Representative Bureaucracy in Emergency Management: Attitudes About Contemporary Emergency Management Policy and Politics in Local Agencies

1.1 Relevant Literature-Representative Bureaucracy

Research using the theory of representative bureaucracy generally cite Kingsley's (1944) piece as the launching point for the theory in an effort to understand the actions undertaken within a bureaucracy. Kingsley's vision of British politics at the time claimed that the opinions of the bureaucracy (particularly those in leadership positions) resulted in policies and programs that did not meet the needs of everyone in society. To solve this, Kingsley felt that some bureaucrats would be sympathetic and represent overlooked issues or segments of society when it came time to implement policies. This would occur as a growing number of middle-class individuals entered the civil service ranks, and would presumably look out for middle-class needs, rather than simply implementing the elite's perception of their needs.

Mosher's (1968) scholarship split the means by which bureaucracies are considered to represent their constituencies into two categories; active and passive. The passive side focuses on how the bureaucracy represents its jurisdiction demographically, while the active side looks at how representatives advocate for public policies that have an impact on their constituents in some manner ( Clark, Ochs, and Frazier 2013; Mosher 1968). On the active side, the actions taken by those in the bureaucracy are shaped by the attitudes, values, and beliefs they personally hold ( Bradbury and Kellough 2011; Krislov and Rosenbloom 1981; Meier 1993; Mosher 1968; Saltzstein 1979). This theory highlights the importance of bureaucratic discretion in decision-making, since it is assumed that those in unelected positions of government will make decisions that represent the citizenry because the officials are reflective of the jurisdiction in their personal background and experiences ( Denhardt and deLeon 1993; Marvel and Resh 2015; Mosher 1968; Selden, Brudney, and Kellough 1998).

A wealth of research focuses on the passive side of the equation, looking at the racial and gender makeup of bureaucrats and the decisions made along those lines across policy fields ( Dolan 2000; Keiser et al. 2002; Kelly and Newman 2001; Marvel and Resh 2015; Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006; Mirer and Stewart 1992; Naff 2001; Riccucci 2002; Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena 2014; Selden, Brudney, and Kellough 1998). As Bradbury and Kellough (2011) point out, the literature that attempts to connect active and passive representation is not very wide and focuses upon the associations between minority (gender and racial) bureaucrats, and outcomes that are consistent with the feelings of those groups.

Kropf, Vercellotti, and Kimball (2013) adapted the idea of representative bureaucracy to the political realm by testing whether partisanship is one of the attitudes used by bureaucrats when implementing provisional voting statutes. Their findings demonstrated a connection between the partisan leanings of election administrators and the number of provisional votes counted. This theme continues throughout the scholarship which suggests that partisan leanings of US-based public officials impacts their actions when dealing with their constituency, or with federal policy demands. For instance, a study by Porter and Rogowski (2018) demonstrated how local election officials tend to be more responsive to those with similar partisan leanings. Other studies mirror these results when looking at voting patterns, and the application of various voter turnout laws ( Burden et al. 2013; Kimball, Kropf, and Battles 2006; White, Nathan, and Faller 2015). Beyond voting laws, Fording, Joe, and Sanford (2007) as well as Davis, Livermore, and Lim (2011) tied together attitudes about the application of welfare laws between local administrators and constituents. Additional scholarship found partisanship can impact behaviors in other policy fields, including at the Internal Revenue Service, and in legal enforcement practices ( Gordon 2009; Mete 2002; Porter and Rogowski 2018). Outside the United States, a study of officials in Sweden by Ohberg and Naurin (2016) found that partisanship matters when elected officials interact with constituents. All of these studies extend the idea of representative bureaucracy beyond demographic factors and support the use of partisanship as a metric when testing this theory.

