Kant’s Critical Objection to the Rationalists in the B-Deduction
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Terence Hua Tai
Abstract
According to a familiar reading of Kant, he denies the possibility alleged by the rationalists of our having non-sensible or intellectual intuition. I argue in this article that he simply holds the possibility to be groundless. To put the contrast in terms of a distinction Kant makes in the A-Paralogisms, he raises a “dogmatic” objection to the rationalists in the former case, and a “critical” one in the latter. By analyzing the two-step argument in the B-Deduction, I defend the “critical” reading, which may, I hope, shed light on how Kant can justify his claim – which may be regarded as a second-order, methodological one pivotal to his Critical project – that possible experience serves as the only guideline for proving that we can cognize objects a priori.
© 2020 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Titelseiten
- Abhandlungen
- Kant’s Critical Objection to the Rationalists in the B-Deduction
- Cassirer, der Grundlagenstreit und die „idealen Elemente“ der Mathematik
- Berichte und Diskussionen
- Can Suicide Preserve One’s Dignity? Kant and Kantians on the Moral Response to Cognitive Loss
- Traduction de l’ « Introduction » du cours de droit naturel ditNaturrecht Feyerabend(1784)
- Bibliographie
- Kant-Bibliographie 2018
- Mitteilungen
- Jahresinhalt Kant-Studien Jg. 111, 2020
Articles in the same Issue
- Titelseiten
- Abhandlungen
- Kant’s Critical Objection to the Rationalists in the B-Deduction
- Cassirer, der Grundlagenstreit und die „idealen Elemente“ der Mathematik
- Berichte und Diskussionen
- Can Suicide Preserve One’s Dignity? Kant and Kantians on the Moral Response to Cognitive Loss
- Traduction de l’ « Introduction » du cours de droit naturel ditNaturrecht Feyerabend(1784)
- Bibliographie
- Kant-Bibliographie 2018
- Mitteilungen
- Jahresinhalt Kant-Studien Jg. 111, 2020
