

IGOR HRUŠOVSKÝ IN POLEMICS WITH DOGMATIC MARXISM*

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In the polemics of philosopher I. Hrušovský against the representatives of dogmatic Marxism in the 1970s, two ontological models of reality met head-on: substantialist-materialistic and nonsubstantialist-structural ones. Hrušovský resolutely rejected the notion of substance and matter as a sort of foundation, that is the orthodox, materialistic monism and substantialist elementarism. In his dialectical-structural conception of reality he understood "substantial level" as the totality of differentiations and contradictory dynamic of the object, as a complex net of mutual structural relationships, influences, and tensions. During the seventies he fully recognized that there is no object or subject "in itself"; he also came to understand the principal participation of epistemological subject. On this discoveries was based his explanation of philosophical categories such as objective reality, materiality, subject, object and especially being and his so-called "naked being". The concept of ontic, "naked being" was introduced for expressing the principal differentiation between being and objective reality as well as his concept as such from traditional, orthodox understanding of ontology in Marxism-Leninism.

"In our efforts, we have to solve contradictions constantly, but we must not deny ourselves, although we are changing in the stream of time" (Igor Hrušovský).

Under the conditions of the totalitarian social system thought was also controlled by the bureaucratic party apparatus which had the ideological and power monopoly of truth. In the totalitarian regime, objective knowledge had to give way to Party knowledge not only because the Party made demands on the monopoly of truth on the basis of its power, its totalitarian monopoly but because objective, non-party, non-tendentious knowledge opened the possibility of theoretical innovation creating thus a sort of "crack" in the whole monolith; it was a sort of the germ of "corrosion" which threatened to grow into the destruction of the whole system. This preventive fear of the power of new ideas going beyond the framework of the doctrine points to the strength of objective knowledge also in the totalitarian social setting. Party, *de facto* programme-tendentious knowledge (seemingly legitimized

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by “class consciousness”) was regarded as the only correct knowledge, because it served something greater than “merely” the knowledge of an individual, a scientist, it served the interests of the whole, whose aims were primary and justified, it was only the fulfilment of the historical sense itself, the implementation of the historical progress, etc.

In contrast, Igor Hrušovský (1907-1978), philosopher and founder of **professional** philosophy in modern Slovakia was convinced of the possibility and necessity of objective knowledge. His dogmatic critics seemingly “were right” to point to the fact that the identification with the Party was of prime importance. As they argued, “priority is the interest in the implementation of the principal ideological attitude, that means in terms of party documents. Only this is important” (T. Halečka [25], 326). Uncompromising insistence of the dogmatics on the validity of Marxist-Leninist principles as the foundation of doctrine was an expression of their conviction that they act in accord with a sort of higher power (historical logic) and Truth (embodied in the party dogmas and politics), which fulfils its own mission through Marxist science, thus opening the way to “a qualitatively new epoch” in the history of human society.

The advocates of this “most progressive arrangement in human history” have constantly suspected Hrušovský of malicious intentions, seeing in him a hidden enemy of the communist social order. According to Andrej Sirácky, representative of dogmatic Marxism: “Any attempt at any re-definitions and re-interpretations of the categories of Marxism-Leninism is revisionism. They should be fully accepted in their authentic sense and meaning and acquired thoroughly. It is our social interest. In addition, they are approved by the particular authorities. And they are binding on man” ([24], 163). Andrej Sirácky, Lev Hanzel, Michal Topoľský, and other ideologists became official, professional interpreters of the historical development and the current state of Marxism-Leninism in Slovakia (see e.g. [28]).

The totalitarian political party, which was in power, wanted to build a new social order to its own, class view of the world; it even asked from the official (Marxist) science to justify theoretically, scientifically that it is the party, tendentious knowledge (party science) that is the real scientific knowledge. However, as we consider, if a scientist conforms to the social interest of a totalitarian power, he moves from the realm of science into the space under the control of ideology. Here, opposite to the objective, unbiased knowledge, decides an opinion leaning on conviction or directly on faith. But such an abdication from the objective, scientific knowledge had not been acceptable to Hrušovský as a scientist for long (he succumbed to such a pressure only in the first half of the fifties when Stalinism enslaved all social and cultural life in Czechoslovakia).

