Abstract
Based on an ethnography of work in a high-security prison, this article explores how safety practitioners develop specialised sensing skills through close engagement with their socio-material work environment and how they use these skills in constructing their understandings of what is going on in everyday work. The results make visible the potential role of the senses in how workers keep systems running, how they maintain safety in situations where quick reactions are needed and for the fast transition to more deliberate forms of sensemaking for early intervention. However, despite the importance prison officers ascribed to the use of the senses for their ability to work proactively, certain technologies seemed to reduce access to sensory inputs and thereby the ability to notice weak signals. This indicate challenges regarding embodied and tacit safety knowledge when more visible representations of safety are implemented. The article aims to contribute to a theoretical framework for understanding the role of senses in safety work through the concept of sensemaking as an embodied, socio-material process.
1 Introduction
Using work in a high-security prison as a case, the present article examines how safety practitioners’ sensing skills are developed and entwined in socio-material work environments and are thereby involved in early sensemaking processes related to safety.[1]
‘Sensemaking’ is a concept that describes the processes where people construct their understandings of what is going on around them to know what actions are required (Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 2005). Although this has mainly been understood as a social process where people make sense through retrospective thinking and discourse, several scholars have argued for applying a broader view that includes emotions, senses[2] (de Rond, Holeman, and Howard-Grenville 2019; Maitlis and Sonenshein 2010; Maitlis, Vogus, and Lawrence 2013; Sandberg and Tsoukas 2015) and materiality (Haavik 2016; Rosness et al. 2016; Sandberg and Tsoukas 2020). Emotional and sensory aspects are particularly interesting when studying operational work in the area of safety, where the situational contingencies and temporal characteristics of work require improvisation (Almklov 2018), that is, immediate on-the-spot reactions that do not allow for analysis (Weick 1998). This makes more unspoken aspects, such as sensing, interesting for how people make sense of safety in situ.
Thus, the current article elaborates on the role of the senses in sensemaking processes evolving in safety work. Risk is here understood from a sociological perspective that emphasises how people construct understandings of risk in socio-cultural contexts (Wall and Olofsson 2008). ‘Safety work’ refers to work aiming to ensure the safety of people and systems, either as an explicit objective as in prison work, police work and firefighting or indirectly as in mining, seafaring and aviation. Although failed sensemaking in other contexts can result in error and confusion, safety practitioners who fail to properly make sense of risk situations and fail to choose the right intervention can produce great harm (Weick 1993).
Therefore, understanding how people in organisations make sense of safety and risk is crucial, not only to cope with evident problems, but also to understand what makes ‘operations proceed smoothly’ (Rosness et al. 2016, p. 54). Whereas safety can be seen as a ‘dynamic non-event’, Hollnagel points out that this focus ‘does obviously not mean that nothing happens’ (2014, p. 23). Still, most studies on sensemaking in organisations focus on sensemaking efforts triggered by major events (e.g. Cornelissen, Mantere, and Vaara 2014; Weick 1993) or at least in ‘high tempo’ work settings where sensemaking processes become more visible (Albolino, Cook, and O’Connor 2006). Yet minor events and everyday work practices are important to study, both because sensemaking in such situations is more common and because of the potential of minor events becoming major if the initial sensemaking efforts fails (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2015, p. 13). Thus, an important aim of the present article is to make visible the role of senses in workers’ understanding of what is going on in their everyday work, both to keep the system running and to solve problems in early phases so these potential problems become ‘nonevents’, at least from the outside. The socio-material environment in which the workers’ sensing skills are entwined is particularly interesting with a view to recent changes in many workplaces concerned with safety, due to increasing standardisation and technological development (Almklov and Antonsen 2019; Almklov and Antonsen 2014; Gould and Macrae 2021; Kongsvik et al. 2020). This is also true in prisons (e.g. Kaun and Stiernstedt 2021). To investigate these issues, the research question is as follows:
How do safety practitioners use their senses to make sense of situations in their everyday socio-material work environment, and how can the constitution of this environment affect the accomplishment of sensemaking? This will be explored through the case of prison officers’ work with safety in a Norwegian high-security prison.
Below, I first present existing research on how safety workers use their senses before presenting sensemaking as the theoretical framework. Thereafter, I describe the study’s data and methods before presenting and discussing the results.
2 Senses in Safety Work
Although several studies have investigated sensemaking in safety work (e.g. Albolino, Cook, and O’Connor 2006; Kilskar et al. 2018; Rosness et al. 2016; Weick 1993), the use of senses has received little scholarly attention. However, sensing is probably included in what is referred to, often briefly, as ‘practical knowledge’, ‘intuition’, ‘gut feeling’ and experience in frontline work, for instance, for helicopter pilots (Chua and Feigh 2013, p. 304), prison officers (Midtlyng 2022, p. 6) and seafarers (Kongsvik et al. 2020, p. 6). Seafaring is, in fact, a kind of work where the sensory aspects are often mentioned. For instance, it is described as involving extracting ‘cues from sounds, smells, vibrations and other weak signals’ (Kongsvik et al. 2020), and seamanship implies feeling ‘the rhythm of the sea, the wind, and the vessel’ to ‘know the signals of the boat’ (Størkersen and Thorvaldsen 2021, pp. 6–11). This suggests that sensing has an important role in seafarers’ work as part of the ‘ship sense’ consisting of both cognitive and perceptual abilities (Prison, Dahlman, and Lundh 2013).
In several studies with a more explicit focus on the senses – and although sometimes with an equivalent implicit focus on safety – how frontline workers use their senses for the sake of safety has been documented in a broad range of contexts, such as military patrolling (Hockey 2009, p. 481), medicine and nursing (e.g. Ihlebæk 2018; Maslen 2016), mining (Kamoche and Maguire 2011; Leger and Mothibeli 1988), firefighting (Somerville and Lloyd 2006, p. 286) and prison work (Herrity 2021; Sørensen 2023). Like with ‘ship sense’, firefighters conceptualise the way their bodies provide information through sight, sound, touch, sensation and movement as ‘fire sense’ (Somerville and Lloyd 2006, p. 286). For miners, ‘pit sense’ is a well-known concept (Kamoche and Maguire 2011; Leger and Mothibeli 1988), which has been described as ‘an ability to take notice minute warning signs, sounds and smells’ (Douglass 1977 referenced in Leger and Mothibeli 1988). Relevant research on the use of senses in work, beyond safety work, is among others Silva and Cunha’s (2022) study of the cork industry and Andreasson, Lindblom, and Thorvald (2017) who conceptualise the sensory competences found in manufacturing as ‘professional sensing’. Research has also pointed out the tensions between such embodied knowledge and other logics in frontline safety work (Almklov and Antonsen 2014; Almklov, Rosness, and Størkersen 2014; Hutchinson, Dekker, and Rae 2022; Kongsvik et al. 2020; Maslen 2016; Perin 2005).