However, Kropf, Vercellotti, and Kimball (2013) note that questions arise regarding fairness of election administration if the partisan leanings of those in charge affect the decision-making process. The authors state that election laws as well as professional norms in the field emphasize loyalty to the organization as well as transparency, efficiency, and effectiveness over personal attitudes ( Romzek 1990). Similar loyalties are stressed in the field of emergency management, where efficient preparation for and response to any sort of potential disastrous incident is paramount to other issues within the organization. Those working in the field of emergency management are also similar to election officials, such as those studied by Kropf, Vercellotti, and Kimball (2013), in that many county and municipal emergency management professionals are appointed to their position, though some are elected in partisan or non-partisan fashion.

Additional recent research has considered why straightforward performance information can be subject to bias in interpretation. This bias can be exacerbated when the information is or is not in line with prior beliefs ( Baekgaard and Serritzlew 2015). This motivated reasoning theory suggests accuracy in policy interpretation may be supplanted by pre-existing personal biases ( James and Van Ryzin 2016). Partisanship was a driving motivator when Meirick (2016) tested motivated reasoning theory regarding the budget deficit, Nawara (2015) tested for the Iraq War and economy, and James and Van Ryzin (2016) tested the theory considering the Affordable Care Act. While these studies considered citizen perspectives on government performance, it is possible that actors within a government agency at any level of government (like those surveyed in this article) could behave the same way, using their own personal biases about the policies they deal with on a daily basis. Nxrgaard (2018) and Grimmelikhuijsen et al. (2017) take this a step further by considering the cognitive behaviors that lead public officials to make certain decisions. These pieces consider what it is about the individual's personality that leads people down a decision-making path. Another theory discussed by Garand (1988) and Garand, Parkhurst, and Seoud (1991), the bureau voting model, suggests that the voting patterns and preferences of bureaucratic officials generally favor those who will increase public spending, therefore increasing the size of the public-sector organization. In testing the model, the authors suggest that government employment bolsters already existing partisan beliefs, particularly among those who support expanding the responsibilities of the public sector.

This study extends the focus on the "active" side of the theory of representative bureaucracy and takes into account the partisan nature of the district in exploring the attitudes of local emergency managers towards federal policy changes under the Obama administration. This is similar to Kropf, Vercellotti, and Kimball (2013), Fording, Joe, and Sanford (2007), and Davis, Livermore, and Lim (2011), although those studies looked at specific local policy decisions and outcomes, while this study focuses on the attitudes local emergency managers hold regarding federal actions in the field. The local emergency managers may be acting in, and purely expressing their own self-interest in a manner similar to the bureau voting model ( Garand 1988; Garand, Parkhurst, and Seoud 1991), but this study seeks to test whether those attitudes regarding federal policy and leadership align with the political leanings of their jurisdiction, exhibiting a form of representative bureaucracy in action.

1.2 Relevant Literature-Emergency Management Policy

Since the tragedies in New York City, outside Washington, DC, and near Somerset, PA on September 11, 2001, the array of policy changes made by the federal government in response to the events received both praise and criticism. The field changed as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) came into existence, and continued to evolve as the response to various incidents (like Hurricane Katrina and "Superstorm" Sandy, as well as terrorist events at Fort Hood, TX, Boston, MA, and San Bernardino, CA among many other examples of natural or man-made origin) highlighted strengths and limitations of the policy changes and the bureaucracies charged with implementing them. Several policies, mandates, and presidential directives were developed in response to the September 11 attacks, all designed with the purpose of enhancing the nation's ability to prepare for, prevent, and respond to terrorism. Doing so involved the amalgamation of many pre-existing and newly developed agencies and actors under the unified direction of DHS, including and most notably for this study the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

These changes at the federal level had a trickle-down effect on state and local emergency management agencies as an increased amount of grant money became available, but also several mandates (both funded and unfunded) that led these state and local departments to reconsider the actions taken to prepare for and respond to all varieties of incidents. Policies like the Incident Command System (ICS), National Incident Management System (NIMS), The National Response Plan (NRP) and its 2008 replacement the National Response Framework (NRF) all promote (on paper) the idea of all-hazards flexibility and attempt to institute a unified command and communication system for all actors at all levels of government. But to accomplish this task, the policies lead back to DHS control and DHS approved methods ( Chang 2017; Sylves 2008). For instance, during the Obama administration, Presidential Policy Directive 8 ( DHS 2011) created the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) process, which required local governments to perform risk assessments that comply with a standardized method of reporting, even if locals had completed, and were satisfied with their pre-existing risk assessment plan.

