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Characteristics of the X *ie* imperative expression: three criteria for the classification of imperatives

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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to reveal the characteristics of the X *ie* imperative expression (abbreviated to X *ie*) with reference to other related expressions, such as conditional imperatives and past imperatives, in Japanese and other languages. Three criteria are proposed for a description of imperatives in terms of the realization of the propositional content: (i) possibility of realization, (ii) attitude toward realization, and (iii) preparedness for realization. X *ie* is an imperative of a reproof, characterized by the unique combination of (i) possible, (ii) negative, and (iii) unprepared. This paper further focuses on a discourse-pragmatic relation of the expression with its preceding and following utterances, a topic not fully discussed in the literature. The analysis in this paper shows that X *ie* is a marked imperative form of a verb of speech that expresses the speaker's instantaneous reaction to newly obtained information, i.e., the addressee's violation of the maxim of quality. This characterization suggests that the Japanese language is sufficiently sensitive to the violation to lexicalize it and that X *ie* can be considered in terms of mirativity. Finally, this paper systematically compares X *ie* and non-directive imperatives from other languages.

Keywords: maxim of quality; realization; unprepared; X *ie*

1 Introduction

Imperative forms are typically used to express the speaker's intention to require the addressee to perform some action. This paper is concerned with Japanese imperative forms expressing a reproof, exemplified by *Uso (o) tuke/ie* (Lit. 'Lie'), *Baka (o) ie* (Lit. 'Say something foolish'), and *Zyoudan (o) ie* (Lit. 'Tell a joke'). Despite the imperative

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form, these expressions do not have a typical directive meaning and thus do not represent an ordinary imperative utterance. For example, consider the dialog between A and B:

- (1) A: *Kinou Tokyo de John o mikake ta yo.*
 yesterday Tokyo in John ACC see PST SP¹
 ‘I saw John in Tokyo yesterday.’
- B: *Uso take, John wa kinou Osaka de kaigi da zo.*
 lie tell.IMP John TOP yesterday Osaka in meeting PRED SP
 ‘Don’t talk nonsense (Lit. Lie). John was scheduled to be at the meeting in Osaka yesterday.’

Speaker B in (1) is attempting to disqualify speaker A, who says that A saw John in Tokyo. Used literally, the imperative form of *Uso take* means to require the addressee to lie. In (1), however, *Uso take* is B’s instantaneous reaction to what A said, and its speech act is a reproof, not an order or a request. This imperative use is found only in verbs of speech: *uso o tuku* (‘to lie’), *baka o iu* (‘to say something foolish’), and *zyoudan o iu* (‘to tell a joke’) (cf. Mori 2006). Thus, in this paper, referring to the imperative form in question as *X ie*, I explore how *X ie* can be characterized at semantic and discourse-pragmatic levels and how *X ie* differs from other related expressions in Japanese and other languages.

The structure of this paper is as follows: As an overview of the characteristics of *X ie*, Section 2 states how *X ie* differs from other types of imperatives and mentions previous descriptions of *X ie*. Section 3 deals with how to understand the uniqueness of *X ie*. First, focusing on the realization of the propositional content of imperatives, I propose considering the expression in terms of three standards: possibility of realization, attitude toward realization, and preparedness for realization. I also relate the Gricean principle to the limited predicate type of *X ie* and maintain that the expression is closely connected with not only a prior utterance but also the following disqualifying utterance at the discourse-pragmatic level. Next, the findings are discussed in terms of mirativity and the irrealis-realis nature of discourse. Section 4 presents a cross-linguistic comparison. By the proposed standard, *X ie* can systematically be compared with types of non-canonical imperatives from other languages. Section 5 concludes this paper.

¹ The abbreviations used throughout this paper are as follows: ACC (accusative), COND (conditional), EMPH (emphasis), HON (honorific), HUM (humble), IMP (imperative), LOC (locative), NEG (negative), NOM (nominative), NOML (nominalizer), PART (particle), PST (past), POL (polite), PRED (predication), Q (question marker), QUOT (quotation), SG (singular), SP (sentence-final particle), TE (the Japanese clausal connective (*te*)), and TOP (topic). Some examples, abbreviations, and glosses are regularized in this paper for the sake of consistency.

2 Overview of *X ie*

2.1 Differences from other imperatives in Japanese

There are imperative forms similar to *X ie* in Japanese, i.e., conditional imperatives and past imperatives. Below I provide a preliminary sketch of the differences of *X ie* from these imperatives and regular imperatives. First, I compare *X ie* with regular imperatives:

- (2) *Mado o simero.*
 window ACC close.IMP
 ‘Close the window.’

The speaker in (2) wants the addressee to close the window. This interpretation suggests that the propositional content (‘you close the window’) has not been realized at the time of speech. In *Uso tuke* in (1), by contrast, the content (‘you talk nonsense’) has just occurred and is not what the speaker expects the addressee to do. The speaker of *X ie* does not want the addressee to talk nonsense. Although *X ie* appears in the affirmative imperative form, *X ie* is not used as a regular imperative. Of course, the speaker can use the form *X ie* to require the addressee to lie to someone to cover up the truth on purpose; in that case, the form is a regular imperative, but not *X ie*.

Conditional imperatives, which need to be expressed by *V te miro*, are similar to *X ie* in that both state the opposite of the speaker’s intention (note that *V te miro* literally expressing the speaker’s intention belongs to regular imperatives and can go without *te miro*). For example, the speaker in (3) warns the addressee not to open the box:

- (3) *Sono hako o ake te miro, bakuhatu suru zo.*
 the box ACC open TE look.IMP explosion do SP
 ‘Open the box and it will explode.’

The speaker does not require the addressee to realize the propositional content (‘you open the box’), which is suggested by the addition of a negative consequence of opening the box. The speaker of *X ie* has a similar mindset: he or she does not want or expect the addressee to talk nonsense. Despite this similarity, *X ie* and conditional imperatives differ in whether the propositional content is actual at the moment of utterance. The addressee of *X ie* has just talked nonsense, whereas the addressee of (3) has not opened the box yet (he or she is about to open it).

Another notable imperative expression is “past imperative” (Saito 2016).² The propositional content of this type denotes the past event and thus cannot be realized, i.e., it is too late to be realized:

- (4) [The addressee was supposed to visit the speaker the previous day. He or she did not come on the appointed day but appeared the following day]
 (Kuru nara) kinou koi yo.³
 come COND yesterday come.IMP SP
 ‘You should have come yesterday.’ (Lit. If you come, come yesterday.)

