Quality of politicians and electoral system. Evidence from a quasi-experimental design for Italian cities

Marco Alberto De Benedetto; Elena D’Agostino; Giuseppe Sobbrio

doi:10.1515/ger-2020-0021

Article

Quality of politicians and electoral system. Evidence from a quasi-experimental design for Italian cities

Marco Alberto De Benedetto , Elena D’Agostino and Giuseppe Sobbrio

Published/Copyright: January 20, 2021

Published by

Become an author with De Gruyter Brill

Submit Manuscript Author Information Explore this Subject

From the journal German Economic Review Volume 22 Issue 3

Abstract

We study the effect of the electoral system (single-ballot vs runoff) on the quality of politicians, measured by the average educational attainment, at the local level in Italy over the period 1994–2017. By exploiting the discontinuous voting rule shift nearby the 15,000 population cut-off, we have implemented a RDD and found that the change in the electoral scheme leads to an overall downward variation in the educational attainment of local politicians by about 2 % compared to years of schooling of politicians in municipalities just below the cut-off. Findings are similar when we separately focus on the educational attainment of mayors and councilors, and when we use alternative measures of quality of politicians related both to the previous occupation and to previous political experience. However, different confounding policies related to the voting scheme change at the cut-off. We show that the negative effect is not directly related to the way politicians are elected (runoff vs single-ballot scheme) but to the number of lists supporting the mayoral candidates: in municipalities below 15,000 inhabitants candidates running for mayor are supported only by one single list, whereas above the cut-off mayoral candidates might be supported by more lists. Overall, we speculate that the negative impact produced by the treatment on the educational attainment of local politicians is explained by the different selection process of candidates adopted by political parties, rather than by voters’ preferences toward low-skilled politicians.

Keywords: Regression discontinuity design; Electoral system; Education; Political competition

JEL Classification: C31; D72; I20; J42

Acknowledgment

We would like to thank two anonymous referees, Prof. Maria De Paola, Prof. Francesco Sobbrio, and conference participants at AIEL (2018), SIE (2018), SIEP (2019) and AISre (2019) for useful comments.

References

Baltrunaite, A., P. Bello, A. Casarico, and P. Profeta. 2014. “Gender Quotas and the Quality of Politicians.” Journal of Public Economics 118:62–74. 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.06.008Search in Google Scholar

Barone, G., and G. De Blasio. 2013. “Electoral Rules and Voter Turnout.” International Review of Law and Economics 36:25–35. 10.1016/j.irle.2013.04.001Search in Google Scholar

Besley, T. 2007. Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government. USA: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283910.001.0001Search in Google Scholar

Besley, T., and S. Coate. 1997. “An Economic Model of Representative Democracy.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112:85–114. 10.1162/003355397555136Search in Google Scholar

Besley, T., J. G. Montalvo, and M. Reynal-Querol. 2011. “Do Educated Leaders Matter?” The Economic Journal 121:205–227. 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02448.xSearch in Google Scholar

Besley, T., T. Persson, and D. M. Sturm. 2007. “Political Competition, Policy and Growth: Theory and Evidence from the US.” The Review of Economic Studies 77:1329–1352. 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2010.00606.xSearch in Google Scholar

Bordignon, M., T. Nannicini, and G. Tabellini. 2016. “Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round Vs Runoff Elections Under Plurality Rule.” American Economic Review, American Economic Association 106(8): 2349–2370. 10.1257/aer.20131024Search in Google Scholar

Bordignon, M., T. Nannicini, and G. Tabellini. 2017. “Single Round vs. Runoff Elections Under Plurality Rule: A Theoretical Analysis.” European Journal of Political Economy 49:123–133. 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.02.001Search in Google Scholar

Bracco, E., and A. Brugnoli. 2012. Runoff vs Plurality: Effects of Electoral System on Intergovernmental Grants. A Regression Discontinuity Analysis. Lancaster Economics Working Paper 2. Search in Google Scholar

Caselli, F., and M. Morelli. 2004. “Bad Politicians.” Journal of Public Economics 88:759–782. 10.3386/w8532Search in Google Scholar

Callander, S. 1999. Electoral Competition with Entry. California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. Working Papers 1083. Search in Google Scholar

Calonico, S., M. D. Cattaneo, and M. H. Farrell. 2018. “On the Effect of Bias Estimation on Coverage Accuracy in Nonparametric Inference.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 113:767–779. 10.1080/01621459.2017.1285776Search in Google Scholar

Carozzi, F., D. Cipullo, and L. Repetto. 2020. Divided They Fall. Fragmented Parliaments and Government Stability. CESIFO Working Paper No. 8204. 10.2139/ssrn.3571910Search in Google Scholar