The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 created Quadrennial Homeland Security Reviews (QHSRs), which are designed to review and update the nation's efforts to prepare for, prevent, and combat terrorism at home. The initial iteration ( 2010) identified five missions that guide the actions of DHS; prevent terrorism and enhance security, secure and manage our borders, enforce and administer our immigration laws, safeguard and secure cyberspace, and strengthen national preparedness and resilience. The most recent review ( 2014) built upon its predecessor by enhancing means for collaboration across public, private, and non-profit boundaries. As Kahan (2015a, 2014) points out, the ideas put forth in the QHSRs may seem logical and practical, but if local stakeholders lack funding, constituent support, and analytical tools to comply with federal demands, it limits the effectiveness of what DHS desires to accomplish. Congress echoed those feelings, citing the latest QHSR's lack of focus on cyberwarfare, the lack of flexibility within DHS, and the lack of availability of resources in general to accomplish the tasks outlined within the document ( Verton 2014).

Those who support the federal policy changes as they evolved over the years since the September 11 attacks typically point to clarity in the structure created to manage disaster responders and resources across layers of government. For instance, users of the ICS (which predated the September 11 attacks in some state and local governments, such as California) cite its formation of a clear chain of command that reduces delay while promoting communication and coordination in disastrous situations ( Chang 2017; Cole 2000; Comfort et al. 2010; Goldfarb 1997; Molino 2006). Others point to the successful response to "Superstorm" Sandy in 2012 as a demonstration of enhancements within FEMA itself. In this case, progress stemming from previous incidents (like Hurricane Katrina) led to an improvement in what federal actors and policies desired to accomplish during a catastrophe, which assisted in the response to the storm's impact along the Mid-Atlantic coast ( Kahan 2015b; Rubin 2015; Sadiq, Tharp, and Graham 2016).

Criticism of federal actions and policies in the time since the September 11 attacks focus upon the priorities of DHS, which are considered to be too focused on terrorism at the expense of natural and accidental disasters ( Birkland 2006; Birkland and Waterman 2008; Derthick 2009; Esinger 2004; Gerber and Robinson 2009; Haddow 2005; Hite 2006; Kahan 2015b; McEntire 2004; Roberts 2014; Schneider 2005; Tierney 2005; Waugh 2006; Waugh and Sylves 2002). Another critique of the policies is the perceived lack of coordination, accountability, and communication between layers of government and key actors in spite of what is desired by the federal policy demands. Responses to these problems within the literature field go in divergent directions. Some call for greater command and coordination, led by the federal government, with FEMA serving as an agency that people can rely upon for information and resources ( Sadiq, Tharp, and Graham 2016). Others call for enhanced collaboration, but still allowing for local flexibility when planning for and responding to incidents of all varieties ( Brudney and Gazley 2009; Caruson and MacManus 2011; Fleming, McCartha, and Steelman 2015; Hu, Knox, and N. Kapucu 2014; Kapucu and Hu 2016; McGuire 2006; Quarantelli 2002; Roberts 2014). This also includes increasing disaster resiliency and mitigation efforts at all levels of government ( Egli 2013; Parris 2014). In the same vein, many scholars state that the problem is the command-and-control system itself which emerged after the September 11 attacks. In response, there is a general suggestion to overhaul the present system, with the outcome favoring greater local input and less focus on national standardization in the field ( Chang 2017; Hildebrand 2015; Jensen 2011; Jensen and Waugh 2014; Jensen and Youngs 2014; Lester and Krejci 2007; Scavo, Kearney, and Kilroy 2008; Shughart II 2006).

