Five theses on humor literacy in the public sphere

3.1 Thesis 1

Thesis 1: Humor has evolved to become a form of political discourse which simultaneously entertains and functions as a tool for political engagement. Laughter, humor, comedy, and related concepts have long been intertwined with politics. As early as the third century B.C., satirists challenged the moral norms of their time, setting the foundation for the Western canon of political satire (Griffin 1994). Since then, politically oriented humor has taken numerous forms. From late-night talk shows, to stand-up comedians, or satirical political movements, humor is commonly associated with the subversion of hegemonic ideas and political suppression.

Nonetheless, public perceptions on humor are stubbornly marked by the amoralist view of humor as existing in a separate discursive realm, free of real-world ramifications. In scholarship today, this view is partly supported by theories of humor as psychological relief (see Weaver et al. 2016), suggesting humor is lighthearted, playful, and ultimately harmless. Some scholars (e.g. Davies 2011) have remained faithful to this so-called exculpatory approach to the social impact of humor (for an overview see Weaver 2011, pp. 8–9). In such a view, humor is first and foremost a inherently benign form of communication. This perspective also allows humorists to dismiss critiques by claiming “it’s just a joke,” exonerating those producing it from any liabilities, or minimizing potential harm done because of it. Furthermore, it overlooks the notion that to joke “with total impunity would mean that there are no boundaries to push at anymore [as] humor is only possible because certain boundaries, rules and taboos exist in the first place” (Pickering and Lockyer 2005, p. 14).

But increasingly, the distinction between “entertainment” and “serious” discourse has eroded, blurring the line between humor and politics (Baym 2010; Gray et al. 2009). Consequently, humor is now “no longer content to stand adjacent to political culture as a ludic companion” (Boyer 2013, p. 276), leading some to argue ours is the “new golden age of satire” (Holm 2018, p. 4). The rise of the internet – especially the user-driven, interactive Web 2.0 – has in previously unimaginable ways reconfigured the potential and vernacular for political engagement among citizens (e.g., da Silva and Garcia 2012; Trifonas 2018). Recent research has shown how digital humor primarily serves to express political subjectivity and opposition (Davis et al. 2018). Similarly, analyses of social media communication reveal that political engagement in digital environments is increasingly humorous, with the majority of posts either expressing criticism and protest, being humorously intended, or combining both (Teixeira et al. 2018). Such developments have by now mainstreamed modes of “silly citizenship” (Hartley 2010) or the more drastic “memefication” of political discourse (Bulatovic 2019).

All this underscores how humor has become a proxy for political discourse. Moreover, this shift towards a general “repoliticization of humor” (Nieuwenhuis and Zijp 2022) – the idea that humor can be instrumentalized as a form of political weapon – is now widely visible throughout society. Political campaigns, for example, are increasingly marked by a symbiotic relationship with popular humorous culture. To illustrate, after Trump’s 2016 electoral success, fringe platforms like 4chan celebrated with the acknowledgment that they had “actually elected a meme as president” (Ohlheiser 2016), while in 2024, the DNC credentialed over 200 content creators, to boost a virality of playful and humorous coverage supporting VP Kamala Harris among younger voters (Padilla 2024). Furthermore, professional comedians now often assume roles as journalistic figures (Koivukoski and Ödmark 2020) or social rights advocates (Waisanen 2018). And for audiences, political satire increasingly serves as a means of emotional and political understanding (Lee and Jang 2017), while shareable humorous content – i.e. gifs, memes and videos – has become central to everyday political engagement.

3.2 Thesis 2

Thesis 2: Humor serves a diversity of ideological agenda’s spanning a spectrum between progressive and reactionary, reflecting the epistemic uncertainty of the current political moment. As a form of politics, humor operates as an inherently ideological medium. Conventionally, it is assumed that humor serves a primarily progressive goal (see Holm 2018), and that humorous social critique ideally “punches up,” to question dominant power structures. In the last decade, however, anti-establishment critiques on the political right have been on the rise, and have managed to weaponize certain forms of humor to spread moral panics and reactionary ideologies (Lamerichs 2018; Sienkiewizc and Marx 2022). Examples such as Fox’ late-night show Gutfeld!, the conservative podcast The Joe Rogan Experience, or conservative Christian satirical news website The Babylon Bee interweave humor with the normalization of reactionary anti-woke discourses or even conspiratorial ideologies (Bozzi 2024).