However, safety practitioners’ use of senses for sensemaking has rarely been investigated. Herrity (2021) is an important exception, connecting the use of the senses with sensemaking in safety-related work in her study of sound in a prison (and a pub). She shows that prison officers use the ‘soundscape’ of the prison to make sense in prison work, arguing that different rhythms and tunes form ‘a focus for assessing and monitoring safety’ (Herrity 2021, 14). While Herrity emphasises the significance of sound in prisons, the current article focuses on sensory input more broadly. Moreover, this article uses the prison as a case to examine the use of the senses as a cross-sectorial phenomenon in safety work and emphasises how the constitution of the work environment can affect the accomplishment of sensemaking. Building on existing research, the present article aims to contribute to a theoretical framework for understanding the sensory aspects of sensemaking in frontline safety work.
3 Sensemaking
In this article, sensemaking is understood as a socio-material process in which the role of materiality (included technology) and social aspects for sensing is acknowledged (Haavik 2016; Rosness et al. 2016; Sandberg and Tsoukas 2020). In contrast to seeing people and the workplace as separate entities, as is common in many other approaches to sensemaking, Sandberg and Tsoukas argue that people are ‘always already immersed within specific sociomaterial practice worlds’ which ‘specifies a particular way of being and acting’ (2020, p. 5). This way of seeing people ‘immersed and skillful[ly]’ engaging with the world is different from the subject–object separation more common in organisational sensemaking research (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2020, p. 3). As such, this perspective on sensemaking does not see socio-material work environments as consisting of freestanding entities that we subsequently attach meaning to but, rather, as relational ensembles of people, objects and tools that constitute a meaningful context for sensemaking (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2020, p. 5). For people new to a work environment, this is a shift from seeing the environment at a distance, to becoming immersed in a ‘meaningful relational whole’ (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2020, p. 5). Thus, how people make sense of their environment will differ based on where they are situated and, consequently, are engaged. For a pilot flying an aircraft, a cockpit is ‘not an array of externally related objects to be contemplated, as it would be for an outsider, but a meaningful whole that is available for action’ (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2020, p. 5). Therefore, sensory skills differ between different environmental domains, and workers consequently develop an occupation-specific ‘ordering of importance and hence of notice and attention’, which differs in different areas of expertise (Winch 2018, p. 675[3]).
Thus, embodiment, such as bodily sensations, sensory knowing, felt experiences, and emotions, are an integral part of sensemaking (Cunliffe and Coupland 2012; Herrity 2021; Sandberg and Tsoukas 2015, 2020; see also Rosness et al. 2016, p. 63) because our entwinement with the work environment is constituted bodily through sensory engagement (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2020). The topic of embodiment is not new in sensemaking research; it was recognised early on, for instance, by Weick (1993), who underlines how the firefighter Dodge was an ‘experienced woodsman’ who tried to save his crew of wildland firefighters in Mann Gulch (de Rond, Holeman, and Howard-Grenville 2019, p. 1962). However, Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld (2005, p. 412) suggested that organisations are ‘talked into existence’, which underlines the mainly cognitive and discursive focus of this research (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2015) and sensemaking research has generally been accused of the ‘neglect of the body’ (e.g. Sandberg and Tsoukas 2015, p. 20, see also de Rond, Holeman, and Howard-Grenville 2019).
Despite this, there is some studies on the role of emotions in sensemaking, such as Maitlis and Sonenshein (2010, p. 566) who note that emotions often have been viewed as an impediment to cognitive processes, particularly sensemaking but that, in reality, emotions (or at least arousal) are at the core of sensemaking processes. Maitlis, Vogus, and Lawrence (2013) suggest that emotions are important in signalling the need for sensemaking, to shape processes and conclude it. How emotions can affect sensemaking in stressful situations in professional work is, for instance, documented in Cornelissen et al.’s (2014) study of an antiterrorist police operation and in Boehm’s (2018) study of bodily performativity in frontline command. Regarding the use of the senses in sensemaking, however, there are very few studies, with Cunliffe and Coupland (2012) and Herrity (2021) being two exceptions. The neglect of the body in sensemaking research is problematic because what are often understood as mental activities are constituted by bodily engagement in our environment (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2020, p. 6) and leaving out these embodied aspects only allows for investigating deliberate forms of sensemaking (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2015, p. 25).
The shortcomings of only focusing on deliberate sensemaking is pointed out in Herrity’s (2021) study, when she observes that sensemaking is grounded in familiarity with what one of her participants in the prison termed ‘the everyday tune that’s normal for here’ (p. 13). In their typology of sensemaking, Sandberg and Tsoukas (2020) mention this as immanent sensemaking. This is the most basic type of sensemaking in organisations, principally bodily, and a continuous habitual mode of engagement in which people spontaneously respond to and make sense of routine situations without deliberative elements (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2020).
This means that sensemaking is not ‘activated’ by interruptions, as has been commonly portrayed in organisational sensemaking research (Maitlis and Christianson 2014; Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 2005, p. 414). What breakdowns and disruptions activate is not sensemaking but rather improvisatory, innovative action (Yakhlef and Essén 2013) involving a different type of sensemaking. Involved-deliberate sensemaking is partly tacit and bodily and partly a deliberate thinking process that happens when the habitual routine is interrupted by, for instance, an anomaly (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2020, p. 11). By ‘bracketing, noticing and extracting cues from our lived experience of the interrupted situation’ (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2015, p. 409), people create an ‘initial sense’ of the situation that they start interpreting (p. 14). Going from immanent to involved-deliberate sensemaking means that people shift, in reality on a recursive continuum, from ‘absorbed engagement to paying deliberate attention to what is going on’ (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2020, p. 11). Ingold points out the differences in perceptual systems for the ability to notice such features in the surrounding environment: ‘ … because the perceptual system of the hunter is attuned to picking up information, critical to the practical conduct of his hunting, to which the unskilled observer simply fails to attend’ (2000, p. 55). Therefore, those skills that enable professionals to spot details in dynamic situations are important for practicing certain occupations (Winch 2018, p. 678). Similarly, Weick et al. emphasise the ability to be aware of ‘discriminatory detail’ based on ‘patterns of interrelation among processes of perception and cognition’ (2005, p. 515). This shows how skilful sensemaking processes can contribute to mindful organising, that is the ability on the front line to collectively capture ‘discriminatory detail about emerging threats’ and ‘swiftly act in response to these details’ (Vogus and Sutcliffe 2012, p. 723).
For the study of operational safety work, immanent sensemaking and the transition from immanent to more involved-deliberate sensemaking is particularly interesting. These are the sensemaking modes both when ‘operations passes smoothly and safely’ (Rosness et al. 2016, p. 54) and when there have been interruptions, but there is still time to prevent or mitigate breakdowns. Based on this framework of sensemaking, the present article aims to analyse how safety workers use their senses to make sense of situations related to safety. Through a relational understanding of how work environments constitute meaningful contexts for sensemaking, the article also aims to analyse how sensemaking can be affected by the ways in which the work environment is constituted.
