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HOW TO APPROACH 'PREJUDICE' AND 'STEREOTYPES' QUALITATIVELY: THE SEARCH FOR A MEANINGFUL WAY[1]

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Abstract: This paper is partly a theoretical and analytical exploration of different ways to do research about stereotypes and prejudice, and partly a confessional tale of my journey. It is a journey that has been about looking for a meaningful and useful way of approaching empirical material collected in different research projects over more than 15 years, in an attempt to say something about how ordinary social actors talk (and possibly think) about prejudice and stereotypes. There is an immense volume of social psychological writing on this topic, and from that I discuss in detail several new(ish) discursive, critical and constructional approaches and the (im)possibility of applying them to my empirical material.

Key words: prejudice; stereotypes; qualitative methods; discursive approaches; critical social psychology

Introduction

Over time, this article has evolved from a short, simple conference presentation focusing on a few interesting extracts concerning prejudice and stereotypes. When I began writing the article in "discussion" with other (cited) authors, looking for potential new ways of analysing the same extracts, it got far more complicated than I had anticipated. It now takes the form of part theoretical and analytical paper about stereotypes and prejudice, and part confessional tale (Van Maanen, 1988) of my journey. It is a journey that has been about looking for a meaningful and useful approach to analysing empirical material I have collected in different

[1] This work was supported by the Slovak Research and Development Agency contract No. APVV-14-0531; however, the empirical material it is based on was collected as part of several earlier research projects (for details, see part 2. Empirical material). An earlier and much shorter version of this article appeared (in Slovak) in *Community psychology in Slovakia: Proceedings from a scientific conference* (Petrjánošová, 2015).

research projects over more than 15 years, in an attempt to say something about prejudice and stereotypes.

The study of prejudice became central to social psychology with the work of Allport (1954). Allport, who focused mainly on negative ethnic prejudice, defined it as "an antipathy based on faulty and inflexible generalization. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group or an individual of that group" (Allport, 1954, p. 9). As Billig (2012) notes, prejudice was initially defined more broadly but at the beginning of the 20th century it narrowed to refer to negative opinions and to focus on categories of ethnicity and race[2]. Today (in mainstream social psychology) this concept can mainly be found in the triad of prejudice, stereotypes/stereotyping and discrimination; prejudice is usually defined more specifically as a complex attitude to a specific group, stereotypes/stereotyping as the attribution of specific characteristics to this group and discrimination as a non-neutral behaviour towards this group and its members (e.g. Dovidio, Hewstone, Glick, & Esses, 2010). Alternatively, this triad is understood slightly differently in the three-part model of attitudes (sometimes called the ABC model), in which stereotypes are seen as the cognitive aspect, prejudice as the affective aspect and discrimination as the behavioural aspect of attitudes towards a group (Fiske, 1998). Moreover, in recent writing numerous more specific concepts have appeared that have a more or less clear connection to the concept of prejudice and that can be used as dependent measures which tap into the ABC model. These include social distance, intergroup trust, perceived threat, and so forth (for an incomplete but rather voluminous and recent overview, see Lášticová & Findor, 2016).

Nonetheless there is immense variation in the social psychological work done on prejudice. As Condor and Figgou (2012) summarize more generally, in social psychology, prejudice has been studied as a matter of "instinct, drive, motivation, emotion, categorization, social identity, attribution, personality, executive control or rhetoric" (p. 202). There have also been many different opinions on the reasons for prejudice and the mechanisms by which it comes about. Dovidio (2001) describes how these have changed over time—the early works saw prejudice as a personality fault, later it was viewed as imperfect information processing and recently more and more researchers have focused on unconscious and automatic prejudices.