From a different angle, Kriner and Reeves (2015a, 2015b) studied the issuance of disaster declarations by recent presidents. Their findings suggest that locations in swing states, as well as "core states" for the party holding the office of the presidency were more likely to receive a disaster declaration than others, especially during election years. Their findings suggest that states which supported President, ot were considered "swing states" had an enhanced likelihood of receiving a disaster declaration during the 2012 election, though he was less particular regarding location during the earlier years of his presidency. This suggests that the Obama administration was not universalistic with support depending on where and when a disaster took place, potentially adding to the confusion for those on the ground when seeking assistance or operating with federal expectations. While their findings illustrate that this feature is not unique to the Obama presidency, it shows that leadership from the federal government can vary for a variety of reasons. It also suggests that the receipt of grants or disaster declarations (or lack thereof) could impact the way in which local actors envision support from the federal level.

Combining these critiques, it becomes easy to envision a system that wound up being used in a manner that was not consistent across all jurisdictions when called upon. This means the implementation of the federal demands were not necessarily meeting the goals of the policies and mandates. For instance, in response to Hurricane Katrina, Neal and Webb (2006) found that local actors responding to the storm tossed aside the use of NIMS and the ICS due to lack of knowledge about the policy's requirements. Instead, the local officials relied upon their own experiences and methods to address the issues left in the storm's wake. Sobel and Leeson (2006) reaffirmed these findings, citing the slow response to Katrina's effects as a result of a complex system of bureaucratic checkpoints that, when dismissed or altered to the needs of local demand, became increasingly satisfactory to local actors. Of course, policy changes have occurred over the years since Hurricane Katrina, but as many scholars point out, inconsistency within the system remains, which is exactly what a command-and-control policy is designed to overcome through leadership and direction ( Chenoweth and Clarke 2009; Fosher 2010; Gerber, Cohen, and Stewart 2007; Hildebrand 2017). The lack of consistency bores itself out in this study through the different degrees of satisfaction and anger expressed by local emergency management professionals when asked about their experiences.

2.1 Dependent Variable Measurement-Perceived Effects on Local Departments Under President Obama

Hypothesis A considers the actions taken under the Obama administration, and if they are perceived to be beneficial or negative by those in local emergency management departments. In the survey, respondents were asked two open-ended questions about working with the Obama administration. The first question, used to develop this dependent variable metric, asked "since the start of the Obama administration (January 2009) has there been any change in the actions of and/or requirements from the federal government that affected your department directly or indirectly?" The responses were divided into three different categories: those who viewed the changes under Obama as positive in the respondent's opinion, those who view the changes under Obama as negative in the respondent's opinion, and those who expressed there was no positive or negative change since 2009.

Not all of the 775 respondents chose to answer every question in the survey, especially the open-ended questions that serve as the dependent variables of interest in this study. In total, 473 (61%) of the respondents provided information to this question. As demonstrated in Table 1, this sub-set of respondents features a roughly equivalent breakdown in terms of partisan election history as those who responded to the survey, and of those who received an invitation to participate in the study.

240 of the 473 respondents to this question expressed something negative about the changes under President Obama, while 84 expressed a positive remark about the federal government's actions. An additional 149 respondents felt the actions did not have an impact on their department in a positive or negative manner. A handful of additional responses were omitted from variable development when the respondent expressed that they did not have the knowledge to provide a response to the question (usually because of a limited time in the field or position), or when the provided answer was not intelligible.

A content analysis was performed by the author as well as another colleague in order to test for intercoder reliability. Both reviewers subjectively scored the data as either positive, negative, or no impact. For this question, the author concludes that the inter-rater reliability is satisfactory, with an obtained Cohen's Kappa score of 0.96, which is near perfect agreement ( Landis and Koch 1977; Lombard, Snyder-Duch, and Bracken 2010).

