Martina Faller*

The interrogative flip with illocutionary evidentials

https://doi.org/10.1515/flin-2023-2050
Received May 31, 2022; accepted July 31, 2023; published online February 12, 2024

Abstract: This paper develops an account of the Cuzco Quechua reportative evidential. It is proposed that it contributes a preparatory condition in all its uses which states that the evidence holder has reportative evidence that supports the speaker raising the issue denoted by the sentence it occurs in. In declarative sentences, this results in the speech act of presenting the proposition expressed without expressing the speaker's belief that it is true. In interrogatives, there are two readings. On the interrogative flip reading, the evidence holder is the addressee and the resulting speech act is a question supported by the speaker's assumption that the addressee has reportative evidence for one of the answers. On the second reading, the evidence holder is the speaker, and the resulting speech act is one of asking the question on behalf of someone else. The account differs from previous accounts of the flipped reading of evidentials in questions which make them part of the answers. It is argued that analyzing the reportative's contribution as a preparatory condition better captures the insight that the speaker chooses the evidential based on what they know about the addressee's likely type of evidence at the time of speaking. The paper moreover argues that preparatory conditions cannot be analyzed as presuppositions in the common ground and should instead be understood as propositions the speaker takes for granted, but which may be new information to the addressee.

Keywords: interrogative flip; reportative evidentials; preparatory conditions

1 Introduction

The interrogative flip refers to the phenomenon of a marker that references the speaker's perspective/point of view in declarative clauses "flipping" to the addressee in interrogatives (San Roque et al. 2017; Tenny and Speas 2003; Tenny 2006, and many others). This paper discusses this flip for illocutionary evidentials from the perspective of speech act theory. It is argued that the flip can be accounted for by

***Corresponding author: Martina Faller**, The University of Manchester, Manchester, UK,
E-mail: Martina.T.Faller@manchester.ac.uk

analyzing such evidentials as contributing an evidential preparatory condition, requiring that the relevant evidence holder have the specified type of evidence. Who the relevant evidence holder is, is determined by sentence type: in declarative sentences the evidence holder is by default identified with the speaker *S* and in interrogatives with the addressee *A*. The discussion will focus on the reportative evidential in Cuzco Quechua (Quechuan: Peru). (1a) illustrates its use in a declarative clause, and (1b) its flipped reading in an interrogative. This evidential is of particular interest because it also has a non-flip reading in interrogatives in which the speaker asks the question on someone else's behalf, as illustrated in (1c). The evidential condition EC is displayed on a separate line from the English translation to highlight the different interpretations.[1]

(1) a. Wawa-yki Martina=qa pay-wan=**si** ka-sha-n.
child-2 Martina=TOP (s)he-COM=REP be-PROG-3
'Your daughter Martina is with him (he says).' (Valderrama and Escalante 1982: 108)
EC: *S* has been told that *A*'s daughter Martina is with him.

b. Pi=**s** hamu-nqa.
who=REP come-3.FUT
'Who, did they say, will come?' (Mejía Huamán 2016: 168)
EC: *S* expects that *A* was told by someone who will come.

c. Imayna=**s** ka-sha-nki.
how=REP be-PROG-2
'(She asked) How are you?' (Conversation, Faller 2002: 233)
EC: *S* asks *A* how *A* is on behalf of a third person.

The paper's main argument is that evidentials in interrogatives put a constraint on the context in which the utterance is made just as they do in declaratives. In both sentence types, evidentials mark the speaker's assumptions about the type of evidence that is available to the evidence holder and that is relevant to the issue under discussion at the time of speaking. This differs from previous analyses of the interrogative flip in which an evidential's contribution is captured as a constraint on the possible answers (Bhadra 2017, 2020; Eckardt 2020; Faller 2002; Garrett 2000; Korotkova 2016; Lim 2015; Littell et al. 2010; Zimmermann 2004). The second main argument of the paper is that, despite constraining the utterance context, the evidential condition cannot be analyzed as a presupposition that is assumed to hold in the common ground CG (Stalnaker 1978, 2002). Instead, it should be considered a speaker presupposition, that is, a proposition that is taken for granted by the speaker,

1 The data presented in this paper either come from my own fieldwork or from published sources, as indicated.

but which may be new information for the addressee. I argue that Gauker's (1998) conception of presupposition is well suited to account for the evidential condition and preparatory conditions more generally. The discussion of these issues contributes to our understanding of perspective-sensitive linguistic expressions and types of presuppositions more widely.

The remainder of this introduction provides some basic background on Cuzco Quechua and its three main evidentials. Section §2 discusses how the contribution of illocutionary evidentials in declaratives can be analyzed as a preparatory condition in Searlian speech act theory. The meaning of the Cuzco Quechua evidentials in interrogatives is described in Section §3; Section §4 argues against analyzing evidentials in interrogatives as constraining the answers and instead proposes to analyze them as a preparatory condition also in this use. Finally, Section §5 discusses the status of the evidential preparatory condition as a speaker presupposition and Section §6 concludes.

Cuzco Quechua belongs to the Southern Peruvian variety of the Quechuan language family, which comprises 44 varieties in total (Eberhard et al. 2022). It has agglutinative morphology, and is mostly suffixing. It possesses a large number of enclitics, including three evidentials. In declarative sentences, these mark the speaker's type of source of information for the proposition expressed (Cusihuaman 2001; Faller 2002; Muysken 1995; Weber 1986), as illustrated in (1a) for the reportative =*si* (allomorph =*s*), and in (2a, b) for the best possible grounds evidential =*mi* (allomorph =*n*)[2] and the conjectural =*chá* (allomorph =*cha*).