Again, when we look at how prejudice has been researched, there is great diversity. Very different methods were used at different times and by researchers working within different paradigms. Prejudice has been researched using qualitative (e.g. interviews, focus groups), quantitative (e.g. questionnaires, social distance scales), as well as experimental (e.g. pupil dilation, response latency) methods. The predominant methods, though, are perhaps those that are most easy to use: direct self-report questionnaires (for an excellent overview see Fiske & North, 2014). Usually those researched give their views (personal or for their whole

[2] Recently prejudice and stereotypes concerning groups other than ethnically or racially defined ones have been researched and discussed routinely, for example gender stereotypes (Fusková, Hargašová, & Andraščíková 2017), stereotypes about young or old people (e.g. Dionigi, 2015), homeless people (e.g. Vázquez, Panadero, & Zuniga, 2017), etc.

group[3]) on different groups defined for example according to race/ethnicity, age, gender, sexual orientation or other criteria, and researchers measure the attitudes of one group towards the other while working with different components according to the theory they subscribe to—competence, trust, warmth, and so on.

The role of the researchers is omnipotent here—they get to say what is (and is not) prejudice and whether and to what extent someone is prejudiced (or not); in short the researchers are the "standard setters" of truth (Kruglanski, 1989 in Dixon & Levine, 2012a, p. 306). As Durrheim and colleagues argue (2016), social psychologists have "generally sought to develop authoritative definitions and measures of prejudice" (p. 18) and these from top down definitions "have been superimposed on ordinary people's attitudes in order to identify prejudiced individuals" (p. 18). Moreover, there is a problem with these definitions. As Condor and Figgou (2012) state, they are not very precise and have not exhibited a "high level of consistency over the past century" (p. 201). Despite social scientists' claims that they have 1) been making the definition more and more accurate over time in line with scientific progress, and 2) that they are much more specific and precise than ordinary social actors—lay men and women—in fact their definitions are not so very different. However, as Durrheim, Quayle and Dixon (2016) state, in everyday communication what counts or does not count as prejudice is context dependent in the given situation and sometimes even fought over "with considerable passion and no little skill" (p.18), mainly because casting the same idea as prejudice or as a rational and legitimate attitude has very different consequences in the real world. Because of all the real-life complications with a clear-cut definition of prejudice, and because of other more generally critical voices (e.g. Whetherell, 2012), I have placed the terms "prejudice" and "stereotypes" in quotation marks in the title and also in important places in the article as a reminder that these are just labels.

Inspired by these insights and following my old suspicion of measurement tools, in this article, I am not interested in measuring the extent to which someone (a person or group) could be considered prejudiced, or how that changes after such and such an intervention[4]. Neither am I interested in the content, what exactly the potentially prejudiced opinion is about or which characteristics are ascribed to the group of people in question. What I want to look at are the opinions of the participants, but I plan to approach prejudice from a meta position, so as to better understand what the participants say and possibly think ABOUT prejudice, rather than what their explicit definitions of it might be. Thus in this article I shall attempt an approach to stereotypes and prejudice where I am interested in how the research participants THEMSELVES refer to the existence and validity of prejudice/stereotypes (in themselves and others), what they think about how the stereotypes are shared within their own and other groups, how they personally (dis)agree with them, how carefully they express an opinion that could be socially unacceptable, how they work around this complication, and so on. All this is possible only in contexts where the participants can articulate their opinions (not for example in closed questions in a questionnaire). Thus the methods of empirical

[3] And then report the attitudes of the whole group (defined ethnically, for example), as in the SCM questionnaire (see Fiske & North, 2014).

[4] This is despite having great respect for those who are trying to make the world a better place with such interventions and do not just write about the—frequently depressing—status quo.

material collection already determine which approaches can and cannot be used with the material. Here I am using extracts from interviews, focus groups and (open limit) answers to an open question in a questionnaire. Another possibility would be to use statements that did not originate in a research setting, but that are "natural"[5]—like newspapers articles or political speeches (see e.g. Wodak & Meyer, 2001).

I would like to make two small points before I present the empirical material collected and the analytical perspective: First, as mentioned above, implicit definitions of prejudice do not appear to differ so greatly in lay discourses and in scientific writing. However, in my experience, if ordinary social actors use (and often they do not) an explicit term when referring to something they consider prejudiced/one-sided/stereotypical, they tend not to distinguish between the concepts of stereotypes and prejudice but use both terms synonymously, or they sometimes use "prejudice" in reference to negative opinions only, and "stereotypes" for both positive and negative opinions. That is why I use both terms in this article, and, of course, I use the term the participants use in each extract from the empirical material. Second, in this article I deal only with nationally defined groups, often defined on the basis of state citizenship because this was the perspective from which our earlier research projects were conducted. This is despite my agreeing that nationalities are labels and that in real life issues around membership in nationally defined groups is often complicated, complex and not at all clear-cut (see also *methodological nationalism*, Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002).