The responses within each metric of this variable cover a wide array of reasons that helped and/or hindered the respondent's department in their opinion. When coding the data, positive terms about the policies, the president's actions, or the bureaucratic process were categorized as favoring the president. The following are selected representative examples of those who viewed the federal actions/requirements under President Obama as positive:

1. "There has been a more practical approach and a shift from the overwhelming push of huge amounts of post-911 funds doled out under the Bush Administration. That money was poorly targeted, its impact poorly evaluated which reduced the all hazards approach, even harming local programs. We were all forced to work with incompetent contractors who produced useless plans and products."

2. "[The] administration has done a great job at getting things accomplished in spite of political opposition."

3. "Consolidations of grants and the grant application process. Awesome!"

4. "Increased emphasis on all-hazards planning and preparedness has changed our message to the community to be less focused on natural disasters. The requirement for a State-level THIRA motivated us to create our own. We have participated fairly frequently in webinars and comments to the Federal Register on proposed policy revisions with regard to FEMA's disaster deductible, the NIMS Refresh, etc."

5. "Having requirements in training, planning and preparedness is good thing. It makes the local responders work together and be better prepared when a disaster strikes."

6. "Whole community initiative has benefited my department. Training programs from FEMA independent study program have increased."

7. "NIMS requirements for local jurisdictions have not been stressed. That is a good thing."

Those classified as neutral for the analysis includes individuals who felt the differences between the two administrations were limited, or they that there was no difference in how the policies set forth by the George W. Bush and Obama administrations affected their daily operations. Most answers codified as neutral simply stated "no" or "there have been no changes" as their response to the question of interest.

On the other hand, the following responses are representative of those who viewed the actions/requirements under President Obama as negative. Many respondents in this category point to a reduction in available grant funding and/or the development as additional bureaucratic red tape. Several more are very denigrating of the former president, his politics, his attitude towards emergency management or towards their geographic region in general. In many cases, the rhetoric in this category is similar to the frustrations and opinions expressed in the general populous (especially in the politically conservative realm) in the months prior to the 2016 election, if not for the entire eight years under President Obama.

1. "The FEMA Folks were our partners before Obama, now they are an endangered species. All we receive is dictates from the Fed. All Disasters are local; I do not trust the Fed. to come if we need assistance."

2. "The reduction in funding has created a snowball effect down to the local level that has cause great gaps in the preparedness and safety of the smaller communities. The target to regionalize different jurisdictions and agencies have reduced the efforts of small counties and communities by withdrawing grant funding and their abilities."

3. "We are a very small county jurisdiction, before 2009, we had lots of interaction between my office and the local responders. Since 2009, the requirements of EMPG have greatly increased the time we have to spend on grant management, leaving less and less time for preparing for disasters less time to interact with other agencies and departments. I do think we are worse off than we were during the previous administrations. All disasters start local then work up. Because of the changes, most local emergency managers feel we are working for the federal government other than our local jurisdictions."

4. "Some federal departments do not practice the NRF or NIMS. This was never enforced after HSPD 5 and has been neglected worse by some. Some federal agencies that work with our jurisdiction have become accustomed to ICS/NIMS because that is how we work. However, when federal representatives come in from "HQ" they mostly don't operate within NIMS/NRF. FEMA is the exception as they always (in our experience) follow NIMS/ICS guidelines."

5. "Environmental Historical Preservation (EHP) requirement. Takes too long to get approval. We have cancelled projects since grant performance period would be exceeded. No common sense. Had to submit EHP to erect tent on county property. Reason: ground disturbance activities due to pounding stakes in the ground to hold tent up."

6. "The THIRA came and went. When we were approached on it, it was totally confusing and was presented with very little thought for what the FEDS expected the end document to look like. It was a 'cluster' to put it mildly. It was a huge burden on counties that don't have the staff that was needed to create the document."