(2) a. Fiebre-wan=**mi** wañu-pu-n-ku ….
fever-COM=BPG die-BEN-3-PL
'They died from fever.' (Valderrama and Escalante 1982: 28)

b. Suqta chunka wata-yuq ka-sha-n=**chá**.
six ten year-POSS be-PROG-3=CONJ
'He must be sixty years (old).' (Conversation, cited in Faller 2002: 172)

2 The Cuzco Quechua reportative in declarative sentences

The Cuzco Quechua evidentials are best analyzed as illocutionary modifiers, that is, they constrain the illocutionary force with which the sentence they occur in can be

2 The term *best possible grounds* is proposed in Faller (2002) as a broader term than the more traditional *direct*.

used, not the truth conditions of the proposition expressed. I've argued for this analysis extensively in previous work, and will not repeat the arguments here, but the main observations are that the Cuzco Quechua evidentials cannot be embedded in conditional antecedents, scope under negation, or be agreed with or challenged (Faller 2002, 2007, 2011, 2014, 2019). The strongest argument for analysing the reportative as an illocutionary modifier is its ability to ask a question on someone else's behalf, illustrated in (1c). Such examples can be relatively straightforwardly accounted for on the assumption that the reportative specifies the speaker's type of grounds for making a particular speech act (see Section §4.3). However, there is considerable cross-linguistic variation in the empirical properties of evidentials, and different types of accounts will be appropriate for different types of evidentials. For example, some evidentials are best analyzed as modals, that is, quantifiers over possible worlds, which contribute to the truth conditions of the proposition expressed, and which have an evidential presupposition that restricts the set of possible worlds being quantified over to those in which the indicated type of evidence holds (Faller 2017; Izvorski 1997; Matthewson et al. 2007; Rullmann et al. 2008 and many others).[3] Others are best analyzed as contributing not-at-issue propositions that directly update the CG, that is, without the addressee being expected to assent to it being added (Murray 2010, 2014). Evidentials also vary as to whether they can appear in questions and if so how they are then interpreted (San Roque et al. 2017). In sum, the different accounts proposed in the literature may reflect genuine cross-linguistic differences,[4] and are therefore not necessarily in competition with other. The account developed in the following for the Cuzco Quechua reportative is only intended to extend to evidentials that have a similar empirical profile.

The discussion in this paper is couched within the Searle-Vanderveken framework (Searle 1969; Searle and Vanderveken 1985; Vanderveken 1990) for illocutionary force.[5] In this framework, a speech act $F(p)$ consists of an illocutionary force F, which combines with a propositional content p. F itself is complex, consisting of seven components which determine under what conditions a speech act is successful and non-defective. The illocutionary point is the essential purpose of a speech act which must be achieved in order for the speech act to be considered successful

3 Note that the question whether evidentials are modals is orthogonal to the question of whether they are illocutionary modifiers. That is, some modals are part of the proposition expressed, while others are better analyzed as operating at the level of speech act (Faller 2011; Lyons 1977; Nuyts 2000; Palmer 1986; Zeevat 2003; Wolf 2015; Zimmermann 2008).

4 Though see Korotkova (2016) who argues that different theoretical approaches to evidential do often not make different empirical predictions.

5 Faller (2019) and Faller (2023) implement some of the ideas discussed here in the commitment-based discourse framework of Farkas and Bruce (2010) and Farkas (2022). See also AnderBois (2014) and Davis et al. (2007) for alternative accounts of illocutionary evidentials.

(Searle and Vanderveken 1985: 13–14). Of the other components, only sincerity and preparatory conditions are relevant to this paper. Sincerity conditions express the speaker's mental state with respect to *p*, and are associated with a degree of strength, whereas preparatory conditions are propositions that are taken for granted in the utterance context by the speaker. These three components for simple, canonical assertion are given in (3) (adapted from Searle and Vanderveken 1985: 54–55).[6]

(3) Simple Assertion:
   a. Illocutionary point: to represent as actual a state of affairs
   b. Preparatory conditions: {*S* has evidence that supports the truth of *p*}[7]
   c. Sincerity conditions: {*S* believes *p* with a neutral degree of strength}

Note that an assertion can still be successful even if the conditions in (3b) or (3c) are not satisfied. Such an assertion would be defective (insincere or unwarranted), but as long as it successfully represents as actual a state of affairs (3a), it counts as an assertion.[8]

One of the main linguistic questions for this approach is to what extent the illocutionary force of an utterance can be derived from its linguistic form. I assume in this paper that while linguistic form typically does not fully determine illocutionary force, there are linguistic expressions which specify illocutionary components as part of their conventional meaning and in doing so constrain the illocutionary force that the resulting sentence can be used with.[9] For example, the adverb *alas* adds the sincerity condition that the speaker *S* laments that *p* as shown in (4) (Vanderveken

6 Searle and Vanderveken (1985) take the degree of strength of the sincerity condition to be a separate component of *F*, but is incorporated into the sincerity condition in (3) for simplicity. The degree of strength of simple assertion, that is, assertion with no additional felicity conditions "than those determined by its illocutionary point", is the "neutral degree of strength" (Vanderveken 1990: 59). Additional conditions can raise or lower the degree of strength.