In this specific context, the expression serves as a reproach toward a person who arrived too late. Unlike English imperatives, the imperative form in (4) is compatible with the past-oriented adverb *kinou* (‘yesterday’). Neither past imperatives nor *X ie* asks the addressee to perform some action at a future time, and both are a verbal rebuke. However, the two forms should be differentiated. Example (4) implies that the speaker wanted the addressee to realize the propositional content (‘you come the previous day’). Recall that the speaker of *X ie* does not expect or want the addressee to talk nonsense. This difference correlates with another difference in speech act between the two. Past imperatives are a reproach about what was not realized (i.e., you did not come yesterday), whereas *X ie* is a reproof about what has been realized (i.e., you have talked nonsense).⁴

With this relation, a crucial point to remember is the difference between past imperatives and the following idiomatic imperative form expressing a prohibition:

2 Past imperatives have been discussed under several names. For example, Tomioka (2016) refers to past imperatives from Early Middle Japanese as *teokure no nozomi* (‘too-late request’), and Tagawa (2019) uses the term *guti meireibun* (‘grumble imperatives’). According to Inoue’s (1993) classification, past imperatives are characterized by *taining hi-kouryo* (‘time non-consideration’) and *muzyun kouryo* (‘contradiction consideration’), in which it is too late to realize an action at the time of speech and the reality (e.g., you did not come yesterday) contradicts the content the speaker wants to be realized (e.g., you come the previous day), respectively.

3 Notice that past imperatives are normally followed by the sentence particle *yo* with a falling tone; otherwise, they would be likely to sound less natural (cf. Inoue 1993; Saito 2016; Tagawa 2019). The English translation ‘should have’ has conventionally been used in the literature on past imperatives (e.g., Aikhenvald 2010; Palmer 2001; among others), and I will follow this convention. For examples of ‘should have’ from other languages, see Section 4.

4 In this paper, *reproach* and *reproof* are defined as follows:

<reproach> something that you say or do to criticize someone, especially for not being successful or for not doing what is expected

<reproof> something that you say or do to show that you disapprove of someone’s bad or silly behavior

(From *Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary and Thesaurus*; underline mine)

- (5) *Ototoi* {*koi* / *kiyagare*}.
 the day before yesterday come.IMP
 ‘Don’t come again.’ or ‘Come when two Sundays meet.’ (Lit. Come the day before yesterday.)

The co-occurrence with the past-oriented adverb *ototoi* results in this form appearing to be a past imperative, but the target meaning is not a reproach expressing ‘you should have come the day before yesterday.’ As the English translation ‘when two Sundays meet’ suggests, a mention of something that is obviously impossible to occur leads to a negative connotation. In (5), it is obviously impossible to go back to a point of time in the past by traveling into the past, inducing the negative interpretation ‘Don’t come again.’ The mechanism of interpretation in (5) differs from that of past imperatives. Furthermore, neither *ototoi* nor the imperative form of *kuru* (‘to come’) can be replaced with other expressions. Past imperatives exhibit no such fixedness. Thus, I maintain that *Ototoi koi/kiyagare* is an idiomatic fixed expression for a negative imperative of a prohibition. *X ie* is a partially fixed expression because *X* can be filled by at least *uso*, *baka*, and *zyoudan*. More importantly, *X ie* is not a form by which to express a prohibition. As mentioned in the next section, *X ie* is not always interchangeable with a negative imperative of a prohibition, whereas *Ototoi koi/kiyagare* always expresses a prohibition.

2.2 Descriptions in the literature

X ie differs from regular imperatives, conditional imperatives, and past imperatives. In this section, I review how this distinct type of imperative form is treated in the existing approaches. Specifically, *X ie* can be approached from the compatibility with an adverbial phrase inducing the negative connotation, the relation with imperatives of indifference, and the ironic use of a prohibition.

First, many dictionaries (e.g., *Dai zisen*, *Kozien*, *Meikyo*, and *Nihon kokugo dai ziten* [2nd edition]) use *uso*, *baka*, and *zyoudan* as an example of the entry word *yasumi yasumi* (‘more carefully’ or ‘thinking carefully’):

- (6) a. *Zyoudan mo yasumi yasumi ie*.
 joke EMPH more carefully tell.IMP
 ‘Don’t tell a joke.’ (Lit. Tell a joke more carefully.)

(From *Meikyo*)

- b. *Baka mo yasumi yasumi ie, hyappon no daikon de*
 nonsense EMPH more carefully tell.IMP one hundred radish with
tumaru wake ga aru ka tte
 get clogged reason NOM be Q QUOT
 ‘Don’t talk nonsense (Lit. Talk nonsense more carefully); there’s no way to
 get clogged with one hundred radishes.’

(From *Nihon kokugo dai ziten*)

The imperative expressions used with *yasumi yasumi* in (6) appear to be the X *ie* of my concern but are not the same. In the case of imperatives with *yasumi yasumi*, the particle *mo* cannot be replaced with *o* or omitted. Moreover, with *yasumi yasumi* in (6), an interpretation emerges that the speaker expects and requires the addressee to tell a joke or lie with due care. By contrast, X *ie* uses the particle *o* (or often omits the particle) and has no such interpretation. The expressions with *yasumi yasumi* may be regarded as a variant or original form of X *ie*, but they belong to regular imperatives literally meaning ‘Lie/Tell a joke more carefully’ and implying ‘Don’t lie/tell a joke.’ In similar contexts, the adverbs *iikagen/hodohodo ni* (Lit. ‘in moderation’) are also used:

- (7) a. *Uso o tuku no mo {iikagen / hodohodo} ni siro.*
 lie ACC tell NOML EMPH in moderation do.IMP
 ‘Don’t lie.’ (Lit. Lie in moderation.)
 b. *Uso mo {iikagen / hodohodo} ni siro.*
 lie EMPH in moderation do.IMP
 ‘Don’t lie.’ (Lit. Lie in moderation.)
 c. *Iikagen ni siro.*
 in moderation do.IMP
 ‘Stop it.’ (Lit. Do something in moderation.)

These expressions can state the content that seems against the speaker’s intention. In (7a), for example, to lie is not what the speaker wants the addressee to do, but the content can be expressed in the affirmative imperative form. After all, to do something in moderation, you must stop doing something too much. The same applies to *yasumi yasumi*: to do something more carefully, you must stop doing something without due care. Putting aside the use or omission of the particle *o* and the connotation of a request, X *ie* is similar to the imperative used with *yasumi yasumi*, which induces the negative connotation.