What binds such examples is that they conflate humor with a deliberate form of anti-establishment social critique, often aimed at alternative interpretations of notions like ‘elite’ or ‘truth’. In a way, this resonates with Billig’s (2005) assertion that what is considered an act of contesting humor – i.e. punching up or challenging those in power – to one person or social group, could be interpreted as disciplinary of social conventions – i.e. punching down – by another, as “one’s own power is curiously invisible, for power is always claimed to reside on the other side” (pp. 203–204). In other words, in a context of an ideologically pluralist political landscape where left-right dichotomies are challenged, critique is voiced by an ideologically heterogenous cast of social actors, each laying claim to interpretations of what constitutes a valid target of humorous social critique.

The fact that humor embodies a diversity of ideological voices can be seen as the result of broader systemic changes in political culture, which alter the epistemic nature of comedic critique itself. Because humorous critique is always “an attack upon discernible, historically authentic particulars (…) possess[ing] genuine historic identity” (Rosenheim in Bogel 2001, p. 8), to be humor literate implies an understanding of the way that our current political context allows, facilitates, or negotiates the act of formulating humorous social critique. One model which captures the nature of these changes is what Anton Jäger has described as the shift from post-politics to hyperpolitics (Jäger 2022, 2023): The idea of post-politics asserted that the convergence of free market capitalism and liberal democracy solidified into an incontestable societal framework (Wilson and Swyngedouw 2014), equaling the exhaustion of political contestation. On the contrary, where “nothing was political” in a post-political moment, “everything is political, and fervently so” in the current hyperpolitical context (Jäger 2022, para. 8). Fueled in part by general processes of democratization and inspired by the possibilities of digital technologies, this hyperpolitical state brought about an unprecedented proliferation of critical discourses. Where conventionally the practice of social critique has been a privilege of a limited cast of social actors – e.g., journalism, the arts, politics – today “everyone is a claimsmaker and not just on social media” (Hochuli 2022, p. 418).

What this means for public humor is that societal critique has become central to humorous discourse, with critical memes, parodic gifs, sketch comedy, satirical news, and editorial cartoons all taking aim at a specific interpretation of a given status quo. Yet, this abundance of critique raises questions about its impact: As Holm (2018) notes, “in our current conjuncture (…) where we are called upon to act as innovative individuals and free-thinking entrepreneurs (…) critique is hailed as a welcome, necessary and encouraged aspect, ultimately rendering it blunt” (p. 35). In other words, the public sphere may have grown so accustomed to humorous critique that it challenges our ability to distinguish substantive critique from, for example, mere criticism or ridicule.

3.3 Thesis 3

Thesis 3: Humor operates differently within distinct sociopolitical contexts, which define the interpretation of its impact across diverse cultural or social settings. As a universal human trait, humor appears across diverse cultural and historical contexts. However, interpreting humor’s meaning, intentions, or impact requires recognizing that its production and reception are deeply shaped by cultural norms and social hierarchies (Lu 2023). As Billig (2005) observed, “if there are no universal ethics, politics and aesthetics, which are shared by all cultures, then likewise there can be no universal humor” (p. 188). It can thus be said that humor is polysemic and open to interpretation. In today’s globalized, digitally connected, and culturally diverse society, this can complicate the relationship between comedic intent and reception, as humorous messages rapidly cross cultural boundaries and often spark “collapsing” contexts where “norms from one context seep into the bounds of another” (Davis and Jurgenson 2014, p. 477).

Research shows that comedic tastes are shaped by symbolic boundaries that shape what is considered suitably humorous (Kuipers 2011). These boundaries reflect social divides along lines of class (Friedman and Kuipers 2013), gender (Tosun et al. 2018), and ethnicity (Jiang et al. 2019). In the digital era, humor’s production and circulation have become public, with digital platforms facilitating the hypervisibility and mass sharing of humorous content (Sobande et al. 2022). When humor goes viral, it often presupposes a “global village” of shared values, but today’s highly polarized public sphere reveals humor as a marker of differing values: Shared laughter signals common ground, while taking offense suggests contrasting values or beliefs. Viewed as such, the recurrent claim in conservative circles that “the woke can’t take a joke” (Mann 2021) as well as critiques from the left that certain reactionary forms of humor are “just not funny” (Okundaye 2020) overlook how humor is first and foremost a reflection of distinct cultural contexts. To dismiss certain reactionary forms of humor as unfunny, for example, runs the risk ignoring the growing success of an entire industry of anti-establishment humor, both in the form of an organized community of professional comedians, as well as more decentralized but outspokenly partisan digital communities surrounding platforms such as 4chan, 9gag, Gab or Truth Social.