7 This condition is simplified from the more expansive formulation in Searle and Vanderveken (1985: 54) "that the speaker has reasons (or grounds or evidence) that count in favour of or support the truth of the propositional content", to focus on its evidential aspect. As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, the notion of 'evidence' itself is taken as a primitive notion here, that is, it is left unexplained what exactly counts as evidence for asserting a proposition. I refer the reader to McCready (2014) and Bhadra (2022) for discussions of what notion of evidence is most suitable in the linguistic analysis of evidentials.

8 With some types of speech acts, the falsity of a preparatory condition leads to the speech act being unsuccessful overall. For example, speech acts that have as their preparatory condition that the speaker holds a particular office such as the speech act of declaring a couple married, become unsuccessful if this condition is not met.

9 van Elswyk (2023) argues against the idea that grammatical evidentials encode speech act meaning, where genuine speech act meaning consists of inferences that can only be explained by "facts about what type of action was performed by an utterance in a particular context." (p. 54). His critique does not apply to semantic accounts that use illocutionary terminology to describe the conventional meaning of evidentials. The account proposed in the current paper is of the latter type, as it considers

1990: 150), while epistemic possibility adverbs arguably reduce the degree with which the speaker believes *p*, as shown in (5) for *possibly* (Wolf 2015: 77).[10]

(4) a. **Alas**, it is raining.
b. Sincerity conditions: {*S* believes that it is raining, *S* laments that it is raining}

(5) a. The dog is **possibly** on the lawn. (Wolf 2015: 77)
b. Sincerity conditions: {*S* believes that the dog is on the lawn with a low degree of strength}

Sentence type does not conventionally code illocutionary force, though it correlates to some extent with it.[11] Thus, declarative sentences are typically used for making assertions, but can also be used for asking questions when uttered with rising intonation, e.g., *It is raining?* Following Faller (2002, 2019), I therefore assume that declarative sentence type is conventionally only associated with the illocutionary force of *presenting p* as a proposition that is relevant to the question under discussion (QUD). However, in the absence of any illocutionary markers to the contrary, the assertive conditions in (3b, c) apply by default.

The various illocutionary components are not independent of each other in the sense that specifying one might imply another. For example, boasting has the sincerity condition "that the speaker takes pride in the existence of the state of affairs which is represented" (Vanderveken 1990: 138), which determines the preparatory condition that this state of affairs is good. With simple assertions, the preparatory condition that the speaker has evidence in support of *p* (3b) arguably implies that they believe *p* (3c).

On this approach then, illocutionary evidentials can be analyzed as adding a preparatory condition that specifies the type of evidence the speaker has in support of *p*. This preparatory condition in turn also implies a sincerity condition. Thus, the Cuzco Quechua evidential *=mi* specifies the preparatory condition that the speaker has the best possible grounds for *p*, which in turn implies that they believe *p*.

evidential conditions to be conventionally encoded meanings, not inferences resulting only from the performance of a speech act.

10 As this paper is not directly concerned with degrees of strength, the informal scalar descriptors of 'low', 'neutral', 'high' are sufficient for our purposes. The reader is referred to Vanderveken (1990: 120) for a formal account of degrees of strength as sets of integers that form an Abelian group. Other approaches to degrees of strength are based on probability functions, see for example Wolf (2015).

11 Murray and Starr (2021) therefore distinguish between sentential force, which "consists in the distinctive ways different *sentence types* [their emphasis] are used to change the context" (Murray and Starr 2021: 3), and utterance or illocutionary force, which is sentential force plus any contextual inferences. I do not make this distinction here and consider the Cuzco Quechua evidentials to be modifier of illocutionary force, though their meaning contribution does not rely on contextual inferences.

Similarly, =*chá* specifies that the speaker can conjecture or infer *p*, which in turn implies that they believe *p* to a low degree. The reportative =*si* specifies that the speaker has reportative evidence for *p*, as shown in (6c) for (6a), but unlike the other two evidentials, it does not imply anything about the speaker's belief regarding *p*. They may believe it or not, and even believe it to be false (Faller 2002, 2019). Instead, the reportative condition in (6c) implies that someone else believes *p*. Following Faller (2019), I refer to this third party as *principal P*, that is, "someone whose position is established by the words that are spoken, someone whose beliefs have been told, someone who has committed himself to what the words say" (Goffman 1979: 17).[12] Note that the sincerity condition is still formulated in terms of the current speaker's beliefs because it is their sincerity that is at stake in the current speech act of presenting *p* as relevant to the QUD, not the principal's.[13]

(6) a. Pay-kuna=**s** qulqi-ta saqiy-wa-n.
(s)he-PL=REP money-ACC leave-1.OBJ-3
'They left me money.' (Conversation, Faller 2002: 191)

b. Sincerity conditions: {*S* believes that *P*, *P* ≠ *S*, believes that they left *S* money}

c. Preparatory conditions: {*S* has reportative evidence for the proposition that they left *S* money}[14]

Thus, while the best possible grounds and the conjectural evidentials give rise to assertive illocutionary force in declarative sentences (weakened in the case of the conjectural), the illocutionary force associated with the reportative remains that of

12 Faller (2019) refers to commitments rather than beliefs. Commitments are propositions that a speaker publicly commits to with a discourse move, whether they believe them or not. Nevertheless, speakers who do commit to a proposition are by default assumed to also believe it (Farkas and Bruce 2010: 86).