I would like to disclose a certain situation that is reiterated (also today to some extent): when a scientist, intellectual, has to make decision (again and again, also nowadays), when s/he has to answer the question whether it is admissible to conform objective knowledge to other criteria, to assumptions other than scientific.

Such a rigorous standpoint can seemingly be disqualified by objections from two sides: by accusation of idle moralizing and, on the other hand, by casting doubt from the perspective of epistemological relativism... My point is not to moralize but to point to a certain situation – both social and individual – when an individual-intellectual finds him/herself in a dilemma; when s/he has to decide whether s/he should only be led by his/her own individual resolution and follow the interest of objective knowledge (that means to be true to oneself) or whether he should adjust this interest to the social interest or to that which it pretends to be. It does not mean that an individual-scientist could not identify him/herself with the whole – a precondition of this possibility is neither to replace the knowledge accepted by that whole by convictions and by belief nor to be in contradiction with objective knowledge (here this existential and ethical problem grows into the epistemological or ontological issues...).

The above-mentioned dilemma – between an individual mission to explore the world and to serve the interests of the whole by knowing and by social demands – is actually a dilemma of the philosopher-intellectual in society from the times of Socrates. Socrates rejected the Gods of Athenian community, following his own philosophical mission. Hrušovský was not able to go as far as that Socratic boundary situation to enforce his own ideas regardless of life and death and the mercies; but he could have said together with Socrates that as long as he breathed and had strength to do it, he did not stop philosophizing since “the spiritual motion once performed cannot be reversed by anything” as his contemporary, Czech philosopher Jan Patočka put it ([26], 55-56).

However, in the seventies Hrušovský’s philosophical invention was somewhere within Marxism but not Marxism as a doctrine or official teaching but within his own vision or dream of Marxism as an open philosophical system. He had never given up his ambition to remain within the limits of official Marxism or to keep the acknowledgement as Marxist philosopher! Nevertheless, his obstinacy, stubbornness in refusing to abandon his theoretical positions and opinions he had shaped as early as in the first (pre-Marxist) stage of his creative work was admirable. Hrušovský’s **scientific conviction** played a crucial role here (for details, see [27], 82, etc.) and was the basis of his abilities of intellectual resistance. What was, and still is, essential from the point of view of the connections studied by us is the fact that on the basis of scientifically understood philosophy it was unthinkable, even inadmissible to him to think about submitting this science/philosophy to some non-scientific or even ideological pretensions (although he admitted, even wrote about the dialectic of theory and practice, intellectual creativity and social practice as early as in the forties). However, Hrušovský had always attributed a decisive role to theory, knowledge and, primarily, to science.

In the seventies I. Hrušovský tried to complete his own philosophical conception founded on his personal philosophical development in the first stage of his creative work (towards the end of the thirties and during the forties) on the basis of

philosophical scientism and, after the peripeties of the fifties, updated in the sixties. He had to defend constantly his standpoints vis-à-vis the criticism of the dogmatists, who threw doubt not only on his theoretical attitudes from the perspective of the inviolability of the Marxist-Leninist principles but they denied also his right to defend them and his right to public defence. "Comrade Halečka" was commissioned to dispute with Hrušovský in philosophical press with the approval of "higher forum" of the Party; the words of Siráky addressed to Hrušovský in this connection indicate a lot: "If you would like to discuss in the journal *Filozofia*, you would have to ask 'the higher forum' for approval" ([25], 406). The polemic took place in the journal *Filozofia* in 1977 ([20], [21]); Hrušovský recorded his own polemics with the dogmatic and official Marxists in several dialogues which he wanted to publish in the publication entitled 'Monológ a dialógy'. They could not be published at that time (as well as other texts) and thus the book was published in a curtailed, censored form as late as after his death (Monologues and Dialogues, Bratislava 1980). The whole manuscript of his unpublished dialogues contain the essence of his polemics with dogmatic Marxism as well as the basic theses of his dialectical-structural philosophical conception.

In conditions where serving the only Truth had to replace scientific scepticism and the philosophical posing of questions was chained by ideology, Hrušovský's independent thought (although not beyond the framework of official philosophy) was suspicious even inadmissible. The guards of the ideological purity of Slovak Marxism thwarted the publication of Hrušovský's texts which argued with the dogmatic Marxists since they regarded it as necessary to suppress any independent intellectual performance that might threaten the monolith of the state-party doctrine and the rigidity of totalitarian thought.