3.1 Related Concepts
‘The making of sense’ (Weick 1995, p. 4) is researched and conceptualised in different but related ways. Cognitive psychology has offered insight into how individuals make sense of the world and how human cognitive processes continually select, interpret, retain and respond to information in our environment (e.g. Endsley 1995; Wickens and Carswell 2021). Whereas some strands of psychological research treat these processes as detached from their contexts, others are concerned with how they play out in interaction with the environment. Research on intuition as part of ‘natural decision-making’, for example, explains intuition as ‘pattern matching’ in which people use their experience as a repertoire of patterns that ‘highlight the most relevant cues, provide expectancies, identify plausible goals, and suggest typical types of reactions” (Klein 2008, p. 457). One important goal is to ‘demystify’ intuition by identifying the cues that experts use to make their judgements (Kahneman and Klein 2009, p. 516). The concept of intuition is compatible with parts of sensemaking processes. However, ‘intuition’ is closely connected to the contexts this research is rooted in, that is, research on successful chess players and how they quickly recognise patterns (Kahneman and Klein 2009). ‘True intuitive skill’ requires a combination of a predictable environment and opportunities to learn from it (Kahneman and Klein 2009, p. 515), which is not the case in many work settings, including prisons. Sensemaking is also a much broader concept than intuition. Intuition will always be a result of sensemaking processes, but sensemaking processes are not necessarily connected to intuition.
Like research on intuition, the literature on situational awareness is concerned with ‘pattern matching’ and psychological processes such as long-term memory contributing to ‘the operator’s internal model of the state of the environment’ (Endsley 2000, p. 4). The differences between the concepts of sensemaking and situational awareness have been debated (Endsley 2015a, 2015b, Klein 2015). Endsley points out that sensemaking as portrayed by Weick (1995) was retrospective and concerned with deliberation, in contrast to her theory on situational awareness which included ongoing, automatic processes of recognition, looking forward (Endsley 2015a, p. 18).
This critique has, however, been addressed within the research on organisational sensemaking which this article is based on. By broadening the theory of sensemaking, the concept captures the entire sensemaking process and directly refers to the process of making sense, not only the end state (Klein 2015). Moreover, sensemaking here goes beyond cognitive psychological processes, to include the cultural shaping of sensemaking processes, for example within communities of practice (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2015). For example, whereas the concept of ‘attention’ is applied as a generic, disembodied entity in much psychological research (e.g. Endsley 1995), here, attention is seen as ‘culturally elaborated ways of attending to and with one’s body in surroundings that include the embodied presence of others’ (Csordas 1993, p. 138). Thus, the phenomenological approach to sensemaking applied in the current article helps challenge the widespread understanding of sensemaking in safety work as a disembodied cognitive process, emphasising the significance of seeing workers’ embodied knowledge as inherently related to their work environments.
4 Data and Methods
The data have been generated from a larger ethnographic study of safety work in a Norwegian high-security prison, where an initial research interest was practical, tacit knowledge as part of how frontline workers understand and ‘read’ situations related to safety.
Ethnography is an acknowledged method to study tacit knowledge that is often taken for granted (Atkinson and Hammersley 2007). As a result, the method is useful for capturing the sensemaking process ‘from within its practice world’, particularly challenging for the forms of sensemaking depending on people embedded inside the organisational activities in which they enact (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2020, p. 24). In their article on prospective sensemaking, Rosness et al. (2016, p. 65) point out that this kind of sensemaking is challenging to study because ‘one needs to know what to look for (…) to see it’. As a former prison officer, I was familiar with the characteristics of prison work, which gave me some shared modes of attention (Csordas 1993) with the participants. I used my own experiences of sensing the prison environment as a starting point to direct my observations towards the participants’ use of senses. Getting a ‘head start’ by knowing about the research topic in advance can be an advantage when researching familiar contexts (Berger 2015, p. 223). In addition to knowing what to look for, this familiarity made it easier to navigate the prison by knowing how prisons work and are organised and being familiar with the related jargon. Prison officers mentioned that they did not have to ‘babysit’ me because as a former prison officer, I could ‘take care of myself’ in a prison environment, and some of them expressed relief that I would not misinterpret their ‘black humour’. However, sharing tacit knowledge with participants can also complicate the research process (see, e.g. Berger 2015), among other things, because of the possibility of taking things for granted. It could be that the participants who knew that I was a former prison officer took it for granted that I knew things and, accordingly, did not elaborate or explain. It could also be that my own tacit knowledge gave me blind spots. In both cases, this could result in poor descriptions. This could be particularly challenging when studying tacit knowledge such as the use of senses, and very likely, there are aspects of the work that I did not manage to capture. Still, I believe that my efforts to naively observe and describe the prison environment, especially at the beginning of the fieldwork, helped me view the prison environment from another perspective. Moreover, my approach as a ‘naïve question mark’ seemed to make the participants accept having to explain nearly everything to me. Also, I found that my experience was useful exactly because aspects of the sensemaking process become more visible when the organisational activity is interrupted (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2020). For example, when I heard what I interpreted as the escalation of a conflict between an officer and a prisoner in another room, I struggled to remain with the trainee I followed, who did not read the sensory input the same way as I did and continued our conversation without reacting. As such, tacit ‘prison knowledge’ became visible in the contrast between what I was supposed to do as a researcher and what I used to do as a prison officer.
Fieldwork was conducted between August and December 2018 in 54 sessions over a total of nearly 300 h, including observation and informal conversations. Some weeks before the fieldwork began, the governor sent an email containing my information letter to all employees informing them about my project and the voluntariness of participating. I also sent a notice with information for the prison to post on the wings so that the prisoners would be informed about my presence. At the beginning of the fieldwork, the managers who lead the morning meetings briefly introduced me and my project so that everyone knew why I was there. When I was present in these meetings, and when I arrived for new fieldwork sessions and in new situations, I emphasised the voluntariness of participation in the study. Yet, it was not possible to ask for permission to observe every situation in advance. Bosk (2008, p. 155) argued that ‘an overly scrupulous approach’ to informed consent would disrupt the lives of the participants and be intrusive. For example, tense situations would suddenly arise in the prison, which required me not to interfere. I would therefore observe, and if I wrote something down, I would ask the officer afterward whether it was okay to have done so or if they wanted me to delete the notes. I still may have had an overly strict approach to the question of consent; this was commented on several times. However, I believe it was wise to be careful in such matters, especially because of the hierarchic prison structure, in which officers are used to doing what their superiors tell them.
I was following prison officers and operational senior officers at work, in different activities and tasks at the wings, in the guard’s rooms, during watch and in meetings. Because security information is not meant to be shared with the prisoners, much of the observation and informal conversation was happening where the prisoners were not present. These informal conversations were usually carried out during or right after the situations unfolded, often based on my observations of officers’ body language, but also sometimes more detached from these situations. For instance, conversations based on my observations often led officers to talk about how they used their senses more generally. Also, conversations about other topics, such as how to have oversight, could develop into officers talking about how they used their senses.
The prison under study was large (in a Norwegian context), which gave some variety in buildings, type of wings and participants’ experience and practices, which proved useful for learning about their use of senses. The prison was housing male prisoners only, both sentenced and remanded in custody. Because of anonymity considerations, the prison will not be described in further detail. Anonymity reasons is also why all participants are referred to as ‘he’, although both men and women were working as prison officers.
