Abstract
This paper examines access to and impacts of two COVID-19 federal pandemic relief initiatives. The Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) was a new program to help “small businesses” cover near-term operating expenses and incentivize employers to retain employees. Pandemic relief also included increased COVID-19-specific funding for the existing Emergency Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) program. We frame our study with the Policy Feedback Framework to focus on how the policy design and implementation created resource effects and the messages nonprofits received when accessing the programs. We focus our study on the arts and culture sector, which was disproportionately impacted by the pandemic closures. We conducted an online survey of New York City nonprofit arts and culture organizations and semi-structured interviews with industry stakeholders six months into the pandemic closures. Survey results indicate that while the resource effects were mainly positive, the PPP implementation relied on a narrow conception of small businesses that did not align with nonprofit governance, arts and culture hiring practices, or revenue and expense models (negative interpretive effects). For those who accessed the PPP, its resource effects benefited the organizations in the near term. Few accessed the EIDL 30-year loan program mainly due to the financial risk of default. Nonprofit arts and culture organizations learned they must collectively advocate for inclusion in programs not adapted for their operating realities. After this study, the performing arts successfully advocated for a one-time $16.25 billion grant program titled the Shuttered Venue Operatrors Grant (SVOG). The lessons for policymakers are that 1) nonprofit governance structures are different from small businesses and 2) cookie-cutter approaches, like the PPP program design, create barriers for accessing resources.
1 Introduction
The federal government’s responses to the 2020 pandemic included the creation of a new Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) to help small businesses cover near-term operating expenses and to provide an incentive for employers to retain employees. It also increased COVID-19 specific funding for the existing Emergency Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) program. Both programs were implemented by the Small Business Administration (SBA). Nonprofit organizations were eligible for both programs; however, the SBA’s focus on small businesses proved problematic for nonprofit organizations. An immediate barrier was that the application forms required “name of the owner,” which nonprofits do not have.
Creating rules for the PPP and rapidly implementing the program during pandemic shutdowns significantly expanded the scope of the SBA’s practice (Ceka and Warner 2024). The pandemic programs generated exponential growth in SBA budget appropriations, from $715 million for fiscal year 2019 to $762 billion in 2020 (Congressional Research Service 2022). The PPP distributed 4.6 million loans totaling $512 billion by June 2020. This distribution greatly exceeded all of SBA’s lending under the 7(a) small business lending program in fiscal years 1990–2019 combined (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2020). The explosive pandemic expansion came without the requisite increase in administrative capacity. Combined with urgent pressure to distribute funds, the lack of appropriate administrative support led to a troubled rollout process (Maher et al. 2020).
The PPP targeted manufacturing, restaurants, and other industries that hire up to 500 employees to achieve the policy goals of immediate relief and employee retention (Small Business Administration 2020). It was not intended for organizations with program-based contract employment patterns (Doniger 2021). This created challenges to accessing pandemic funds for arts and culture nonprofit organizations. Arts and culture nonprofit organizations’ employment patterns differ significantly from businesses such as restaurants, manufacturing and retail, and nonprofit employee-reliant organizations such as nonprofit human service providers (Finchum-Mason et al. 2020). Arts and culture employment patterns are often program-based, with cultural labor hired for specific exhibits, performances, or arts-in-education programs such as artists, musicians, actors, stagehands, teaching artists, and museum educators. Organizations have adapted to changing sociocultural environments by substituting independent contractors for wage labor (Woronkowicz et al. 2020). Nonprofit arts and culture’s divergent hiring practices from employee-intensive small businesses raises the question about how nonprofits were able to access pandemic program funding and how well it fit with their needs.
Discrepancies between the mission of arts and culture nonprofits and pandemic relief programs are particularly problematic in light of disproportionate pandemic effects on the industry; the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that arts and culture lost 12.5 % of jobs, more than double other nonprofit sectors (Newhouse 2022).[1] Revenue from ticket sales, concessions, and tuition evaporated for the duration of the closures. Research on nonprofit financial reserves further indicates that many organizations do not retain sufficient financial reserves (Kim and Mason 2020). The loss of earned revenue combined with limited reserves left many nonprofit arts and culture organizations reliant on government and philanthropic sources. The federal government increased the National Endowment for the Arts’ budget by $210 million during the pandemic (National Endowment for the Arts on COVID-19 n.d.), but historically underfunded, the increased funding was far too little for the recovery needs of arts and artists (Newhouse 2022).
In this paper, we focus on the experiences of nonprofit arts and culture organizations applying to access the PPP and the EIDL pandemic relief programs. We situate our research in the Policy Feedback literature to focus on both the resource effects and the interpretive effects nonprofit arts and culture organizations experienced (Béland and Schlager 2019; Weible and Sabatier 2018). The resource effects address the funding and its impacts on the organizations. The interpretive effects are the messages people, in this case organizations, receive as they experience government programs. We designed a mixed methods study of New York City nonprofit arts and culture organizations six months into the pandemic to identify barriers to access (resource effects) and how nonprofit arts and culture organizations experienced those programs (interpretative effects). Our research contributes knowledge to the emerging literature on pandemic impacts on the nonprofit sector. We make a unique contribution to understanding how the arts and culture nonprofit organizations experienced benefits of funding but considerable barriers to participation.
2 COVID Impacts
The literature examining the impacts of government assistance for nonprofits and small businesses in the wake of the pandemic provides several consistent findings. First, the PPP was helpful in the short-term at assisting nonprofits and small businesses stay solvent during the pandemic, despite rollout shortcomings (Ceka and Warner 2024). PPP was generally less helpful at providing long term assistance for nonprofit issues such as staff retention (Mumford et al. 2024).