Hrušovský could not even present his views abroad. He was not allowed to take part in the international philosophical congress in Düsseldorf in Germany in August 1977 (Hrušovský's contribution was accepted by the international committee for oral presentation as well as for the publication in congress materials; the contributions of "really orthodox Marxists" were not accepted...Under pressure from A. Siráky and with the "blessing" of the Director of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Slovak Academy of Sciences in Bratislava, Vladimír Cirbes, Hrušovský had to cancel his participation and ask for removal of his contribution from the congress materials; we quote A. Siráky: "It is a binding decision, approved by the highest authorities. Do so without any further words and the copy of the letter of cancellation as well as the postal receipt give to the cardinal, that is to say to comrade Professor Cirbes, by return" ([25], 407-408).

Everybody who presented his own opinion in public, even in the most moderate form, had to face razor-sharp criticism from the party dogmatists and official Marxists. "The philosophically educated comrades, devoted to Marxism- Leninism" (Siráky's words) saw in each innovation of ideas deviating from the accepted schemes a manifestation of intellectual fluctuation and even ideological instability.

They revealed “risk” in each creative initiative, which should have been reduced by “deep penetrating into the heart of Marxist-Leninist doctrine” (A. Sirácky [25], 314). Each intellectual initiative had to be carefully confronted “with the basic theses of the classics whether it had not slipped into revisionist positions” (V. Cirbes [25], 314, A. Sirácky [24], 163). They saw the cause of the “crisis”, which allegedly appeared in the thought of the Slovak intelligentsia, in giving up the substantional ontology and in “succumbing to the influences of structuralism”. Attempts at improvement of Marxism-Leninism, for example by structuralism ploughed, according to M. Topoľský, “precisely from the bourgeois mentality and pseudo-revolutionary” of intelligentsia. “From the position of our world view the whole of structuralism has to be rejected as an anti-Marxist, reactionary doctrine”, A. Sirácky said ([25], 294; [24], 168).

It was therefore more or less “logical” that I. Hrušovský also had to face such a “principal” criticism. He had been exposed to allegations from as early as the mid-forties, that he was under the influence of the “bourgeois” philosophical streams; particularly to neopositivism of the Vienna Circle and to structuralism schools, which he had disseminated and construed in Slovakia from the thirties. Let us mention how Hrušovský had to face accusations of “Carnapism” already in polemics with the intuitive realist Jozef Dieška, Christian philosopher, in the mid-forties... Later that admonition was taken by M. Topoľský, Marxist, who used it purely instrumentally, when he wanted to discredit Hrušovský as “official Marxist” on any occasion. In the period of Normalization (in the seventies) there was also suspicion of “the revisionist attempt” at improving Marxism-Leninism, “anti-marxist correcting” of materialist dialectic by the structuralist method and so on.

In Hrušovský’s polemics against dogmatic Marxists in the seventies, we see a **clash of the two ontological models** of reality: substantivist-materialist and nonsubstantivist-structural ones. In the former case it was a traditional, orthodox **substantivist** (metaphysical), monistic, closed **model** based on Marxist-Leninist materialism. Ontology presupposes here material (determined) being (simultaneously as a potential object) existing independently of the subject. Matter as the absolute, last and homogeneous essence is simultaneously recognized as the objective, independently existing reality (beyond our consciousness), which is reflected by the subject – copied, “photographed”, pictured by our feelings, but existing independently of them (we refer to Lenin’s definition of matter). Such a standpoint can be well defined as epistemological **objectivism**. Objective reality and material, homogeneous substance consisted of the two sides within this understanding, two aspects – epistemological and ontological – of one basic principle: the material unity of the world.

Hrušovský’s concept was on principle different. He founded it on a **non-substantivist** (antimetaphysical), pluralistic and open structural model of reality. There is no place there for metaphysical substance as an absolute, last substance, even the issue of the substrate and the final, most fundamental elements (homoge-

neous entities) and their materiality (and/or the question of “material bearer”) is here more or less irrelevant. This result could not be expressed by Hrušovský openly, unless he would fully abandon the basic binding principle of materialist monism – the foundation of Marxism – and that was something he was probably neither able nor wanted to do.

