Home Takeover Premia and Leverage: Theory, Empirical Observations and Recommendations
Article
Licensed
Unlicensed Requires Authentication

Takeover Premia and Leverage: Theory, Empirical Observations and Recommendations

  • Vincent Covrig , Daniel L. McConaughy EMAIL logo and Mary Ann K. Travers
Published/Copyright: December 10, 2015

Abstract

The greater a target company’s leverage, the less cash or shares an acquirer needs to control the target enterprise. Given the benefits of acquiring a target, the equity takeover premium is spread over relatively more assets in a more highly leveraged target, thus reducing the premium paid relative to the entire enterprise. This suggests that more levered targets may receive greater equity premia, expressed as a percent of the unaffected share price, other things equal. To test this, we examine takeover transactions that occurred during the 2003–2013 time period. We find that higher equity takeover premia are related to higher pre-deal leverage levels, consistent with theory. Our results are robust with respect to size, industry, profitability, year of transaction, synergy potential, and type of acquirer (strategic, horizontal or financial). Our empirical analyses support the Appraisal Foundation Working Group’s recommendation for best practices, namely, to adjust takeover premia for leverage.

References

Appraisal Foundation Discussion Draft– The Measurement and Application of Market Participant Acquisition Premiums, September 1, 2015.Search in Google Scholar

Bargeron, L., F. Schlingemann, C. Zutter, and R. Stulz. 2008. “Why Do Private Acquirers Pay so Little Compared to Public Acquirers?” Journal of Financial Economics 89:375–90.10.3386/w13061Search in Google Scholar

Boston Consulting Group. 2013. “Divide and Conquer: How Successful M&A Deals Split the Synergies” March.Search in Google Scholar

Cooney, J., T. Moeller, and M. Stegmoller. 2009. “The Underpricing of Private Targets.” Journal of Financial Economics 93:51–66.10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.08.001Search in Google Scholar

Cornell, B. 1993. Corporate Valuation. New York: Business One Irwin, 239–66.Search in Google Scholar

Cornell, B. 2013. “Guideline Public Company Valuation and Control Premiums: An Economic Analysis.” Journal of Business Valuation and Economic Loss Analysis 8 (1):53–69.10.1515/jbvela-2013-0005Search in Google Scholar

Eckbo, E. 2010. Corporate Takeovers, 2 vols. Amsterdam: Elsevier.Search in Google Scholar

FactSet Mergerstat / BVR Control Premium Study. http://www.bvmarketdata.com.Search in Google Scholar

Harford, J., S. Klasa, and N. Walcott. 2009. “Do Firms Have Leverage Targets? Evidence From Acquisitions.” Journal of Financial Economics 93:1–14.10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.07.006Search in Google Scholar

Jenkinson, T. and R. Stucke. 2011. “Who Benefits from the Leverage in LBOs?” Working paper available at SSRN.com.10.2139/ssrn.1777266Search in Google Scholar

McConaughy, D. 2002. “Negative Takeover Premia and Stock Price Levels in Internet Stocks.” Valuation Strategies 5 (4):20–9.Search in Google Scholar

Modigliani, F. and M. Miller. 1958. “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment.” American Economic Review 48 (3):261–97.Search in Google Scholar

Nath, E. 1990. “Control Premiums and Minority Interest Discounts in Private Companies.” Business Valuation Review 9:39–46.10.5791/0882-2875-9.2.39Search in Google Scholar

Nath, E. 1994. “A Tale of Two Markets.” Business Valuation Review 13:107–12.10.5791/0882-2875-13.3.107Search in Google Scholar

Pratt, S. 2009. Business Valuation Discounts and Premiums, 2nd ed. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.Search in Google Scholar

Schlingemann, F. 2004. “Financing Decisions and Bidder Gains.” Journal of Corporate Finance 10:683–701.10.1016/S0929-1199(03)00043-9Search in Google Scholar

Published Online: 2015-12-10
Published in Print: 2017-5-24

© 2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Downloaded on 7.9.2025 from https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/jbvela-2015-0002/html
Scroll to top button