Article
Open Access
Hintikka's Socratic Epistemology Meets Gettier's Counterexamples
-
John Ian K. Boongaling
Published/Copyright:
September 1, 2022
Published Online: 2022-09-01
Published in Print: 2017-09-01
© 2022 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Contents
- The Logic of Intending and Predicting
- Hintikka's Socratic Epistemology Meets Gettier's Counterexamples
- Two Conceptions of Legitimacy: A Response to Fabian Wendt's Moralist Critique of Political Realism
- A Plea for Rhees' Reading of Wittgenstein's On Certainty: is grammar conditioned by certain facts?
- Report on the 6th Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association (EPSA17), 6-9 September 2017
Keywords for this article
Hintikka's socratic epistemology;
Gettier's counterexamples;
knowledge as justified true belief;
interrogative model of inquiry;
deductive and interrogative moves;
logic of questions and answers
Creative Commons
BY 4.0
Articles in the same Issue
- Contents
- The Logic of Intending and Predicting
- Hintikka's Socratic Epistemology Meets Gettier's Counterexamples
- Two Conceptions of Legitimacy: A Response to Fabian Wendt's Moralist Critique of Political Realism
- A Plea for Rhees' Reading of Wittgenstein's On Certainty: is grammar conditioned by certain facts?
- Report on the 6th Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association (EPSA17), 6-9 September 2017
