Some remarks on the concept and intellectual history of human dignity

Introduction

Human dignity became a particular pressing topic for mankind after World War II, partly due to the devastating effects of the war, but specifically because of the exposure of crimes committed by the Nazis against civilians (the Holocaust). In response to these unprecedented human rights violations and crimes against humanity, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, which holds that “… recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world” (UDHR, 1989, p. 257). The purpose of this declaration was to create a formal internationally-binding legal framework for the protection and preservation of human rights across the world.

In addition to a similar reference in the Preamble^[2], it explicitly mentions human dignity three more times, either directly or indirectly in connection with human rights^[3]. Over time, many of the principles in the declaration have come to form the basis of other international documents (including ones relating to medicine and health care)^[4], and they are also reflected in many national policy and legislative documents^[5], where the intention is that these principles should be incorporated into practice. That human dignity is accorded extremely important status in them is evident in the fact that in the Preamble to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and subsequently the International Covenant on Economics, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), human dignity features equally alongside human rights, and moreover “… these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person” (ICCPR, 1966, p. 263; ICESCR, 1966, p. 280).

The more attentive reader of these documents will, however, realize that although human dignity (and respect for it) is explicitly promoted as being fundamental to and inseparable from humanity, there is no explanation of “what” dignity is; rather, it is regarded as self-evident and is conceived in pre-reflexive uncertainty and vagueness.^[6] This is not surprising—declarations and documents of this nature are not theoretical treatises and have different, more practical, objectives. Consequently, they contain obvious discrepancies connected with this vagueness. Declarations and document relating to the elementary nature of the relation between dignity and rights are illustrative of this: is (human) dignity simply different from human rights and should it therefore be posited alongside them (as in the expression dignity and rights) or is it a right (as in the expression right to dignity), or do rights derive from dignity and, finally, are rights indispensable for dignity ? The vagueness of the concept of dignity is not only typically found in documents like these, but also in some of the philosophical, ethical and bioethical discussions on the topic. Back in the 1980s the American Presidential Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems highlighted this, along with the frequent use of the concept of dignified death in such documents, stating that it has “… been used in dry conflicting ways that their meanings, if they ever were clear, have become hopelessly blurred” (President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems …, 1983, p. 24)^[7]. It is clear, as we will see later, that many undesirable consequences result from this vagueness.

The aim of this paper is to highlight some of the basic problems associated with the explication of the concept of human dignity in general and particularly in the field of bioethics (especially medical and nursing ethics) and by exploring the intellectual history behind them (Cicero), suggest possible solutions for some of the problems.

The concept of human dignity as a problem (1)

The persistence of the unfavorable state of debate on human dignity has led many authors in the fields of philosophy and bioethics to the radical conclusion that the vagueness and ambiguity of the term is fundamental to it, and it should therefore be excluded from (bio)ethical discourse on the grounds that it is useless and redundant. It seems as if, like the concept of human rights, human dignity has lost its initial “innocence” (Düwell, 2014, p. 23).

This argument has played out on the semantic and epistemological level as critics attempt to show that the concept of dignity is inherently contradictory, ambiguous and empty (has no cognitive content) or is meaningless for other reasons. It was on this basis that A. Schopenhauer rejected Kant’s concept of dignity in the 19th century on the grounds that it was an “unconditioned and incomparable value”. Anticipating some of the current views on the matter, he claimed that “… it is … nothing but a hollow hyperbole, within which there lurks like a gnawing worm, contradictio in adjecto” (Schopenhauer, 1903, p. 101)^[8]. “This expression ‘Human Dignity’, once it was uttered by Kant, became the shibboleth of all perplexed and empty-headed moralists. For behind that imposing formula they concealed their lack, not to say, of a real ethical basis, but of any basis at all …” (Schopenhauer, 1903, p. 101). P. Singer, in his famous struggle for the freedom of animals, uses phrasing similar to Schopenhauer’s when he argues that philosophers are unable to find specific differences between humans and animals that would justify speciesism (the instrumental abuse of other species for our own needs), so they “resort to high-sounding phrases like ‘the intrinsic dignity of the human individual’” (Singer, 1986, p. 227). These “Fine phrases are the last resource of those who have run out of arguments” (Singer, 1986, p. 228). R. Macklin has received great acclaim from those who criticise the epistemological misuse of the concept of dignity in bioethics with her provocative slogan:Dignity is a useless concept (Macklin, 2003). In her article she claims that “… appeals to dignity are either vague restatements of other, more precise, notions or mere slogans that add nothing to an understanding of the topic” (Macklin, 2003, p. 1419). “It means no more than respect for persons or their autonomy” (p. 1419). Therefore, this concept is “… useless … in medical ethics and can be eliminated without any loss of content” (p. 1420). S. Pinker writes in a similar vein to Macklin, referring aptly to the President’s Council on Bioethics report, Human Dignity and Bioethics (2008) as “The Stupidity of Dignity” (Pinker, 2008). He opines that, despite the efforts of their authors, the concept of dignity in these essays “… remains in a mess” (2008). It is a “… flippery… ambiguous…”, and “…squishy, subjective notion …”, and it “… has three features that undermine any possibility of using it as a foundation of bioethics.” Dignity is relative, fungible and can be harmful^[9] (Pinker, 2008). It is “almost” useful in bioethics, if only as “… just another application of the principle of autonomy” (2008).

