“Legitimate Authority” in the Chinese Tradition: Ethics-Politics

1 Introduction

Over 100 years ago, Max Weber (1864–1920) proposed three types of “legitimate authority” (drei Arten der legitimen Herrschaft): charismatic (charismatische Herrschaft), traditional (traditionelle Herrschaft), and rational-legal (legale/rationale Herrschaft) (Weber, 1980, pp. 122–124). Interestingly, he classified the ruling order in ancient China as charismatic (Weber, 1980, pp. 140–141), in stark contrast to some Chinese scholars, who expected to see it fall into the category of traditional authority (Mao, 2001, p. 87; Yue, 2006, p. 220).

Weber’s types of “legitimate authority (合法统治)” were imported into China from the West, while the concept and theory of “ethics-politics (伦理政治)” were home-grown, representing Chinese scholars’ self-understanding of the Chinese political tradition and political thought. “Ethics-politics” advanced first by Liang Qichao (梁启超 1873–1929) about 100 years ago, summarized his perception of the close connections between ethics and politics in ancient China. According to him, the perfect clan organization blurred the boundary between family and state, shaping the Chinese style of government closely connected with ethics (Liang, 1996, pp. 44–48). Liang Shuming (梁漱溟 1893–1988) stated that this constituted a striking characteristic of Chinese political practice, which was heavily intertwined and integrated with ethics (Dai & Jiang, 2001, p. 272). Some contemporary Chinese scholars have inherited this view and developed it rather systematically (Yang, 2007, pp. 373–374) “political model” and a “cultural type” characterized by the “homogeneity (同构同化)” of ethics and politics: “Political issues are measured by ethical standards (伦理标准) and ethical rules (伦理规则) are implemented by political control” (Ren, 2005, pp. 28–29).

This article argues that none of Weber’s three types of legitimate authority corresponds to the political structure that existed in ancient China or the ideal framework advcated in Confucianism. And “ethics-politics” can act as the fourth type of legitimate authority, which may serve as a reference when comparing the political systems and ideas of China and the West.

2 “Ethics-Politics” as the Fourth Type of Legitimate Authority

Weber labeled the model of government in ancient China “charismatic” because adversity (such as a defeat in a war, a drought or a flood) would force a monarch to repent publicly or even abdicate. It indicated that the monarch had lost his “charisma (魅力)” or “virtue (德)” (Du, 2018, pp. 66–69), as mandated by Heaven/Tian (天), and was no longer a legitimate “son of Tian” (天子). Weber captured the core of political legitimacy in ancient China, namely that the legitimacy of a monarch was built on his virtues, but he erroneously equated “virtue” with “charisma”. According to him, “charisma” was “above the everyday life” (Weber, 1980, p. 142), that is, transcendent. “Virtue” nevertheless has been infused into China’s political daily routines ever since the rulers of the Western Zhou Dynasty advocated the legitimacy theory of “virtuous practice being worthy of the mandate of Tian.” Furthermore, Weber’s charismatic authority was built on the worship of a ruler by his followers and could transcend certain values. Traditional Chinese “virtue,” is inseparable from values, and is a requirement for any ruler (Barnwell, 2013, pp. 77–78).

In the following part, we will examine why Weber did not regard the ruling order in ancient Chinese as “traditional authority” from the aspects of the “types of legitimacy belief” and “the relationship between the monarch and his administration.” On the former, Weber argued that the legitimacy of the traditional authority was based on the traditional order, the power of the master, and belief in the sanctity of that power. The master was chosen according to rules that were handed down (Weber, 1980, p. 130). Apparently this seems true of ancient China. For instance, succession to the crown and the imperial throne were either according to the system of lineal primogeniture, or granted by the reigning monarch. However, this procedure for power transfer did not touch upon the nature of legitimacy, as the so-called “traditional ruling order” (政统) could not be the reason for legitimacy or reflect the “principle of legitimacy.”^[1] (Weber, 1980, pp. 549–550), viz. “to govern by humanity” (Du, 2021, pp. 64–66), approved of by Confucianism. For Confucians, a person assuming the throne did not become a legitimate ruler unless he demonstrated that he had met their standards known as “Confucian orthodoxy.” Perhaps it is for this reason that Deng Yong believes that ancient Chinese tended to favor “the legitimacy of governance of a political power” rather than “the legitimacy of the source of political power” (Deng, 2011, pp. 47–75).

