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The Primacy of the Good Will

  • Julio Esteves EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: April 1, 2014
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Abstract: In this article I argue that Kant’s conception of the good will in its relation to the gifts of nature and fortune listed in the opening paragraphs of Groundwork I is usually misunderstood. The misunderstanding has its roots in the attribution of the alleged predicate ‘good in a conditioned sense’ to those gifts, even when they are taken in isolation. As a result, the centrality and primacy of Kant’s concept of the good will as the condition of the goodness of those gifts is completely obscured. However, a different picture emerges if one takes into account that ‘good in a conditioned sense’ properly means ‘good only on the condition of being combined with a good will’, so that talking of the goodness of such gifts taken in isolation or apart from the good will is a logical contradiction. Accordingly, we will see that, in his practical philosophy, Kant assigns to the good will a role very similar to the role played by Aristotle’s concept of substance in his theoretical philosophy. For, according to Kant, those gifts can be good and be said to be good only on the condition of being in a will which is good. Finally, we will see how this interpretation of the primacy of the good will sheds light on Kant’s view on the moral worth of actions.

Published Online: 2014-04-01
Published in Print: 2014-04-01

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