate destination, precluded imaginative options. Instead, as Dwight R. Messimer aptly framed in the title of his book, Langley, despite the heroic efforts of her crew to fend off the air assault and mitigate the damage, was doomed to become a pawn of war.