Prison officers are frontline personnel, so they are the first responders when ‘something happens’ in a prison. In Norwegian prisons, safety is the main objective, and the anticipation of risks related to incidents like fires, assaults, riots and escapes is central and requires early sensemaking. Together, prison officers have the responsibility for certain areas of the prison, where their function has a distinct physical characteristic: They are the ones putting out fires, handling conflicts, breaking up violence, coping with people who have committed suicide and running after people who try to escape. They are also exposed to violence themselves because of their close interactions with prisoners. In addition to responding when something happens, they are also continuously working to prevent these incidents from happening in the first place, which arises from a heavy emphasis on anticipatory work in Norwegian prisons. This makes prisons useful settings for micro-studies of the socio-material dimensions of how they continuously make sense within a bounded environment.
While doing the fieldwork, I wrote down fieldnotes in a notebook, and after every session, I wrote extensive fieldnotes as soon as possible. Usually, this was right after having left the prison. All notes were broadly categorised to obtain an overview of interesting patterns in the data material, and as such, the analytical work started the first day of fieldwork. The code ‘sensing risk’ was produced during the fieldwork. The focus on sensing followed by observations of and talk about the importance of senses in the performance of work, and this broad code initially included everything related to sensing. The focus on senses related to risk followed by the overall focus of the study on how prison officers performed safety work.
After the fieldwork ended, I refamiliarised myself with the fieldnotes and generated codes again to ensure that everything was properly included. This included to ensure that all data about sensing was included in the broad code ‘sensing risk’ which was then extracted from the rest of the data. Reflexive thematic analysis was then carried out for this part of the data material. This analytical approach can be presented as a six-phased process: familiarisation of data, coding, generation of initial themes, development and reviewing of themes, refining, defining, and naming themes, and writing the report (Braun and Clarke 2019, 2022). However, the analysis was moving back and forth between these phases, due to the recursive and non-procedural nature of reflexive thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke 2019).
In the first coding of the data material regarding how the prison officers were using their senses, I attempted to use codes that were close to the empirical data. This was meant to reduce the influence of the researchers’ own expectations (Tjora 2021) and ensure that the analysis was grounded in the data given a shared professional background with the participants. When possible, extracts from the data were used to produce semantic codes, such as ‘having feelers deep into the wing’, ‘sensing the atmosphere’, ‘the air that crackles’ and ‘then you sense that something is wrong’. After this round of coding, such semantic codes were grouped together, based on mutual thematic connection (Tjora 2021). Sometimes, this process created the initial themes; sometimes, it was necessary to group the codes into initial themes again. The initial themes were further developed and refined, defined and named.
Through this analytical process, two main themes were developed: ‘Sensemaking through the senses’ and ‘Cut off from the senses’. ‘Sensemaking through the senses’ was constructed as an overall pattern of shared meaning (Braun and Clarke 2022, p. 77) across three sub-themes. This theme is quite like the initial broad code ‘sensing risk’ as produced during the fieldwork, but as a result of the analytical process, the final theme became broader than merely sensing risk, and the process of making sense through the senses is highlighted. Because this broad theme included a great deal of nuance it was further elaborated in sub-themes. The first sub-theme is how the officers constructed what I call ‘sensory maps’ through engagement with the socio-material work environment. This theme was based on initial semantic codes such as ‘we know what sounds belong here’, ‘unnatural sounds at that time’, ‘now I have acquired that sense’ and ‘you know with experience’, which were grouped together in the codes ‘development of a “sense”’, ‘sensory norm’ and ‘reacting to anomalies’. These codes were grouped together in a theme concerning the ‘construction of sensory socio-material maps’ which the officers used to navigate in the prison and developed through engagement in the environment. The second theme concerned how the officers’ attention was directed at prospective risks, based on the codes ‘scanning the environment’, ‘constant awareness to change’ and ‘readiness to respond’. The third sub-theme captured how the sensory sensemaking process was shared and tacitly performed within small communities of practice, based on the codes ‘unspoken codes’, ‘shared knowledge’ and ‘no need to explain’.
The other main theme, ‘Cut off from the senses’, was an initial semantic code that was ‘promoted’ to a candidate theme because of its richness and nuance (Braun and Clarke 2022, p. 81). This theme was built on initial codes such as ‘cameras do not catch the atmosphere’, ‘cut off from the senses’ and ‘waiting for shit to hit the fan’, which were grouped in the codes ‘sparser sensory experience’, ‘missing information’, ‘reactive response’ and ‘change from before’. These codes included the way in which technological solutions can be perceived as barriers to sensory input and, consequently, the ability of officers to make sense of what is happening in the prison environment quickly.
5 Results
5.1 Sensemaking through the Senses
I am sitting by the desk, together with two prison officers in the guard’s room of their wing. The door between the wings and guard’s room stands open so that the prisoners can just walk right in. You cannot see what is going on in the hall from the guard’s room, but the female officer says that even if they are sitting there, ‘We have our feelers deep into the wing’. They are listening, smelling, ‘using the senses all the time’. The male officer adds, ‘Even if we are sitting here on our arses, we must be constantly ready’. They describe an ‘atmosphere’ they sometimes sense, which is often difficult to deconstruct what it is about. ‘You know that kind of thick air – the air that crackles a bit? You can feel that something is about to happen’. (Extract from fieldnotes)
For a prison officer, that ‘something is about to happen’ is usually a way of referring to the development of some unwanted event, like assault, conflicts, rebellion or escape. The ability to sense that something (wrong) was about to happen was found to be an important way of being able to early on make sense of what was potentially happening in the prison environment characterized by considerable situational variability. This ‘sense’ was often referred to among prison officers as ‘gut feeling’, ‘feelers’ and ‘feeling of the atmosphere’. Whereas prison officers are working to prevent and manage risks from both human and nonhuman sources (like fires), such ambiguous feelings are often directed at something going on among people. The experience of having a gut feeling, without being able to explicitly decompose what it is about, is a common finding among safety practitioners, from prison officers (Herrity 2021) to nurses (Ihlebæk 2018, p. 485f) and miners (Somerville and Lloyd 2006). However, gut feelings often seemed to be about subconsciously noticing ambiguous but very concrete cues, which seemed to give a bodily feeling of ‘chronic unease’ (Reason 1997, p. 34). Although emotions generally have been little investigated in sensemaking research, Weick (1995, p. 45) suggest that interruptions to the workflow trigger arousal of the autonomic nervous system, which serves as a warning that something needs attention. Such arousal could probably be experienced as receiving a ‘gut feeling’ of something being wrong.