13 Pancheva and Rudin (2019: 328) similarly argue that a speaker presenting *p* with a reportative commits to the proposition that the principal is committed to *p*. The reportative condition itself is not encoded by the reportative in their account, but is rather derived from this commitment: since discourse participants commit to propositions in the course of making a discourse move, the current speaker can only know of the principal's commitment to *p* as a result of them having asserted *p*. That is, Pancheva and Rudin (2019) assume the opposite direction of implication than I do here.

14 (6) is not intended as a compositional analysis of the reportative, but only represents the relevant illocutionary components of an utterance of the entire sentence. Please see Faller (2019, 2023) for a more formal, partially compositional account using the commitment-based framework of Farkas and Bruce (2010). A full account of the reportative (and other types of evidentials) moreover needs to spell out what it means to have reportative evidence for *p*. Faller (2011) provides such an account in terms of existential quantification over possible worlds in which what a third party has said is true, that is, where the accessible worlds are determined by a so-called *informational* modal base (Ehrich 2001; Kratzer 2012). For the main purpose of this paper, which is to discuss the nature of the evidential condition in both declarative and interrogative sentences, the informal formulation in (6c) is sufficient.

simply presenting *p* as relevant to, and possibly resolving, the QUD. Because the speaker does not express that they believe *p* even weakly, reportative presentations of *p* are compatible with the speaker asserting a contradiction of *p*. For example, (6a) was immediately followed up with (7).[15]

(7) Mana=**má**, ni un sol-ta saqi-sha-wa-n=chu.
no=IMPR not one Sol-ACC leave-PROG-1.OBJ-3=POL
'(But) no, they didn't leave me one sol.' (Conversation, Faller 2002: 191)

The main question addressed in this paper is whether the illocutionary effects of evidentials when used in interrogatives can be accounted for in similar terms. The next section describes the interpretations of the Cuzco Quechua evidentials in interrogatives before moving on to the proposed analysis in Section §4.

3 The Cuzco Quechua evidentials in interrogatives

In interrogatives, the Cuzco Quechua evidentials may participate in the flip, that is, they can specify the addressee's grounds for their answer as anticipated by the speaker. In *wh*-questions, evidential enclitics usually attach to the *wh*-phrase.[16] (1b) above and (8a–c) illustrate the flipped reading of the reportative.

(8) Flipped reportative *=si*:
a. Pay=ri may-ta=**s** ri-sqa.
(s)he=TOP where-ACC=REP go-NX.PST
'And as for him, where, did he say, did he go?' (Cusihuaman 2001: 257)
b. May-pi=**s** chinka-chi-n qolqe-n-ta.
where-LOC=REP lose-CAUS-3 money-3-ACC
'Where, did (s)he say, did (s)he lose her/his money?' (Tunque Choque 2017: 46)
c. Phayna=ri qa-nqa=chu=**s**.
faena=TOP be-3.FUT=POL=REP
'And did they say that there will be *faena*?' (Cusihuaman 2001: 259)

All three examples in (8) convey that the speaker expects the addressee to base their answer on what someone else said. In (8a, b), this is likely the referent of the subject,

15 The phenomenon that a speaker using a reportative may deny the truth of the proposition expressed has been dubbed "reportative exceptionality" by AnderBois (2014). It is attested across a wide variety of reportatives, including ones that are part of the proposition expressed.

16 The evidential enclitics are also claimed to be focus markers (Cusihuaman 2001; Muysken 1995; Sánchez 2010). Note that only the reportative can be used in polar interrogatives, as illustrated in (8c). It is not clear why the other two cannot, and I will set this issue aside for this paper.

whereas in (8c) it is someone unspecified who may be identifiable from the context, for example, someone in charge of organizing the *faena*, a type of collective work event for the community.

With the best possible grounds evidential, the speaker expects the addressee to base their answer on best possible grounds, typically direct, first-hand evidence. This can, in context, result in an overall stronger force of the question, given that an addressee who has best possible grounds can be expected to give an answer.

(9) Flipped best possible grounds evidential =*mi*:
May-manta=**n** ka-nki-chis.
where-ABL=BPG be-2-PL
'Where are you from?' (Espinoza 1997: 16)

Using the conjectural in an interrogative produces so-called conjectural questions, questions that do not necessarily expect the addressee to provide an answer. These questions still involve the flip reading, because, if the addressee nevertheless does provide an answer, the speaker expects them to only be able to conjecture it. The overall effect is one of the speaker "wondering". Conjectural questions in Cuzco Quechua are analyzed in Faller (2023).

(10) Flipped conjectural =*chá*:
Hayk'aq-manta=raq=**chá** qallari-nqa.
when-ABL=CONT=CONJ start-3.FUT
'Who knows when they will start.' (Conversation, cited in Faller 2023)

While I assume that the Cuzco Quechua evidentials are illocutionary modifiers, and this will play a role in their analysis, it should be pointed out that evidentials which contribute to the proposition expressed can also have flipped readings. This is shown for the reportative interpretation of the German (Germanic) modal *sollen* 'shall' in (11).[17] The addressee is expected to provide an answer based on the penalty notice they received.

(11) German reportative modal *sollen* [Context: the addressee had received a penalty notice informing them that they were caught by a speed camera and asks for advice in an online forum whether to pay it or not. One person asks:]

Wo	**soll**	es	denn	passiert	sein?
where	shall.3.SG	it	then	happen.PTCP	be

'Where is it said to have happened?'
(https://www.computerbase.de/forum/threads/geblitzt-in-holland.46235/)

17 For analyses of the reportative use of German *sollen* as a modal, please see Bochnak and Csipak (2019), Ehrich (2001), Faller (2017), Kratzer (2012), Matthewson and Truckenbrodt (2018), and Schenner (2008).