From a historical view, Ono (1995) describes X *ie* as the main clause of a conditional construction with the connotation of *hounin* (‘indifference’ or ‘permission’). Using early data in the Edo period, Ono explains the interpretation of X *ie*:

- (8) *Uso o tuki nasai to sode de tataku nari.*
 lie ACC tell do.HON.IMP QUOT sleeve with tap PRED
 ‘She taps the man with her sleeve, saying “Don’t talk nonsense”.’
 (Ono 1995: 116)

The context is as follows: When a woman condemned a man for something, he attempted to talk himself out of trouble. From the woman’s standpoint, what the man said was a transparent lie or nonsense. Instead of saying so, she just tapped the man with her sleeve and said, “*Uso o tuki nasai*,” which implies that she let him lie as he wanted to, although she knew that it was nonsense. This implication illustrates an attitude of indifference or permission. Notably, Ono’s next example suggests that X *ie* is compatible with a conditional construction expressing indifference (see also Shinzato 2002):

- (9) (*Miesuita uso o tuku nara, ikurademo*) *uso o tuke.*
 transparent lie ACC tell COND no matter how much lie ACC tell.IMP
 ‘(If you tell such a transparent lie), you can lie (whatever you like).’
 (ibid.: 115)

X *ie* can be used in the context of indifference, where the speaker leaves the addressee to do what he or she likes. In (8), certainly, the woman left the man to lie as he liked. Typical imperatives of indifference are as follows:

- (10) *Soko made iu nara, {katte / suki} ni {siro / siyagare}.*
 there until say COND in your convenience do.IMP
 ‘If you insist that much, have it your own way.’

The affirmative imperative form is used to express the indifference. As long as X *ie* is naturally compatible with the context of indifference, such as (9), X *ie* is semantically and pragmatically similar to imperatives of indifference, such as (10). Thus, the use of the affirmative imperative form in X *ie* makes sense despite appearing counterintuitive at first.

X *ie* can also be treated as an ironic expression of its negative version X *iuna* (‘Don’t say X’). Nishimitsu (1999), for example, explains the possible scenario of the development of X *ie*:

Of the speaker’s utterance “I think what you said is a lie, but I will overlook it. Don’t lie from now on,” the first half is considered to have been deleted, because it can implicitly criticize the addressee. The resulting *Uso o tukuna* (‘Don’t lie’) was entrenched, and then the opposite expression *Uso o tuke* (Lit. ‘Lie’) became used as *hiniku* (‘an irony’). Both expressions are now so conventional that it is difficult to see a connection between the two.

(Nishimitsu 1999: 248; translation mine)

As long as *X ie* is an irony, choosing to use *X ie*—as a pragmatic strategy—can avoid using a prohibition that may sound too direct or strong. Notice, however, that *X ie* is not always used instead of *X iuna*. For example, the choice of *X ie* is not appropriate, such as when the speaker seriously intends to stop the addressee from lying or talking nonsense in a formal setting. The negative form is used as a straightforward prohibition instead. The relation between *X ie* and *X iuna* needs to be understood based on each case.

Ishikawa (2008) also regards *X ie* as an example of *hango* ('irony'). According to Ishikawa, the imperative form generally represents that the speaker intends that an unrealized action should volitionally be realized by the addressee. Thus, Ishikawa maintains that *X ie* is the imperative form that purposely characterizes the realized action (i.e., the addressee talked nonsense) as an unrealized action. As Svahn (2016) demonstrates, however, this characterization is not a full account of the usage of *X ie*. It remains unclear why *X ie* exceptionally characterizes a realized action as an unrealized action.

Each approach highlights the blended aspects of *X ie*: its similarity to the imperatives with the adverbial phrase *yasumi yasumi*, compatibility with the context of indifference that emerges in a conditional construction, and interpretation as an irony of its negative version. In these respects, *X ie* seems to be almost a regular imperative, which can co-occur with *yasumi yasumi*, appear in the context of indifference, and serve as an irony. This is what the descriptions of *X ie* in the literature imply. The question is rather how *X ie*, i.e., the imperative form of a verb of speech expressing a reproof as an immediate response to the addressee, can uniquely be characterized and differentiated from other types of imperatives in Japanese and other languages.

3 Characteristics of *X ie*

3.1 Three criteria

In this paper I argue that the uniqueness of *X ie* can best be described by the following three criteria related to the realization of the propositional content of imperatives:

- (i) possibility of realization
- (ii) attitude toward realization
- (iii) preparedness for realization

A relevant analysis is Mori's (2006) discussion of regular imperatives, conditional imperatives, and *X ie* in terms of a potential/actual scale. The potential/actual scale

alone, however, cannot fully distinguish types of imperatives. Under his framework, the propositional contents of regular imperatives, conditional imperatives, and *X ie* are potential, potential (close to actual), and actual, respectively. The propositional content ‘you close the window’ in (2) is not realized at the time of speech and can be realized at a future time. This characterization shows the content is potential on the scale. The addressee of the conditional imperative in (3) is about to realize the content ‘you open the box.’ Because the content is not realized and can be realized, it is also potential (almost actual). The propositional content of *X ie* is what the addressee said. In this sense, the content has been realized and it is considered actual.

Mori (2006) does not consider past imperatives. Because this type has propositional content, which was not realized and cannot be realized, the reality status of past imperatives is neither actual nor potential. Moreover, the differences on the potential/actual scale are no more than the differences in the reality status of the propositional content; these differences do not immediately reflect semantic or pragmatic differences between types of imperatives. Therefore, I revisit the concept of reality, which is useful for the description of types of imperatives, from the perspectives of (i) possibility of, (ii) attitude toward, and (iii) preparedness for the realization of the propositional content of imperatives.

First, I consider each type of imperative in terms of (i), i.e., whether realizing the propositional content is possible. In regular imperatives, because the speaker wants the addressee to realize the content, the content must be possible to realize. The content of conditional imperatives is about to occur. In other words, the content is possible to realize. In *X ie*, the content (e.g., ‘you talk nonsense’) was realized at the time of speech; thus, the content is possible to realize. In past imperatives, however, the content (e.g., ‘you come the previous day’) is too late to realize; thus, realizing the content is not possible.

Criterion (ii) is associated with a negative connotation that Mori (2006) mentions with reference to the speaker’s intention. Both conditional imperatives and *X ie* can be replaced with a negative imperative in certain contexts. This similarity indicates that the speakers of these imperatives have a negative attitude toward the realization of the propositional content. The speakers of these imperatives do not want the addressee to realize the content. In regular imperatives, however, the speaker has a positive attitude toward the realization of the content because he or she wants the addressee to realize the content. In past imperatives, too, the speaker has a positive attitude toward the realization of the propositional content, although for the addressee, realizing the content is no longer possible.

Preparedness for realization in (iii) means that the speaker is mentally prepared for the realization of the propositional content at the time of speech. Of the four types of imperatives, *X ie* alone has no preparedness. In regular imperatives, the speaker

wants the content to be realized. This desire shows his or her preparedness for the realization at the time of speech. Preparedness in conditional imperatives is from the speaker's expectation that the propositional content is about to occur. The speaker of past imperatives also has a prepared mind because he or she wanted the content to be realized. However, the speaker of *X ie* is not prepared for the realization of the propositional content (e.g., 'you talk nonsense'). The addressee's nonsense utterance is not what the speaker wants or expects to be realized. This unpreparedness, triggered by the addressee's nonsense utterance, leads to the speaker's immediate reaction with the connotation of surprise or unexpectedness.