There is, however, a sequel to this criticism that the concept of dignity is useless. An epistemologically motivated and fundamentally anti-metaphysical argument has become an anti-religious argument. The concept of dignity is rejected on the grounds that its content, according to the critics, is saturated by the non-cognitive irrational content of religious origin. These two levels can be found in the work of Macklin and Pinker, since there appear to be two ways of demonstrating the cognitive vagueness of dignity. According to R. Macklin, the views stating that human dignity should mean “… something over and above respect for persons and for their autonomy …” have their source in religion and especially in Roman Catholic writings (Macklin, 2003, p. 1420). S. Pinker, in his review subtitled “Conservative bioethics’ latest, most dangerous ploy”, says that the report is simply a maneuver “… to impose a radical political agenda, fed by fervent religious impulses …” (2008) and it is “… the culmination of a long effort by the Council to place dignity at the center of bioethics” (2008).

As Macklin and Pinker do, we should differentiate an additional level in the radical critique of dignity that does not employ a direct epistemological or explicitly “anti-religious” argument. This argument occurs, as Heidegger would say, on the ontic level—it is based on scientific knowledge, particularly evolutionary Darwinism. The American psychologist B. Skinner (1976) argues that in the modern scientific picture of man, “… autonomous man - the inner man, the homunculus, possessing the demon, the man defended by the literatures of freedom and dignity,” (Skinner, 1976, p. 196) is being destroyed. “The direction of the controlling relation is reversed: a person does not act upon the world, the world acts upon him” (Skinner, 1976, p. 206). Similarly J. Rachels claims in his book about the moral implications of Darwinism that this doctrine refutes the two main ideas on which the idea of dignity is based: the religious belief that man was created in the image of God, and the assumption that only man is a rational creature (Rachels, 1990, p. 171). Darwinism “…leads inevitably to the abandonment of the idea of human dignity and the substitution of a different sort of ethics” (Rachels, 1990, p. 171); one that is based on the assumption of interspecies equality and not on the assumption that “… the lives and interests of human beings are of supreme moral importance, while the lives and interests of other animals are relatively unimportant” (Rachels, 1990, p. 171). This attitude is close to P. Singer’s anti-species conception mentioned above which requires that “… at least some members of other species are also equal - equal, that is, to each other and to humans” (Singer, 1986, p. 226). Hence, it is just a high-sounding but unsubstantiated phrase about human dignity seeking to argue against this equality.^[10]

Summing up this article so far, the concept of human dignity appears to be a complex problem. This is partly because the criticism is made on several different, though not isolated, levels. On the semantic-epistemological level, it has been argued that the concept is empty and meaningless for either logical (internal inconsistency and ambiguity) or empirical reasons (not possessing cognitive content)^[11]. Consequently, it is redundant in the current (bio) ethical discourse; it is as if one had applied Occam’s razor. The second neuralgic point in the concept of human dignity is, according to the critics, its supposed religious origin^[12] and content, which is considered to be “over and above respect for persons and for their autonomy” (Macklin) because of the empirical content on autonomy for example. This injection of religion into (secular) ethics is considered inappropriate and unacceptable by Macklin and Singer. Finally, the concept of human dignity appears to be scientifically (ontically) unjustified. Speciesism and therefore the form of anthropocentrism on which it is based are incompatible with the current (natural) scientific picture of the world (man), built on biological evolutionism.