Second, blanket economic aid responses to the pandemic did not reflect the diverse needs of sectors and types of organizations in times of crisis. Arts and culture nonprofits were affected more seriously than human services nonprofits, illustrating the need for more organization-specific assistance (Kim and Mason 2020). Size of organizations was also an important factor; smaller firms suffered significantly more than larger firms in terms of job losses, finances, and survival overall (Doniger 2021). A one-size-fits-all approach led certain types of organizations to fall through the cracks and suggests that a more tailored response is required to adequately support all organizations (Choi 2022). Larger arts and culture organizations receive the bulk of operating support dollars, while smaller organizations are more reliant on public dollars (Rhoads et al. 2023). Ultimately, funds flowed to those who were less adversely affected economically (Granja et al. 2020), at the expense of organizations that were in more urgent need of fiscal support and attention. This presents the need to directly involve the small businesses and nonprofits when creating and implementing crisis assistance programs, as opposed to using outdated and ineffective models that do not account for the diversity and nuances of the organizations being served (Choi 2022).
Third, the time constraint of COVID-19 pandemic research added an additional layer of difficulty–much of the above data were gathered early or during the pandemic, meaning that many nonprofit and public organizations were still discovering and experiencing the fiscal impacts of the pandemic (Bies et al. 2020). Since all the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic studies were published within the past four years, the long-term pandemic impacts require ongoing research.
3 Theoretical Framing
Policy feedback theory has its roots in historical institutionalism that brought the state back into focus for its power to make policies that reshape politics and policymaking (Lowi 1964). Historical institutionalism was developed in the early 1990s by scholars such as Pierson (1993), Skocpol (1992), and Steinmo et al. (1992), among others, whose work refocused attention on the impact of historically constructed political and policy institutions on future politics and policy. Social construction of target populations also emerged in the early 1990s that focused attention on how benefits and burdens are allocated differently among target populations based on political power and societal social construction that result in divergent messages (Schneider and Ingram 1993). Policy Feedback theory distinguishes between interpretive and resource effects that combined impact future political mobilization and civic engagement (Mettler 2002; Weible and Sabatier 2018). Subsequent research brought social construction and policy feedback together to study policymaking for different target populations and diverse policy domains (Béland and Schlager 2019). These studies and others in this line of research demonstrate that program designs matter for future political engagement (Béland and Schlager 2019; Weible and Sabatier 2018).
In Figure 1, we adapt Mettler’s policy feedback framework to demonstrate the potential for policymaking with positive resource and interpretive effects and include the opposite effects that would negatively impact political mobilization and civic engagement. In this paper we focus on the resource effects to answer questions about the pandemic federal funding programs’ impacts on nonprofit organizations and the interpretive effects these organizations experienced while trying to access the programs.

Policy feedback theory. Source: Adapted from Suzanne Mettler (2002). Bringing the state back in to civic engagement: Policy feedback effects of the G.I. Bill for world war II Veterans. The American political science review, 96(2), 351–365. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3118030.
The federal government has a long history of underfunding arts and culture as compared to European Union member countries (Commission et al. 2021). For example, the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), with a 2023 budget of $207 million, receives only 0.003 % of the $6.1 trillion federal budget (Ready et al. 2024). As a target group, the arts in general is constructed positively but as a sector lacks the political power to win favorable policies. As a dependent target population, Schneider and Ingram theorize that politicians provide empty rhetoric, such as “the arts are fundamental to society,” and can avoid allocating more funding because the political repercussions, as expressed in electoral outcomes, are unlikely. However, the federal pandemic programs had the potential to have positive resource effects on arts and culture organizations. The programs also had the potential to send messages that government valued nonprofit organizations. Our study utilizes Policy Feedback to identify nonprofit arts and culture organizations’ experiences relative to those potentials.
4 Federal Pandemic Programs
The PPP and EIDL provided the primary federal pandemic relief (prior to the passage of the Shuttered Venue Operators Grant in December 2020). In this section, we describe the program design and its implementation process for each program.
4.1 Paycheck Protection Program
The signing of the CARES Act into federal law on March 27, 2020, created the PPP and provided COVID-specific funding for the EIDL program. The PPP was a forgivable loan designed to keep workers in “small” businesses (i.e. fewer than 500 employees) paid and employed during the pandemic. To maximize reach, the PPP granted expanded eligibility to sole proprietors, independent contractors, self-employed individuals, veterans’ organizations, tribal business concerns, and nonprofits. The breadth of organizations included was a marked differences from past SBA programs. The implemented program parameters included:
Loan amounts based on the average total monthly payroll costs incurred during one year before the loan was made multiplied by 2.5, and not to exceed $10 million.
Requirement to expend funds in eight weeks.
75 % of the loan had to be expended on payroll costs.
Maintain or return to the same level of full-time equivalent (FTE) number of employees by the end of the loan.
Loans had to be processed through SBA-approved lenders (i.e. primarily large banks and referral services) (Brown et al. 2020).
The legislative program parameters were much broader than initially implemented by SBA and allowed loan forgiveness for payments on payroll costs, covered mortgage obligations, or covered utility payments. The legislation did not include percentages for how the loan was spent to qualify for forgiveness (Courtney 2020).
Less than three months later the PPP Flexibility Act (June 5, 2020) allowed for additional program flexibility that included:
Tripling the time to expend funds to 24 weeks; and
Reducing the payroll costs expenditure requirement from 75 % to 60 %.
It also included a “safe harbor” clause for borrowers unable to match the FTE level they had at the time of closure. This provision allowed forgiveness if the organization was able to document its inability to return to the same business activity level it had before February 15, 2020. The safe harbor clause was critical for arts and culture organizations during closure because their inability to return to pre-pandemic FTE-levels could be due to compliance with requirements issued by a government health agency,[2] social distancing requirements, or other worker or customer safety requirements related to COVID-19.
The PPP was initially funded at $349 billion (Round 1) and was recapitalized to $659 billion (Round 2) one month later. Because the pandemic impacts continued, the PPP was recapitalized again with an additional $284 billion in December 2020 through the Consolidated Funding Act, which brought the total program funding to nearly one trillion dollars (CSL STYLE ERROR: reference with no printed form.). Program parameters were again changed to:
Allow previous PPP recipients to participate in a second draw.
Allow access for those who had not yet received a PPP to apply for a first draw.