The Cuzco Quechua reportative however has an additional, speaker-oriented, reading that is not found with the German reportative, namely to ask a question on someone else's behalf, as in (12a) (repeated from 1c). In this use, the reportative indicates that there is a third party source for the question speech act itself, not the proposition expressed.[18]

(12) [Context: a third person had asked the addressee how she was but did not get a response; the speaker then repeated the question on her behalf]

a. Imayna=**s** ka-sha-nki.
how=REP be-PROG-2
'(She asked) How are you?' (Conversation, Faller 2002: 233)

b. Wie soll es Dir gehen?
how shall.3.SG it you go
'How are you said to be?'

The attempt of reproducing this with the German reportative *sollen* in (12b) fails, that is, it can only mean that the speaker is asking about what someone else says about how the addressee is. The analysis proposed in Section §4 is therefore only intended to apply to illocutionary evidentials. How the flip can be accounted for with non-illocutionary evidentials while preventing the on-behalf reading will need to be addressed on a future occasion.

Finally, it needs to be noted that there are evidentials in other languages that allow a speaker-oriented reading in which the speaker has evidence of their own in support of the proposition expressed, but asks the addressee for confirmation (Bhadra 2020; San Roque et al. 2017).[19] This is not a possible reading with any of the evidentials in Cuzco Quechua, as far as I have been able to ascertain. It is an interesting question what factors determine which evidentials allow which readings, and I refer the reader to Bhadra (2020) for a discussion of this issue.

---

18 There is some evidence that the best possible grounds evidential =*mi* may also have a use in which it is still speaker-oriented. Thus, Faller (2002: 232) suggests that interrogatives with=*mi* may serve to ask questions with authority, for example, when a teacher asks a pupil a question, or to express that the speaker has very good reasons for asking, both of which are paraphrasable as "I have the best possible grounds for asking this question …". It is less clear what such a speaker-oriented reading would mean for the conjectural. More research is needed on the possible interpretations of these two evidentials in questions.

19 An example is given in (i) for the reported marker *néh*[1] in Sochiapan Chinantec (Otomanguean) (San Roque et al. 2017: 128).

(i) hi[1] ca-jéh[32] néh[1] hué[32] Engo[3]jmá di[1]?
QUERY PAST-SHAKE.II REP land Mexico.City INDB
'Did Mexico City have an earthquake (as I/we have heard)?' (Foris 1993: 544, cited in San Roque et al. 2017: 128)

4 The pragmatics of the evidential flip

The interrogative flip with evidentials has received a substantial amount of attention in the previous literature, both from syntactic and from semantic-pragmatic perspectives. It is a type of perspective shift which other perspective-dependent linguistic items are subject to (Garrett 2000; Korotkova 2016; Tenny and Speas 2003; Tenny 2006). The type of perspective that is relevant varies for the different types of expressions. Thus, evidentials reference an *evidence holder* (Murray 2017), while epistemic modals reference a *judge*, that is, someone who evaluates the truth of a proposition (Bhadra 2017, 2020; Stephenson 2007). While these roles often coincide, and therefore tend to be subsumed under a general term such as *perspectival center* (Korotkova 2016: 237) or *origo* (Garrett 2000), they may also come apart. Reportatives are prime examples of the evidence holder being distinct from the judge/prinicipal, as illustrated in (6) (Faller 2019).

The illocutionary flip with evidentials concerns the evidence holder: it is the speaker in reportative presentations and assertions, and the addressee in questions. It is quite intuitive that this should be so, given that the point of a standard information-seeking question is to request the addressee to provide the speaker with an answer that resolves the QUD, while at the same time the speaker portrays themselves as not having the knowledge or evidence to resolve the issue themselves (Garrett 2000; Korotkova 2016). For Garrett (2000: 238), the role of evidence holder (*origo* in his terminology) is intrinsically linked to assertions, and it is therefore a pragmatic necessity that it is identified with the addressee in questions as the participant who is expected to assert an answer. Korotkova (2016) similarly argues that because sincere information-seeking questions are about the addressee's information state, any element which makes reference to an origo's perspective will be anchored to the addressee in questions. Such a purely pragmatic approach predicts that the shift might not occur with pragmatically non-canonical questions and Korotkova (2016: 252–254) shows that this prediction is borne out in, for example, quiz or biased questions. The pragmatic interaction of evidentials and questions may be further constrained by their syntax and semantics (e.g., according to Bhadra 2020, evidentials that obligatorily do not shift are ungrammatical in interrogatives, that is, they only occur in declarative sentences used as biased questions), but this does not mean that the shift itself is not pragmatic in nature. I therefore assume in the following that the identification of the evidence holder with the addressee in questions is a result of the pragmatics of information-seeking questions. My focus is however on how to treat the evidential condition in the pragmatics of questions once the evidence holder is resolved to the addressee.

