Abstract
Since many types of food are experience goods and have a collective reputation, the food industry has various minimum quality standards. However, in the food industry, sometimes not all firms adhere to the standard, and consumers do not always distinguish between compliant and non-compliant firms. This paper finds that when there is only partial compliance, having a food quality standard or increasing compliance for the standard does not always increase profits for the firms adhering to the standard, even though average industry quality increases. Potential solutions to the free riding problem are analyzed.
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Non-Tariff Measures When Alternative Regulatory Tools Can Be Chosen
- Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As), Market Structure and Inventive Activity in the Agricultural Biotechnology Industry
- Measuring Bilateral Market Power in International Markets of Vertically Differentiated Agricultural Commodities
- Testing for Oligopsony Power in the US Green Skin Avocado Market
- Innovation in the Seed Market: The Role of IPRs and Commercialization Rules
- Modeling US Farmer Soybean Seed Choice with Path Dependencies: Inevitable Patented Seed Market Dominance?
- Partial Adherence to Voluntary Quality Standards for Experience Goods
- Investigating the Price Transmission Mechanisms of Greek Fresh Potatoes, Tomatoes and Cucumbers Markets
- Channel Concentration and Retail Prices: Evidence from the Traditional Cheese Market of Cyprus
- Price Dependence between Different Beef Cuts and Quality Grades: A Copula Approach at the Retail Level for the U.S. Beef Industry
- Factors Associated with Alcoholic Beverages Consumption in Russia: A Discrete Choice Model
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Non-Tariff Measures When Alternative Regulatory Tools Can Be Chosen
- Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As), Market Structure and Inventive Activity in the Agricultural Biotechnology Industry
- Measuring Bilateral Market Power in International Markets of Vertically Differentiated Agricultural Commodities
- Testing for Oligopsony Power in the US Green Skin Avocado Market
- Innovation in the Seed Market: The Role of IPRs and Commercialization Rules
- Modeling US Farmer Soybean Seed Choice with Path Dependencies: Inevitable Patented Seed Market Dominance?
- Partial Adherence to Voluntary Quality Standards for Experience Goods
- Investigating the Price Transmission Mechanisms of Greek Fresh Potatoes, Tomatoes and Cucumbers Markets
- Channel Concentration and Retail Prices: Evidence from the Traditional Cheese Market of Cyprus
- Price Dependence between Different Beef Cuts and Quality Grades: A Copula Approach at the Retail Level for the U.S. Beef Industry
- Factors Associated with Alcoholic Beverages Consumption in Russia: A Discrete Choice Model