7. "Homeland Security Grant money has drastically been reduced. Our state had 80 million available in 2009 and only 2.5 million available in 2015."

8. "The Obama administration's encouragement of violence against law enforcement has impacted local departments as they try to deal with the statements made by the President. The Obama administration should be held accountable and punishments should be issued for the gross neglect of national security and local peace and safety."

9. "Grant funding dollars have been reduced. Terrorism is on a steady rise and is encouraged by the Obama Administration."

10. "Much of suburban and rural America are non-competitive for Federal programs. We continue to focus almost entirely on a defensive strategy of target protection and neglect the overall process of terrorism and vulnerability of small and rural communities to all hazards. Terrorism is a farm-to-market process. We are neglecting a huge opportunity by focusing on target denial. They will always find soft-targets."

11. "Some direct impact, the usual invention of, and subsequent implementation of additional bureaucratic guidelines and supposed "policies" that smell of political correctness, but tend to do nothing more than slow actual, real-life operations at the local level, which by the way, is where EVERY disaster occurs. There is far too much involvement in forcing political correctness and far too little actual improvement of local capabilities in meeting needs before, during and following disaster or significant event."

12. "We have been executive ordered to death, with more requirements and no funding to assist!!! He will go down as the worst President ever."

Some of these comments, both positive and negative, echo Kriner and Reeves (2015b) findings in that disaster declarations can be politically motivated. The sample comments show some local managers praising the availability of grants and focus on certain issues, while others are screaming for more funding, or at least the continuance of funding rather than watching it flow to other locations or for political issues that seem arbitrary in their opinion.

2.2 Dependent Variable Measurement-Similarities Between Bush and Obama

Hypothesis B considers if there are perceived differences in the actions undertaken by the George W. Bush or Obama administrations in the field of emergency management and homeland security. A second open-ended survey question asked the respondents directly "do you feel the actions and/or requirements from the federal government during the Obama administration were similar or different from those of the George W. Bush administration?" This question focuses on the attitudes and perceptions of the respondent, and what changed (if anything) between the two administrations in their opinion. Once again, the responses were divided into three categories, and those who stated they were not sure, or provided an unclear response were omitted from the categorization when developing the variable.

In total, 379 respondents provided a viable answer to this question, with 107 saying there was no difference between the two administrations. Of the remaining responses, 193 painted a picture that was more positive about their experience with President Bush, while 79 were more positive about President Obama when discussing the differences between the administrations. As demonstrated in Table 1, the election result history of this sub-sample of respondents is also roughly the same as those who respondent to the survey, and of those who received an invitation to participate.

Once again content analysis testing occurred with another colleague for intercoder reliability. Both reviewers subjectively scored the data as more favorable towards President Obama/detracting of President Bush, more favorable towards President Bush/detracting of President Obama, or expressed no difference between the two presidents. In this case, a Cohen's Kappa score of 0.91 was obtained, which like the previous dependent variable is near-perfect agreement ( Landis and Koch 1977; Lombard, Snyder-Duch, and Bracken 2010).

Those who favored President Obama's administration's methods mostly looked towards the application of the policies under his tenure, though several were critical about Bush in a political manner. Some representative examples of those who favored President Obama are as follows:

1. "Local emergency management is where the rubber hits the road and taking the focus off strengthening it was a disservice. Money flowed to the beltway bandits for political reasons. The people involved had no appreciation for emergency management or local governments. The benefits of the hundreds of millions spent by the Bush Administration was so minimal as to be unjustifiable. It hurt local programs basic mission badly. Terrorism is a police responsibility which EM can and would support but to undermine the already under-supported all hazards programs was shameful."

2. "Under the G.W. Bush administration the focus was on terrorism which hindered and went against our "all-hazards" approach."

3. "Bush overreacted. Too much money in the wrong places."

4. "The Bush administration was all about political appointments whereas the Obama administration appointed people who actually know Emergency Management and Homeland Security."

