Abstract
China’s State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) enjoy many special benefits. They do not turn over profits and rents to the state, they pay much less interests than other enterprises in their use of capital, they enjoy monopolistic power in the marketplace, incomes of SOE employees, including managers, are free of policy restrictions. Because these substantial interests are not transferrable to individuals, competition exists for them. Compared with executives of private enterprise, senior managers of SOEs are 94 times more likely of being convicted of a crime. High benefits enjoyed by senior managers of SOEs come with a great risk. Once the illusion of SOEs is punctured, SOE leaders with higher education and long-term visions may become the driving force of SOE reform.
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© 2021 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Original Articles
- On the Observability Requirement in Economics as an Axiomatic Science
- A Theory of Partial Property Rights and the Illusion of State-Owned Enterprises
- Can Good Intentions Bring Negative Consequences? The Perceived Positive and the Side Effects of the Law on Alcohol Control
- Share Contract Revisited: A New Transaction Cost Approach
- The Rural Labor Transfer with Respect to the Development of Farmland Leasing Market: Evidence from Rural China
- Wisdom of the Past
- Robert Malthus, Thomas. 1836, “Introduction”, Principles of Political Economy, 2nd ed. London: W. Pickering (the first edition was published in 1820).
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Original Articles
- On the Observability Requirement in Economics as an Axiomatic Science
- A Theory of Partial Property Rights and the Illusion of State-Owned Enterprises
- Can Good Intentions Bring Negative Consequences? The Perceived Positive and the Side Effects of the Law on Alcohol Control
- Share Contract Revisited: A New Transaction Cost Approach
- The Rural Labor Transfer with Respect to the Development of Farmland Leasing Market: Evidence from Rural China
- Wisdom of the Past
- Robert Malthus, Thomas. 1836, “Introduction”, Principles of Political Economy, 2nd ed. London: W. Pickering (the first edition was published in 1820).