The environmental cues that signalled that ‘something was wrong’ for prison officers seemed to be closely related to the sensory experiences of changes in social and material conditions. Some cues were signs of what were perceived as aggressive body language, like fisted hands, shaking and facial expressions like the widespread description of people with a ‘dark gaze’ as a sign of immediate risk, which was often reported when talking about prisoners perceived as dangerous in specific situations. The officers’ attention towards body language concurs with Sørensen’s (2023, p. 339) description of how Norwegian prison officers constantly interpreted the body language of a high-risk prisoner by ‘reading signs, body language, voice, gaze, facial expressions, tone of voice, and whether he was tense’ for being able to judge whether he was ‘angry, scared or gentle’. Reacting to such signs is a basic human skill, but observing a prisoner community as a prison officer is still different because the officers are already immersed in the prison environment which forms a meaningful context and helps them make sense of it. For prison officers, a common orientation towards risk becomes important in their ‘ordering of importance and hence of notice and attention’ (Winch 2018, p. 675). The experienced officers seemed to have a very fine-tuned awareness of details, for instance, how the officers noticed that prisoner A gave prisoner B a gaze, whereas prisoner B turned his head a little bit towards prisoner A – ‘then you know something is emerging’. The ability to notice such details seemed closely related to a combination of awareness of anomalies as understood in the prison context, and local knowledge about the variable social and material environment.
To sense risk in the community of prisoners was often also about subconsciously putting together several pieces of information. In the initial quote, an officer is talking about the sense of ‘thick air – the air that crackles a bit’. He explained what this sense could be based on:
When you walk into the wing, you know who used to sit where and talk with whom. Suddenly, you notice that the sound on the TV in the common area is turned up and is unusually loud. You see that prisoners A and B are sitting together in the common area, which they never used to do. You know that three other specific prisoners sit together in a cell, which they neither use to do. Then, you sense that something is wrong. (Extract from fieldnotes)
It seems clear from this excerpt that familiarity with the environment was important to get a sense of whether something was wrong. The sound of the TV was unusually loud, and the constellations of prisoners were not as it used to be. Therefore, in addition to general knowledge of people and prisons, the prison officers made sense based on very local knowledge of each specific delimited environment for which they were responsible: ‘You learn to sense the feeling on your wing’.
Being able to act appropriately involves understanding the nature of the situation you are facing. People without training and experience within a specific work environment would have less access to such occupation-specific understandings (Winch 2018, p. 676), as newcomers perceive an unfamiliar environment as contingently linked items before they gradually engage with it and it becomes a meaningful whole (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2020, p. 5). A practice supervisor who was lecturing trainees about the cues on which gut feelings often are based explained to me that ‘in the beginning they can’t point it out’, but gradually, they saw it. These lectures gave the trainees awareness of the sensemaking process and probably helped them unpack that the ‘gut feeling’ was, for a large part, about them making sense of sensory input in the prison environment.
5.1.1 Construction of Sensory Socio-Material Maps
A prison officer once told a trainee that ‘it’s something happening at the wing now – the atmosphere is really heavy’. The trainee did not understand what he meant and replied that he did not feel anything. The officer replied that probably he would develop this sense over time. Months later, the trainee came to him and said, ‘Now, I’ve acquired that sense you were talking about’. (Extract from fieldnotes)
Despite the above mentioned lectures about “unpacking” the basis of gut feelings, this kind of knowledge needed to be developed by bodily enactment, by repeated experiences that made their ‘bodies become a source of information’ related to safety (Somerville and Lloyd 2006, p. 286) so that the trainees, over time, became immersed in the prison environment and able to make practical sense of it (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2020). The trainee in the extract experienced a gradual development of a ‘sense’ of what was happening on the prison wing, illustrating how learning to sense the prison environment is a process of ‘enskillment’, one that is closely connected to learning by doing (Ingold 2000). By engaging in a particular environment, people learn to inhabit this specific environment and develop relevant and shared bodily understandings of what is both typical and deviant, allowing them to respond spontaneously to what happens around them (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2020, p. 17f).
Sound seemed to be a particularly important sensory input for the prison officers’ sense of safety, being ‘extremely important’ according to one officer. Another agreed: ‘We know what sounds belong here’. One of the most distinct sensory experiences during the fieldwork was participating in ‘listening rounds’ during a night shift. A little group of officers walked from wing to wing to see – and listen – if everything was as it should be. The officer locked up the door to the wing as quietly as he could and walked calmly inside, where he stood silently and listened, before he walked back and calmly locked the door again. I asked what he did in there, and he said he was listening to ‘unnatural sounds’. It could be hammering, thuds, shouting. Noise from the prisoners’ TVs was not unnatural at this time; on the contrary, that could be a sign that everything was as it should be.
Thus, differentiation between ‘regular sounds’ and ‘anomalous sounds’ was important. Officers on the isolation wing, for instance, seemed to immediately hear the difference in the sounds signalling that the cell interior was ‘smashed’, that is, damaged, which required immediate action. The difference was about intensity: ‘You can feel it trembling’; it is a higher and more brutal sound in which experienced officers could tell the moment the hammering escalated, while standing at a distance. Herrity (2021, p. 15) finds the same in the prison in her study between a prisoner who dropped a weight and a prisoner who threw a weight down in the prison gym. A similar differentiation of sound, although regarding completely different sounds, has also been reported among experienced seafarers in Kongsvik et al. (2020, p. 6). In the present study, the absence of sounds from activities, complaints and requests from prisoners could also be interpreted as a sign of ‘something going on’. The sound of silence was a special kind of silence that gave a feeling of unease in the absence of the expected flow of sounds. This was similarly demonstrated in the incident ending with successfully landing on the Hudson River where the moment when ‘normal engine noises’ were lost was described as ‘eerily quiet’ (Sullenberger and Zaslow 2009, p. 209, as referred to in Sandberg and Tsoukas 2020), a distinct feeling made sense of as ‘something being wrong’ that contributed to further interpretation and action.
This indicates that different occupations develop specific senses towards different cues in very different work environments (Ingold 2000; Winch 2018) where the body is trained so that it ‘seeks out, and responds to, modulations or inflections in the environment to which it is attuned’ (my italics, Ingold 2000, p. 244). People thus take on a specific stance towards the relevant environment, included the people and technologies engaging in it (Winch 2018, p. 675). The concept of ‘professional sensing’ is useful to capture this, and for the case of sound, ‘professional hearing’ is useful to address ‘the skilled embodied practice of being able to hear and recognise anomalous sounds that enact relevant information’ (Andreasson, Lindblom, and Thorvald 2017, p. 104).
The prison officers’ sensemaking was based on the construction of a sensory norm for each specific environment within the prison, forming what I conceptualise as tacit sensory ‘maps’ over their areas of responsibility of what sounds, sights and smells belonged to whom, where and when; consequently, this can show what does not represent potential risk but instead safety. Like the dynamic environment of the prison, the sensory maps were also dynamic, changing when environmental changes in relation to safety were noticed. Most of the time, the sensory maps were part of the officers’ immanent sensemaking of the prison environment, ‘feeling their way’ around situations while drawing on the sensory background this familiarity gave them (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2020, p. 10).
The sensory maps were also important to know when action was not needed, which economised officers’ efforts so that they could concentrate their attention to make sense of unexpected or irregular cues. Therefore, the officers involved-deliberate sensemaking were activated, like the nurses in Ihlebæk’s study, ‘only when a deviation from normality is detected’ (2018, p. 488). This indicates the significance of sensory knowledge for the transition from habitual to interpreting work in the process of making sense of safety.