I argue that it is thus incorrect to equate approving or disapproving of specific attempts at humor with having or not having a so-called sense of humor. Instead, perceptions on the affordances and limits of humor go beyond content and intention when assessing intercultural differences. For example, when professional comedian Tony Hinchcliffe spoke at a political rally in October 2024, he was publicly condemned for racist jokes – referring to Puerto Rico as a “floating island of garbage.” Hinchcliffe himself, known for his distinct “roast” comedy style, was quick to publicly rebut his critics with the claim that “these people have no sense of humor” and that his joke was taken out of context (Hinchcliffe 2024). As such, discourses on humor are often problematically intertwined with issues of inclusion and exclusion, where taking offense is reduced to lacking a sense of humor. Yet scholarship underlines that stark differences indeed exist between cultures in terms of preferred humor styles, but also regarding views on when, why or even how to laugh (e.g., Yue et al. 2016). Contemporary discourses on the boundaries of humor thus often hinge on stereotypical us-them dynamics, taking form in terms of defenders of the freedom to mock, and a perceived “humorless Others” (Kuipers 2011).

Furthermore, claims that humorous free speech would be universal (and in extension untouchable) ignores the historical contingency of such a right and inequalities in access to it. Equally does it overlook the plights that it accompanies in a pluralist and multicultural society. To understand public humor, in other words, one cannot look beyond cultural differences both external as well as internal to the contexts in which it take place. In this sense, public humor literacy ideally facilitates cross-cultural dialogue and understanding, which acknowledges both the cultural relativity and ideological specificity of public humor today.

3.4 Thesis 4

Thesis 4: The voice of the speaker – i.e. identity, social positioning, and cultural authority – affects how humor is perceived in and influences public discourse. Individual freedom of speech – i.e. the freedom to hold opinions and receive and impart information and ideas – is widely recognized and enshrined in different transnational declarations. Article 19 in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, posits “the right to freedom of opinion and expression (…) through any media and regardless of frontiers” (United Nations General Assembly 1948). Similarly, the US First Amendment – by now an international shorthand for the right to free speech – delineates the limits to governmental interference in instances of public expression. However, debates on the boundaries of free speech have been around as long as the idea itself. In this context, article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights explicitly formulates how free speech “carries with it duties and responsibilities [and] may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society” (European Court of Human Rights 2021, p. 12). In other words, freedom of speech in this sense can be seen as a normative goal rather than an inexhaustible principle, and is arguably subject to contextual limitations. Among these, are limitations pertaining to the voice or role of the speaker or producer of public humor.

Public humor literacy underscores the need for understanding who communicated what from which position and with which intent. In this sense, the speaker’s social positionality matters, for example if that actor represents specific ideological, economic, cultural or political interests. In other words, I contend that public humor’s impact is equally defined by its cultural or historic context, as by who expresses it. In this regard, research on public humor scandals (Herkman and Koivukoski 2024) has revealed how public controversies on humor are caused almost exclusively by politicians or professional comedians. This is not to say that public humor produced by less publicly visible actors cannot be transgressive or, vice versa, is immediately always innocuous. Rather, it underlines how humor’s societal impact, when produced in more private social contexts, often has far less societally detrimental potential.

The oft-cited platitude that humor’s ideally punches up and not down equally implies that the social position of the humorist plays a role in how humor is perceived among audiences, and what impact it has as a form of humorous critique. In the world of stand-up comedy, for example, a 2022 comedy special by UK comedian Ricky Gervais sparked backlash on account of alleged transphobic content, which the comedian frequently defended as “just jokes” (BBC 2022). The comedic bit in question – a graphic description linking transwomen to sexual assault – was seen by some as punching up i.e. questioning the prominence of discourses on comedic free speech and public sensitivities to trans-issues themselves. Conversely, it could be said that Gervais’ recurrent references to his financial wealth in the same show meant that he abandoned his humility as comedic underdog, undermining the subversive potential of his humor (Nicolaï and Maeseele 2024). In addition, as Zijp (2025) has discussed, professional comedians increasingly construct a troubled notion of their comic persona, which can obscure audiences’ perceptions of comedy’s claims to truth or authenticity. Notwithstanding that this “playing with the borders between real and staged” (Zijp 2025, p. 12) can inspire conversations on humor’s capacity as social commentary, it can also further the increasingly politicized nature of humor as anything can ultimately be ‘just a joke’ regardless of who does the joking.

Such observations underline the need for conceptual distinctions between ‘actual’ comedic critique and ‘mere’ comedic ridicule or criticism – a distinction between a bottom-up interrogation of deep-rooted structural contingencies, or mere subjective discontent disguised as a profound deconstruction of socio-political issues. These tensions gain visibility today in the rising number of court cases on public forms of humor in Western contexts (Godioli and Young 2023). Yet, contrary to public perception, as fueled by reactionary discourses on cancel culture and wokeness, one common denominator in jurisprudence on humor is that courts ideally refrain from the restriction of humor which is offensive on a purely subjective basis (Godioli and Young 2023, p. 34). Rather, what is taken into account is whether humor is deliberately and recognizable framed as such by the speaker, or whether the transgressions serves any public interest. To be literate in public humor thus invites audiences to interpret the message in light of its source, and critically interrogate the intentions behind and positionality governing the production and dissemination of humorous messages.