5. "If anything, policies have stabilized in the past seven years. The federal government has become less draconian and more collaborative in the past seven years."

6. "Obama's administration seemed to bring back the All Hazard approach to emergency management. The Obama administration also seems to recognize that every state/municipality functions independently, which seems to be reflected in the National Response Framework versus a National Response Plan."

7. "The bureaucracy under the Bush DHS/FEMA seemed to be more than under the Obama administration. An example would be our annual NIMS report is much easier to complete than the ones before."

8. "My belief is that the Obama administration addressed problems as they occurred and took steps to prevent disasters, whereas under Bush the Federal Government did not take action until after the events occurred and the actual reaction was slow."

9. "Bush did nothing."

Several of the respondents expressed that there was no difference when working with the two administrations. Responses codified in this manner mostly responded to the question of interest for this variable by saying "similar" or "for the most part the same", or "no major changes between the administrations."

Those who found working with George W. Bush's administration to be a more positive experience mostly pointed to the availability of funding as the reason why. But several responses are just as, if not more politically motivated against President Obama then they are favorable about President Bush. The following are selected representative examples from this category of the variable:

1. "180 out from President Bush, Obama is a man of no action unless it helps him politically. To him a disaster is no transgender bathrooms."

2. "I think the Obama Administration has an entirely different agenda in all the things they have done in regard to preparedness and EM. They seem to be all about federal power and taking over actions that should be done by the local jurisdictions. If they can't take over, then they pass legislation that interferes with how we do our work and disrupts us as much as possible."

3. "Under the Bush administration, Emergency Management and preparedness were funded much better than they are now. The priorities of the Bush administration were on making our homeland safe, whereas the Obama administration has done everything they can to destroy our country by whatever means they can, including the gradual destruction of domestic programs for preparedness."

4. "At the local level I do not think we have seen much change until the THIRA Assessments and the requirement to do them. I think it was a big mistake for FEMA to stop asking for current THIRA information each year. It was one of the smart things coming from a Federal level and they dropped it. I do not get it!!! It was working and working well to be able to plan with real true, community driven details."

5. "Different. I don't feel the Obama administration grasps the urgency of our Homeland Security issues in the United States as well as the George W. Bush administration did. I think Obama has weakened the United States security worldwide during his tenure."

6. "Too much bureaucracy justifying their jobs with no common sense to what is actually happening in the world outside of the beltway and state capitol in the real world."

7. "Much, much worse during the Obama administration. The Obama administration has taken great care to divide this county in a multitude of ways-race, economic status, criminal law (lack of enforcement), economics-encouraging socialism, attempting to destroy basic constitutional rights, federal infringement into areas best governed by the states, destroying the education system of the county, bullying the states to conform to degrading and evil practices."

8. "The Obama administration has been the most relaxed administration in the last 30 years of the United States when referring to national security and all-hazards preparedness. George W. Bush supported NIMS, ICS, NRF and identifying and hardening CI/KR. The Obama administration has weakened the national security of this nation for the next generation."

9. "During the Obama administration, there has been far too much emphasis placed on Global Warming/Climate Change and not enough on terrorism and other threats."

10. "I think Bush liked us Okies more"

11. "There does seem to be a reluctance to label terror for what it is and for many of these Emergency Management organizations that were implemented post 9/11, much of it has become nothing more than spoon feeding people glorified weather reports."

12. "The Bush administration openly supported the efforts of all emergency management personnel and their efforts, provided tools, grants and guidance to the entities that were required to meet the new demands in a post-9/11 world. The Obama administration has reduced the support and not provided any new tools while simultaneously providing additional requirements and guidance."

