The commodification of personality: Human enhancement and market society

What is “personality”? There is no universally accepted definition of the term. One reason for the great variety of definitions is the importance that each scholar attaches to the different traits that comprise personality. In the 1930s, for instance, Gordon Allport counted 49 definitions. Taking into account this complex semantic situation, one of the most complete definitions of personality, I would suggest, is the following: personality is “the set of psychological traits and mechanisms within the individual that are organized and relatively enduring and that influence his or her interactions with, and adaptations to, the intrapsychic, physical, and social environments” (Larsen & Buss, 2014, p. 4). From this definition, it follows that personality refers to the traits that make each person unique. Based on this initial clarification, this article intends to address the following three questions: 1) How can new technologies modify personality? 2) Why might personality become a commodity? 3) What is wrong with turning personality into a commodity, or in other words, how might this produce negative effects?

Firstly, how can new technologies modify personality? There are different ways in which this might happen. Perhaps in the foreseeable future it will be possible to modify personality via the use of different kinds of psychopharmaceuticals or “personality pills.” ^[1] An example of such modification could be selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), a medication usually prescribed for depression and anxiety that alters the level of serotonin in the brain. ^[2] SSRIs could be used by healthy people with the following potential effects: a reduction in anger, hostility, and impulsiveness, and an increase in extraversion (warmth, gregariousness, and, in some contexts, assertiveness). Prozac, which is widely used, seems to produce “the most extensive transformations of personality” (DeGrazia, 2000, p. 36) and makes people “more energetic, confident, and socially attractive.” What is more, it allows one to reshape the self, to acquire a new identity and become a new person (Kramer, 1993). According to some ethicists, new developments in SSRIs may change an individual’s fundamental personality (Ilieva, 2015). However, it is expected that more refined psychopharmaceuticals that allow us to alter more specific aspects of our personalities will be developed in the near future. ^[3]

Another way to modify personalities is through neuro/nanotechnology, such as emerging alternative applications of implantable brain-interfacing devices (IBIDs), which “target functions or traits tied closely to agency, personal identity and personhood” (Mathews, 2011, p. 487). While these technologies were initially created in order to treat diseases including Parkinson’s, dystonia, and other psychiatric and neurological disorders, in the near future IBIDs could be applied solely to modify behavior and personality. For example, in 2016, Elon Musk and a small group of partners funded a neurotechnological company called Neuralink which specializes in the development of brain-machine interfaces by means of neural implants. Finally, there are the advanced methods of gene editing and other biotechnological methods that could be applied in human beings, similarly to the current applications in agriculture and bovine animals. They could even be used to change personality traits, more specifically, one’s temperament, which is the biological basis of personality. For example, CRISPR ^[4]/Cas9 technology may open up a broad spectrum of possibilities. Such technology allows for the precise editing, amending, and altering of the genome of any cell. In the near future, it could be used not only to prevent or cure diseases, but also to define personality traits.

In short, according to current scientific-technological developments and predictions by bioliberal technologists, scientists, and philosophers, the next few decades will see the emergence of a wide range of resources for curbing aggressive tendencies, shyness, or jealousy, improving creativity and cognitive abilities, enhancing courage, empathy, or self-esteem, controlling impulses, emotions, mental states, and so on. As Fukuyama has put it:

[s]tolid people can become vivacious; introspective ones extroverted; you can adopt one personality on Wednesday and another for the weekend. There is no longer any excuse for anyone to be depressed or unhappy; even ‘normally’ happy people can make themselves happier without worries of addiction, hangovers, or long-term brain damage (2002, p. 8).

We will have the possibility of choosing our personality traits arbitrarily, à la carte, by purchasing new technologies in pharmacies or stores.

Secondly, why might personality become a commodity? As already mentioned, the possibility of modifying personality by technical means could turn us into buyers and consumers of personality. As such, personality, which constitutes a core aspect of the self, could become a commodity. In his book What money can’t buy, Michael Sandel develops a powerful explanation of why “we drifted from having a market economy to being a market society” (2012, p. 10). According to Sandel, a market society consists in applying market economy principles to society, turning everything into a source of financial gain—nature, culture, values, even the human condition. A market economy is a valuable tool for organizing productive activity, but a market society is a way of life in which market values seep into every aspect of human existence (Sandel, 2012, p. 10). It is the absolute domination of market reasoning. In a market society, “everything is up for sale” (Sandel, 2012, p. 15).

Historically, the human body has been treated as a commodity through both legal and illegal means. Prostitution, slavery, the sale of ova, sperm, organs, and blood, the trafficking of refugees, and surrogate motherhood are all stark examples of this phenomenon. In a future highly technological society or, it would be better to say, a posthuman society, it may be possible to treat not only bodies but also minds/souls as commodities. Insofar as a desired personality could be constructed from technologies purchased at pharmacies or stores, such personalities will become mere objects of consumption and the market society will be strengthened. In this sense, aligned with Sandel, the French philosopher Michel Onfray thinks that we live in a society that has declared war against nature, in order to achieve an integral capitalism in which everything is produced and turned into an object to be bought or sold (2019). Personality does not escape this logic.

Almost 20 years ago, the American bioethicist Carl Elliott expressed real concern about this danger, writing that “the market represents something far more sinister because it seems to view the world as a place where everything has a price. How will our sensibilities be changed if we start to see our children, our bodies, and our minds as potential objects of consumption? Where does the soul go, once it’s been priced and tagged? (2003, p. 20). Personality should not be included in the list of products on which we can put a price, just as we should not put a price on family life, education, civic duties, or the environment. If we commodify personality, we corrupt and degrade ourselves.