Simplify the forgiveness application for loans under $150,000.
Further expand the approved financial institutions to service the loans to include Community Development Financial Institutions, Minority Depository Institutions, Certified Development Companies, and Microloan Intermediaries (U.S. Small Business Administration 2021);
Create a $15 billion (5 %) set aside for additional PPP lending by Community Financial Institutions.
Narrow eligibility from 500 employees or less to 300 employees or less.
Require applicants to have at least a 25 % reduction in gross receipts in any calendar quarter of 2020 compared to the same quarter of 2019 (U.S. Treasury 2021; emphasis added).
Importantly, the Consolidated Funding Act contained the key for nonprofits to access a second forgivable PPP loan (CSL STYLE ERROR: reference with no printed form.).[3]
The rapid implementation of the PPP forced the SBA to figuratively “build the plane while flying it”, straining the SBA’s administrative capacity. Between April 2020 and April 2021, the SBA issued over 90 FAQs, guidance documents, interim final rules, etc. (see Table 1). The first few months before the Flexibility Act in June 2020 were uniquely laden with strife and uncertainty. Organizations had to navigate a quickly shifting legislative landscape. The SBA’s severe administrative burdens to create and implement the PPP leads to our first research question to identify the program’s interpretive effects.
Summary of PPP rulemaking April 2, 2020 - April 19, 2021.
Application forms & revised forms | FAQs | Interim final rule (IFR) | Guidance | Form instructions | Procedural instructions | Questionnaires & documents | Total | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
SBA | 10 | 10 | 26 | 4 | 1 | 9 | 3 | 63 |
SBA & treasury | 1 | 17 | 2 | 1 | 21 | |||
IRS | 1 | 1 | ||||||
Interagency | 2 | 2 | ||||||
Federal reserve | 1 | 2 | 1 | 4 | ||||
Total | 12 | 29 | 31 | 7 | 1 | 9 | 3 | 91 |
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Data table produced by authors.
Research Question 1A:
What were nonprofit arts and culture organizations’ experiences in the PPP application process?
The PPP’s focus was on retaining employees for businesses such as restaurants and retail.
As discussed above, however, arts and culture organizations often hire personnel through contracts for specific programs, not as employees. The focus on employees also did not allow arts and culture organizations to robustly cover fixed costs such as rent and utilities, often among their largest expenses. This leads to our second PPP question regarding resource effects.
Research Question 1B:
How beneficial was the PPP in sustaining organizations during the prolonged pandemic closures?
4.2 Emergency Injury Disaster Loan
The EIDL is an ongoing SBA program designed to assist private, non-farm businesses with 500 employees or less that have sustained losses in a disaster-declared county. The CARES Act authorized $10 billion in COVID-specific emergency EIDL funding (Courtney 2020). While dwarfed by the nearly $1 trillion invested in the PPP, this lesser-known program was another source of funding available to arts and culture nonprofit organizations. Unlike “building the plane while flying it” for the PPP, the EIDL was an existing program with SBA employees familiar with the loan application and review process. The program rules required the business/nonprofit to be in existence for at least one year before the disaster and waived any personal guaranteed requirement on advances and loans of less than $200,000. The loan was a 30-year, 2.75 % fixed interest rate for nonprofits and 3.75 % for businesses, with no upfront fees or penalties for early repayment. In our study we repeated the research questions for the PPP to identify the EIDL’s interpretive and resource effects.
Research Question 2A:
What were nonprofit arts and culture organizations’ experiences in the EIDL application process?
The PPP and Health Care Enhancement Act recapitalized EIDL with an additional $10 billion mere weeks after the Cares Act. Even with the recapitalization, the program was oversubscribed. On May 4, 2020, due to program funding constraints and with the stated SBA goal of helping as many small businesses as possible, SBA decreased the maximum EIDL loan amount from $500,000 to $150,000, or the equivalent of six months of working capital (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2020). The amount is in stark contrast to the $2 million loan amount normally set by the SBA. Almost a year later, this limit was raised by the American Rescue Plan Act to allow borrowers to increase loan amounts up to $500,000 on the same terms (American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, 2021).
Allowable expenditures include paid sick leave for employees unable to work due to COVID-19, payroll, increased costs due to supply chain interruption, rent or mortgage, and repaying obligations unable to be met due to revenue losses. Organizations were eligible to secure both PPP and EIDL resource support but expenses could not overlap. Organizations were also able to secure an EIDL Grant Advance (CARES Act 2020), of $1,000 per employee up to $10,000. Initially, this grant was to be deducted from PPP forgiveness, however the rule was later rescinded (America Rescue Plan Act of 2021 2021). A follow-up second question identifies EIDL resource effects.
Research Question 2B:
How beneficial was the EIDL in sustaining organizations during the prolonged pandemic closures?
5 The Case of New York City Arts and Culture Sector
We focus on New York City’s complex and interdependent ecosystem of arts organizations and cultural workers. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the NYC arts and culture scene was home to almost 2,200 nonprofit arts organizations and was arguably the epicenter for arts and culture in the U.S. (Stringer 2019). The industry had an estimated economic impact of $5.6 billion in 2017 and generated more than 117,000 jobs (Americans for the Arts n.d.). In contrast to the federal funding for the NEA, New York City allocated $238 million in 2023 for its Department of Cultural Affairs (DCLA FY24 Adopted Budget Statement 2023). That is, one city agency provides more funding than the federal government’s budget for the NEA. The NYC arts and culture workforce includes freelance artists, musicians, dancers, actors, curators, and educators within a diverse array of nonprofit organizations and for-profit businesses. The nonprofit organizations range from small and community-based (e.g., a dance school in Brooklyn), to world-famous performing arts institutions (e.g., Carnegie Hall, the Metropolitan Opera) and museums (e.g., the Metropolitan Museum of Art and Natural History Museum).