In the following pages, we will try to establish how and to what extent the aforementioned criticism of the concept of human dignity should be taken seriously and how the problems detected can be solved. However, as we have made clear, the content of human dignity is vague, and so we will have to attempt to explain it in another way. For our purposes, we will use a less strict, “softer” approach to pinpointing the concept of human dignity than that found in the assumptions typically implicit in the criticisms discussed above. We shall not be giving up on other methods but will be loosely inspired by L. Wittgenstein for whom: “… the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (Wittgenstein, 1969, I, 43; p. 20) and “… the speaking of language is a part of activity, or of a form of life” (Wittgenstein, 1969, I, 23; p. 11). Thus it will be more appropriate for us to ascertain the function of the term/concept of human dignity for which the (socially and culturally conditioned) life of man is intended and has been shaped i.e. its purpose and meaning, albeit variable over time. With this in mind we can go back to the beginning of the intellectual history of human dignity in Europe, in which our pre-understanding of the concept of human dignity was created, and where its contextual meaning can be expressed to the fullest. The aim of what follows is, on the basis of this theoretical and historical analysis, to explore the basic layers of the meaning of human dignity and consider them in light of the criticism that Skinner, Macklin, Pinker and Rachels represent.

On the conceptual history of human dignity (Cicero)

In Western, Euro-American civilization, to which we shall limit our considerations^[13], there are two relatively independent (but mutually influencing) sources of the creation and formulation of the concept of human dignity: ancient Greek and Roman philosophical (and legal) writing and Judeo-Christian religious-theological (and also philosophical) writing.

The first source relates to the Hellenistic-Roman period of philosophy. The key works are those by Cicero (106 BC - 43 BC), particularly his book On Duties (De Officiis)^[14] which had a fundamental and paradigmatic influence on the subject. We shall therefore limit our analysis to his considerations, as we presume that we will find in them the essential layers of the meaning of human dignity, including the problems associated with them, “in a nutshell” as it were.^[15]

Cicero’s philosophical thinking was influenced by Platonism, academic skepticism and the peripatetic school, but he also completed and reconsidered some Stoic ideas about the world and man. In relation to the problem of human dignity and in the context of his work he writes: “But it is essential to every inquiry about duty that we keep before our eyes how far superior man is by nature to cattle and other beasts: they have no thought except for sensual pleasure and this they are impelled by every instinct to seek; but man’s mind is nurtured by study and meditation; He is always either investigating or doing, and he is captivated by the pleasure of seeing and hearing” (Cicero, 1928, I, XXX, p.107). In On Duties (De Officiis), Cicero makes an apparent effort to distinguish man from “animal” on the basis of specific features of his nature: thinking, reason and rationality. Since the time of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle these have been considered the quintessential human qualities: first they were encapsulated in the Greek term zoon logon echon used to describe man and then later the Latin animal rationale. These qualities distinguish man from animals, but also place him above (he stands over them), and this is his special value. In the work of Cicero, the ontological (ontic) thinking on human nature is mixed-up with axiological thinking - in this respect man (as a species) is somewhat greater (in position and status) than other species, and his reason is considered to be higher than his “own” sensual (bodily) passion and appetence.

In another passage, however, Cicero extends his traditional perspective in two directions and also explicitly uses the Latin phrase dignitas (dignity) in what was a new way for his day—applying it to human beings and to human nature.^[16] He writes:

And if we will only bear in mind the superiority and dignity (lat. excellentia and dignitas) of our nature, we shall realize how wrong it is to abandon ourselves to excess and to live in luxury and voluptuousness, and how right is to live in thrift, self-denial, simplicity, and sobriety. We must also realize that we are invested by nature with two characters, as it were: one of these is universal, arising from the fact of our being all alike endowed with reason and with that superiority which lifts us above the brute. From this all morality and propriety (lat. Honestum decorumque) are derived, and upon it depends the rational method of ascertaining our duty (Cicero, 1928, I, 30; p. 109).

What is new here (reflected in Cicero’s first duty) is the distinction between character (and value criterion), i.e. Cicero attributed dignity, based on reason, equally to every human being without distinction.