3.5 Thesis 5

Thesis 5: Humor operates via distinct humor mechanisms and genres – e.g., satire, irony, sarcasm – which codefine its effects and potential as a tool for social critique. Public humor literacy necessitates understanding of distinct humor mechanisms and genres to avoid a monolithic understanding of humor. Rather, what we call humor is a diverse collection of genres, styles or forms of expression pertaining to the humorous, each with their own internal logic or rhetorical aim. In addition to the previous theses above – covering ideology, context, voice – I argue, that understanding humor on a content level is equally important to mitigating humor-related conflict in the public sphere. Examples are the nuanced differences between sarcasm and irony (Burgers and van Mulken 2017), or satire and parody (Salomon 2006), or the role of intertextuality in humorous texts (Tsakona 2020). Not being aware of such distinctions runs the risk of reductionist, dichotomous understandings of humor’s role in the public sphere as either singularly lighthearted or, conversely, that humor has exclusively become a site of political antagonism. Furthermore, I contend that many controversies regarding humor have originated, at least in part, from the conflation of concepts such as irony, sarcasm, satire or parody, which fuel misunderstandings and obscure intentions or ideological underpinnings of certain humorous expressions.

By now, over a century of academic literature has attempted to define humor-related key concepts such as laughter (Bergson 1911), parody (Hutcheon 1985), satire (Simpson 2003) or the semantics of humorous ambiguity (Raskin 1984). Yet, even within academia definitional consensus is not a given and interpretations of humor mechanisms are contingent on normative or paradigmatic contexts (Nieuwenhuis and Zijp 2022; Peifer 2012). It is, however, commonly assumed that certain forms of humor ideally grant comedians a form of comic license (Quirk 2010) which allows them to transgress the bounds of non-humorous speech. On the other hand, however, events such as the Van Langenhove trial and its public reception teach us that certain humorous genres are increasingly instrumentalized as rhetorical defense strategies – e.g. the claim that racist memes are ‘only satire’ – problematizing the perceived ‘comic innocence’ of humor in the public sphere (Zijp 2024).

The ability to recognize certain humoristic features could allow audiences to distinguish between, for example, distinctly racist humor – e.g., ridiculing or playing out racial stereotypes – and humor about racial issues – e.g., ironically referencing racial tropes to satirically critique broader discourses of intercultural tensions. In this sense, public humor literacy also ideally facilitates a tolerance towards the unique merits of humor in terms of challenging hegemonic discourses or status quos.

However, herein arguably lies the most pertinent challenge of an attempt at formulating guidelines for public humor literacy: In the context of increasing politicization of public humor, such insights are increasingly appropriated in defense of expressions that thread the line between humor and more disruptive forms of speech such as racism or hate speech. In recent years, it has become noticeable how satire or irony are increasingly strategically instrumentalized. To illustrate, in 2021 the owner of Flemish openly rightwing satirical magazine ‘tScheldt was sentenced to six months in prison and a fine of 4,000 euros for inciting hate speech with the publication of a defaming photograph of spokesperson to the Flemish liberal party, Zelfa Madhloum – a Belgian citizen with Iraqi roots. In response to the ruling, the magazine posted a public reply asserting that the image was merely humorous “clickbait” and that ‘tScheldt “does satire, and supports a non-violent, laughing society” (De Ziel 2021). In turn, the judge ruling in the case countered these claims, stating that “[‘tScheldt’s] questionable publications show no sign of satirical exaggeration, irony or sarcasm” (Meeussen 2024).

As discussions on the boundaries of humor grow ever more public, the role of jurisprudence plays an increasingly important role. A recent body of research (Godioli 2020; Godioli and Young 2023) has set out to chart this growing correspondence between humor, legal frameworks, and content moderation on freedom of expression. Here, findings show how courts transnationally strive to protect humorous free speech, but also stress the urgency of a uniform terminology to “set the basis for a more consistent approach to the subjectivity of humor” (Godioli and Young 2023, p. 36). To understand the complexities of humor as critique, some authors have attempted to distinguish between different forms of subversive humor. As such, the terms such as “pseudo-satire” (Medjesky 2016) or “weak reflexivity” (Colpean and Tully 2019) have been introduced to describe humor that appears satirical but lacks meaningful social critique. Such forms of superficially progressive humor, can then serve to reinforce the very ideologies they seem to target. In other words, it is important to note that not all humor is satirical, and comedic ridicule or criticism does not always equate to profound critique.