Empirical material and analytical perspective

Over the last 15 years, I have been involved (in various teams with several colleagues) in a number of predominantly qualitatively oriented projects in which participants were divided up using national categories and which looked at what is happening in the borderlands or other areas where the members of these different national groups live their everyday lives together. We have never explicitly asked about "stereotypes" or "prejudice" as we were interested in other issues, but sometimes (not in fact very often) the participants referred to them explicitly or implicitly. Some time ago I decided to search all the different transcripts again in order to look specifically at those parts where this topic is thematized. The research projects are:

1) In 2003–2004 we used semi-structured interviews and commented drawings of the borderland in an Austrian–Slovak project about young adults from the borderland and their perceptions of their own nation and the other nation (32 Slovaks, 32 Austrians, aged 16–24, selected using quota sampling taking into account age, gender, education, size of dwelling and (not) having a better experience of the other nation) (see Spannring et al., 2005);
2) in 2005–2007 in a project on the lives, attitudes and feelings of home of Slovaks travelling regularly (mostly daily) to Austria for study or work we used focus group discussions, semi-structured interviews and commented drawings of the borderland (26

[5] By "natural" texts I mean those that appear naturally and not just at the behest of the researcher; despite generally being aimed at an audience of some kind.

Slovaks, aged 24–46, selected using quota sampling taking into account age, gender, education and size of dwelling. We then looked for and added "contrasting cases") (see Lášticová & Petrjánošová, 2014);

3) in 2009–2010 in a project on the everyday lives of a "community" of Slovak short-term migrants to Ireland we used semi-structured interviews with 8 (male and female) Slovaks who had different leadership roles in the Slovak group in Ireland (see Lášticová & Petrjánošová, 2013);
4) in 2010–2012 in a research project on intergroup attitudes in central Europe we analysed answers to an open question about experiences of the neighbouring nation. The respondents were Czechs and all their neighbours—Austrians, Germans, Poles and Slovaks (1,260 female and male university students from the respective borderlands) (see Graf, Hřebíčková, Petrjánošová, & Leix, 2015).

The theoretical perspective I adopt in this article was inspired and influenced mainly by the traditions of discursive analysis (e.g. Condor, 2011), critical discursive analysis (e.g. Wodak & Krzyzanowski, 2008; Van Dijk, 1984) and rhetorical approach (e.g. Billig, 2012). Much of the texts, especially the older ones, deal with the tensions around expressing prejudice in a world and era where there is a broadly shared *prejudice against prejudice* or a "general cultural norm against 'prejudice'" (Billig, 2012, p. 141) and a tendency to consider prejudiced attitudes to be objectionable on ethical grounds and irrational in nature.[6] Researchers have focused on the micro-level of strategic self-monitoring, self-presentation (relying on Goffman's work) or more generally on identity management issues in expressing prejudice but avoiding the stigma of being evaluated as prejudiced (Condor, 2000; Augustinos & Every, 2007) or even more generally on "careful negotiation and identity construction around the topic of prejudice" (Wetherell, 2012, p. 168). For example Van Dijk explored specific semantic, pragmatic and conversation strategies of "adequate self-expression, positive self-presentation and effective persuasion" (1984, p. 116) when formulating "ethnic opinions" (p.116). Recently, the writings have focused even more on the "social" side—not on the verbal acts of individual actors but rather on how prejudicing and stereotyping happens as a result of the joint discursive action of several speakers (e.g. Condor & Figgou, 2012) or even of speakers and hearers (as a result of implicit allusions on one side and understanding of contextual information and shared categorical associations, e.g. Durrheim et al., 2016).[7]

Thus, when looking now (in 2018) at the older materials, I am mainly interested in how people speak ABOUT "stereotypes" and "prejudice", and for instance how they assess their accuracy and whether they admit to expressing views that can be considered prejudiced. In connection with the last point I assume that there are many more negative stereotypes

[6] However, there are also exceptions to this rule. First, for example, there is an astonishing degree of acceptance of even the public expression of blatant prejudice against Roma in Slovakia (cf. Lášticová & Findor, 2016; for the situation in Europe in general see Tileaga, 2015). Second, sometimes negative stereotypes are needed and used creatively to do "the rhetorical work of justification and criticism" (Durrheim, 2012, p.191), as Durrheim shows in talk-in-interaction extracts where the participants justify their practices of racial segregation, but do so in subtle and implicit ways as if only "gesturing towards the intended meaning" (p. 195).