In the remainder of this section, I mention negative imperatives and seemingly irregular imperatives, such as *Ototoi koi*, imperatives with *iikagen ni/hodohodo ni/yasumi yasumi*, and *Katte/Suki ni siro* treated in Section 2. In the negative imperative *Hasiruna* ('Don't run'), for example, the propositional content 'you do not run' is possible to realize. Because the speaker wants and expects the addressee to realize it, he or she has a positive attitude toward the realization of the content and is prepared for the realization. In other words, negative imperatives, including *X iuna*, are characterized as regular imperatives. *Ototoi koi* may appear to be a past imperative morpho-syntactically, but because of its lexical fixedness, it is better to regard it as an idiom that conventionally functions as a negative imperative of a prohibition (see example 5). Imperatives used with *iikagen/hodohodo ni* or *yasumi yasumi* are regular imperatives expressing 'Do something in moderation' or 'Do something more carefully,' even if interpreted as 'Don't do something' or 'Stop it' (see examples 6 and 7). Likewise, *Katte/Suki ni siro* belongs to regular imperatives of *hounin* (see example 10). Because the speaker of this type of imperative leaves the addressee to perform an action as he or she likes, the propositional content is possible to realize, the speaker has a positive attitude toward the realization, and he or she has a prepared mind for the realization.

The discussion in this section is summarized in Table 1:

Table 1: Characteristics of types of imperatives.

	(i) Possibility	(ii) Attitude	(iii) Preparedness
Regular imperatives	possible	positive	prepared
Conditional imperatives	possible	negative	prepared
Past imperatives	impossible	positive	prepared
<i>X ie</i>	possible	negative	unprepared

The distribution in Table 1 clearly shows how *X ie* is similar to and different from the other types of imperatives. *X ie* is remarkably similar to conditional imperatives because of the shared characteristics (i) and (ii) but is different from past imperatives

because no characteristics are shared with each other. Deviance from regular imperatives determines the degree to which a given imperative is typical or canonical. Conditional and past imperatives share two characteristics with regular imperatives, but *X ie* shares one.

The focus on the realization of the propositional content of imperatives with reference to possibility, attitude, and preparedness improves the understanding of the multi-faceted characteristics of *X ie* and differentiates *X ie* from regular, conditional, and past imperatives. The introduction of (iii) provides a new perspective on the classification of imperatives: prepared versus unprepared imperatives, which was not found in the literature on Japanese imperatives.

3.2 An immediate reaction to the preceding utterance

I have compared *X ie* with types of imperatives. I can now consider other related expressions with reference to the preceding context. First, there are similar but non-imperative expressions, which use *X* of *X ie*:

- (11) a. (*Sonna no*) *Uso* ({*da* / *daro*}).
 Such lie PRED
 ‘(That’s) nonsense / unbelievable / bizarre.’
 b. (*Sonna*) *bakana*.
 Such foolish
 ‘It can’t be.’
 c. *Zyoudan zya nai*.
 joke PRED NEG
 ‘You’re kidding.’

Just as with *X ie*, these expressions (‘*X*-expressions’ hereafter) can also function as the speaker’s instantaneous response to what the addressee said at the discourse site. Notably, (11a)–(11c) can be replaced with *Uso tuke* in (1). The replacement, however, affects the nuance of the entire sentence:

- (12) {*Uso tuke* / *Uso daro*}, *John wa kinou Osaka de kaigi da zo*.
 lie tell.IMP lie PRED John TOP yesterday Osaka in meeting PRED SP
 ‘{Don’t talk nonsense / That’s nonsense}. John was scheduled to be at the meeting in Osaka yesterday.’

X ie, as suggested by the imperative form, focuses on the addressee’s verbal behavior (i.e., ‘you talk nonsense’). *X*-expressions do not have such propositional content and sound similar to the speaker’s assessment of the situation or information that he or she has encountered.

With this relation, there is a crucial difference in usage: X-expressions are compatible with wider contexts than those of X *ie*. For example, when you find your car gone from where it was parked, you can talk to yourself, as in (11a)–(11c), but you cannot use X *ie*. X-expressions can thus be used as a monologue when the speaker encounters an unexpected situation or information that has nothing to do with the addressee's prior utterance. In this case, X-expressions show disbelief regarding what the speaker has encountered or learned unexpectedly.

Consider the difference in the acceptability of X-expressions and X *ie* in a dialogic context:

- (13) A: *Kinou Tokyo de John o mikake ta yo.*
 yesterday Tokyo in John ACC see PST SP
 'I saw John in Tokyo yesterday.'
- B: {*Uso da* / * *Uso tuke*}, *Tokyo ni iru to wa sira naka tta.*
 lie PRED lie tell.IMP Tokyo in exist QUOT TOP know NEG PST
 'Oh, really? I didn't know John was in Tokyo.'

In this context, no reproof is given when speaker B unexpectedly learned that John was in Tokyo. Unlike (1), speaker B does not think that speaker A's utterance is nonsense. *Uso da* in (13) expresses one of the disbeliefs stemming from a gap between the speaker's knowledge and the information that he or she received from the addressee's prior utterance at the discourse site. The same applies to *Sonna bakana* and *Zyoudan zya nai*. Next, I present a monologic context:

- (14) [The speaker finds his or her car gone from where it was parked]
 {*Uso da* / * *Uso tuke*}, *kokoni tome ta zo.*
 lie PRED lie tell.IMP here park PST SP
 'It's bizarre. I'm sure I parked my car here.'

In (14), the speaker who has encountered an unexpected situation is talking to himself or herself but not to someone else. Once again, *Uso da* in (14) expresses one of the disbeliefs caused by a gap between the speaker's knowledge and the situation that he or she has encountered. *Sonna bakana* and *Zyoudan zya nai* can also function as a monologue, but X *ie* cannot be used in such a monologic situation.⁵

⁵ Notice, however, that X *ie* becomes acceptable ('?' means that it still sounds less natural than X-expressions) if a prior utterance can be assumed:

- (i) [It has started raining contrary to the weather forecast]
 {*Uso da* / ? *Uso tuke*}, *tenki yohou wa hare da tta zo.*
 lie PRED lie tell.IMP weather forecast TOP sunny PRED PST SP
 'It's unbelievable. The weather forecast said it's sunny today.'

This approximation clarifies the nature of X *ie*. X *ie* is an expression used in a specific context, i.e., a dialogic response to the addressee's preceding utterance. I argue that X *ie* is a marked imperative form that lexicalizes the addressee's violation of the maxim of quality in the Cooperative Principle (Grice 1975):⁶

- (15) Try to make your contribution one that is true:
 a. Do not say what you believe to be false.
 b. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

(Grice 1975: 46)

Saying something false or nonsense conflicts with this maxim. As stated by Grice, the observance of the maxim of quality is of particular importance to the extent that “other maxims come into operation only on the assumption that this maxim of quality is satisfied” (ibid.). Given this significance, a reasonable assumption is that a construction has emerged as a specific expression to lexicalize the serious violation of this maxim of quality. This lexicalization is exemplified by X *ie* in the case of Japanese.