We also selected New York City because in March 2020 it was the pandemic’s epicenter in the United States with over 203,000 cases and 18,676 confirmed deaths by June 1, 2020 (Thompson et al. 2020). As part of the pandemic closures, all arts and culture organizations were fully closed by New York State and/or City Executive Orders in March 2020 (Mayor and Affairs 2019). The arts and culture sector suffered significant negative consequences. In just three months, the Americans for the Arts estimated the economic impact of COVID-19 on the arts and culture sector to be $5.9 billion nationally (n = 19,398) with a median impact of $51,500 in NYC (n = 1,396) (Americans for the Arts n.d.).
In May 2021, over a year after the initial shutdown, only some of the NYC arts and culture organizations had been allowed by New York State to reopen, and those that did had capacity limitations (e.g., museums, zoos) and timed ticketing. The performing arts sector mostly remained closed for 18 months because capacity limitations and ongoing public health concerns made reopening financially infeasible. The prolonged closures left organizations with limited or no earned revenue streams. Adding to the economic impact was the cancellation or reduced format for annual spring fundraising galas or staff to manage development strategies (Van Steenburg et al. 2022). A 2020 national survey of the 500 largest foundations found that nearly all responded to the pandemic by changing internal strategies and grantee relationships (Finchum-Mason et al. 2020). Thus, federal pandemic relief programs were particularly pertinent to New York City arts and culture organizations during data collection for this study.
6 Methodology
Mixed method data collection included a survey of nonprofit arts and culture organizations in New York City and semi-structured interviews with industry leaders and stakeholders.
6.1 Online Survey
We developed an online survey of nonprofit arts and culture organizations in NYC focused on their experiences with the PPP and EIDL. The survey asked participating organizations for basic descriptive information, such as the number of employees, operating expenses and fiscal reserves, and geographic location. We designed questions for each of our research question themes: 1) experiences with PPP applications, 2) effects of PPP on the organization, and 3) experiences with EIDL applications, and 4) effects of EIDL on the organization. The experience questions inform interpretive effects, and the program effects questions inform resource effects.
The section on PPP application experiences began with questions identifying the interpretive effects. It asked each organization to report if they qualified for the PPP loan, if they applied for a PPP loan, if their application was approved, and, finally, if they accepted the loan. Next, participants reported any prior banking relationship(s) with their lender(s) (e.g., line of credit, checking account, existing relationship with board member, etc.). Participants were asked two questions about loan forgiveness. The first question asked how confident they were that the loan would be forgiven and what impact it would have if the loan was not forgiven. These questions focus on the interpretive effects of applying for a PPP without SBA’s fully developed criteria and process for loan forgiveness. This block of questions about application experiences was repeated for both PPP Round One (only SBA-approved lenders) and PPP Round Two (loan institutions expanded). To assess the resource effects of the PPP loan we asked the loan amount, how beneficial it was, and how well it matched the organization’s needs.
We repeated similar question for EIDL questions to assess interpretive and resource effects.
6.1.1 Survey Distribution
We compiled a list of grantees funded by the NYC Department of Cultural Affairs (DCLA) from Open Data for FY14 - FY18. Additionally, we contacted the five borough arts councils by email and phone and presented our survey request via Zoom at the daily “Culture@3” Zoom call with NYC nonprofit arts and culture organizations, foundations, and city officials. Finally, we distributed the survey via professional networks and featured the survey on social media. The survey was distributed starting in December 2020 and closed before the January 6, 2021 Congressional certification of the election of President Biden to control for the effects of the incoming Biden Administration and expected changes to the policy environment.
6.2 Interview Methodology
We conducted 16 semi-structured interviews with a range of NYC arts and culture stakeholders from February 2021 through May 2021. Interview participants were recruited from city government, private foundations that fund NYC arts, borough arts councils, and an array of nonprofit arts and culture organizations’ leadership. Interviews followed a semi-structured format guided by our research questions to assess access and barriers to pandemic programs and broader themes on how the pandemic was affecting the sector. For nonprofit organization leaders, we asked how many performances/shows organizations were canceled or postponed, whether they offered virtual programming, submitted applications to other government funding programs (e.g., NEA), and the financial viability impacts of the long-term closure. For government officials, foundations, and sector support organizations, we repeated general questions on the arts and culture as a sector with more specific questions for the different types of stakeholders. All interviews were held via Zoom and conducted with at least two authors present. Appendix A includes the nonprofit organization leadership interview questions.
The authors analyzed the transcripts using NVivo qualitative data analysis software to identify common themes and patterns in participants’ responses. The team used a combination of deductive codes based on the interview questions and inductive codes for emerging themes of interest. The relevant deductive codes for this paper include government funding, organizational size/disparity, PPP, EIDL, government interactions, funding or organizational equity, and government relief program confusion. The inductive codes include future needs, virtual or continued service delivery, first days of the pandemic, furlough, pandemic positive experiences, government advocacy, reopening, for-profit over nonprofit. One author led the coding process, and a co-author reviewed the identified passages for each theme to reach consensus on interpretation.
7 Results
The survey was completed by 153 nonprofit organizations, representing an 11.7 % response rate from mailing list contacts. About two-thirds of respondents, 68 % (n = 101), were performing arts organizations. Non-performance-based arts made up 11 % (n = 17) of participants. Five percent of respondents were arts councils and service organizations, and 16 % (n = 24) were other types of arts and culture nonprofit organizations. Figure 2 shows the geographic distribution of survey respondents by zip codes. Survey responses included all five boroughs with Manhattan being the most common at 55 % (n = 81), which was expected because it has the highest concentration of arts organizations. Manhattan was followed by Brooklyn 21 % (n = 31), Staten Island 10 % (n = 15), and Queens 10 % (n = 14). The fewest responses came from the Bronx, 5 % (n = 7). A cluster of responses emerged roughly along the “cultural corridor” that runs from the North Shore of Staten Island through the western shore of Brooklyn, and north into lower and midtown Manhattan. Additional smaller clusters emerged in the Bronx, Eastern Brooklyn, and parts of Queens. Figure 3 illustrates the geographic distribution of PPP recipients. Compared with Figure 2, organizations in eastern Brooklyn or Queens and very few in the Bronx reported receiving PPP funds. These three parts of NYC are primarily low-income and/or minoritized areas (New York University Furman 2020).[4]

Survey respondents by zip code. Note: This map uses organizational zip codes to create a heat map showing the location of survey respondents.