Indeed, from the Western Zhou Dynasty onwards, three elements constituted the political legitimacy in Chinese political thought: the mandate of Tian, the virtue of the ruler, and the will of the people. Tian as the source of legitimacy was the formal element, while the ruler’s virtue and the will of the people were essential reasons for legitimacy. After Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty (汉武帝), Confucianism became the resource of national ideology and the political legitimacy. Confucianism neither denied the traditional ruling order featured by “the son of Tian ruling the people,” nor gave much consideration to the issue of legitimacy of power acquisition. Instead, it focused on the monarch’s level of moral development and his attitude toward the people according to the tradition of “Tian nurtures the people and appoints a king for their benefit,” as was declared in “13th Year of Duke Wen” of Zuo’s Commentary to The Spring and Autumn Annals (《左传 · 文公十三年》).

The relationship between the sovereign and his administration provides another perspective on the issue of the political legitimacy. Weber defined the relationship between the two factors as “personal.” The executive branch, he wrote, is subordinate not to the law, but to specific individuals appointed by the rulers who are either prescribed or established conventionally. If in ancient China, the state officials were genuinely mainly composed of Confucians or those who had received Confucian ideas, then these officials should have had no personal relationship with the emperor. Although they served in the imperial court and carried out the emperor’s decrees, they did not obey the emperor as an individual, but the person on the throne. According to the Confucian ideal, a specific emperor played merely one role in the ruling order, performing the duties of that position. Therefore, the officials actually did no more than obey their own ideal, or the so-called “Confucian orthodoxy.” This tradition was established by Confucius, who observed, “A minister serves his monarch by following the Way (dao, 道), and resigns if he can’t” (from “Xian Jin” of The Analects,《论语 · 先进》). And Xunzi put it more explicitly: “Follow the Way, not the monarch” (“On the Way of Ministers” in Xunzi,《荀子 · 臣道》).

In ancient China, it was not the succession of the throne according to the rules of “the traditional ruling order” but the inclusive “virtue” required of the monarch (as approved by Confucianism) that determined the legitimacy of his authority. Only by virtue of this “virtue” can the correctness and validity of his authority and the ruling order be guaranteed. Correctness, which is a belief in the right of authorities to rule and of members to obey (Easton, 1965, p. 288) and validity (Weber, 1980, pp. 122–124) lie at the core of legitimacy, so we should, on the grounds of its unique correctness and validity, present our conception of a unique “type of legitimate authority” of ancient China —“ethics-politics.” In this way, we can truly grasp the essence of Chinese politics and understand it better. At the same time, we take advantage of and modernize this ideological resource in a way proper to China.

3 The Historical Origins and Principles of “Ethics-Politics”

“Ethics-politics” as a “type of legitimate authority” is not just an “ideal type” of concept for government or a fantasy, but a crystal clear historical fact, which dates back at least to the Western Zhou Dynasty.

After Emperor Wu of Zhou overthrew the Shang Dynasty through the Battle of Muye, the Zhou ruling clique established a feudal kingdom on the basis of the patriarchal clan system. The Zhou Dynasty “developed a political system that unified the state-level and the family-level organizations” (Chen, 2007 p. 66), forming a homogeneous pattern (同质模式) that integrated “the family with the state” (Han, 2001, p. 61; Lü et al., 2004, p. 2 & Pi, 2007, p. 26). A good case in point is the king of Zhou. He was both the political authority and the patriarch of the Ji clan. “The state is a representation of the clan on the political level, whereas the clan is at the core of the state governing structure.” (Tian & Zang, 1996, p. 32) This indicates that ethical and political principles are inseparable.