However, the norm-deviance categorization was based on the expectation that sensory input categorised as ‘normal’ was expected to remain stable and, thereby, something the officers did not need to pay more attention to. By largely determining what was interpreted as ‘disruptive ambiguity’, this could reduce the ability to accurately make sense of risk by ‘lumping’ discriminatory details into categories (Weick and Sutcliffe 2006, p. 516). Thus, the stability in performance provided by habitual immanent sensemaking could also disturb the sensemaking process because of rigidity, especially when facing the unfamiliar (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2020, p. 20). This means that, in addition to being useful, safety practitioners’ immanent sensemaking could be vulnerable through its habitual aspects. This vulnerability will probably be larger in more complex work environments, for instance, in prisons where people relate to other people as a source of risk (Midtlyng 2022, see also Winch 2018, 681f). However, in addition to being habitual, the form of sensemaking identified in the current study was also attentive, which meant that the officers were distinctively sensitive to change.
5.1.2 Prospective Attentiveness
Several times, when talking with experienced prison officers, I eventually understood that the officers’ attention was divided: although being attentive towards our conversation, they were, at the same time, constantly aware of what happened around us. They had a bodily readiness that could be difficult to spot from the outside. This readiness was easiest to notice when they became aware of ambiguities and anomalies that needed more dedicated attention. Suddenly, they either got quieter in the middle of the conversation, discrete and quietly paying close attention trying to make sense, or they left the room with a speed adjusted to the assumed urgency to look if everything was okay. They were constantly scanning the environment (Ingold 2000, p. 244), taking sensory input from the social and material environment. This attentiveness was part of the officers’ immanent sensemaking and served as a necessary precursor to know when to act by being able to notice and, consequently, react to very small discrepant cues at a very early stage. As such, the prison officers’ attentiveness seemed to contribute to ‘effective sensemaking’ which Kudesia (2017, p. 27) has related to the sensitivity to operations and preoccupation of failure in mindful organizing (Weick and Sutcliffe 2006). The immanent sensemaking of everyday work was accompanied by careful attention towards input, which could signal change. This could be explicit warnings like fire alarms and ringing from panic buttons, but more frequently, these included subtle cues like ambiguous messages from the intercom, specific forms of interaction between prisoners, bangs from doors and their colleagues’ body language.
Whereas habitual performance is about repetition, attentive habitual performance is a more creative process. This is a key characteristic of skill, different from habit, that is little responsive to environmental variations (Ingold 2000, p. 401). Habituated bodily skills have an adjustability to respond to varying circumstances (Yakhlef and Essén 2013, p. 885). This was reflected in the changes in the sensory norms of the prison environment because of the shifting composition and dynamics among people on the wing. This responsiveness is important because, as mentioned above in relation to the norm-deviance categorization, being committed to a certain frame is associated with sensemaking failure regarding the needed flexibility and improvisation when facing the unexpected (Cornelissen, Mantere, and Vaara 2014; Weick 1993). Yakhlef and Essén argue that, to become a so-called expert, a set of skills is incorporated in the body, which are ‘ready to anticipate and incorporate salient features of the world’ (2013, p. 885).
The ability to anticipate features of the prison environment was closely connected to the prison officers’ prospective attentiveness. Such anticipation could happen long before the cues were interrupting any ongoing activity and often before the officers knew what it was about, beyond associating it to possible risk. Because even if the officers could not put their finger on what the feeling was about, they responded to the sense that something was wrong. This bodily responsiveness – before being able to explain it – is illustrated in an officer’s recollection of his own reaction in a situation in which he came running to help a colleague who had pushed the panic button4. The following extract from the fieldnotes describes what happened when the officer arrived at the situation:
He started to scream to his colleagues that they must get the prisoner down on the floor (to get control over his body). He repeatedly screamed, ‘Get him down!’ without knowing exactly why. He just felt it was urgent. So his colleagues got the prisoner down on the floor and controlled him. Afterwards, the senior officer came to him and asked why he had told them to get the prisoner down on the floor. First, he could not answer. After having thought about it for a while, trying to recall the situation, he told the senior officer that he had observed the prisoner’s gaze wandering around the wall – ‘like he was looking for a weapon or something’.
The senior officer replied, ‘Funny that you say that’, and took out a bar-like object that had been lying hidden alongside the wall. The officer commented, ‘Often, you feel you don’t have control, but you act the right way anyway’. (Extract from fieldnotes)
Sometimes, one can get a sense that there is something important that cannot quite be grasped in the moment (Cunliffe 2002, p. 42). Similar to Boehm’s (2018, p. 462) findings in his study of bodily performativity in frontline command work, the officer felt the risk of a striking event because of what he observed before he was able to make deliberate sense of it, and his colleagues responded. These reactions can be explained by the interplay between habitual and expressive forms of immanent sensemaking, which both makes people affectively aware of the severity of a situation and of the need for action based on bodily sensations (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2020). For instance, when I asked the prison officers how they knew the difference between sounds, as elaborated on earlier, one of them answered, ‘I cannot tell the difference, but I know I must react’.
This indicate that sensemaking based on the use of senses can contribute to quick responses to weak signals through prospective attentiveness; Because action was often initiated without having anything near a complete and organised sense of what is going on, simply because of a vague sense that ‘something might be wrong’, this will often be an essential skill for keeping people safe in situations where quick reactions are needed. Gherardi mentions what Bourdieu called having a ‘feel for the game’, which is not about what one ‘sees but what he fore-sees’ (2019, p. 65f). The results of the present study thereby support that sensemaking can work prospectively, as argued by Rosness et al. (2016), who show how nurses worked to make sense of operation situations to be some steps ahead of the surgeons for the surgery to proceed without interruption (p. 60). Such abilities to see the development of a process within a complex situation and anticipate that an occurrence will take place is often an important feature of expertise (Winch 2018).
5.1.3 Shared Tacit Understandings
Lacking specialised sensory skills for sensemaking sometimes made it challenging to follow important aspects of safety work for new officers because experienced officers often operated based on tacit knowledge and understanding about safety and risk.
On handover, the permanent officers could just state, ‘It’s the usual’, which, for those familiar with each other and the wing, immersed within this place as a meaningful context, seemed informative and made sense. Another similar phrase was ‘we should pay some attention’, which was often the conclusion in meetings where risk related to prisoners was discussed. When I asked a wing manager what he expected when telling her officers to ‘pay some attention’, he said, ‘I expect them to open their eyes a little more. That is, the seventh sense, that prison officer thing’. This seemed to be an equivalent cue to what Hockey (2009) conceptualises as ‘switching on’ among infantry men when they ‘turn on their senses’ when on patrol.