Cicero, in his thoughts on dignity, generalized the principle of equality across the human species, going beyond the older aristocratic or more generally the meritocratic^[17]understanding that had predominated in ancient Greece and Rome (and eventually in most of Cicero’s writing); dignity was not granted to all people but to privileged individuals or groups for varying reasons. In this context the Latin term dignitas (and semnotes the similar ancient Greek term and Jewish gedula, see e.g. Sulmasy (2007, pp. 11-12) initially meant the higher political (and socio-economic) status (position) of an individual or groups (classes)^[18]. While the aristocratic understanding of human dignity is linked to the hierarchization of people in society, Cicero’s concept of human dignity contains indications of a general equality among people, and hence one aspect of what we usually call humanity. ^[19]

Moreover, and this is another important point in his book, all people (the human race) have the potential (ontologically-essentially) for dignity rather than actually, factually, possessing it. It is in this context that O. Sensen refers to the two-fold notion of the traditional paradigm^[20] of understanding dignity, which includes Cicero’s understanding. It is on this basis that “one’s initial dignity can be realized but also wasted” (Sensen, 2011b, p. 163). The first duty (mentioned by Cicero) is man’s duty to abolish any discrepancy between these two components (phenomenon and essence), and thus to live in accordance with his inner dignity —nature, rationality.^[21] Cicero’s concept of dignity is two-pronged and from the ontological-axiological reflections on human nature (regarding the essence, the objective aspect of dignity), it presents a challenge for deontology—regarding the actions we perform and the responsibilities we have in life (phenomenon, the subjective aspect of dignity). Man should, depending on his actions, live up to his initially intended designation; he has to be true to it.^[22]

Based on the foregoing, we can say that the concept of human dignity outlined by Cicero has at least three fundamental and mutually conditioned functions. The first is directed outwards towards man’s relationship with other animal species—not only are we different from “them”, we are also (given our position and role in the world) more valuable. The second, albeit less clearly articulated in his writing, is aimed inwards towards the human race: in (this concept of) dignity, we are all equal; everyone has (as we already know, the potentiality) for human dignity because we are all equally and always human—from birth to death. The third is somehow superimposed on these two functions—a subsequent function— in which dignity is a challenge to behave responsibly and reasonably.

The concept of human dignity as a problem (2)

In light of this historical excursion, we will now try to form an opinion on the criticisms of the concept of human dignity and establish how this can help us obtain a better understanding of the concept. We will respond in turn to each level of argument and will also base this on the views of the authors referred to above who have attempted to prove that the concept of human dignity has a legitimate place in philosophy and bioethics discourse. We will begin with the semantic-epistemological issues that provide a kind of theoretical and methodological starting point to solving the problem and also have important consequences for the application of this concept in (health care) practice. Therefore, we will devote more space to them.

There are many factors in the criticism of the concept of human dignity that can be considered constructive and we see the main challenge as how to overcome the difficulties the criticism has revealed. It seems, however, that radical conclusions about the uselessness and redundancy of the concept in bioethics, are too strict, and above all premature, and have no adequate justification. If we were to remove all the vague notions from the theoretical tools used in (bio) ethics, then little would remain. This applies equally, since time immemorial, to frequently discussed concepts such as goodness, happiness, love, duty as well as justice, equality, rights, autonomy etc. There is a strong element of uncertainty even in the last one, which some critics want to replace dignity with. As evidenced by the fact that in its practical application (e.g. euthanasia) we must often choose between 1) Kantian concept (founded on supraindividual morality and categorical imperative) and 2) “capacity for self-determination through choice …,” based on individual’s interests and wishes (Forster, 2011, p. 51)^[23]. From this point of view, it is clear, that this criticism of the concept of human dignity was unfair since it did not evaluate it using the same standard as for other concepts (for more on this see Andorno, 2005; Dresser, 2008). Moreover, the fact that these weaknesses have occurred or do occur does not mean that they cannot be removed. According to R. Dresser this criticism is therefore premature. At the present stage of the investigation “these are not reasons to abandon dignity. Rather, they are reasons to pay more attention to it” (Dresser, 2008, p. 350).^[24] However, as it turns out, this “attention” has led to numerous and fruitful attempts to develop a methodology on the issue.