It should be noted here that the postulate of substance and matter as a substrate (or a sort of “primordial” matter as absolute substance), that is the orthodox materialist monism and substantialist elementarism was strange to Hrušovský as early as from his first published monograph *Invencia a vývoj* (Invention and Development, 1935), where he criticized the idea of materialist monism and cast doubt on the justification of the validity of the materialist dialectic as a universal elucidating principle (invalid particularly in abiotic, inorganic area, since the nature of this reality is not dialectical; transformations are here purely quantitative (see [1], 20, 23-24).

According to Hrušovský, the dialectic of the development of science shows that there is no final essence, no last further indivisible elementary particles. “In contemporary science we speak about fundamental elements of the particular object only from the perspective of a certain substantial level as about relatively steady elements” ([25], 331). He objected even to the concept of substance as a traditional, prevailingly metaphysical, vulgar materialist concept. What can be denoted as the **level of substance** is first of all the unity of differentiations (mutual actions) and controversial dynamics of the object. It is the inner structural differentiation of the object with a dynamic, not a static character.

Hrušovský's understanding of **substance** was **dialectical-structural** (at the ontological and epistemological levels). As early as in the mid-sixties he pointed out that the substance of objects and phenomena is not something strongly fixed; it is not monolithic, absolute, but a dynamic controversy as a source of transformations: the objects are only relatively stable, there is no final and invariable substance of things. Similarly, in the mid-seventies he pointed out that if we speak about penetration into “the deep essence” of reality, it means to explore substantial level, that is the grasping of inner controversies and interactions, of constituents of the object, and the more differentiated and more adequate exploring of the structure, dialectical-structural diversity of objective reality. In the cognitive-practical processes we gradually penetrate into the deeper dynamic structures of reality. The dialectic of the development of science shows that **there is no last, final substance of reality** (homogeneous entities), its structure is inexhaustible, consisting in the infinity of its attributes, links, and mutual actions. “The substance of objects is controversial in all its dimensions and deep layers. Therefore, to define it means to know its inner controversies, the dynamic interaction of its constituents” ([19], 170). The category of substance is “definable only as a unity of differentiations and controversial dynamic of object” ([19], 169). Hrušovský repeatedly emphasized that it is “justified to prefer the dynamic-structural conception over the substantialist understanding” ([13], 225).

He had to defend his opinions constantly in his polemics against his dogmatic opponents. Referring to contemporary Soviet philosophers, he emphasized that “the substance of each object is the whole of its concrete deep ties and relations” ([19], 167). Hrušovský explained his standpoint by asking: If a model of an atom is an example of mutual actions, what does the concept of the substance of atom mean, if not just this structure?

The central category in Hrušovský’s nonsubstantialist model is the **category of structure** and its dialectic. The elements are dominated by relations, structural bonds. The mode of being, the reality of each object is constituted by specific constellations or configurations of the particular mutual actions. What is called “the substance” of the object is formed by basic sides and constituents, it is the totality of mutual relations and the expression of the unity of the differentiation and controversial dynamic of the object.

According to his opponents Hrušovský thus absolutized relations. According to Sirácky “substances decide in the objective world” [25], 330) and Hrušovský unjustifiably “substantiated” structural relations and mutual actions; dogmatists also reproached structuralists, including Hrušovský, for abstracting from the material bearer; however, by this criticism, Sirácky “hit the nail on the head”, however, not to the detriment (as he intended), but in favour of the philosophical importance of Hrušovský’s conception. Hrušovský reacted to the reproof concerning the ontologization of relations for example in the above cited study [19].

Structure is dialectical, it has immanently controversial, antimonic character. Its inner controversies are the basis of the motion and the source of qualitative changes. Hrušovský emphasized the moment of the dialectic of structural interactions and he saw there also the specific contribution of his own structurology. He considered it a theoretical concept which non-controversially could unite diachronic and synchronic aspects.

Hrušovský rejected concepts of reality which were based on the postulate of the possibility to know the substance, as absolutist. It was again a thesis which was the basis of his philosophical creative work from the very beginning. In agreement with the structuralist and logico-empirical inspirations of his own thought he only spoke about the possibility to explore the structure. We do not look at the reality, so to speak, “in the original”, that is as it could exist also without any relation to our consciousness (without denying its objectivity); but its knowing depends on the subject.