4.1 The evidential flip as projecting evidentially constrained answers

Most existing semantic/pragmatic accounts of the interrogative flip incorporate the evidential condition as part of the answers in some way (Bhadra 2020; Eckardt 2020; Faller 2002; Garrett 2000; Korotkova 2016; Lim 2015; Littell et al. 2010; Zimmermann 2004).[20] (An exception is Murray 2010, whose account I will discuss in Section §5.) This approach rests on the assumption that interrogatives denote sets of propositions, the potential answers (Hamblin 1973; Karttunen 1977).[21] Evidentials and other perspective-sensitive expressions can then apply directly to the propositions in this set. In doing so, they impose a constraint on the subsequent discourse, restricting the expected answers to those that are based on the indicated type of evidence. This idea can be stated very directly in the commitment-based framework of Farkas and Bruce (2010) and Farkas (2022), which tracks the discourse participants's commitments in a scoreboard. In addition to registering the actual discourse commitments speakers incur in the course of making an utterance, the scoreboard also allows the *projection* of future commitments for any participant. For example, with a canonical assertion, a speaker *S* expresses their own commitment to the truth of the proposition expressed and projects the addressee's *A* commitment to it as well. The resulting commitments for the assertion in (13a) are represented in (13b, c), where DC_X is the set of discourse commitments for participant *X*, and the addition of a proposition to an existing set of DS_X is represented as set union ∪; the projected set *PS* is a set of DC_X.[22]

(13) a. *S* to *A*: He went home.
b. $DC_S \cup$ {he went home}
c. $PS = \{DC_A \cup$ {he went home}}

Projecting the addressee's commitment to the proposition expressed captures that the default response to an assertion is acceptance (Farkas and Bruce 2010).

---

20 These accounts differ in what type of meaning they consider the evidential condition to be and how the evidence holder is identified with the addressee.

21 Garrett (2000) assumes that questions denote sets of assertions rather than sets of propositions. Thus, (i) denotes the set of assertions in (ii).

(i) Dorje to Tashi: "Who left?"

(ii) {ASSERT$_{\langle \text{Tashi,Dorje} \rangle}$(A left), ASSERT$_{\langle \text{Tashi,Dorje} \rangle}$(B left), ASSERT$_{\langle \text{Tashi,Dorje} \rangle}$(C left), …}
Garrett suggests that the Tibetan evidentials operate directly on the answer assertions, though he does not spell out the details.

22 A full scoreboard also contains a Table, which tracks the questions under discussion (Farkas and Bruce 2010; Farkas 2022).

Canonical questions project a set of addressee commitments, one for each possible answer in the question denotation, and no speaker commitments. For example, the question in (14a) projects the set DC_A in (14b).

(14) a. *S* to *A*: Where did he go?
b. *PS* = {DC_A ∪ {he went home}, DC_A ∪ {he went into town}, DC_A ∪ {he went to the field}, …}

The default response move to a question is for the addressee to assert, and thereby commit to, one of the answers. A *compliant* response to a discourse move is one in which the addressee confirms one of the projected commitments in *PS* (Farkas 2022). Non-compliant responses are not (necessarily) infelicitous, but they do not result in the resolution of the QUD. For example, the addressee may ask for further information or evidence before responding, answer only part of a question or indicate that they are not able to answer it.

In this framework, one way of accounting for the interrogative flip of evidentials is to include the evidential condition in the set of projected addressee commitments.[23] As the reportative does not commit the relevant evidence holder to the proposition expressed itself, a question with the reportative on the flip reading only projects addressee commitments to having reportative evidence, not the potential answers themselves. This is illustrated in (15); '*Rep*(*A*, *p*)' stands for '*A* has reportative evidence for *p*'.

(15) a. Pay=ri may-ta=**s** ri-sqa.
3=TOP where-ACC=REP go-NX.PST
'And as for him, where, did he tell you, did he go?' (Cusihuaman 2001: 257)
b. *PS* = {DC_A ∪ {*Rep*(*A*, he went home)}, DC_A ∪ {*Rep*(*A*, he went into town)}, DC_A ∪ {*Rep*(*A*, he went to the field)}, …}

The core idea encapsulated in (15) is that an evidential in an interrogative tells us something about the addressee's future commitments. Their response is not only expected to resolve the QUD, but to do so on the basis of the indicated type of evidence. Accounts that built the evidential meaning into the answers therefore correctly predict "answer parallelism" (Bhadra 2020: 402), the fact that, typically, the addressee will use the same evidential in the answer. This is illustrated in (16) for the Cuzco Quechua best possible grounds evidential =*mi* and in (17)[24] for the reportative.

23 This idea, which is only very roughly sketched here, has been developed in much more detail by Bhadra (2017, 2020). Her main focus is to account for the underlying semantic and syntactic differences between evidentials that flip and those that do not.

24 This example is taken from an exercise in Mejía Huamán's Cuzco Quechua textbook which practices the use of the reportative in questions and answers. All the worked examples use the reportative in both, that is, this book teaches answer parallelism as the default.

(16) a. May=**mi** asno-kuna? Imata=**n** rura-ru-ra-nki, ….
where=BPG donkey-PL what=BPG do-HORT-PST-2
'Where are the donkeys? What have you done (with them)?'
b. Fiebre-wan=**mi** wañu-pu-n-ku ….
fever-COM=BPG die-BEN-3-PL
'They died from fever.' (Valderrama and Escalante 1982: 28)

(17) a. Pi=**s** hamu-nqa.
who=REP come-3.FUT
'Who, did they say, will come?'
b. Qan=**si**.
you=REP
'You, they say.' (Mejía Huamán 2016: 168)

On a strong understanding of answer parallelism, questions with evidentials "[project] a very particular kind of response, essentially putting morphemes into the addressee's mouth" (San Roque et al. 2017: 11). Indeed, in some languages, using a different evidential in the answer than the one used in the question appears to be infelicitous. For example, in Cheyenne (Alqonguian: USA), the question in (18a) with the hearsay evidential can only be answered with the hearsay, not the direct evidential (Murray 2010: 142–3) (glosses as in original).[25]

(18) Cheyenne
Q: Mó=é-némene-**sėstse** Floyd?
y/n=3-sing-RPT.3SG Floyd
'Given what you heard, did Floyd sing?'
A: Héehe'e é-némene-**sėstse**.
yes 3-sing-RPT.3SG
'Yes, he sang, I hear.'
A': #Héehe'e é-némene-∅.
Yes 3-sing-DIR
'Yes, he sang, I'm sure.'

