

Categorization is a process that can be studied for various and from various angles. Since language is a universal human instrument, linguistic categorization inevitably combines psychological, ethnographical, philosophical, and other aspects. The basis of categorization may be seen in similarity which is so fundamental and taken for granted that it is very difficult if not impossible to define, as no doubt all fundamental ideas are. In this respect, our mind moves between two hedges that cannot be overstepped, i.e., in an interval defined on the one hand by the conviction that similarity exists in the objective reality independently of ourselves and on the other hand by the suspicion that sameness is simply a matter of convention, something imputed to the outside world by the human subject. The former extreme ignores the role of human factor, reducing it to a passive observer while the latter assigns the outer world (and in the long run also the human subject) an essentially fictitious nature.

Perhaps there is some justification in steering the middle course. There can be no doubt that similarity is at the same time subjective and objective, being worthless both without the human observer as well as without what is there to observe. In the interaction of the human subject with the surrounding reality the latter looms large through its sheer immensity while the former ought to be taken into account because of its dynamic and active nature. In other words, either contribute to what is conventionally labelled as similarity.

The idea of similarity itself reflects the nonexistence of an absolute identity and of a total dissimilarity. These extremes exist as extraneous limits but phenomena and entities in between may be viewed as either more or less similar. Categorization is then a procedure that results in grouping phenomena perceived to be significantly more similar than the rest is. Categorization helps us to find our bearings in the immense phenomenological complexity. This necessary and useful simplification, however, can only be achieved through doing some violence to reality. Within it there are various

degrees of similarity and this grading is continuous — in any case, too fine to be done justice by our coarse-grained linguistic categories.

Two opposing views on categorization have established themselves in linguistic semantics. The diagnostic characteristics of the so-called classical (or structuralist) approach to categorization are (1) categories defined as a conjunction of necessary and sufficient features, (2) features defined as binary, (3) categories displaying clear boundaries, (4) equal status of all category members (pp. 23—24).

In Chapter One that may be viewed as a prelude to his book, Taylor describes and analyses the domain of colour terms (pp. 1—20). Berlin and Kay in their pioneering publication *Basic Color Terms* published in 1969 have come to the conclusion that not all colour terms have an equal status but that there are focal and nonfocal terms. It may be said that this was precursory to the idea of prototypes.

Some inadequacies of the classical approach to categorization were also noticed by L. Wittgenstein. However, the foundations of a new approach were laid in psychology. It has been found out that there is a level of categorization which is cognitively and linguistically more salient than the others, i.e., the "basic level", and it is at this basis level that people, according to Rosch, conceptualize things as perceptual and functional gestalts (cf. p. 48). Both the higher and the lower levels are cognitively derived, vague, rhapsodic. An important cognitive feature of the basic level categories is that they maximize the number of attributes shared by members of the category, at the same time minimizing the number of attributes shared with members of other categories (pp. 50—51).

The prototypical approach to categorization is cognitively powerful. As far as the relation between the prototypical and the classical approaches is concerned, one may say that the latter is just a particular, reduced instance of the former. On a more abstract level, one could characterize the so-called prototypical approach as semantics enriched with some elements of the theory of probability. The usefulness of its in-

roduction in linguistics had been repeatedly propagated in linguistics; more particularly in semantics by, e.g., V. V. Nalimov. However, the prototype approach cannot be reduced to probabilism; its further essential feature consists in its sensitivity to perception, recognition, and cognition in general.

Taylor's discussion of categorization is comprehensive. He distinguishes folk categories and expert categories (pp. 68—74), linguistic and encyclopaedic knowledge, notions as domains and schemas, hedges, frames and scripts. All this points out in the direction that language cannot be satisfactorily described as an autonomous phenomenon but rather as a system linked to a variety of other systems in the environment of which it functions.

Taylor has much to say about the so-called meaning transfer, namely, about metaphor and metonymy. Many authors have been discussing metaphor in the recent decades but Taylor has

made an attempt to turn our attention to metonymy, a so far neglected and yet vitally important factor of cognitive processes (pp. 122 to 141).

The present publication is not restricted to lexical semantics. The author views language as a whole and that is why his scholarly interest encompasses phenomena beyond lexicon, i.e., morphology, syntax (pp. 142—157), intonation (pp. 158—172), phonology (pp. 222—238), as well as the process of acquisition of categories (pp. 239—256). His book includes an extensive bibliography (pp. 257—267) and a subject index (pp. 269—270).

There can be no doubt that the readers will appreciate this informative and accessible book on an important trend in present-day, cognitively oriented linguistic.

Viktor Krupa

Kittay, Eva Feder: *Metaphor. Its Cognitive Force and Linguistic Structure*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, First Paperback Edition 1989, ISBN 0-19-824246-8. 358 pp.

This publication is another proof that the subject of metaphor is virtually inexhaustible. Any bibliography includes some items dealing with cognitive aspects of metaphor but Kittay's work is a large-scale attempt at presenting the problem in a consistent and yet transparent manner to anybody interested in it.

A variety of hypotheses have been suggested to explain the essence of metaphor and the author has added a hypothesis or rather a theory of her own, the so-called perspectival theory. The latter is linked in Kittay's opinion with the relational theory of meaning. Her attitude to metaphor is based on the old idea of metaphor as two concepts operating simultaneously. A critical evaluation of the previous hypotheses is followed by a brief summary of the salient features of a perspectival approach according to which metaphors are considered to be sentences (not isolated words), to consist of two constituents between which there is a tension and yet they represent a system within which meaning may

be seen as irreducible and cognitive, and arising from an interplay of the above constituents (pp. 22—23).

The author tries to explain why she believes the terms tenor and vehicle not to be suitable and in fact views metaphor as a sign of a sign because in metaphor "both the expression level and the content level bear content" (p. 28). In other words, one component of the metaphor is used as a way of conceptualizing the other. As it has been repeatedly mentioned, the two concepts, however, do not interact in isolation but as components of their respective conceptual domains or semantic fields. That is why a metaphorical usage may be considered to be an application of a whole conceptual system to another, preferably distant or at least different domain.

The cognitive significance of metaphor is seen in its ability to restructure or to induce a structure on a given content domain (p. 37). Thus metaphor does not supply entirely new