Empirical knowledge defines more or less adequately the structure of reality, but not its ontological quality (“substance”). The adequacy of knowledge is determined by the verifiability of the degree of probability of empirical statements (and even their high probability is only temporary). Hrušovský kept to these standpoints throughout his philosophical route, even as a Marxist philosopher. That was one of the reasons why he was permanently criticized by orthodox, dogmatic Marxists.

The subject is in Hrušovský’s conception cognitive-practical and primarily “onto-creative”. It is a sort of medium of the process of the objectification of be-

ing. Real objects cannot be adequately perceived "as such" without looking at the portion of creative activity of the cognitive subject. Such an epistemological subject participates in the process of objectification, that is of the transition from the being beyond our consciousness into the form (mode) of empirical-practical objects. Now we come to the part of Hrušovský's philosophical creative work of the seventies, in which he himself saw the greatest innovation of his own philosophical conception.

His sketch 'Ideová retrospektíva' (Intellectual retrospection) is important, because Hrušovský defines here the key, precious moments of inspiration of his philosophical invention (referring to S. Zweig he names them "star hours"). In the first such a "star hour" (in the 1940s) appeared his version of dialectical-structural understanding of the world as a complex network of mutual structural relations, actions, and tensions. He understood reality as a dynamic structure, with unlimited structuralization, differentiation, and variability. He had an experience (as if he found himself in the "atmosphere of Bruno visions") of ontological inexhaustibleness, unlimitedness of this "structurality". The second crucial experience came after a severe health crisis in 1972, when he fully realized (as he literally wrote "then I began to see light") that there is no object and subject "in-itself", there is always a contradictory interaction between them, and he understood the decisive participation of the subject in shaping objective reality, that is the meaning of its onto-creative activity. As he had said, in the forties he perceived the world as an objective reality independent of the subject and he thought that its relatively adequate grasping is primarily conditioned by the analysis of cognitive means. Since the emergence of the concept of the key role of epistemological subject he has been concentrated on the exploration and deduction of consequences of this knowledge of the crucial role of the cognitive-practical subject for the understanding and interpretation of philosophical categories such as the world, objective reality, materiality, subject and object but mainly being (whether objectified or undetermined) and the structure. Thus if the concept of structure was central to the first period, in the seventies it was the concept of being. Towards the end of his life, Hrušovský tried to synthesize his philosophical invention into the form of the dialectical-structural conception of objective reality on the basis of the (ontic) assumption of "naked" being.

As we have mentioned, ontological substantialism and epistemological objectivism was not acceptable to Hrušovský; whether idealistic – therefore his polemics against intuitive realism in the forties, or materialistic – therefore his clashes with orthodox Marxism-Leninism in the seventies. In an effort to deny the necessity to speak about the substance or substantial level of what "is" (of the objective world in terms of its ultimately determinedness, that is both as material and homogeneous substance), but mainly in an effort to deepen his own philosophical criticism, he now distinguished two profound levels of reality: ontic and ontological. The concept of ontic, "naked being" was introduced for expressing this principal differentiation (between being and objective reality) as well as to differ his concept as such from traditional, orthodox understanding of ontology in Marxism-Leninism.

In his studies from the early seventies, he tried to make a principal difference between the ontic question of being itself, that is of its existential independence from consciousness and the ontological question of the characteristics of being (its modes). He clearly distinguished (already in his study 'Kategória bytia' (Category of Being) [11]) the issue of being as an existential reference and the modes of its existence, that is the issue of ontic being as a philosophical category from the question of ontological being as an empirical category. According to him, ““being in itself”, ontic reality registered in the epistemological relation: ‘cognition-being’ differs from the empirical (objective-subjective) reality with its whole deep differentiation”. And further: “the external being independent of our consciousness turns, in the dialectical process of cognition and practice, from ‘thing-in-itself’ into ‘thing for us’, becoming both cognitively and practically a comprehensible object.” ([11], 123-124). Ontic being (not as determinedness) is “something” beyond our consciousness, beyond the cognitive subject – it is not non-being; it is the existential reference. It is concretely non-determined – “naked” as long as it is beyond our contact with a cognitive-practical subject. It is not, however, chaotic but somehow organized, that is “peratic”. It is a precondition for the development of the process of objectification. This term (“peraticity”) was not supposed to define determinations of this being, but its potentiality to become determined (to become objective reality). We therefore assume that this “naked being” is knowable and objectifiable (that it can become an object). Hrušovský did not want to give up this assumption of peraticity with respect to the epistemological-realistic basis of his own philosophical conception. His supposition that cognition is only possible thanks to the fact that being is not chaotic but organized in a way, and assumption that being beyond consciousness is differentiated and richer than we actually perceive it was also important; of course, the question of the justification or criticalness of such an assumption is here raised. However, for Hrušovský, the proof of its justification (if his consideration of the category of practice is set aside) is the possibility of the more and more probable and deeper cognition of the objective world.