Explicating the concept of human dignity primarily means articulating the elementary and seemingly unified content relating to several different meanings and several different forms (kinds) of dignity, too. This explication was mainly a response to the allegation of ambiguity, and thus the subsequent variability and relativity of the concept of dignity, depending on the context of social (particularly health care) practice. Cicero anticipated this solution, albeit unintentionally and briefly, and in addition to the commonly accepted aristocratic (meritocratic) dignity of man (individual, group), identified a new kind of (previously unreflected) human dignity which derives from human nature. Thus he sketched out answers to questions that had not yet to be asked. This major two-pronged distinction (aristocratic/human), has now been reversed and is the primary means by which many contemporary philosophers and bioethicists constructively respond to the criticism of the concept of human dignity. Accordingly, they distinguish between human dignity (in a narrow sense) and relational dignity. While the first one is the inherent value of each human being (insofar as he is a human being), it is constant and man cannot be deprived of it, the second is a random feature that can be obtained, lost and acquired to different degrees and varies depending on location, time and observer (Pinker). This distinction can be used to resolve the issue about the initial ambiguity of the concept—how can one legitimately and without contradiction argue that dignity is, on the one hand, an inalienable human feature (value) and that nobody (nothing) can deprive man of it, while, on the other hand, reject torture, slavery and humiliation because they deprive man of human dignity? The answer is, in the light of this distinction, that each claim relates to a typologically different meaning (form) of dignity. Different terminology is used in the literature to denote these two forms. Thus, Hungarian author A. Kolnai calls the first human dignity and the second dignity as a quality (Kolnai, 1995), while contemporary Swedish bioethicist L. Nordenfelt identifies this difference as the difference between dignity as Menschenwürde (expressed in a Kantian way) and dignity as merit (see Nordenfelt, 2003, p. 100) and N. Jacobson talks similarly about human dignity and social dignity (Jacobson, 2007, pp. 294-295). D. P. Sulmasy refers to intrinsic dignity and attributed dignity (Sulmasy, 2007, p. 12), while R. van der Graaf with J. van Delden write about unconditional dignity and relational dignity (van der Graaf & van Delden, 2009, pp. 154-155, p. 159). These classifications have become highly diversified and sophisticated forms of dignity.^[25] However, if this simple distinction (between human dignity and relational dignity) is not to result in the separation of the phenomena themselves and thus in an unwanted dualism of both forms of dignity, then it is necessary to establish their unity. This unity (dependence) could lie in the fact, as N. Jacobson writes, that “Social dignity is grounded in human dignity, and is one consequence of its recognition” (Jacobson, 2007, p. 294). But the question remains as to the content of human dignity which establishes social dignity and which could form the basis for the various forms of duty to act with dignity and also the right to preserve the dignity in human life.

Another direction the epistemological reflections on the concept of human dignity was prompted by the criticism that human dignity has no cognitive content and can be reduced (as often happens) to other concepts, such as the concept of autonomy. As was the case with the previous problem, there is no simple (unambiguous) solution to this. We think that its very existence, as well as the degree of its seriousness, is largely conditioned by the theoretical platform it necessarily emerged from. The logical-epistemological perspective would presuppose a classical, original Aristotelian definition of the concepts (through genus proximum and differentia speciffica). It is very likely that in this case we will come up against the limitations of this type of determination based on the “logic of things”. If we accept the fact that the concept of human dignity is categorical in character, hence the character in its (here the ethical) area of fundamental and thus the most general concept, then it is clear that it is not possible to find genus proximum of the concept of human dignity (as well as other categorical concepts—goodness, happiness, justice, autonomy, etc.) and adequately determine its content. Then it seems completely legitimate (and maybe even necessary) to determine the content of the concept using another (similar) concept of the same level of universality. However, this does not mean fully reducing the first concept to the second one nor that it does not have its own “excessive” cognitive content^[26]. In the Hegelian philosophical tradition, which responds to these boundaries of classically defined concepts, e.g., the similar definition is considered only as one (first) step to a more complex process, which consists of the gradual mutual coordination, polarization and dependency of content of categories (Bakurija, 1973, p. 114). There are several authors who suggest that in some aspects at least a similar method could be used to produce a definition even in ethical principles and categories. According to J. Malpas and N. Lickiss we should bear in mind when defining dignity that it “… connects up with too many other concepts, and in too many ways, for it to be amenable to any simple rendering - it has to be seen as a part of a network of concepts from which it cannot easily be disentangled” (Malpas & Lickiss, 2007, pp. 1-2). This probably applies to other concepts of the given level. Foster also points out on mutual conditionality and coherence of moral concepts and principles such as autonomy, beneficence, justice and other (2011, pp. 61-62)^[27].