Naturally, the lexicalization of its violation correlates with the restriction on the predicate type of X *ie*: *Uso (o) tuke/ie* (Lit. ‘Lie’), *Baka (o) ie* (Lit. ‘Say something foolish’), and *Zyoudan (o) ie* (Lit. ‘Tell a joke’). These predicates involve the maxim violation and receive special treatment in Japanese. The markedness of X *ie* correlates with deviance from typical imperative usage: as shown in Table 1, X *ie* is the most deviated from regular imperatives. Moreover, if X *ie* is a marked imperative, its negative form X *iuna* is an unmarked imperative that literally corresponds to the maxim and lexicalizes the violation. As mentioned in Section 2.2, X *iuna* functions to stop the addressee from lying or talking nonsense in a serious manner, such as when a teacher scolds a pupil for lying:

- (16) {*Uso tukuna* / **Uso tuke*}, *usotuki wa tomodati deki nai zo*.
 lie tell.NEG.IMP lie tell.IMP liar TOP friend make NEG SP
 ‘Stop lying. Liars can’t make friends.’

This type of X *iuna* expresses the addressee's violation of the maxim of quality, just as X *ie* does. Notice, however, that X *iuna* does not always lexicalize the violation. It can also be used when the speaker wants to prevent the addressee from talking nonsense as a precaution:

In this situation, the speaker of *Uso tuke* is providing a reproof for what the weather forecast said and is expressing disbelief stemming from a gap between his or her knowledge and the actual weather condition.

6 The maxim violation is linked with the discussion of X *ie* in Ihara (2021) and Mori (2020), but the relation is not fully considered from a discourse-pragmatic and cross-linguistic perspective the present paper takes.

- (17) {*Uso tukuna yo* / * *Uso take*}, *suguni bareru zo*.
lie tell.NEG.IMP sp lie tell.IMP soon come out SP
'Don't lie. You'll soon be caught lying.'

No prior utterance violating the maxim is involved in this case. *X iuna* is an unmarked negative imperative used in a dialogic context. It is not restricted to an instantaneous response to what the addressee said.

The findings in this section are summarized in Table 2:

Table 2: Differences between *X ie*, *X*-expressions, and *X iuna* in relation to the preceding utterance.

	Monologic use	Restricted to a response to the addressee's prior utterance that violates the maxim of quality
<i>X ie</i>	No	Yes
<i>X</i> -expressions	Yes	No
<i>X iuna</i>	No	No

3.3 A unit with the following utterance

I have examined the characteristics of *X ie* in relation to the addressee's preceding utterance. To further understand the characteristics of *X ie*, in this section, I shift the focus to an utterance subsequent to *X ie*. The speaker often adds another comment to *X ie*, disqualifying the addressee's prior utterance:

- (18) A: *Etuko nozoitari see hen yo*.
Etuko look into do NEG SP
'I (=Etuko) didn't look into (the sitting room).'
- B: *Uso ii nasai, okaatyan mi te si tte masu*.
lie tell do.HON.IMP mom see TE know TE POL
'Don't lie (Lit. Lie). I (=A's mother) knew you did. I saw you.'
- (*Sasameyuki* by Junichiro Tanizaki)

In (18), the additional comment after *X ie* is intended to convince A. In general, the content that follows *X ie* serves to disqualify what the addressee said. The speaker of *X ie* lets him or her talk nonsense while recognizing that the addressee's utterance is not worth believing. In this sense, *X ie* plays a role as a discourse marker to introduce a disqualifying utterance.

X ie and a disqualifying utterance are not separate components; rather, the two utterances form a unit in this order, which is shown by a comma instead of a period

in (18). In a natural course of conversation, X *ie* normally precedes a disqualifying utterance. Because X *ie* is an immediate response, it is appropriate to respond to the addressee's nonsense before disqualifying the nonsense. In reverse order, the flow of utterances would become unnatural:

- (18') A: *Etuko nozoitari see hen yo.*
 Etuko look into do NEG SP
 'I (=Etuko) didn't look into (the sitting room).'
- B: ? *Okaatyan mi te si tte masu, uso ii nasai.*
 mom see TE know TE POL lie tell do.HON.IMP
 'I (=Etuko's mother) knew you did. I saw you. Don't lie (Lit. Lie).'

Compared with (18B), B's utterance in this order is less natural as an immediate response to A's preceding utterance. The contrast of (18) and (18') indicates that X *ie* preferably precedes a disqualifying utterance at the discourse-pragmatic level.⁷

For comparison, consider X *ie* together with X-expressions and X *iuna* in the context of (1):

- (19) A: *Kinou Tokyo de John o mikake ta yo.*
 yesterday Tokyo in John ACC see PST SP
 'I saw John in Tokyo yesterday.'
- B: *{Uso tuke / Uso da / Uso tukuna}, John wa kinou*
 lie tell.IMP lie PRED lie tell.NEG.IMP John TOP yesterday
Osaka de kaigi da zo.
 Osaka in meeting PRED SP
 '{Don't talk nonsense / That's bizarre / Don't talk nonsense}. John was scheduled to be at the meeting in Osaka yesterday.'

7 Conditional imperatives and their consequent sentences also form a similar unit, but the connection between the two is at the content level:

- (i) a. *Ugoi te miro, utu zo.*
 move TE look.IMP shoot SP
 'Make a move and I'll shoot you.'
- b. * *Utu zo, ugoi te miro.*
 shoot SP move TE look.IMP
 '(Lit. I'll shoot you. Make a move).'

The addressee's movement is the cause of the speaker's shooting. The two events in this order are semantically linked. Regarding the relation between X *ie* and the disqualifying utterance, the addressee's nonsense is not the cause of the content of the disqualifying utterance.

X *ie*, X-expressions, and X *iuna* can co-occur with a disqualifying utterance. The inherent difference between the three expressions reflects itself in whether the disqualifying utterance can naturally be first:

- (19') A: *Kinou Tokyo de John o mikake ta yo.*
 yesterday Tokyo in John ACC see PST SP
 'I saw John in Tokyo yesterday.'
- B: *John wa kinou Osaka de kaigi da zo. {*Uso take /*
 John TOP yesterday Osaka in meeting PRED SP lie tell.IMP
**Uso daro / Uso tukuna}.*
 lie PRED lie tell.NEG.IMP
 'John was scheduled to be at the meeting in Osaka yesterday. 'Don't talk nonsense / That's bizarre / Don't talk nonsense.'