PPP recipients by zip code. Note: This map uses organizational zip codes to create a heat map showing the location of paycheck protection program recipients from our survey participants.
Organizations were asked to report their 2020 operating expenses as well as the number of full – time, part-time, and per diem or seasonal staff that they employ. Table 2 summarizes the responses. Participants varied significantly in size in terms of both operating expenses and the number of employees. About one-third had operating expenses of less than $100,000 in 2020, and about one-quarter of organizations had operating expenses above $1,000,000. Similarly, the number of staff employed ranged from none to several dozen for full-time, part-time, and per diem employees. In terms of fiscal stability, 45.7 % (n = 53) of organizations had 0–3 months of operating cash on hand as of Nov. 1, 2020; 27.6 % (n = 32) reported 4–6 months of operating cash on hand. Roughly one-quarter (26.7 %, n = 31) had more than six months of operating cash on hand. Further, 46 % (n = 52) reported having no reserve funds. Of those that did have reserve funds, 36.7 % (n = 22) had accessed the funds, and 13.3 % (n = 15) were unsure if the funds had been accessed. In short, only about one-quarter of organizations reported having untouched reserve funds as of winter 2020.
Mean number of employees by operating expenses.
Mean Number of Employees | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
2020 Operating Expenses | n | Percent | Full time | Part time | Per diem/seasonal |
0–$100,000 | 38 | 32.8 % | 1.8 | 4.1 | 24.3 |
$100,001–$250,000 | 18 | 15.5 % | 3.4 | 3.8 | 16.0 |
$250,001–$500,000 | 21 | 18.1 % | 3.4 | 5.3 | 24.7 |
$500,001–$1,000,000 | 9 | 7.8 % | 3.7 | 3 | 24.4 |
$1,000,001–$5,000,000 | 23 | 19.8 % | 10.9 | 10.2 | 29.7 |
$5,000,001+ | 7 | 6.0 % | 106.5 | 90.8 | 32.0 |
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Because not all participants responded to each question, the categories do not sum to our full survey respondent level (n = 153). Throughout this report, the team calculates category percent by using the number of participants who answered the question being analyzed.
7.1 PPP Interpretive Effects
About two-thirds of organizations surveyed (n = 88) reported that they qualified for the PPP loan. Of those that qualified, seven decided not to apply. Of the remaining 81 that applied, 68 were approved by the bank and, finally, 65 organizations accepted a PPP Round 1 loan (see Figure 4). Ultimately, 65 of the 88 (74 %) qualifying organizations accepted a PPP loan in Round 1.

PPP application attrition. Note: This flow chart demonstrates attrition of PPP applications at each step of the process from qualification to approval.
In Round 1 the requirement that the lender had to be SBA-approved proved to be a barrier for those without an established banking relationship. Fifty of 65 (77 %) organizations that accepted a PPP loan in Round 1 had a prior banking relationship with the lender (see Table 3). Checking accounts were the most common banking relationship (n = 42) followed by credit cards (n = 13) and lines of credit (n = 8). Five organizations reported an executive staff relationship with a lender and five also reported a board member relationship with the lender. One organization reported both. Common interview and qualitative survey responses expressed,
[T]he primary bank that we held did not return my phone calls or emails for a week, and there was one time, when I did actually call them and the person who picked up the phone didn’t put me on hold, and yelled to the branch manager, while I was on the phone and she was like, “yeah I’m not going to call her back.” - Arts and Culture Service Organization interview, April 2021
Banking relationship PPP round 1.
Type of Relationship | n | Percent |
---|---|---|
Checking account | 42 | 84 % |
Credit card | 13 | 26 % |
Line of credit | 8 | 16 % |
Board member relationship with lender | 5 | 10 % |
Loan | 3 | 6 % |
Executive staff relationship with lender | 5 | 10 % |
Board member recommendation | 0 | 0 % |
Executive staff recommendation | 0 | 0 % |
Other | 8 | 16 % |
This quote represents the general impression shared by many of our respondents without prior relationships with SBA-approved lenders. Interpretive responses indicate that access to PPP funding was not a priority for the federal government. Unlike businesses that may have a line of credit or loans with an SBA-approved bank, arts and culture nonprofits experienced a barrier to participation.
The rules for PPP loan forgiveness were unclear and yet most organizations were either extremely confident or very confident (91 %) that they would qualify for loan forgiveness. Crucially, confidence in forgiveness may have been a major factor in accepting a loan – 65% of organizations reported that they would have suffered major negative impacts or faced closure if the loans had not been forgiven (See Figure 5).

Impacts of PPP not being forgiven.