Finally, we will demonstrate another way in which the question about the categorical content of human dignity can be answered. Specifically: human dignity should not be defined at all (in the classical sense). This is similar to with the way we see so-called primitive terms/concepts and statements in axiomatic systems in the exact sciences^[28]. Zaborowski says that for R. Spaemann “The dignity of the person …. is ‘a non-definable, simple quality’ which can only be experienced intuitively, not scientifically …” (Zaborowski, 2010, p. 222). He states that “Person” is “a nomen dignitatis” and “This name says who we are, and this is ‘evidently not simply identical with what we are’” (Spaemann in Zaborowski, 2010, p. 222). This “non-cognitivist” (and obviously unacceptable to most of the above-mentioned critics) approach to the notion of human dignity is very close to Moore’s understanding of good as the basic concept in his Principia Ethica (Moore, 1922, pp. 6-7) and neither he nor Spaemann believe it is subject to naturalistic fallacy (the assumption that the meaning of moral terms can be defined and reduced to empirical predicates). This vision of human dignity (despite the differences) is close to the thinking of the existentialists; as Heidegger would say, its ontological status cannot be explained ontically, it cannot be reduced to it.^[29]For example G. Kateb (2011, pp. 10-16) considers dignity to be an existential rather than a moral value; “value or worthiness is imputed to the identity of the person or the species …” (p. 10).

As for the oft-repeated criticism that human dignity is a concept of religious (Christian and especially Catholic) provenance, we believe that the article thus far has proved this to be unfounded. First, from a historical perspective, the need for a theoretically articulated concept is pre-Christian in origin, as we have seen. This is generally the case in terms of content too. But Cicero’s and the Stoic understanding of dignity implies a certain form of pantheism^[30], without which nature (cosmic and human) could probably not be considered reasonable and neither could human dignity be subsequently identified with it. Cicero’s overall position on this issue is rather cosmocentric and naturalistic, but not theocentric-theistic (that contains a transcendent god-creator)^[31]. It turns out that the idea of personal God and the Holy Trinity is not prerequisite to the idea of human dignity^[32].

In connection with the opinion that the work of science (especially Darwin’s theory of evolution) has “refuted”, or “destroyed” the idea of human dignity, we wish to make two remarks. The first concerns the epistemological background of the ontic argument and the second relates to the problem of anthropocentrism (or speciesism). In relation to the first, we believe that, despite the strong special-science reasoning of evolutionary theory, there is some skepticism over whether the sphere of (modern) scientific knowledge (information on what “is”) can directly and clearly influence the value-normative area of our lives (conative preferences and prescriptions), including human dignity. This is a complicated issue and so we are merely drawing attention to the logical-epistemological justification of validity, the legitimacy of this transition. This is especially so given that we know from G. Moore and D. Hume that there are questions marks over the extent to which empirical predicates can be used to define moral concepts^[33] and to which factual arguments based on the “is” can be used to draw normative arguments based on the “ought”^[34]. This ultimately means that senso stricto morality cannot be confirmed by science (or drawn from it); equally it cannot be refuted by it either. Similarly, the idea of dignity does not depend only on the facts but appears to have a different source. However, as we have illustrated, this does not have to be religious in origin.

Regarding the other side of this issue, it is clear that the idea of human dignity (and thus human equality), which in Cicero’s philosophy binds us to act responsibly, was reasoned by the inequality of other species in relation to man. Man is superior to animals because he has dignity (reason) and they do not^[35]. Historical development, however, has marked the concept of inequality and has unfolded it into (“Singer’s”) speciesism with possible and factual negative consequences arising from it. Darwinism came up with the idea that a person should surrender to his established special status in nature. Singer’s, seemingly democratic motto that “all animals are equal” (Singer, 1986) is, however, ambiguous: are animals like people or are people like animals? (Illies, 2014, pp. 517-525). What is the common denominator here if, in rejecting anthropocentrism, we do not want to end up with naturalism? We believe that the solution is perhaps, albeit rather generally put, the idea of human dignity as otherness. We are not more or less valuable, but we are not the same like other creatures, we are just different. Otherness is a barrier that does not allow for the naturalist abolition of our self-identity, our self-refutation nor our anthropocentric speciesism^[36].