The officers often talked about their safety-related sensory knowledge as something shared, like ‘we know what sounds belong here’ or ‘that prison officer thing’. However, this seemed to vary based on the characteristics of the wings. Some units were larger, with changes in staff from day to day and, consequently, less interrelation between officers. An example of this was when I was participating in the day shift on a wing where there had been conflicts between prisoners for several weeks. There was a standing decision that one specific prisoner should be moved from the wing if there was any sign of trouble regarding other prisoners’ safety. Discussions about this in the officer group were followed by stating that they ‘should pay some attention’, that is, be particularly aware of warning signs. This day, two inexperienced temporary officers were on duty. After a while, I asked them how things were that day. They said it was okay, in a way that I interpreted contained a question of why I asked. Therefore, I asked more about that situation, and one of them responded by asking, ‘Who?’ None of them knew who the prisoner was or what the situation was about, so they were not familiar with the instruction of ‘paying some attention’.
Other wings were smaller, with a more permanent core of officers with larger possibilities for interrelation, with the characteristics of a community of practice (Lave and Wenger 1991). For officers working closely, their use of senses seemed to contribute to tacit, bodily and shared understandings of ‘what is going on’. For instance, an officer explained that he and his colleagues collaborated without thinking about it; there was no need to say anything: ‘If I stand up like this (raises and turns his head a little), my colleague immediately knows something is happening’ and will react accordingly. Several experienced officers mentioned this silent way of working collectively: there was often no need to say a lot to solve a situation; you could catch each other’s eye or make a little movement – your colleague would understand and react to it.
The problem with explicit explanations in situations related to prisoners and possible risk was about effectiveness and the need to react fast, including reacting without explicitly stating the problem and what should be done while confronting a prisoner. This refers to a difference between safety and security contexts, where safety benefits from information sharing, but security often needs some secrecy (Bieder and Gould 2018, p. 108). It is not wise to expose one’s plan in front of a perceived threat. This was illustrated by a verbal code among some officers when there was a need to silently call for attention. This made shared tacit knowledge even more important. Acquiring sensory sensemaking skills about safety was also about tuning in on colleagues and creating shared sensemaking of the situation, as one officer said, ‘If you know each other well enough, there’s normally no need to talk, you just do it, and it works’. This shows that important parts of sensemaking in relation to safety do not seem to be ‘something that people possess in their heads, but rather, something that people do together’ (Gergen 1985, p. 270, as referenced in Gherardi 2019, p. 47).
5.2 Cut off from the Senses
It’s much more difficult now than earlier; it feels like something is missing. Earlier, you heard all sounds, knew all smells, you were together with the prisoners. I always caught everything that happened, but here, maybe you use your vision – if you take the trouble. Earlier, I knew that ‘now, there’s a conflict’. Now, I must be told afterwards. (Prison officer on building design resulting in physical distance from prisoners, excerpt from fieldnotes)
This theme captures how many prison officers experienced specific technologies in the work environment as problematic for their ability to make sense of safety and risk based on sensory input.
Although high-security prisons are built based on the same principles, there are some differences both within the same prison and between different prisons. The use of camera surveillance and other digital technological solutions differs between prisons and wings, and there are differences between how the prison wings are built, for instance, when it comes to distance between the guard’s room and where the prisoners stay. In some places, the guard’s rooms are open so that prisoners can walk right in; in other places, there are locked doors between them. When work environments are understood as ‘relational ensembles’ that constitute meaningful contexts for sensemaking (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2020, p. 5), such differences is not trivial. The Norwegian Correctional Service has now standardized the building design of new prison buildings, where no guards’ rooms will have direct access to the areas where prisoners live, which leads to a planned physical distance between prisoners and officers (Johnsen et al. 2023a, p. 15). There seemed to be differing opinions on such building design in the current study, but many prison officers who were used to working from an open guard’s room (or in very old buildings where sound were floating) were concerned with building design that did not allow them to notice sensory information (as in the initial excerpt).
This problem seemed to be enhanced with the increasing use of digital technological safety solutions, such as camera surveillance. Although several officers stated that this was not the purpose, in some ways and to some extent, it seemed like camera surveillance was partly replacing physical presence in the prison wings. For instance, I was told that formal risk assessments took camera surveillance into account when suggesting less staffing at each wing because someone watched the screens. A senior officer mentioned this as ‘false safety’ because of what he perceived as a not so reliable system. His point was illustrated by an occurrence in the common areas in one of the wings where there was a serious fight between prisoners right outside the window in the guard’s room. Despite the sounds from the disturbances within the actual wing, the sound did not float into the guard’s room, so the officers did not become aware of it before they were told through the intercom by a prisoner shouting for help. An officer sat in front of several screens from surveillance cameras but still did not notice what was happening, probably preoccupied with other tasks, like answering inquiries through the intercom and watching the other screens. This officer seemed quite astonished when he explained that he did not notice what happened, ‘even if it was there right in front of me’. The same problems would be valid for officers’ safety when present on the wings, who would not be heard if using their voice to signal a need for help if it was almost soundproof between the guard’s room and the wings. In Andreasson, Lindblom, and Thorvald (2017), line operators’ work with monitoring digital representations was complemented by the rest of the team being the operators ‘eyes, ‘ears’ and ‘hands’ on the production floor. This could indicate that monitoring through screens could be complemented by other kinds of information than solely the representations on the screens, for instance, other sources of sensory input. A similar point is made in Silva and Cunha (2022, p. 246) who demonstrate how practitioners’ ability to use their senses to make sense of what is happening is a necessary complement to get automated systems to work properly.
A prison officer commented that, with such distance to the wings, ‘one is very cut off from the senses, which I always have used so actively as a prison officer’. He pointed out the combination of senses as important, not only relying on vision, as with camera surveillance. Cameras gave good oversight from the guard’s room, but they did not catch ‘the atmosphere’ and did not include sound. In a recent evaluation of the new standardized building design of prisons in Norway, researchers criticize the physical distance between officers and prisoners (Johnsen et al. 2023a). The prison officers they interviewed emphasize the exact same troubles related to the use of senses and the insufficiency of camera surveillance for safety (Johnsen et al. 2023a, pp. 38–39; Johnsen et al. 2023b, p. 12f). One of the officers in the current study pointed out that being physically on the wing – contrasting it to ‘sitting in front of cameras’ – gives ‘some unofficial signals’ about what is about to happen, instead of ‘sitting and waiting for shit to hit the fan’. It seemed as if the officers’ embodied, relational and ongoing engagement with the prison environment became disturbed, which demonstrates how the constitution of the socio-material work environment can affect the accomplishment of sensemaking. In this case, the changes in the work environment were reducing the officers’ constant sensemaking regarding what was happening on the prison wing to a process which largely became activated by disruptions. This shows how the human factor, as pointed out by Almklov and Antonsen (2019, p. 15), is ‘inextricably entwined with the technological’.
