If Embryos and Fetuses Have Rights

Michele GoodwIn

doi:10.1515/lehr-2017-0007

Article

If Embryos and Fetuses Have Rights

Michele GoodwIn

Published/Copyright: January 5, 2018

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From the journal The Law & Ethics of Human Rights Volume 11 Issue 2

Abstract

What exactly does it mean to be human or for that matter a “non-human”? This essay unpacks questions regarding the personhood of embryos and fetuses. It takes as its lead the escalating political demand for embryos to attain rights and the status of children. The essay argues that such political demands are not in isolation physically, medically, or legally of women’s health and rights. It makes the case that embryos and fetuses cannot be granted rights without impermissibly implicating pregnant women. Thus, the essay argues against the extension of criminal and tort law to punish pregnant women under fetal protection laws by drawing an analogy to the duty to rescue jurisprudence.

Keywords: non-human; personhood; embryo; fetuses; pregnant women; granted rights; duty to rescue

Published Online: 2018-1-5

Published in Print: 2017-1-26

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Articles in the same Issue

https://doi.org/10.1515/lehr-2017-0007

Keywords for this article

non-human; personhood; embryo; fetuses; pregnant women; granted rights; duty to rescue