Thirdly, what is wrong with turning personality into a commodity, or how might this produce negative effects? According to the Italian philosopher Maurizio Ferraris, this question is an effective relativistic tool that can be deployed to suppress any kind of criticism (2014, p. 12). For our purposes here, I will try to explain in what sense the commodification of our personalities could be wrong. When I argue that personality could become a commodity, I am suggesting that it could be ontologically reduced to the category of a thing or an instrument, or, to adopt the term used by the American philosopher Martha Nussbaum, it could be objectified^[5]. This objectification might entail a myriad of social, anthropological, and ethical problems. I will explain four of them here.

First, the objectification of personality could lead to a sort of standardization of personalities. One could imagine that in a future society of enhanced beings, governments or powerful corporations might be interested in imposing a paradigm or ideal personality. Such an ideal could be achieved using the same kind of technologies with the same outcomes. As the philosopher John Gray writes:

As scientific knowledge grows, it seems likely that not only the disease profiles, but also the personalities of future human beings will become alterable by human will. At that point, equipped with the new powers conferred by biotechnology, we will be what Lenin could only dream of becoming—engineers of souls. (2004, p. 25)

It is well known that engineering is based on the standardization of methods, tools, and products for the purposes of planning and control. In this context, any sophisticated future technologies for modifying personality could become tools for constructing societies comprised of beings with quasi-cloned personalities who are easy to manipulate and master. It is not difficult to imagine, mutatis mutandis, a similar scenario to that described by Aldous Huxley in his novel Brave new world (1932), in which a futuristic World State designs a rigid caste society by means of genetic manipulation and the drug soma. This suggests a dramatic social scenario in which we could find new forms of discrimination, inequality, corruption, and even slavery.

Second, as a result of the above, personality as we know it would cease to exist. If, by personality, we mean that which distinguishes one human being from all others, that which makes each human being unique, the conversion of personality into a commodity and its subsequent standardization would undermine its very essence. In other words, we would find ourselves in a paradoxical situation: the “enhancement” of personality would entail its destruction if our personalities were serially produced. The “enhancement” of personality, then, would result in a deep loss of identity. Certainly, “[t]he last fifty to eighty years has seen an evolution of certain rights to personal identity, personal development, personality […] as property rights in our person” (Marshall, 2014, p. 33); ^[6] however, nothing prevents the possibility that axiological criteria and laws may change in order to build a “more efficient” society.

Third, the consumption of “happy pills” (drugs that activate four primary chemicals: dopamine, oxytocin, serotonin, and endorphins) would allow us to avoid dealing with the trials and constraints that are an integral part of human life, and are even fundamental to our evolutionary adaptation (Sharon, 2014, p. 68). These drugs, which if regularly consumed would keep us in a permanent state of well-being, would in fact drastically decrease our ability to face problematic situations. In order to save us from moments of stress, anxiety, and even suffering, they would reduce our capacity for bearing such states. This would produce infantilized adults who only accept the pleasant side of existence and who do not appreciate the potential for growth and maturation in everyday sufferings. Furthermore, when we deal with such problematic situations, we often realize that we are capable of much more than we had imagined, which is a vital aspect of self-knowledge and personal growth.

Fourth, in line with the above, purchasing a new personality according to our desires (or the interests of the State) reveals an ethical problem detected by the American lawyer Wesley J. Smith. He has discussed what he calls the “Lazy way to human ‘improvement’” (2019) and claims that conscious striving toward virtue is better than pills or brain implants because only human beings can pursue virtue. Technocrats do not seem to be interested in real improvement. In fact, Smith points out that “[t]hey want quick, easy technological fixes; a gene edit here, a brain implant there. They dream of becoming extraordinary, with the physical prowess of fictional super heroes, all without having to actually work for it. Sad” (2019). I agree with Smith that this is sad, because the intention is to transform the human soul into a product and turn us into passive receivers of technology.

Let me share a personal experience that chimes with Smith’s assessment. I have practiced martial arts from an early age and have always been impressed by the film The Matrix and how its lead character, Neo (played by Keanu Reeves), learns different martial arts in a few seconds and is transformed into a lethal fighter after being plugged into a computer. But I personally prefer the means of daily effort, with thousands of repetitions of movements, physical exhaustion, and even injuries, even though I will never be able to fight at the same level as Neo. The achievements will be less impressive, but they are extremely gratifying as the result of dedication and sacrifice. To transform personality into a commodity that can be easily modified perhaps leads us to reach a particular goal, that is, to obtain a personality that we have envisioned, but it robs us of the journey toward achieving this goal—which is possibly the most attractive and exciting aspect. In this sense, the desire for immediacy prevents us from discovering the value of processes, of patience, and of the depth that is achieved in the long term.

The commodification of personality, then, deprives us not only of the merit of achievement, but also of experiences and lessons with a pedagogical value that cannot be provided by technology. It is likely that here lies the distinction between mere knowledge and wisdom. Here, it is helpful to recall the words of the American ethicist Karen Lebacqz:

In our enhancement efforts, we risk making our bodies and minds little more than tools, turning into “someone else”, flattening our souls, and ignoring the pursuit of true happiness. (2011, p. 52)

By way of conclusion, I want to say that this article is not intended as a mere diatribe against human enhancement, or as a gloomy visualization of a future technologized society. Nevertheless, the high expectations placed on new technologies in view of their breathtaking development could overshadow the question of its risks. This is not an exaggeration if the increasing social impact of the transhumanist metanarrative is taken into account. In this context, I would argue that the application of technological resources for personality modification could lead to the commodification of personality and thus to serious problems—as has always happened when human beings have been objectified. But I do not intend to provide an ultimate solution to this problem here. On the contrary, following Sandel’s reasoning (2012), this article intends to pose the question of what kind of society we want for ourselves and our descendants. Do we really want a society in which our personalities are priced and tagged? Or are there certain realities that cannot be evaluated according to a cost-benefit analysis?