It is generally believed that there were two important principles underlying the patriarchal system of the Western Zhou Dynasty: “loving one’s relatives” and “honoring one’s seniors” (Gan, 2006, p. 26; Pi, 2007, pp. 160–163 & Yang, 2007, p. 60). The “Great Treatise” in The Book of Rites (《礼记 · 大传》) states, “Regulating the hierarchical relationship to one’s ancestors and deceased father is a case of honoring one’s seniors. Regulating the hierarchical relationship to one’s offspring is a case of loving one’s later generations. Regulating the order of brothers and cousins, gathering members of the same clan to dine together, arranging them orderly according to blood relations, and making difference of the relationship between them according to the rituals, are all truths pertaining to humanity.” Although the “Great Treatise” mainly talks about patriarchal rituals, they are directly related to political governance. In the paragraph quoted above, “to regulate” means “to rectify.” Therefore, “Regulating the hierarchical relationship to one’s ancestors and one’s deceased father is a case of honoring the seniors” means “rectifying the relationship between oneself and his father and ancestors,” and “respecting one’s seniors.” “Regulating the hierarchical relationship to one’s descendants” means “rectifying the relationship between oneself and one’s offspring,” or “loving one’s descendants (恩爱后代)” (Liu et al., 1993, p. 489). The last statement, “[the aforementioned] are all the truths pertaining to humanity,” declares that human relations, viz. ethics, is the theme of the book.

The book then goes on to say, “When the sagely king assumes the throne and rules the world, he must begin with the way of humankind.” And “loving one’s relatives” and “honoring one’s seniors” are discussed again. It can be justifiably concluded that “loving one’s relatives” was meant to highlight the blood lineage and the family affection between clan members, so as to maintain unity. The principle of “honoring one’s seniors” similarly bears the dual meanings of ethics and politics. Confucius remarked, “To his son and heir, a ruler is a father in terms of blood relations, and a monarch in terms of politics. The ruler has both fatherly love and monarchical honor, thus the capacity for ruling the whole world.” (“Wenwang Shizi 8” in The Book of Rites, 《礼记 · 文王世子第八》)

In short, these two principles determined the status of a clan member in the internal hierarchy of the clan according to age, sex, and relationship to the eldest son and heir of the firstborn. At the same time, the daily political activities of the upper class members in the clan also had a strict order to follow, so that the daily life and political system within the clan could operate orderly.

Beyond doubt, Confucians added their own notions to the rituals and rites practiced by the ruling class of the Western Zhou Dynasty, and thence developed a number of theories, part of which were what we designate as “thought of ethics-politics”. Meanwhile, Confucians also absorbed the political theory of the ruling group of the Western Zhou Dynasty, especially the idea of legitimacy, and finally formed the “thought on legitimacy of ethics-politics” particular to Confucianism.

4 The Five Components of the “Thought on Legitimacy of Ethics-Politics” of Confucianism in the Pre-Qin Period

“Virtue” runs through the “thought on legitimacy of ethics-politics,” which is related to the traits of Chinese philosophy, especially Confucianism. Mou Zongsan summarized Chinese philosophy with two words “subjectivity (主体性)” and “inner-morality (内在道德性)” ― and held that Confucianism alone developed “moral subjectivity (道德主体性)” (Mou, 2010, p. 5).

Historically, there are probably two reasons for this. First, the pre-Qin Confucians inherited and improved the political thought of the early Western Zhou Dynasty, especially the thought of legitimacy, that is, the theory centered around “mandate of Heaven (天命)”, “respect virtue (敬德)” and “protect ruled people (保民).” (Du, 2017, pp. 67–80) “Virtue” was the prerequisite for a ruler to receive the will of Heaven and to perceive the wishes and worries of the people. Second, the pre-Qin Confucians did not query the existing “monarchies” [be it the feudal system established in the Western Zhou Dynasty or the centralized system of prefectures and counties (Zou, 2004, pp. 24–29)] that emerged in the late Spring and Autumn Period). In order to ensure long-term peace and stability, Confucians seem to have focused on the morality of the rulers and government officials.

In the following part, we will look at the core position of “virtue” in the five components of the “thought on the legitimacy of ethics-politics.”