25 Murray (2010: 143) describes the following scenario as one in which the question in (18a) is felicitous: the speaker Q overhears the addressee A ask someone on the phone "Did Floyd sing?", but does not hear the answer. Q therefore asks (18a) and justifiably can expect A to base their answer on reportative evidence. This is a context in which it is highly unlikely that A has independently direct evidence for the answer, since if they did, they would not have needed to ask the question to the third person. It would be interesting to know if in contexts where the addressee has (unbeknownst to the speaker) direct as well as reportative evidence, an answer with the stronger evidential would become felicitous. I will come back to situations that may license non-parallel evidentials in the next subsection.

While expected, answer parallelism is however not required in Cuzco Quechua, as illustrated in (19) and (20). In (19), a conjectural question is answered with a reportative.

(19) a. Tren, tren, imayna=**chá?**
train, train, how=CONJ
'The train, the train, how might it be?'
b. Kuru hina=**s** suchu-n.
bug like=REP crawl-3
'It crawls like a bug (they say).' (Valderrama and Escalante 1982: 30)

The short dialogue in (20) was confirmed by a consultant to be acceptable in a context in which *S* mistakenly believes that *A* has (only) reportative evidence about when her brother, who lives in Lima, arrived in Cusco for a visit. *A* uses the best possible grounds evidential in her answer because she was in fact there when he arrived.

(20) S: Hayk'aq=**si** tura-yki chaya-mu-rqa-n.
when=REP brother-2 arrive-CISL-PST-3
'When, did they say, did your brother arrive?'
A: Qaynunchaw=**mi**.
yesterday=BPG
'Yesterday.' (acceptability judgement elicited)

It is also possible to answer a question that contains the best possible grounds evidential with the reportative. (21) was presented to a consultant for judgement in a context in which two children are saying good-bye to each other after a family visit. *A* only knows when the next visit is planned because he was told by a family member.

(21) S: Hayk'aq=**mi** kuti-mu-nki.
when=BPG return-CISL-2
'When will you come back?'
A: Navidad-pi=ña=**s**.
Christmas-LOC=DISC=REP
'At Christmas, they say.' (acceptability judgement elicited)

These examples were accepted without hesitation, that is, they are not just marginally acceptable but fully felicitous. While answer parallelism may be the typical response, it is not a strict requirement for this language. Garrett (2000: 229) similarly observes that Tibetan evidential questions presuppose that the addressee is able to answer the question on the basis of the indicated evidence, but that other evidentials in the answer are nevertheless possible. Likewise, Eckardt (2020: 27) notes that the answers to a question with the German inferential particle *wohl* on the

flip reading need not contain *wohl*, especially if the addressee knows the answer for certain (footnote 20).[26]

The preceding observations suggest that rather than analyzing evidentials on the flipped reading as constraining the answers, they would be better analyzed as directly coding the speaker's assumptions about the addressee's type of evidence. This will be developed in the next section.

4.2 The flip as a constraint on the current context

Accounts of the interrogative flip that locate the evidential's contribution within the answers take the evidential to constrain the subsequent discourse. These accounts typically also observe that evidentials in questions encode the speaker's assumptions about the addressee's type of evidence, though this is often not explicitly incorporated into the analysis. I propose that this should in fact be the primary aspect to be captured, especially for languages that do not require answer parallelism. What I mean by this is that the speaker's use of an evidential has to be grounded in the evidence available to them at the time of speaking. This is illustrated quite nicely by the Spanish translation provided by Cusihuaman (2001: 257) for (22) (repeated from 8a). His use of *te dijo* 'did he tell you' as the translation of the reportative strongly suggests that the speaker knows that the addressee has spoken to 'him'. Without such knowledge, the speaker would not be licensed to use the reportative.

(22) Pay=ri may-ta=**s** ri-sqa.
(s)he=TOP where-ACC=REP go-NX.PST
'And as for him, where, did he tell you, did he go?'
('¿Y te dijo él adónde fue?') (Cusihuaman 2001: 257)

While in most situations the speaker's assumptions about the addressee's type of evidence align with what the addressee will mark in their response, there are also situations in which this is not the case. The speaker may simply be mistaken about what type of evidence is available to the addressee. For example, the speaker of (21a) may think that the addressee can and has decided himself when he will come back, but the addressee is only able to report what others have decided. Or a speaker may have witnessed the addressee engage with a source of information but is mistaken about what propositions it supports. For example, the speaker of (22) may have seen

26 According to Eckardt (2020: 27), her account, which also makes the meaning of a flipped evidential part of the answers, is compatible with this flexibility due to "general cooperativity principles that always allow the speaker to offer more information than requested" (footnote 20). In the examples (19)–(21), the conversational principle at play rather seems to be Grice's Quality: *A* in these examples indicates the type of evidence they have, not the one (mistakenly) anticipated by the speaker.