13. "We received federal grants to support local operations in planning, mitigating, responding to and recovery from during George Bush's Admin. We have severely weakened since President Obama and have no consistent strategy. Millions of dollars were spent in the Bush Admin to go by the wayside in the Obama Admin"

14. "The requirements, it seems like there are no requirements under the Obama administration and no consequence for not following the requirements set forth in NIMS and under the NRF. I guess that goes hand in hand with not providing funding. The criteria for UASI designation is a joke. That program should be scrapped and a new system that fairly distributes the preparedness funding throughout the US and not just the favorite Cities, that just happen to be major democratic voting blocks."

The final comment above truly brings the piece into focus by highlighting the rift along partisan lines that has gripped our national conscious. Just as citizens snipe about politics, we see it occurring within the bureaucracy as well. Whether these attitudes expressed by local respondents are representative of their jurisdiction is what quantitative testing will explore to follow.

2.3 Independent Variable Measurement-Party Vote History

The independent variable used in regression testing is the voting history of the jurisdiction in the previous five presidential elections. This time period was selected to encompass both the Bush and Obama administrations, as well as the election of Donald Trump in 2016. Furthermore, since the attacks of September 11, 2001 represented a significant shift in the actions undertaken by the federal government in the field of emergency management, it made sense to limit the focus to the elections that encompass only those administrations. Maintaining this time frame allows the research to consider those in power as DHS and other key homeland security policies came into existence and were implemented and/or updated.

County level election results came from the website http://uselectionatlas.org , which provides such information for the relevant elections. Where applicable, municipal level results were found on state government and local media webpages. However, not every municipality provided results, and in that case the county level voting results were substituted. Using local election results also allows for greater specificity than state-level results since voting tendencies at the local level may not be reflective of the state at-large (such as a rural district that favors Republicans in heavily Democratic state or a heavily Democratic urban center in a primarily Republican state).

The variable measurement is directly derived from the voting behavior of the jurisdiction. If the county or municipality voted for the Democratic candidate in all five elections of interest, the jurisdiction was coded as "Strong Democratic". If the jurisdiction voted for the Democratic candidate in four of the previous five elections, they were coded as "Democratic". Those that split their vote with three elections going to one party's candidate and two elections to the other party's candidate they were coded as "swing" jurisdictions. The scale continues with "Republican" and "Strong Republican" in the same manner described for the Democratic jurisdictions. Table 1 illustrates how the results break down amongst the responses to the survey. Not surprisingly, the majority of the respondent's jurisdictions fall into the "Strong Republican" category, which is reflective of the country at-large.

2.4 Independent Variable Measurement-Organizational Characteristics

Correlation and ordered logistic regression testing occurred to determine if any characteristics of the jurisdiction increased the odds of predicting their voting history along with their attitudes about emergency management during the Obama administration. This includes the type of jurisdiction itself (municipality or county), the (logged) population of the jurisdiction, if the department budget increased or decreased between 2009 and 2016, and the department's full-time equivalent staffing change between 2009 and 2016. Table 2 illustrates the responses to Likert scale questions for FTE change during the Obama administration while Table 3 does the same with budget change as reported by the respondent. Each table is broken out for the entire sample, and for the sub-sets of respondents for each independent variable question of interest. In all cases the subsets are reasonably reflective of the entire sample in terms of the percentage of responses in each category of the Likert scale.

The other independent variable metrics related to the organization, jurisdiction type and population, are based on the background of the respondent and 2016 U.S. Census data estimates. The population of the jurisdictions served by those who responded to the survey range from just over 300 to over 4,000,000. Of the 775 respondents to the survey, 528 (68%) respondents represented a county while the remaining 247 (32%) represented a municipality. Table 4 below demonstrates the breakdown of county demographics along rural, suburban, and urban characteristics for the respondents to the survey in general and for the questions of interest in the development of the dependent variables. The results show that while the majority of respondents come from "rural" counties, they are still slightly under-represented when compared to the percentage of "rural" counties in the nation. Counties considered to be "suburban" make up a slightly higher percentage of the respondents to the survey as compared to the number of "suburban" counties in the nation (Pew 2018; National Center for Health Statistics 2013).