X *ie* and X-expressions become unnatural when preceded by the disqualifying utterance, unlike X *iuna*, which does not change much. This correlates with X *ie* and X-expressions being an immediate reaction to what the addressee said. Immediacy decreases if the speaker begins with a comment that disqualifies the addressee's utterance. This is how X *ie* and X-expressions in (19') become unnatural as an instantaneous response.

X *ie* and X-expressions still differ in terms of connecting a disqualifying utterance by (na)n(o) *dakara* ('because'). Consider the following context:

- (20) A: *Kinou Tokyo de John o mikake ta yo.*
 yesterday Tokyo in John ACC see PST SP
 'I saw John in Tokyo yesterday.'
- B: *{Uso take / Uso da / Uso tukuna}, John wa kinou*
 lie tell.IMP lie PRED lie tell.NEG.IMP John TOP yesterday
Osaka de kaigi da zo.
 Osaka in meeting PRED SP
 '{Don't talk nonsense / That's bizarre / Don't talk nonsense}. John was scheduled to be at the meeting in Osaka yesterday.'
- A: *Demo are wa John da tta yo.*
 but that TOP John PRED PST SP
 'But that was John.'
- B: *Zyaa sirabe te mi you.*
 now ask TE see let's
 'Now, let's ask (the office).'

[Subsequently, A and B ask the administration office whether John participated in or was absent from the meeting in Osaka, and they are informed of John's presence at the meeting]

- A: *Sou kamosirenai kedo Tokyo de John o mi ta n da yo.*
so maybe but Tokyo in John ACC see PST NOML PRED SP
'Maybe so, but I did see John in Tokyo.'
- B: *Ttaku, John wa kinou Osaka de kaigi na*
geez John TOP yesterday Osaka in meeting PRED
*n(o) da kara, {*uso tuke / (sonna no) uso*
NOML PRED because lie tell.IMP that NOML lie
da / (sonna) uso tukuna}.
PRED such lie tell.NEG.IMP
'Geez! Because John participated in the meeting in Osaka yesterday,
{that's nonsense / don't talk nonsense}.'

The use of *nan(o) dakara* in (20) requires both the speaker and the addressee to take the content of a disqualifying utterance for granted. To be connected by *(na)n(o) dakara* with a disqualifying utterance, John's presence in Osaka must be a known fact to the addressee and the speaker at the time of B's final utterance in (20). X-expressions connected by *(na)n(o) dakara* are not an immediate response expressing the speaker's disbelief of newly obtained information but an expression by which the speaker attempts to convince the addressee of his or her nonsense in the preceding utterance. However, X *ie* cannot be preceded by a disqualifying utterance or be connected with it by *(na)n(o) dakara*. This finding suggests that X *ie* is strictly restricted to the speaker's immediate response (i.e., a response without his or her analytical judgment) to newly obtained information at the discourse site. X *iuna*, whether connected by *(na)n(o) dakara* or not, is a prohibition, which stops the addressee from talking nonsense.

The findings in this section are summarized in Table 3:

Table 3: Differences between X *ie*, X-expressions, and X *iuna* in relation to a subsequent utterance.

	Preceded by a disqualifying utterance	Connected by <i>(na)n(o) dakara</i> with a disqualifying utterance as a known fact
X <i>ie</i>	No	No
X-expressions	No	Yes
X <i>iuna</i>	Yes	Yes

Table 3 implies that *X ie* is not an independent expression at the discourse-pragmatic level. *X ie* forms a unit with the subsequent disqualifying utterance; if not overtly expressed, the disqualification would be implied in the context. Obviously, this unit has another close connection with the addressee's preceding utterance because it triggers the utterance of *X ie*, as discussed in Section 3.2.

3.4 Mirativity

This paper proposed criteria (i)–(iii) for the classification of types of imperatives in terms of the realization of the propositional content. Notice that (iii) was introduced in the discussion of imperatives for the first time; whether the speaker is mentally prepared for the realization has not been considered seriously in the imperative research. I have shown that combining (iii) with (i) and (ii) facilitates the systematic understanding of the characteristics of regular/less regular imperatives or unmarked/marked imperatives.

This section further stresses how unpreparedness in imperatives is related to what is called mirativity (cf. Akatsuka 1985; see also Aksu-Koç and Slobin 1986; DeLancey 1986, 1997, 2001; Slobin and Aksu 1982). In this paper, I use “unpreparedness” as a general term and “mirativity” as a linguistic term. By mirativity, I mean the unexpected realization of a situation associated with the speaker's surprise. The speaker's surprise at newly obtained information has been discussed in terms of the speaker's unprepared mind and the irrealis-realism nature of discourse (e.g., Akatsuka 1985; Aksu-Koç and Slobin 1986; DeLancey 1986).

The way of marking the speaker's unprepared mind or mirativity varies from language to language. For example, as Aksu-Koç and Slobin (1986) and Slobin and Aksu (1982) have discussed, the choice of the suffix *miş* expressing indirect experience in Turkish suggests that the speaker is not prepared for a given event:

- (21) a. *Nixon istifâ et-ti.*
 Nixon resignation make
 ‘Nixon resigned.’
 b. *Ecevit istifâ et-miş.*
 Ecevit resignation make
 ‘(It is reported that) Ecevit resigned.’

(Slobin and Aksu 1982: 196)

In the example of Richard Nixon's resignation being expected and then occurring, the suffix *di* (realized as *ti*) expressing direct experience is used as in (21a). By contrast, when the Turkish premier Bülent Ecevit unexpectedly resigned, the suffix *miş* expressing indirect experience is used as in (21b), implying “an unprepared mind

from the standpoint of the speaker” (Slobin and Aksu 1982: 196). A similar phenomenon is shown by the contrast between existential copular verbs *yod* and *'dug* in Tibetan:

- (22) a. *ŋa'i k'aŋ la si-mi yod.*
 my house LOC cat exist
 'There's a cat in my house.'
 b. *ŋa'i k'aŋ la si-mi 'dug.*
 my house LOC cat exist
 'There's a cat in my house.'

(DeLancey 1986: 212)

According to DeLancey, the cat in (22a) is presumably the speaker's or a cat which the speaker expects to find in the house, but in (22b), the speaker has no such expectation. The use of *'dug* in (22b) requires the context where the speaker comes home and unexpectedly finds a strange cat.

Akatsuka (1985) connects the use of the conditional form *no nara* in Japanese with the discussion of mirativity:⁸

- (23) A: *Boku, huyu no LSA ni iku koto ni si ta yo.*
 I winter's LSA to go that on decide PST SP
 'I'm going to the Winter LSA.'
 B: *(*Mosi) kimi ga {iku no nara / * i ttara / * ik eba / * iku*
 if you NOM go that COND go COND go COND go
 toki ni wa}, boku mo iku yo.
 time at TOP I too go SP
 'If (*by any chance) you are going, I'm going, too.'

