Appendix A. Supplementary Figures



Figure A.1. Convergence to different bargaining norms as a function of the minority size (in percent). The in-group strategies of majority and minority members are shown. The agents' initial strategies are assigned randomly. The plots are averaged over the number of agents (between 20 and 100) and the probability p_{out} of forming a link between two agents with different social identities (varying from 0.2 to 0.8). The high payoff H was held constant at 6. Both the majority and the minority group are likely to converge to a norm of equal division (fair norm). For a small minority size, the minority group is less likely to converge to a fair norm. The reason for this is that in case of a very small minority size (and a small total population), there are minority members that have no in-group collaborators and therefore can never update their in-group strategy. As a consequence, the minority group cannot converge to a fair norm.



Figure A.2. Convergence to different bargaining norms as a function of the minority size (in percent). The out-group strategies of majority and minority members are shown. Initially, the majority members discriminate against the minority members, i.e. the majority members play high against the minority members and the minority members play low against the majority members. The plots are averaged over the number of agents (between 20 and 100) and the probability p_{out} of forming a link between two agents with different social identities (varying from 0.2 to 0.8). The high payoff H was held constant at 6. Independent of the minority size, the majority continues to discriminate against the minority.



(a) random (b) discriminatory

Figure A.3. Convergence to different bargaining norms as a function of the minority size (in percent) if the anti-discrimination measure of an internal complaints board is applied. The out-group strategies of majority and minority members are shown. Initially, the out-group strategies are either (a) assigned randomly or (b) discriminate against the minority. The plots are averaged over the number of agents (between 20 and 100) and the probability p_{out} of forming a link between two agents with different social identities (varying from 0.2 to 0.8). The high payoff H and the probability p_c of being reported to the internal complaints board by a (randomly chosen) non-discriminatory collaborator were held constant at 6 and 40 %, respectively. For both initial networks, the population becomes more likely to converge to a fair norm with increasing minority size. If the initial network is random, the population is most likely to converge to a fair norm. However, if the initial network is discriminatory, in most cases the population converges to a norm where the majority continues to discriminate against the minority. Hence, the existence of an internal complaints board cannot stop discrimination in an initially discriminating society (even for a large minority group).



(a) random (b) discriminatory

Figure A.4. Convergence to different bargaining norms as a function of the probability p_c of being reported by a collaborator if the anti-discrimination measure of an internal complaints board is applied. The simulations were run for 10,000 rounds (instead of 1,000 rounds). The out-group strategies of majority and minority members are shown. Initially, the out-group strategies are either (a) assigned randomly or (b) discriminate against the minority. The plots are averaged over the number of agents (between 20 and 100) and the probability p_{out} of forming a link between two agents with different social identities (varying from 0.2 to 0.8). The high payoff H and the minority size (in percent) were held constant at 6 and 20 %, respectively. Increasing the number of rounds in which agents interact does not lead to a significantly higher proportion of runs converging to a fair bargaining norm.



(a) random (b) discriminatory

Figure A.5. Convergence to different bargaining norms as a function of the minority size (in percent) if training and organisational anti-discrimination measures are applied. The out-group strategies of majority and minority members are shown. Initially, the out-group strategies are either (a) assigned randomly or (b) discriminate against the minority. The plots are averaged over the number of agents (between 20 and 100) and the probability p_{out} of forming a link between two agents with different social identities (varying from 0.2 to 0.8). The high payoff H and the probability p_e of an inspection by the employer were held constant at 6 and 40 %, respectively. For both initial networks, the population is most likely to converge to a fair norm. Wit h increasing minority size the proportion of the population that converged to a fair norm becomes slightly higher.



Figure A.6. Convergence to different bargaining norms as a function of the probability p_c of being reported by a collaborator if training and organisational anti-discrimination measures are applied. The out-group strategies of majority and minority members are shown. Initially, the out-group strategies are assigned such that there is a 45 % probability that a majority agent discriminates against the minority. The plots are averaged over the number of agents (between 20 and 100) and the probability p_{out} of forming a link between two agents with different social identities (varying from 0.2 to 0.8). The high payoff H and the minority size (in percent) were held constant at 6 and 20 %, respectively.