Again, this may reveal an inhibitory effect of the terms of the PPP applications if organizations that were not confident in the program’s likelihood of forgiveness chose not to apply. As one interviewee responded,
Now we are going into this process of forgiveness and I’m super anxious to know whether that’s going to be process and time [intensive]… interest is going to kick in, you know it’s very uncertain. What I cannot tell you is whether other people have already gotten their forgiveness approved, and I should ask to understand better. – Arts and Culture Service Organization interview, April 2021
The same interviewee said regarding her own organization,
What we’re waiting for is still the forgiveness and I’m not sure if it is the consequence of SBA releasing new forms in December …or of our [banking] institution that is not doing it. Again, because we went through this small institution that changed hands… I call them every other week [and they say] that they are waiting for the SBA… That the SBA just released new forms after the new package came out for loans in December, they are still trying to figure it out what the processes are for them to process my forgiveness application. We submitted it in January, and now we are in May, so we’ve been waiting for three, four months, plus. Again I put it on this institution in particular, but, so it makes me also wonder what kind of oversight do these institutions enter in the way that they process all of this. I don’t have an answer.” - Arts and Culture Service Organization interview, April 2021
Loan forgiveness was also complicated by state portal issues and size of loan,
We have actually not been forgiven yet because the portals are currently closed in New York State… But the banks are not forgiving loans more than $150,000, or processing the paperwork, I should say because they’re not the forgiving entity. But they’re not currently processing paperwork for loans greater than $150,000.” - Arts and & Culture Service Organization interview, March 2021
The safe harbor clause also came up as an important factor in strategic decision-making. As one executive director of a large arts and culture organization stated,
We just sort of decided that we might have to pay back some of this loan. And that we had to do what was best strategically for the institution, not what was best strategically for this $650,000 loan. Because in that moment, there was much more at stake than just whether we could get the loan forgiven or not. And so we did kind of make that calculation early on, as it happens, the safe harbor clause does help us and also you know, because of the extension of the timeline the FTE became a little less salient because we ended up adding up being able to add some staff over that time period and do some other things that you know made sense for the institution and also helped us recoup … getting [to] be eligible for the forgiveness. - Executive Director large organization interview, March 2021
Survey participants were asked to rate how much administrative or logistical barriers affected their PPP application(s) on a 1–5 scale (see Table 4). Forty-two of 84 participants (50 %) across both rounds encountered at least a moderate amount of barriers while applying for both Round One and Round Two, suggesting that the application process was difficult for about half of nonprofit arts organizations.
Did those barriers affect your organization’s PPP loan application?
Round 1 | Round 2 | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
n | Percent | N | Percent | |
Not at all | 18 | 26 % | 6 | 43 % |
A little | 17 | 24 % | 1 | 7 % |
A moderate amount | 18 | 26 % | 2 | 14 % |
A lot | 11 | 16 % | 3 | 21 % |
A great deal | 6 | 9 % | 2 | 14 % |
Total | 70 | 14 |
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The bold is the total number of organizations that responded.
An arts service organization commented,
There was also a lot of confusion about the paperwork, because it looked as though the federal paperwork was written and then rewritten and rewritten and rewritten. “So, I thought, I filled this form out before, well you filled out the early version of the form, so you need to fill it out again” things like that. – Arts and & Culture Service Organization interview, March 2021
Securing a PPP loan, particularly during the early weeks of implementation, favored those with connections. In this quote, the participant speaks to the lack of capacity for smaller organizations to navigate the complicated bureaucratic process described above, as well as highlighting the geographic inequity in distribution of resources:
You know, there are always winners and losers in these things, and I think that many, very small organizations, the ones that are the two-person organizations, that are not attached to larger institutions or neighborhoods where there’s good cultural infrastructure, which is really most of Brooklyn, probably most of Queens and the Bronx and Staten Island too, and probably a lot of Manhattan. I really worry that those people will have the capacity [to] be able to sustain their work. - Arts and & Culture Service Organization interview, March 2021
A government official spoke directly to the challenges nonprofits face, especially the smaller ones.
… the feedback at the beginning, the nonprofit organizations were forced to compete for funds with for profit… the smaller ones, the more scrappy ones and that didn’t have a relationship with a bank, that they didn’t have you know enough to show for a loan, were left out at the beginning. - Government Official interview, May 2021
Our findings demonstrate that the PPP policy design was narrowly focused on small businesses that had prior banking relationships with loan officers from SBA-approved institutions. The PPP was not sufficiently adapted for arts and culture nonprofit organizations’ financial realities. As discussed in the introduction, the application was not adapted for organizations that do not have owners, which may have been interpreted by some as a message that the SBA did not prioritize nonprofit organizations. In the chaos of the pandemic in New York City, participation in the PPP was a dire need, even though loan forgiveness was not assured. However, barriers to access for PPP Round 1 were too much for many of the survey recipients and those findings were corroborated by an array of stakeholder interviews. Interpretive messages were that nonprofit arts and culture organizations were not valued by government.
7.2 PPP Resource Effects
Organizations that received a PPP were asked to report the amount of the loan. PPP funding ranged from less than $10,000 for smaller organizations to more than $1,000,000 for larger organizations (see Table 5 for full results).
PPP loan amounts.
Loan Amount | n | Percent |
---|---|---|
$0–$50,000 | 34 | 44.2 % |
$50,001–$100,000 | 13 | 16.9 % |
$100,001–$200,000 | 14 | 18.2 % |
$201,000–$510,000 | 12 | 15.6 % |
$1,000,000+ | 4 | 5.2 % |
In our survey and interviews, we found positive resource effects. The PPP funding benefited nonprofit organizations in terms of synergies with their needs and qualitative satisfaction with the funding. Seventy of 79 organizations (89 %) reported that the PPP loans were “extremely beneficial” or “very beneficial.” For those that could obtain the loan, it infused funding when earned revenue disappeared (See Table 6).
How beneficial was the PPP to your organization?
Response | N | Percent |
---|---|---|
Extremely beneficial | 55 | 69.6 % |
Very beneficial | 15 | 19.0 % |
Moderately beneficial | 4 | 5.1 % |
Slightly beneficial | 5 | 6.3 % |
The loans also matched organizations’ needs, as demonstrated by 78 % of survey participants reporting that the loan was either a “perfect match” or a “very good match” for their needs (See Table 7). A limitation to interpreting these results is that there is some bias to how well the loans matched organizational needs since these organizations accepted PPP loans. Some organizations may have chosen not to apply for or accept the loans if the restrictions did not meet the needs of the organization. Qualitative responses indicated that some small organizations did not apply because hiring is program-based.
Not for profit organizations like ours were too small to qualify for the PPP loan program. All those involved in our organization are given stipends for their work and hired on a project-by-project basis. – Nonprofit Theater Group qualitative response
How well did allowable expenses of the loan match your organization’s needs?