[7] I elaborate on these new approaches in the concluding part.

around, which did not come up in the research projects, because the participants did not want to "admit" to them, meaning they did not consider it socially desirable to share them with us, the researchers, in that interaction.[8]

In the following part I will show, using specific extracts from the empirical material, examples of different approaches to stereotypes/prejudice, the way the research participants talk/write and possibly think about them. From the wide range of aspects that could be focused on, I shall look in this article, in the following order, at prejudice as a source of knowledge; stereotypes declared as shared within the ingroup and (dis)agreement with them; different discursive ways of dealing with personal experience that contradicts a shared stereotype; and at a declared change in a stereotypical attitude following personal experience.

Results

Prejudice as a source of knowledge about the other group

In the following extract from a semi-structured interview with a young Austrian man from the Slovak–Austrian borderland we can see how he tries to meaningfully answer a question on the differences between his national group and the neighbouring national group. The interview took place in 2003, shortly before Slovak accession to the European Union—a small number of people from Slovakia had been studying in Austria, and a larger number went shopping there or on trips, but the border controls still existed and officially it was impossible for Slovaks to work in Austria. In general there was much less contact in the wider borderlands, including the capitals Vienna and Bratislava, than there is today, in 2018.

Extract 1: I don't know of any prejudice about Slovaks

Interviewer: And what are the differences between Slovaks and Austrians?

Participant: *(...) perhaps wealth. And if anything, then the lifestyle, they do not have it so far, but are on the way. But I don't know of any prejudice about Slovaks from which I could infer the differences between them and Austrians*[9] (answer in a semi-structured interview, 2003, male participant from Austria, age 25, completed upper secondary school, Vienna)

Unfortunately, the interviewer did not press the participant to explain what exactly he meant by "prejudice" when he used the concept in this rather unusual context. More detailed questioning might have revealed more information on his "ethnotheory of prejudice", on what he thinks about the accuracy of such information or if and how he goes about verifying it. Here, we ultimately lose the advantage obtained by the researcher not asking directly about prejudice but some participants spontaneously thematizing it, which could hopefully have made the answer less socially desirable than if the question had been 'are you prejudiced against your eastern neighbours?' This is an extract from a semi-structured

[8] See also Condor (2013) who cautions that social psychology could be largely underestimating the amount of blatant prejudice expressed because much less mitigation goes on in informal encounters than in research situations.

[9] Translated from the German and Slovak by the author of this article.

interview covering several topics, and so the researcher moves on to the next topic and we learn nothing more than this interesting fragment of information. We could extrapolate that the participant does not know a lot about Slovaks, perhaps because of the socio-political context mentioned above, that perhaps they do not interest him (as he lives in a higher status state), and that he has almost certainly never visited Slovakia, but that nonetheless he still (unsurprisingly) tries to answer the question. Only very seldom do participants tell us straight away that they do not know. In his answer this young Austrian man begins by mentioning economic differences (the most frequently mentioned specific difference from the Slovak participants, too, see Spannring et al., 2005). His reference to 'lifestyle' probably means standard of living and without giving the adjective, he means a high, higher or perhaps an average European standard of living, seen from the Austrian side of the border. Then, quite quickly he states explicitly that he does not have enough information about Slovaks to answer the question and suggests the reason is he does not know of any prejudice about Slovaks. This could be viewed as supporting the idea that stereotyping and prejudice are innocent attempts at categorizing the unknown. The problem is that it is not innocent when the prejudice is explicitly negative and when it is the *cause* of people from different groups having no contact with one another and remaining permanently unknown to each other. It is also interesting to see how he (probably lacking the personal experience) automatically looks for any socially shared information about the other group accessible to him, even if it is just hearsay. Not having any information he logically cannot take the next possible step of testing/questioning the accuracy of such information, in contrast to the participants cited in the next part.