Postmodern relativists, referring to Th. S. Kuhn, who aimed “to deny all meaning to claims that successive scientific beliefs become more and more probable or better and better approximations to the truth and simultaneously to suggest that the subject of truth claims cannot be a relation between beliefs and a putatively mind-independent or ‘external world’” ([31], 338, quot. according to [32], 49), would, probably, not agree with Hrušovský’s epistemological-ontological realism and scientific cumulativism.

According to Hrušovský, what can be denoted as ontological being is determined, objectified being – it is objective reality. Supposition of objectification is the activity of the historical subject in dialectical relation to being beyond consciousness. The subject not only penetrates into the given objective reality, but also takes an active part in the process of the transition from being beyond our consciousness into the form (modes) of empirical-practical objects. Different concrete

modes of being are the effect of the objectification of being in the cognitive-practical activity of the subject. The concrete objectual world is differentiated and dialectico-structurally qualitatively diverse. The object is a totality of relations and controversies: their specific constellation or configuration of the particular mutual actions constitutes the mode of being of each object. Each concrete object can be adequately defined only in its links, unity of differentiations, and antagonisms, in dialectical-structural articulation. What can be determined as "essence", is equal to the structure of the concrete, constituent relations of the object.

There is no object or subject "in itself"; there is always a contradictory interaction between them. Being "as such" cannot be perceived. We only recognize particular ways (modes) of being in their relative qualitative determinedness. Only at this level he considered it meaningful to speak about the materiality of the world. I am sure that if Hrušovský's philosophical invention could have been further developed without obstacles, he would have abandoned that dogmatic postulate of the materiality of being as redundant – the postulate of determinedness, concrete determination of being is here sufficient. Objectification, as long as it concerns the ontological-epistemological relevance of this concept, need not necessarily (in my opinion) mean exclusively material objectification. Or, in other words: objectification neither assumes nor implies materiality and if it implies something, then "only" reality!

Be that as it may, it should be clearly said that Hrušovský did not see in materiality any prerequisite but only manifestation in the diversity of objects: "the materiality of the world is not a presupposition of the diversity of its objects, but (that) the materiality of the world is reflected in the diversity of objects" ([25], 319-320). Materiality is already the determined being, that is so the way of being; he also maintained in the dialogues that the matter in the universal, that is in philosophical sense is the effect of objectification. Being ("naked"), which is a prerequisite of the birth of the object "for us", the birth of affirmed being, that is of concrete determinations, ontic being is, by contrast, not determined even in the sense of its potential materiality (if Hrušovský would have maintained something else, he would have committed serious inconsistency, understandable, at the most, with regard to the external context of his polemics).

It should also be said that at the beginning of the seventies the use of the concept of matter by Hrušovský was very broad, for example he wrote: "We distinguish matter (ontic being, or being) as a philosophical category and matter (mass, material, the way of being) as an ontological category" ([11], 122). Such inconsequences were the expression of his indecision and conformity with ruling Marxist paradigm. Hrušovský could give up the category of matter (and, de facto, he gradually abandoned that dogmatic postulate in the seventies; a comparison of his works from the beginning and the second half of that decade would do). However, he admitted it only at the level of objectifying, that is of objective reality.

In his interpretation of the real diversity of the objective world he used two basic categories – dialectic and structure, which were sufficient to describe the substan-

tial differentiation and dynamics of the objective reality. As we have already shown, from his structuralist, nonsubstantialist point of view, Hrušovský also posed the problem of the concept of matter as a homogeneous substance. "There is no primordial matter as the absolute and last substance," he strengthened ([25], 331). To support this interpretation, let us present Hrušovský's opinion, according to which "it is not matter that is a presupposition of categorial determinations, as it is declared by mechanistic materialism, but it is ontic being that is a precondition for these determinations as well as for matter" ([23], 55).