Response | N | Percent |
---|---|---|
Perfect match | 15 | 25.0 % |
Very good match | 32 | 53.3 % |
Somewhat close match | 5 | 8.3 % |
Slightly close match | 4 | 6.7 % |
Not a good match | 2 | 3.3 % |
Unsure | 1 | 1.7 % |
To gain insight into employment decisions, we asked survey respondents to report how many staff were furloughed. Twenty-two organizations (41 %) that received a PPP furloughed staff in some manner. We could not conclude whether the PPP loans prevented furloughing because only 11 organizations that did not receive a PPP answered this question. This may indicate a protective effect of the PPP loans on staff retention. A survey of 648 New York City community-based organizations found that 37.5 % of staff were furloughed, but that result did not include whether the organization had received a PPP loan (Dvorkin et al. 2021).
The qualitative interview responses reflected the difficult challenges organizations faced. They had to make quick decisions that significantly impacted their staff. This quote from a nonprofit executive director highlights the precarity many organizations faced as they navigated federal relief programs,
I made some very hard decisions, very quickly, and so, by the end of April or middle of April I had decided to lay off four people and to not renew contracts for two part-time people. So that was really within a month that I made those decisions. - Arts and Culture Service Organization interview, March 2021
However, even for those who retained their jobs, it did not mean that work continued at the same level of pay, with one nonprofit arts organization executive stating,
Just to say that also regardless of the PPP loan, every one of our full-time staff members took a salary cut and are at that cut rate [of pay] to this day. - Nonprofit Museum Executive Director interview, April 2021
Given the prolonged pandemic shutdown in NYC, the financial benefits of the PPP were positive but as one respondent noted, “[I]t was a drop in the bucket.”
7.3 EIDL Interpretive Effects
Ultimately, the limitations of the EIDL program were reflected in the survey findings. In contrast to the PPP, the EIDL application process generally did not cause confusion. There was, however, a crucial exception: the EIDL grant advance. Of the organizations that accepted both PPP and EIDL loans, 11 of 19 were not aware that if they received both the PPP loan and the EIDL grant advance, that the EIDL grant advance would need to be repaid. Qualitative comments on the survey reflected confusion and frustration about this:
Seems unfair that the $10,000 EIDL [advance grant] provided is being deducted from our PPP forgiveness.
And another said,
We were not clear that [the EIDL advance grant] would be combined with PPP. Luckily, when we were told we’d have to pay it all back, we set up payments and started paying.
That ability to pay was limited, as indicated by nearly two-thirds of organizations reporting that repaying the loan would have had significant impacts on their operations (see Figure 5).
7.4 EIDL Resource Effects
In contrast to the high application rate for PPP loans, only 41 organizations (27 %) applied for an EIDL, which reduced to 30 (20 %) accepting the loan. Of the organizations that accepted the loan, about half found it “extremely beneficial” or “very beneficial.” This contrasts starkly with the PPP in which 89 % of organizations found the program “extremely beneficial” or “very beneficial.”
Multiple survey comments explained that, as a loan, the EIDL was a mismatch for organizations because they were not sure they would survive the pandemic shutdown. Survey respondents stated in open-ended responses,
A loan is not beneficial. I need a grant. If I can’t get a grant to pay off this loan, I will file bankruptcy and close.
Another respondent emphasized the point,
We do not need loans! We need grants!
This finding demonstrates the mismatch of nonprofit arts and culture needs and the loan program. Because of this mismatch, EIDL resource effects were minimal. One executive director of a large organization interviewed (March 2021) whose organization accepted an EIDL had the financial capacity to accept the loan and hold it in case the organization needed it. With the low fixed interest rate, they decided it was a strategic move for sustaining the organization. However, no other study participant reported a similar experience.
8 Discussion
The arts and culture ecosystem varies significantly by tax status, budget size, and artistic discipline. This ecosystem is different from restaurants, retail, and even nonprofits that provide human services such as hospitals, social welfare, and education (Kim and Mason 2020). Even though nonprofit organizations could apply for PPP and EIDL, the policy designs created barriers. For future relief programs to benefit nonprofits and arts and culture, policymakers need to expand their target population conceptualization. At a minimum, application forms should be updated to reflect that nonprofit organizations are governed by volunteer boards and do not have owners.
The PPP and increased EIDL funding were created at the beginning of the pandemic when the expectation by the administration was that it would be a short-term shutdown. The PPP did provide the “near-term” financial benefit that was a goal of the program, but with the cookie cutter approach to hiring practices, arts and culture organizations with contract and program-specific hiring were disadvantaged. The “safe harbor” clause for borrowers was critical for those organizations unable to return to the same business activity level before February 15, 2020. The EIDL was a poor fit for many because of the financial precarity of arts and culture organizations. Incurring debt during closure was not a strategy most boards or executive directors thought wise. While restaurants and stores could switch to take-out and curbside pickup for revenue, that model was not feasible for arts and culture organizations. Reports from survey respondents mirrored past work identifying insufficient financial reserves in nonprofit organizations (Kim and Mason 2020); approximately three-quarters of organizations had six months of operating cash or less on hand as of Nov. 1, 2020, and only about a quarter of organizations retained untouched reserve funds. Given this general financial precarity, taking out a loan without knowing if it would be forgiven was a risky proposition for many arts and culture nonprofits. If the PPP loans had not been forgiven, the impacts from survey respondents overwhelmingly reported major impacts, with most saying it would result in possible or definite closure. It was the financial shock to revenues when the pandemic closures began that was clearly a time of panic with decisions made for short-term survival.
The fiscal reality is that even if the nonprofit organizations received the maximum PPP and EIDL, it was insufficient for their financial need.
8.1 Limitations
NYC is the largest nonprofit arts and culture sector in the country, which made it an ideal choice for a case study; however, it is a case study with limited generalizability. Future research requires a national study to document arts and culture responses to pandemic closures to determine if our findings are specific to NYC or can be applied more broadly. Study designs need to include organizations that did not apply for pandemic relief. Many factors may have created insurmountable burdens to access resources including the PPP chaotic rollout, the lack of an application form adapted for nonprofits, lack of banking relationships with SBA-approved lenders, and lack of clarity on PPP loan forgiveness criteria. It also may have been due to insufficient administrative capacity to overcome the barriers.