Stereotypes declared within the in-group and (dis)agreement with them

In this part I will look at the stereotypes the participants refer to as known or more or less broadly shared within their own group (in-group). It will then be interesting to see whether they declare an agreement or disagreement with them and the reasons they give.

I would like to add a more general note here—if the empirical material collected allows for a comparative perspective, it is useful to look at how the two sides (two groups, for example members of two nations) see each other and what are the differences. In the fourth cited research project involving Austrians, Czechs, Germans, Poles and Slovaks we had this opportunity and found that interesting asymmetries emerged, including in relation to how many stereotypes each group mentioned in reference to the other groups or what the ratio was of positive to negative stereotypes about the same group. If one group (nationally defined, for example) has more stereotypes about the other group than vice versa, this could be interpreted as indicating the second group is particularly interesting to the first group for some, historical, economical or other, reasons. A big difference of this kind was noticeable in relation to Czechs and Germans for instance, with the first group reporting many more stereotypes about Germans than the Germans did about Czechs.[10] Moreover, where it was

[10] But it is also important to take into consideration that if Czech researchers conducted research in all the Czech borderlands, perhaps the participants from behind the borders would feel less confident and less prepared to share their stereotypes than the Czech participants.

possible to guess the emotional valence[11], clear differences emerged in the ratio of "negative" to "positive" stereotypes. For example, all the Austrian stereotypes mentioned in relation to Czechs were negative, but of the reported Czech stereotypes regarding Austrians half were negative and half positive. As mentioned above, I was not interested in statements like *The Czechs are close-fisted,* which is a hypothetical statement that could have been evaluated as prejudiced from the researcher's position. Rather I focused on explicit references to the existence of stereotypes/prejudice like *Here they say, that Czechs are close-fisted* which is another hypothetical statement where it would be interesting to see for example whether and how the speaker maintains the constructed distances from the stereotype (because it is not ´we´ who is saying it, but it is ´they´) in her/his next sentences.

The next extract introduces the theme of agreeing or disagreeing with a stereotype that seems to be broadly shared within the in-group. Sometimes the participants reported agreeing with such a stereotype or that they had experienced it being validated. More often they mentioned such cases when the stereotype was contested, possibly because in these instances it is easier to recognize that stereotypes shape our thinking.

Extract 2: In contrast to what we say here

(...) In contrast to what we say here about Germans, these two girls were much more spontaneous and friendly than me at the time (answer to a single open question "what is your experience of Germans?" in a questionnaire on intergroup contact and attitudes comprised of closed questions except for this one, 2010, Czech statement about Germans, female participant, age unknown, statement no. 1432).

The participant, speaking about a student exchange some time ago during secondary school, does not explicitly say what they "*say here about Germans*". Again, if it was in an interview, at least it would have been possible for a vigilant interviewer to ask for more details about what "they" say and who "they" are, and whether the speaker thought so before, too. But we do not have this fuller answer and can only infer—for example, from the context of the positively coloured statement about receiving a friendly welcome while on the exchange, we could assume that this thing that is generally said about the Germans is quite the opposite of the speaker's experience of the two *spontaneous* and *friendly* young German girls. This situation repeated itself several times, and always when the participants did not specify the stereotype or prejudice referred to, from the context it was clear that they were negative.

Different discursive ways of dealing with a personal experience that contradicts a stereotype broadly shared within the in-group

Where personal experience did not confirm a stereotype reported to be shared within the in-group, participants used different discursive strategies to deal with this in a meaningful and logical way. Sometimes they just reflected on the difference, as was the case with the

[11] The emotional valence can be guessed for example from the specific synonym used or from the overall context in longer answers.

statement in extract 2. In some cases they declared an exception to the rule—someone from another national group who did not act in accordance with the stereotype was declared to be an exception, but the stereotype remained uncontested.[12] Sometimes there were so many exceptions that whole exceptional subgroups of the big national group were declared. An example could be (a fictional) statement like *The Austrians who are my friends are ok, but in general it is true that as a nation they are all big-headed.* These subgroups could be defined according to knowledge of the person, as in the example, but also according to region of origin, age, gender and so on. Only in a few cases from all the material collected did an "antistereotypical" personal experience lead to an (at least declared) change of opinion or abandonment of the stereotype.

