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What’s Belief Got to Do With It?

A Response to Tim Crane
  • Sebastian Gäb EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: December 2, 2023

Abstract

This paper argues that even Crane’s modified account of belief doesn’t do justice to all varieties of religious belief. Particularly beliefs associated with ritual behavior don’t seem to match the criteria of Crane’s alternative account. So, the question remains whether these beliefs should still be called beliefs, or whether the standard model of belief is even more false than Crane suspects.

Zusammenfassung

Es wird die These vertreten, dass selbst Cranes modifizierter Glaubensbegriff nicht allen Formen religiösen Glaubens gerecht wird. Insbesondere scheinen Überzeugungen, die mit rituellem Verhalten in Verbindung stehen, nicht den Kriterien von Cranes alternativem Begriff zu genügen. Daher bleibt die Frage bestehen, ob diese Überzeugungen immer noch als Glauben bezeichnet werden sollten oder ob das herkömmliche Modell des Glaubens sogar noch problematischer ist als Crane vermutet.

References

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Published Online: 2023-12-02
Published in Print: 2023-11-29

© 2023 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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