(Akatsuka 1985: 629)

As Akatsuka explains, speaker 23B, who is surprised at the new information about speaker A's decision to go to LSA, has to use *no nara* in the conditional clause. The incompatibility with *mosi* ('by any chance') suggests that B is certain of A's going to LSA and is not hypothesizing. According to Akatsuka, *no nara* becomes compatible with *mosi* when A uses *iku ka mo sire nai* ('maybe go') and B is not certain of A's going to LSA. In the context of (23), the choice of *no nara* implies B's certainty of it. However, the information that B did not know has just entered his consciousness at the discourse site, and the newly learned information has not been integrated as a fact into B's knowledge of the world. In other words, although the information is

⁸ At the stage in Akatsuka (1985), the argument is not explicitly associated with mirativity. A series of relevant data and considerations (e.g., Akatsuka 1985; Aksu-Koç and Slobin 1986; DeLancey 1986; Slobin and Aksu 1982) are systematically treated under the concept of mirativity in DeLancey (1997).

incongruous with what the speaker knew, it is not yet part of his or her existing knowledge. In (23), the use of *no nara* induces the implication, 'I didn't know this until now,' which is connected with B's surprise or unexpectedness.

Akatsuka further explains that it is not appropriate for speaker 23B to continue using *no nara* after the conversation with speaker 23A. In (24), speaker 23A is referred to as *Takeda san* by speaker 23B:

- (24) [Speaker 23B says to his friend]
*Takeda san ga LSA ni iku {*no nara / kara}, boku mo iku yo.*
 Takeda Mr. NOM LSA to go that if because I too go SP
 'I'm going to LSA {*if / since} Mr. Takeda (=Speaker 23A) is going.'
 (ibid.: 630)

The ungrammaticality of *no nara* is due to the integration of the relevant information into B's knowledge, whereby the information is no longer new to him at the time of uttering (24). Relating this phenomenon to the irrealis-realism division, Akatsuka argues that the change in the acceptability of (23) and (24) shows the movement of the newly learned information from the domain of irrealis to that of realism.⁹

The characteristics of *X ie* are indicative of the mirativity I have outlined. *X ie* is characterized by the speaker's unprepared mind. Because the speaker of *X ie* does not expect the addressee to violate the maxim of quality or talk nonsense, he or she does not expect the addressee's nonsense until the moment of speech. In this sense, the addressee's nonsense is newly obtained information, and the speaker is not prepared for it. This unpreparedness immediately prompts him or her to give the addressee a reproof for the violation of the maxim. Recall that the speaker's unpreparedness is a prerequisite for the choice of mirative markers in (21)–(23). The choice of *X ie* also needs the speaker's unprepared mind, which suggests the mirative nature of *X ie*.

In addition, *X ie*'s resistance to the clause combining by *(na)n(o) dakara* can be compared with the inappropriateness of *no nara* in (24) caused by the integration of

⁹ This phenomenon is analogous to the shift from the present perfect to past tense in the following:

- (i) a. There has been a plane crash near Bristol. Witnesses say that there was an explosion as the aircraft was taking off, ...
- b. The Prime Minister has had talks with President Kumani. During a three-hour meeting, they discussed the economic situation, and agreed on the need for closer trade links between the two countries.

(Swan 1995: 420)

According to Swan (1995), these examples illustrate that after announcing a piece of news in the present perfect, details are presented in the past tense. The news is first stated in the present perfect as new information (i.e., irrealis). Once stated, it is no longer 'just in' and needs to be stated in the past tense as a known fact (i.e., realism).

newly obtained information into the speaker's body of knowledge. X *ie* must be an immediate response to newly obtained information (i.e., irrealis domain). Thus, after the information is taken for granted and becomes a known fact to both the speaker and the addressee (i.e., realis domain), the use of X *ie* becomes unnatural. In such a case, X-expressions and X *iuna* must be used instead, as shown in (20). Regarding the irrealis-realism division, X *ie* is neither preceded by nor combined with a (na)n(o) *dakara* clause, owing to the newly obtained information being resistant to the transition from the domain of irrealis to that of realis.

4 Cross-linguistic comparison

Based on the characteristics of X *ie*, this section reveals similarities and differences between X *ie* and partially related imperative expressions in other languages. Recall that regarding the (i) possibility of realization, (ii) attitude toward realization, and (iii) preparedness for realization, X *ie* is characterized by (i) possible, (ii) negative, and (iii) unprepared. Moreover, X *ie* is restricted to a reproof directed at the addressee who has violated the maxim of quality. By these standards, X *ie* is compared with other related imperatives. English and Russian examples are examined for comparison.

First, consider the English imperative expression *Get out (of here)*.¹⁰

- (25) A: *I finally passed the bar exam.*
 B: *Get out of here!*

The expression is not the imperative of a verb of speech but is interpreted as, for example, 'You're kidding,' 'Unbelievable,' and 'That's nonsense.' The literal meaning can be assumed to be 'If you say such an unexpected thing, I can't stand it; so I order you to get out of here.' Thus, *Get out (of here)* figuratively expresses the speaker's surprise or disbelief as an immediate response to what the addressee said, just as X *ie* does. As the original meaning suggests, the propositional content 'you get out of here' is possible to realize, and the speaker has a positive attitude toward the realization. Given the use as an immediate exclamatory response to the unexpected announcement, the speaker is obviously not prepared for the newly learned information (e.g., the addressee's pass in the bar exam). In this sense, I can safely say that *Get out (of here)* is characterized by (i) possible, (ii) positive, and (iii) unprepared. This expression differs from X *ie* in (ii). In addition, because the addressee's preceding utterance is not necessarily nonsense or the maxim violation, *Get out (of here)* is not always a reproof.

¹⁰ This expression was brought to my attention by one of the reviewers.

By contrast, the following expression uses an imperative form of a verb of speech:

- (26) A: *It's 45 degrees Celsius outside.*
 B: *Talk about hot!*

The form does not have a literal imperative meaning. Generally, *Talk about X* is used to remind and emphasize that a given situation or statement exemplifies the expression X. In (26), the speaker stresses that 45 degrees Celsius is a surprisingly good example of the possible situations expressed by *hot*. *Talk about hot* in (26) is not used in the context that involves the violation of the maxim of quality, but just as *X ie* does, it functions as an immediate reaction to what the addressee said. The speaker's unprepared mind is suggested because the expression could be replaced with an exclamatory utterance, such as 'How hot!' and 'What a hot day!'. The propositional content 'you talk about X' is possible to realize because it has been realized at the discourse site. The speaker has a positive attitude toward the realization in that he or she wants the addressee to use the expression X as a good descriptor for the situation that the addressee has mentioned. The speaker's immediate exclamatory response suggests that the speaker is not prepared for the realization, i.e., he or she does not expect the addressee to discuss the situation that can best be described by the expression X. In summary, *Talk about X* is characterized by (i) possible, (ii) positive, and (iii) unprepared. Once again, this form differs from *X ie* in (ii). *Talk about X* can be used as a monologue, too:

- (27) [As a monologue]
It's 45 degrees Celsius outside. Talk about hot!