A main point here is that early sensemaking related to safety based on sensory input seems to be weakened by technologies designed with other purposes in mind, although these can also have been implemented because of safety concerns. Thus, this may be the result of trade-offs both between safety and other concerns like efficiency and economy, and between different forms of safety concerns. Such tensions between the ability to apply embodied skills and other kinds of representations of safety or managerial concerns have also been found in previous research in other contexts. For instance, Kongsvik et al. argue that bodily and sensory interaction in seamanship ‘runs the risk of being thrown out with the bathwater’ (2020, p. 8) with the technification of seafarers’ work environment. Similar to the prison officers in the present study, experienced seafarers were concerned about the ability to ‘act on “weak signals” for possible safety problems’ (Kongsvik et al. 2020, p. 6). Somerville and Lloyd (2006, p. 286) show how firefighters were concerned about ‘silencing the body’ by using advanced safety protection, and Leger and Mothibeli (1988) show how new and modernising technology reduced the possibility for miners to use their ‘pit sense’ because of the noise. This underlines how the embodied knowledge of the workers is profoundly relational to the socio-material environment. The way frontline workers are ‘cut off’ from sensory input could be understood as organisational ‘sensebreaking’ (Cunha et al. 2015), if not deliberately so, at least as an outcome. For safety workers who deal with immediate danger, where sensory sensemaking does not just inform later deliberate sensemaking processes but are necessary to avoid danger by allowing quick reactions, this ‘numbing’ of the body could be a safety concern worthy of attention.
The tacit nature of immanent and involved-deliberate sensemaking can be one explanation for such problems arising when facing more explicit and visible means from without the communities of practice. Weick et al. notes that, in the early stages of sensemaking, things must be translated into a ‘common currency for communicational exchanges’ so that the tacit knowledge becomes more explicit, simpler, more ordered and, consequently, usable and relevant (2005, p. 413). This can, however, be challenging because higher value is often given to quantitative, measurable and formal knowledge (Perin 2005; see also Almklov, Rosness, and Størkersen 2014; Almklov and Antonsen 2014) which can also hold a symbolic value that can give the impression that risks have been managed, even if this is not the case (Hutchinson, Dekker, and Rae 2022). This point could be transferable to the introduction of particularly digital but also other technological solutions in organisations concerned with ‘hands-on’ safety; the implementation of visible technologies like camera surveillance in prisons could easily give the impression that safety is taken seriously. The results in the present article compared with previous research indicate that the introduction of such ‘hard’ safety measures holds the potential to affect more invisible-working but decisive human skills.
6 Concluding Discussion
The present article has aimed to explore the role of senses in sensemaking processes in frontline safety work and how the constitution of the socio-material work environment affects the accomplishment of sensemaking through an expanded understanding of sensemaking as an ongoing, relational and embodied socio-material process. This contributes to a more distinct theoretical framework for understanding the sensory aspects of sensemaking in such work contexts, which emphasises the relational whole of workers and their environment as a meaningful context for sensemaking.
The results show how safety practitioners are making sense of their work environment in order to maintain safety, in which what is described as a ‘gut feeling’ refers to the specialised sensing skills of ‘reading’ sensory information in a work environment. Thus, in line with the broader understanding of sensemaking (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2020) applied in this article, the present study indicates that the safety practitioners’ specialised sensing is sensemaking. This adds to sensemaking theory, which usually sees sensemaking as being about a more analytical process through thinking and talking (Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 2005). Moreover, previous sensemaking studies explicitly mention embodiment, like emotions, as a precursor to sensemaking (Maitlis and Sonenshein 2010), as something that signals the need for and ‘provides the energy that fuels’ sensemaking (Maitlis, Vogus, and Lawrence 2013). However, based on the results, I argue that, in addition to being ‘talked into existence’ (Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 2005, p. 412), organisations are also performed into existence through frontline workers’ occupation-specific sensory sensemaking practices. The ways in which these sensing skills were entwined and developed through engagement in the socio-material work environment over time has implications for the significance of experience in safety work and the ability to build a community of practice where these skills can be developed and shared.
Based on this relational understanding of sensemaking which includes embodiment, the results also highlights how the implementation of certain technologies could disturb the use of such sensing skills and consequently sensemaking processes, by reducing sensory input in the work environment and thereby the ability to notice weak signals. Due to technological development in many organisations concerned with safety, this perspective on sensemaking offers a useful lens via which to understand the significance of how the socio-material work environment is constituted and how changes in this environment can interfere with the accomplishment of sensemaking and complicate mindful organising.
The case study was a Norwegian high-security prison, which differs from many of the typical occupations commonly studied in safety research, for instance because of the coupling of safety and security concerns and safety as a main organisational objective. However, based on research in a range of completely different contexts of safety-related work, the results seem to have broad relevance. The present article has been an attempt to start theorising these observations, looking for similarities across contexts. Significant differences and similarities between work contexts need to be further explored.
For making use of senses for sensemaking, some characteristics of work seems important. First, because this form of sensemaking depends on sensory input from each specific environment, physical closeness is a premise, with the exception of contexts based on only vision. This makes it mainly a phenomenon among safety practitioners who are hands-on with the environment in question and may differentiate it from sensework (Haavik 2016), which is concerned with sensemaking through representations. Second, I would suggest that these aspects of sensemaking are mostly relevant for situations with the temporal characteristics of operational work (Almklov 2018) and not for systematic, analytical work like investigations. For many forms of work, relying on one’s ‘gut feeling’ would be the opposite of skillful work, and for most situations, there is a need to connect deliberate aspects to this process. However, the sensemaking skills identified in the present study can be essential for keeping people safe in situations where quick reactions are needed and for the fast transition between immanent and more deliberate forms of sensemaking for early intervention.
The present article has several limitations which could be complemented in future research. This study does only focus on the perspective of frontline workers, whereas other perspectives would be useful to add, particularly regarding the experienced barriers to sensory sensemaking on the frontline. How the processes of designing and implementing various technological solutions (in a broad sense and not delimited to digital technologies) is accomplished would be important to study considering the frontline perspectives as emphasized in this study. How the implementation of new technologies influence on risk analyses of work, and how this affects the working conditions could be included in this, as only briefly mentioned in this article. How such processes could be carried out in order to include knowledge of how work is performed in real time could also be explored.
The interaction between digital technology and people would be particularly important to study in more depth, in all sectors including prisons where digitalization has been late but are expanding. One aspect only superficially mentioned in this study is how the presence of digital technologies as alternatives (and not replacements) to physical surveillance can affect workers’ behaviour, and the possible consequences of such changes. While this study mainly focuses on disadvantages with various forms of technology, it would be important to study how technology could possibly enhance sensemaking in different contexts.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Anne Leseth, Kenneth Pettersen Gould, Stian Antonsen and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback on earlier versions of this paper. I am also grateful to the people in the prison for their decisive contributions in allowing, organizing for and participating in the study.
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- (De)Constructing the Disruption: Enacted Sensemaking and Sensegiving in Institutionally Plural Fields
- Sensing that Something is Wrong: On the Role of Senses in Sensemaking in Frontline Safety Work
- Social Systems of Flexible Production: Organizational Conditions for the Resurgence of Craft
- Organizing Integration of Refugees: Translation and Hybridization
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- (De)Constructing the Disruption: Enacted Sensemaking and Sensegiving in Institutionally Plural Fields
- Sensing that Something is Wrong: On the Role of Senses in Sensemaking in Frontline Safety Work
- Social Systems of Flexible Production: Organizational Conditions for the Resurgence of Craft
- Organizing Integration of Refugees: Translation and Hybridization