Caughey, D., and J. S. Sekhon. 2011. “Elections and the Regression Discontinuity Design: Lessons from Close US House Races.” Political Analysis 19(4): 1942–2008. 385–408. 10.1093/pan/mpr032Search in Google Scholar

Chamon, M., J. M. Pinho de Mello, and S. Firpo. 2008. Electoral Rules, Political Competition and Fiscal Spending: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Brazilian Municipalities. Textos para discusso 559, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil). 10.2139/ssrn.1528593Search in Google Scholar

Chattopadhyay, R., and E. Duflo. 2004. “Women as Policy-makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India.” Econometrica 72(5): 1409–1443. 10.3386/w8615Search in Google Scholar

Chin, M. 2019. When Do Politicians Appeal Broadly? The Economic Consequences of Electoral Rules in Brazil. Working Paper. Search in Google Scholar

Cipullo, D. 2020. Voting Systems, Incentives and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from Runoff and Plurality. Uppsala Universitet Working Paper. Search in Google Scholar

Cox, G., and O. A. Neto. 1997. “Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures and the Number of Parties.” American Journal of Political Science 41:149–174. 10.1017/CBO9781139174954.013Search in Google Scholar

Daniele, G., and B. Geys. 2015. “Organised Crime, Institutions and Political Quality: Empirical Evidence from Italian Municipalities.” The Economic Journal 125:233–255. 10.1111/ecoj.12237Search in Google Scholar

DellaVigna, S., and E. La Ferrara. 2010. “Detecting Illegal Arms Trade.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2(4): 26–57. 10.3386/w13355Search in Google Scholar

De Paola, M., and V. Scoppa. 2011. “Political Competition and Politician Quality: Evidence from Italian Municipalities.” Public Choice 148(3): 547–559. 10.1007/s11127-010-9683-9Search in Google Scholar

Ferraresi, M., L. Rizzo, and A. Zanardi. 2015. “Policy Outcomes of Single and Double Ballot Elections.” International Tax and Public Finance 22:977–998. 10.1007/s10797-014-9344-xSearch in Google Scholar

Ferraz, C., and F. Finan. 2011. Motivating Politicians: the Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance. NBER Working Paper. Search in Google Scholar

Gagliarducci, S., and T. Nannicini. 2011. “Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection.” Journal of the European Economic Association 11:369–398. 10.1111/jeea.12002Search in Google Scholar

Grembi, V., T. Nannicini, and U. Troiano. 2016. “Do Fiscal Rules Matter?” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 8:1–30. 10.1257/app.20150076Search in Google Scholar

Jones, B. F., and B. A. Olken. 2005. “Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120:835–864. 10.1093/qje/120.3.835Search in Google Scholar

Lee, D. 2008. “Randomized Experiments from Non-random Selection in U. S. House Elections.” Journal of Econometrics 142:675–697. 10.1016/j.jeconom.2007.05.004Search in Google Scholar

Lee, D. S., E. Moretti, and M. J. Butler. 2004. “Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U. S. House.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(3): 807–859. 10.1162/0033553041502153Search in Google Scholar

Matozzi, M., and A. Merlo. 2015. “Mediocracy.” Journal of Public Economics 130:32–44. 10.3386/w12920Search in Google Scholar

McCrary, J. 2008. “Manipulation of the Running Variable in the Regression Discontinuity Design: a Density Test.” Journal of Econometrics 142:698–714. 10.3386/t0334Search in Google Scholar

Messner, M., and M. K. Polborn. 2004. “Paying Politicians.” Journal of Public Economics 88:2423–2445. 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.01.004Search in Google Scholar

Milesi-Ferretti, G. M., R. Perotti, and M. Rostagno. 2002. “Electoral Systems and Public Spending.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(2): 609–657. 10.1162/003355302753650346Search in Google Scholar

Osborne, M. J., and A. Slivinski. 1996. “A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-candidates.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 111:65–96. 10.2307/2946658Search in Google Scholar

Pande, R. 2003. “Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities?” American Economic Review 93(4): 1132–1151. 10.1257/000282803769206232Search in Google Scholar

Persson, T., and G. Tabellini. 2005. The Economic Effects of Constitutions, Vol. 1. Cambridge: The MIT Press. Search in Google Scholar

Published Online: 2021-01-20

Published in Print: 2021-08-10

You are currently not able to access this content.

Articles in the same Issue

https://doi.org/10.1515/ger-2020-0021

Keywords for this article

Regression discontinuity design; Electoral system; Education; Political competition