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Information flow control for workflow management systems

  • Thomas Bauereiß

    Thomas Bauereiß received his Diplom in Computer Science from the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg. Since 2012, he is a junior researcher and PhD student at the Cyber-Physical Systems Department at DFKI Bremen. His research interests include formal methods and security, focusing on information flow control.

    Deutsches Forschungszentrum für Künstliche Intelligenz, Bibliothekstr. 1, D-28359 Bremen

    and Dieter Hutter

    Dieter Hutter received his PhD from the University of Karlsruhe working on inductive theorem proving. In 1991 he moved to the Saarland University and joined DFKI in 1993 as a member of J.H. Siekmann's resarch group. He lead various projects in Formal Methods and Security. Moving to Bremen in 2008, he is now vice director of the Cyber-Physical System Department at DFKI and honorary professor at Bremen University.

    Deutsches Forschungszentrum für Künstliche Intelligenz, Bibliothekstr. 1, D-28359 Bremen

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Published/Copyright: November 30, 2014

Abstract

Workflow management plays an important role in analyzing and automating business processes. Security requirements in workflow management systems are typically mapped to (role-based) access control configurations. This paper focuses on information flow control, taking into account implicit information leaks. The presented approach operates on a specification level in which no executable program is available yet. We illustrate the modeling of a workflow management system as a composition of state-event systems, each representing one of the activities of the workflow. This facilitates distributed deployment and eases verification by splitting up the verification of the overall system into verification of the individual components. Confidentiality requirements are modeled in terms of information flow predicates using the MAKS framework and verified following existing decomposition methodologies, which are adapted for open systems with ongoing user interaction. We discuss the interaction with other security requirements, notably separation of duty.

About the authors

Thomas Bauereiß

Thomas Bauereiß received his Diplom in Computer Science from the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg. Since 2012, he is a junior researcher and PhD student at the Cyber-Physical Systems Department at DFKI Bremen. His research interests include formal methods and security, focusing on information flow control.

Deutsches Forschungszentrum für Künstliche Intelligenz, Bibliothekstr. 1, D-28359 Bremen

Dieter Hutter

Dieter Hutter received his PhD from the University of Karlsruhe working on inductive theorem proving. In 1991 he moved to the Saarland University and joined DFKI in 1993 as a member of J.H. Siekmann's resarch group. He lead various projects in Formal Methods and Security. Moving to Bremen in 2008, he is now vice director of the Cyber-Physical System Department at DFKI and honorary professor at Bremen University.

Deutsches Forschungszentrum für Künstliche Intelligenz, Bibliothekstr. 1, D-28359 Bremen

Received: 2014-5-30
Revised: 2014-10-5
Accepted: 2014-10-17
Published Online: 2014-11-30
Published in Print: 2014-12-28

©2014 Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston

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