His opponents wanted to convict him of denying the existence of external world as such, objective reality independent of subject and they saw it as the abandonment of the materialist worldview. He probably abandoned the standpoint of Marxist-Leninist materialism (according to him mechanistic) but not the philosophical, ontological and epistemological realism! His reply to the reiterated Marxist-Leninist objections that we could not refuse the dogma about the existence of material reality also before the origin of man, was that statements about objective reality before the origin of man are extrapolations from the achieved level of human knowledge; not only humanized but also "natural nature" is the effect of cognitive activity and objectification. Also nature, as we perceive it in natural sciences, has a certain human-subjective dimension ([25], 319, 322, 404).

Hrušovský's dogmatic critics saw in his philosophical conception withdrawal from dialectical materialism towards subjectivism, transition to the position of philosophical idealism. He was for them "in principle an idealist and metaphysician" (T. Halečka, [25], 403), or "the most dangerous destroyer of Marxism-Leninism" (M. Topoľský, [25], 403). Let us mention in this connection the words of the "domestic classic" of dogmatism; according to him, K. Marx would have allegedly said that what Hrušovský writes and defends are "empty phantasmagorias" ([25], 305).

However, it was not a mere speculation or agnosticism in the case of Hrušovský's philosophical conception but rather the position near to classical Socratic "knowing un-knowledge" (as Jan Patočka put it; [26], 48). The point was that Hrušovský's philosophy was not the "masked subjectivism" or metaphysics but a purely philosophical attitude referring to the principles of the philosophical-epistemological criticism and the concept of philosophy which declares that philosophy is a critical rational science exploring the conditions of the possibility of cognition of empirical reality. In these terms Hrušovský's philosophical reflection followed modern philosophical tradition in the best sense of word.

Hrušovský could naturally be blamed for his remaining in captivity to the traditional subject-object dichotomy, which should have been overcome by post-Hegelian philosophy (in opposition to Cartesianism). Finally, Western rationalistic thought has varied within the horizon of the dualism of subjective and objective since its Greek beginnings. One noteworthy view is that Hrušovský did not understand the subject-object relationship as something static and mechanical or as

a relation between two entities; according to him, we do not explore the object "as such" but it is always mediated by the activity of subject, which is onto-creative. However, for orthodox Marxist-Leninists, his conception was an eclectic connection of Marxist terminology, neopositivist epistemology, Hegelian's ideas and structuralism. He was blamed for various influences, but they forgot about I. Kant somehow, although, obviously, his differentiation of ontic, "naked" and determined, objectified being (reality), as well as assignment of the crucial role to active onto-creative subject in the process of cognitive (and practical) objectification refers to I. Kant's epistemology.

However, it is questionable whether in the conditions of "real socialism" could have existed something like "authentic" Marxism or an understanding of Marxism as an open system. We know that after flourishing of Marxist thought in Czechoslovakia during the sixties innovated by various (phenomenological, hermeneutic, Heideggerian) inspirations (we should mention first of all Czech philosopher Karel Kosík and his famous *Dialektika konkrétního; Dialectics of Concrete* [30]) attempts at such a variant of Marxism were rejected in the period of Normalization after the demise of the experiment of the "Prague Spring". Nevertheless, if there really existed only orthodox Marxism-Leninism as a set of dogmas and principles, which had to be defended against any doubts or criticism, then any effort to place it by a non-dogmatic alternative, however it could be sentenced to failure in advance, and even repudiated not only such attempts but ideas and their authors, each step at a new initiative or innovation of intellectual life have had tremendous validity. Hrušovský left the original work of a thinker who was able to create his own philosophical conception even in the setting of official Marxism. We can only regret that in his effort to protect his integrity as a philosopher he had to defend permanently his basic positions in polemics against the adherents of dogmatic Marxist-Leninism, which was unavoidable if he himself wanted to remain an official philosopher. He did not intend to give up his intellectual ambition. However, these unproductive polemics limited the possibilities for creative invention in his philosophical reflection and he could not continue in his own intellectual initiative towards the immanent logic of thought.

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