In this case, the utterance of *Talk about X* is not directed at anyone, demonstrating another difference between *Talk about X* and *X ie*.

X ie refers to the event in the immediate past. Davies (1986) and Takahashi (2012) have mentioned a conditional use of imperatives whose propositional content refers to the past:

- (28) A: *How was the party?*
 B: *Turn up yesterday and you'd have had a real shock.*

(Davies 1986: 165; Takahashi 2012: 72)

Because in (28) speaker A did not go to the party, the propositional content 'you turn up the previous day' is counterfactual, i.e., impossible to realize. The attitude toward the realization of the content is negative, which is suggested by the following clause (it can also be positive, depending on the context). The speaker is mentally prepared for the realization of the content as long as he or she hypothesizes the event 'if you had turned up yesterday.' Hence, the imperative form in (28) is characterized by

(i) impossible, (ii) negative, and (iii) prepared. It differs from X *ie* in (i) and (iii) despite the shared past-referring nature.¹¹

With the relation to imperatives referring to the past event, I consider Russian imperatives. As shown in the reviews of Nakamura (1998) and Takahashi (2022), the second-person singular imperative mood with a first or third-person subject in Russian can express an unexpected action that has been realized suddenly. Nakamura adds that this form is used as a colloquial expression or a narrative, mostly found in literary works. This imperative usage has traditionally been called ‘narrative’ or ‘historical’ in the literature of Russian imperatives. Narrative or historical imperative usage is associated with the aorist (Daiber 2009) or the optative (Gronas 2006). Holvoet (2020), in a comprehensive analysis of non-directive imperatives from several languages, including Russian and Lithuanian, states that historical or narrative imperatives are “described as introducing unexpected events and could therefore also be called mirative.” Bearing this in mind, consider the following:

- (29) *Его жд\ют, а он и опоздай на целый час.*
 they wait but he and be.late.IMP for whole hour
 ‘They were waiting for him, but he was a whole hour late.’

(Daiber 2009: 19)

In (29), the imperative form is used to describe his late arrival as an unexpected, inappropriate action in the past. Because the propositional content ‘he was a whole hour late’ actually occurred, the content is possible to realize. The speaker’s attitude toward the realization is negative, owing to the unexpected action being normally undesirable, according to Nakamura (1998) and Takahashi (2022). Naturally, the speaker is not prepared for the realization of such an unexpected event. It follows that Russian narrative, historical or mirative imperatives are characterized by (i) possible, (ii) negative, and (iii) unprepared, just as X *ie* is. Given the mirative nature of X *ie*, the parallel is not surprising. However, Russian mirative imperatives are not a reproof directed at the addressee who has violated the maxim of quality. X *ie* is a reproof specific to the maxim violation.

Finally, with the connection to these Russian non-directive imperatives, I briefly present other non-directive imperatives in other languages. It is important not to confuse the aforementioned narrative imperatives, which can refer to the past event,

¹¹ The imperative in (28) further differs from past imperatives in Japanese and other languages. Past imperatives imply that the addressee should have done something at a point of time in the past, whereas the imperative in (28) merely hypothesizes an event referring to the past and is analogous to conditional imperatives in Japanese.

with the following examples from Syrian Arabic and Estonian, respectively (cf. Aikhenvald 2010):¹²

- (30) a. *Kənt kōl lamma kənt fəl-bēt.*
 you.were eat.IMP when you.were in the-house
 ‘You should have eaten when you were at home.’
 b. *Tulnud õhtul õigel*
 come.PAST.PART=SIMPLE.PAST.OPTATIVE evening.LOC.SG right.LOC.SG
ajal koju.
 time.LOC.SG home
 ‘(You) should have come at proper time in the evening.’

(Aikhenvald 2010: 132–133)

As suggested by the English translation ‘should have,’ these imperative and optative expressions correspond to Japanese past imperatives, which function as a reproach to the addressee’s failure to do what he or she should have done. The propositional contents ‘you eat at home’ and ‘you come at proper time’ are counterfactual at the time of speech, i.e., too late to realize. Because the speaker wanted these contents to be realized, his or her attitude toward the realization is positive. The speaker is mentally prepared for the event realization because he or she perceives that the events should have been realized. These “cross-linguistically rare” (Aikhenvald 2010: 133) imperatives are characterized by (i) impossible, (ii) positive, and (iii) prepared. They correspond to Japanese past imperatives but differ from Russian mirative imperatives and *X ie* in nature.

X ie has been compared with cross-linguistic data, such as *Get out (of here)*, *Talk about X*, conditional imperatives in English, mirative imperatives in Russian, and past imperatives in Syrian Arabic and Estonian. None of these is the exact counterpart of *X ie*. However, it is too early to conclude that Japanese is the only language that has a marked imperative expression specific to the lexicalization of the violation of the maxim of quality. The present comparison is a first step to further cross-linguistic examinations.

5 Conclusion

To reveal the characteristics of *X ie*, this paper proposed considering the realization of the propositional content of imperatives in terms of (i) possibility, (ii) attitude, and (iii) preparedness. This paper also adopted a discourse-pragmatic approach to *X ie*,

¹² Van Olmen (2018) also reviews and discusses relevant data from Dutch, Spanish, and other languages as “reproachatives,” but the data include examples in which a verb is not used in the imperative form.

with reference to the preceding and following contexts to which existing approaches have paid scant attention. The main findings are as follows:

- X *ie* is characterized by (i) possible, (ii) negative, and (iii) unprepared, differentiating it from regular, conditional, and past imperatives in Japanese.
- X *ie*, as a unit, is preceded by an utterance that violates the maxim of quality and is followed by an utterance that disqualifies the addressee's nonsense.
- This unit formation is not found in similar but non-imperative instantaneous responses or the negative imperative version of X *ie*.
- X *ie* is a reproof directed at the addressee who has talked nonsense, owing to it being a marked imperative form that lexicalizes the violation of the maxim of quality.
- The speaker's unprepared mind in X *ie* implies that X *ie* can also be discussed in terms of mirativity and the irrealis-realis division.
- A cross-linguistic comparison suggests that there are several unprepared imperatives in other languages, but none of these is the exact counterpart to X *ie*.

The proposed three criteria based on the realization opened up the possibility of discussing X *ie* with other types of imperatives in Japanese and other languages; special attention to discourse context made it possible to connect X *ie* with some theoretical concepts, such as the maxim of quality, mirativity, and the irrealis-realis division. The idiosyncrasies of X *ie* do not prevent researchers from attempting a close linguistic examination. I hope that this case study provides new insights into the understanding of X *ie* and associates the otherwise merely fixed expression with wider theoretical and cross-linguistic contexts than have been presented in the literature.

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