Declared change in stereotypical belief

Where there was a (declared) abandoning of a stereotypical opinion, it was often narrated as a story progressing over time in stages: stereotypical information—personal experience—change of opinion/abandonment of stereotype, and this makes the change of opinion sound reasonable and logical.

Extract 3: Ireland is beautiful.

(…) I have heard that the Irish just drink and take drugs and that Ireland is ugly and it's always raining, but I came here and they are friendly and Ireland is beautiful.(…) (extract from an interview about experiences in Ireland and the existence of a Slovak "community" there, speaking about the decision to go abroad, 2009, AZ, age 29, male participant, short-term Slovak migrant in Ireland)

The personal experiences required for such a change were often not one-off, but repeated and/or long-term.[13] Personal experience of the members of another national group does not always improve relationships and lead to the stereotypes being abandoned (see also Allport's famous conditions for positive inter-group contact influence, in Allport, 1954). In the empirical material there were several cases mentioned where this reportedly did not work (cf. Paolini et al., 2010). For example, in one reported story, following personal contact among Czech and German secondary school students that did not go well a new negative stereotype was created (about what Czech secondary school students are like) and the whole exchange program was stopped.

Concluding remarks

I think stereotypes and prejudice are both a fascinating research issue and a topic with real everyday consequences for all of us. Given my vague suspicion of measurement tools such as

[12] This is similar to *"exception subtyping"*, a strategy for holding on to a stereotyping opinion even when faced with contradictory examples (see e.g. Levine & Hogg, 2010, p. 869).
[13] See also Leix (2013).

direct self-report questionnaires,[14] I felt enlightened and inspired when I discovered the work of several scholars that can be mainly grouped under the discursive and critical approaches to stereotypes/prejudice,[15] who were not interested in how many people in group A would tick negative categorical evaluations of the members of group B. They had found so much more to investigate and problematize!

In this article I wanted to apply what I saw them doing with their extracts to the empirical material we had collected over many years and from many projects. Using a qualitative analysis inspired by the discursive approaches allowed me to observe how participants explicitly talk (and possibly think) about stereotypes—for example, how often and how exactly they mention them, assess their accuracy, (dis)agree with them, explain changes in their own originally stereotypical opinions, explain logically two contradictory assessments of members of the same national group in one short statement. However, I did not look at the most "classic" tension points, at the way speakers mitigate or manage expressions that could be judged as prejudiced in order to avoid being judged as prejudiced themselves. I was more interested in what I could learn about stereotypes/prejudice from the viewpoint of the participants, so in this article I have not used extracts containing prejudice/stereotypes (that I the researcher would have to evaluate as such) but ones ABOUT prejudice/stereotypes. That coincides with the claim of Condor and colleagues (2012) that the research on lay understandings of prejudice is surprisingly sparse, and with Billig's recommendation (2012) that the research should include what ordinary people understand by "prejudice", given that the concept is so important in lay discourse.

However, I kept to the individual level, just as the majority of measuring approaches do. Condor and Figgou (2012) criticize methodological individualism,[16] as the main tendency among all the different approaches to prejudice and suggest that an alternative could be to think of prejudice in terms of collaborative cognition. In this approach groups or networks, not individuals, are the units of analysis. They show the construction, expression and suppression of subtle or blatant prejudice in a different light: first, they show the workings of so called "social scaffolding"—the way a more skilled person helps a less skilled person, instructing him/her in and facilitating the production of a logical (in this case racist) narrative. Second, they focus on how the pejorative portrayal of Others can be the result of joint action, where the contributions of each person are contextually important to the contributions of other participants, in this case allowing escalation in the expression of

[14] These very general and vague suspicions of mine were finally substantiated once I learned about cognitive interviews (see e.g. Willis, 1999) and was involved in a research project where we applied them to two questionnaires on attitudes toward minority groups (one a translation of a very famous questionnaire and the other a newly developed one) and saw how differently different research participants interpreted the same question (Popper & Petrjánošová, 2016).