While beyond the scope of this study, studies are needed to assess longer-term effects that combine the self-reported data with data from non-respondent sources. Our study relies on self-reported data, which have limitations. Six months into the pandemic, respondents drew on memory and their diligence in reviewing records to provide accurate data.
The exploratory nature of pandemic-related research resulted in several limitations to the analysis. Most notably, organizations that closed during the pandemic may have been less likely to fill out the survey and may thus be underrepresented. Similarly, smaller organizations with fewer resources may not have had the capacity to complete the survey.
Our research found stark access differences among the five NYC boroughs. The relatively sparse funding of outer boroughs (see Figures 2 and 3), primarily low-income or minoritized areas, displays the shortcomings of PPP’s reach. We need to understand why arts and culture organizations in minoritized and low-income areas did not apply. Future research should include both those who applied and those who did not to apply to more fully understand the reasons for low participation.
We collected data on identity demographics (e.g., race, ethnicity, age, gender, sexual orientation) of organizational leadership but our sample size did not permit statistical analyses to examine the effects leadership identity may have had on outcomes. We included 16 semi-structured interviews with government officials, support organizations, and sector leaders to gain additional insights into the broader impacts on the sector but our interviews were not sufficient to allow for analysis of leadership identity impacts. Additional research is needed to understand disparities in access and impacts within the arts and culture sector.
9 Conclusions and Directions for Future Research
This study focused on the 2020 federal pandemic policy designs and implementation effects on nonprofit arts and culture organizations in New York City. We focused on two pandemic programs. The PPP was created specifically in response to the pandemic, whereas the EIDL was an established program that provides long-term loans to small businesses during emergencies. Neither of these programs were designed for nonprofits or arts and culture. Our study identified the resource effects nonprofit organizations experienced when they participated in the programs and the interpretive effects they experienced when trying to access the programs.
We found that the PPP application process created barriers for nonprofits to access the program. However, given the financial desperation at the time, the infusion of resources benefited nonprofit arts and culture organizations who accessed the program. In short, the resource effects were positive despite the mixed interpretive effects. The PPP was intended to be a short-term fix to what ultimately became long-term closures, social distancing, limited ticketing, and a seismic shift in how the world consumes art and live performance. The federal government thought narrowly about small business employment in the early pandemic and provided a policy solution tailored to that specific goal.
Future research needs to focus on how the arts and culture sector responded to the resource and interpretive effects. Did it dampen their mobilization and political engagement? Did it vary by discipline? Did it vary by socio-racial geography and leadership? We know now that it resulted in policy feedback effects expressed as political mobilization by the for-profit and nonprofit performing arts. Senator of New York, Chuck Schumer, who at the time was the Senate Majority Leader, championed the $16 billion Shuttered Venues Operators Grant, which was the largest infusion of federal funding for the arts in U.S. history (CSL STYLE ERROR: reference with no printed form.).
The lesson that policymakers need to learn is to design programs with greater attention to nonprofit arts and culture hiring patterns and their revenue and expense models. With few direct employees, the biggest needs were for ongoing operational support for rent, insurance, and utilities. In future pandemics or crises that require extended closures, if nonprofit arts and culture organizations are going to survive, they need policymakers and the agencies that implement programs to recognize that a one size fits all policy design based on a narrow conception of small business does not work. Even the General Accountability Office 2020 report has a cookie cutter approach to its assessment of COVID-19 pandemic programs to identify lessons learned. It provides no separate of analysis of nonprofit organizations, which means that the GAO omits lessons learned for nonprofit organizations, such as the ones we provide in this study.
Funding source: Howard J. Samuels State and City Policy Center, Austin W. Marxe School of Public and International Affairs, Baruch College. “COVID-19 Response Policies and NYC Arts: Access and Impacts.” August 2020 – June 1, 2021.
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Research funding: Howard J. Samuels State and City Policy Center, Austin W. Marxe School of Public and International Affairs, Baruch College. “COVID-19 Response Policies and NYC Arts: Access and Impacts.” August 2020 – June 1, 2021.
COVID-19 Response Policies and NYC Nonprofit Arts: Access and Impacts. Semi-Structured Interview Questions for Nonprofit Organization Leaders. March 22, 2021
Directions: This interview consists of eight questions, all of which are open-ended. We expect the interview to take approximately 30 min of your time.
When the shutdown happened in March 2020, how did your organization respond? What were the immediate effects on the sector?
Was your organization able to access the CARES Act Paycheck Protection Program funding? If yes, how did that funding help your organization? If no, what were the barriers that prevented your organization from accessing?
Was your organization able to access CARES Act Emergency, Injury, Disaster Loan funding? If yes, how did that funding help your organization? If no, what were the barriers that prevented your organization from accessing?
What other relief programs was your organization able to access?
In your professional opinion, how deeply was the arts sector impacted and what type of assistance would currently help the sector recover?
Beyond funding, how have government responses/policies impacted NYC arts and culture ecosystem? (e.g., rent and eviction moratorium, multiplier effects of closures)
What are concrete steps that can be taken to support the sector in the long-term?
Have there been any positive outcomes from the pandemic?
Note: After initial interviews, we learned about the shift to digital programming and revised the first question.
When the shutdown happened in March 2020, what were the immediate effects on your organization?
How many shows/performances were canceled?
If you offered virtual programming,
Did you previously provide virtual programming before COVID?
Was your post-COVID virtual programming successful?
How do you measure success?
What new technology equipment/software/subscriptions/licenses (ex: synchronization) were needed?
How did you pay for these unplanned for costs?
Who provided the labor?
What were the immediate effects on your ability to retain staff?
What was needed to enable staff to work virtually?
Which staff roles and tasks remained the same?
Which staff roles and tasks change?
We also added two questions on the continued pandemic closures.
Now that the closures have continued for longer than expected, what are the impacts on your organization? (financial solvency)
How long can your organization survive?
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