[15] I do not give specific references here as I mean all the discursive and critical work cited in this paper, but also more generally almost all the work by scholars such as M. Augoustinos, M. Billig, S. Condor, J. Dixon, K. Durrheim, T. Van Dijk, J. Potter, R. Wodak, M. Wetherell and others.

[16] Also in Wetherel's view, in mainstream psychology, prejudice "remains a personal pathology, a failure of (…) empathy or intellect" (2012, p.165), but she goes much further into social critique and contrasts this psychological view with another alternative in which prejudice is seen "as a social pathology, shaped by power relations and the conflicting vested interests of groups" (p. 165).

negative opinions. Third, they provide examples of joint inhibition, where one individual relies on others instead of self-monitoring and regulating his own expression of prejudice. Thus the display of prejudice is regulated through the interaction of several people—either through correcting the use of prejudiced categories or by openly admonishing the prejudicial talk of some of them— and not in the individual's mind.

Moreover, Durrheim (2012), when writing about implicit prejudice in interaction, demonstrates how "stereotypes are formulated in the context of social interaction and that they can take an implicit form in which the hearer must help to stereotype" (p.190). In the same spirit, Durrheim and colleagues (2016) present an identity performance model of prejudice that focuses attention not only on how the expression of prejudice is responsive to norms and audiences but also how it shapes those norms. They also show how contestation of the very definition of what can and cannot count as prejudice, can be used either to mobilize hatred against out-groups (if their negative opinion of them is presented not as prejudiced but as reasonable), and to cement or change identities and norms. Regarding the latter they give an interesting example of paedophile people attempting to cast themselves as a "minor-attracted sexual orientation group" and the negative attitudes towards them as prejudice, which would result in very tangible real-life changes, in law for example. Further they illustrate how accusations and denials of prejudice "help to preserve categories, meanings and boundaries" (p. 26) and how repression of prejudice "can be viewed as a collaborative identity performance" (p. 29) in which all participants avoid the potential shame associated with uttering *or* hearing prejudice. Thus denials as well as accusations often remain inexplicit, but still the "work of reproducing the racial order" (2016, p. 29) has been done. Their article is a persuasive plea for a new agenda in social research that would attempt to "understand how the very definition of 'prejudice' is jointly defined and negotiated and deployed in social interactions to achieve social and political outcomes" (p. 32).

I consider these recent constructionist and critical psychological approaches to be highly inspirational but realize they cannot be applied to my empirical material—which I had at first hoped to do in order to obtain a kind of higher level analysis. Of course, having the empirical material that would allow for qualitative analysis (e.g. interview transcripts) is here not enough. To be able to "shake-off" the individual focus and to pay attention to the social or interactional, I would need "interactional" material—transcripts of conversations, for example. Ideally if I am to approach real-life situations these should not be elicited conversations (at the researcher's request or in answer to a direct question) but either "natural" ones (see my explanation above) or ones that do not at least primarily focus on the issue interesting to the researchers (cf. Condor & Figgou, 2012). This last approach is exactly what I was trying to apply in this article when I began looking at older empirical material with a new topic and new perspective in mind.

To be more precise and honest, I wanted to put together material from over a long period and from several research projects, look at it with a new focus and then show how it could be analysed on several levels, inspired by the "classic" and more recent discursive analytical writing. Then I realized just how far the newest approaches have moved on and how inadequate my empirical material is for that.

I still think that the original idea of looking at the topic of stereotypes/prejudice using empirical material in which participants mention it spontaneously and not when prompted

is a good one. But as became immediately clear, this does not work if there was not opportunity for letting them elaborate on the issue once touched upon. There are several reasons for this—the impossibility of asking further more detailed questions in the case of open questions in a questionnaire; interviews having a different focus at the time they were conducted and researchers wanting to cover too many topics in a single encounter in the case of interviews, and I would now say even the inability to explore the unexpected "jewel" of new and interesting information.

Thus in this article I was only able to go as far as the collected empirical material allowed, but exploring these new approaches has given me some new ideas for research that will be more difficult to realize but that will hopefully prove more helpful in the struggle to understand prejudice/stereotypes in the social reality of everyday life.

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