the addressee speak to 'him' and thought that they talked about where 'he' went, but in actual fact, they did not talk about that. In such a situation, the addressee may only be able to guess the answer and therefore use the conjectural or opt out of answering the question due to lack of evidence. It is also possible that the addressee has more than one source of information for the same proposition. For example, in addition to having been told where 'he' went, the addressee may also have first-hand evidence (unbeknownst to the speaker). In this situation, the addressee would be expected to use the stronger evidential. In each of these cases, the addressee's use of an evidential that is different from the one anticipated by the speaker is perfectly legitimate relative to the type of evidence they have. The discrepancy is entirely due the speaker's assumptions about the addressee's type of evidence being incomplete or mistaken. I therefore suggest that evidentials on the flipped reading provide information about the speaker's assessment of the evidence that is available to the addressee in the current context.

Previous authors have in fact described evidentials in questions in similar terms, even if their analysis does not implement this. For example, Garrett (2000: 229) writes that Tibetan interrogatives with the direct evidential *presuppose* that the hearer has direct evidence (but then proposes an account where evidentials modify the answers) and Murray (2010: 143) says with regards to (18a) that it "is felicitous in a context where it is clear the addressee will have reportative evidence for her answer." Murray implements this in her own account as a Stalnakerian presupposition, that is, (18Q) requires that the CG entails that the addressee heard that Floyd sang or that they heard that Floyd did not sing. I will come back to the question what type of presuppositions evidentials contribute in Section §5.

In the speech act framework adopted here, constraints on the current context are implemented as preparatory conditions. This allows us to treat the evidential condition in questions exactly the same as in reportative presentations. To start with, questions are often considered a subtype of request, requesting the addressee to provide an answer. This is reflected in the illocutionary force components for simple, canonical questions in (23) (based on the specification of requests in Vanderveken 1990: 105, 126, 149).

(23) Illocutionary force components for canonical questions (as a subtype of requests):
   a. Illocutionary point: to attempt to get *A* to provide an answer
   b. Preparatory conditions: {(i) *S* does not know the answer, (ii) it is not obvious that *A* would provide the answer without being asked, (iii) *A* is able to provide the answer}
   c. Sincerity conditions: {*S* wants *A* to provide an answer}

Unlike with the preparatory conditions of assertion, it is not immediately obvious that they can include an evidential condition. Note however that condition (iii) in (23b) refers to the addressee's ability to provide an answer. Thus, a particular instantiation of this condition is (24), where *I* stands for the issue raised by the question, that is, the set of its potential answers.

(24) Evidential preparatory condition:
The evidence holder has evidence that bears on *I*.

(24) is formulated so as to cover both assertions and questions. As discussed in the previous section, I assume with Garrett (2000) and Korotkova (2016) that the evidence holder is identified with the speaker in assertions and, more generally, presentations of *p*, and with the addressee in information-seeking questions, due to the pragmatics of these types of speech acts. The formulation "evidence that bears on *I*" in (24) is intended to capture the fact that in questions with a flipped evidential, the speaker can only presuppose that the addressee has evidence that will allow them to resolve the issue, not that that they have evidence that supports the truth of a particular answer. This formulation extends to assertions and reportative presentations, which can also be thought of as expressing an issue, namely the singleton set containing the proposition expressed, {*p*} (Farkas and Roelofsen 2015; Farkas 2022).

Including (24) in the set of preparatory conditions of questions predicts that information-seeking questions should be infelicitous in contexts in which the speaker knows that the addressee does not have any evidence that bears on the issue. This prediction is borne out. For example, it would be infelicitous for me to ask my friend in Cusco what the price of bread in Liechtenstein is, given that I know that she has never been to Liechtenstein, and has never expressed any interest in food prices in this country. That is, I know that she would not be able to answer this question due to lack of evidence and should therefore not ask her this.

Illocutionary evidentials can then again be analyzed as specifying a particular type of evidence. For example, the Cuzco Quechua reportative adds the condition that the addressee *A* has reportative evidence that bears on *I*. The sincerity and preparatory conditions for (15), repeated here as (25a), are given in (25b) and (25c).

(25) a. Pay=ri may-ta=**s** ri-sqa.
(s)he=TOP where-ACC=REP go-NX.PST
'And as for him, where, did he say, did he go?' (Cusihuaman 2001: 257)
b. Sincerity conditions: {*S* wants *A* to provide an answer to *I*}
c. Preparatory conditions: {*A* has reportative evidence that bears on *I*}

The reportative preparatory condition can be generalized for both presentations and questions as in (26).

(26) Reportative preparatory condition:
The evidence holder has reportative evidence that bears on *I*

The flip of the Cuzco Quechua reportative is straightforwardly accounted for by the identification of the evidence holder with the addressee in questions. In the event that the preparatory condition turns out not to hold, that is, if the speaker is mistaken about the addressee's type of evidence, the question as a whole can still be successful, that is, constitute a request to the hearer to provide an answer, though it would be considered defective.

This analysis also accounts for default answer parallelism. While preparatory conditions are constraints on the current context, they, like any other type of presupposition, persist into the subsequent discourse, unless the addressee explicitly indicates that they have a different type of evidence.[27] That is, if the speaker has correctly identified the type of evidence the addressee has, and the addressee does not have a second type of evidence in support of the answer, then they will mark their answer with the same evidential. But if the speaker's information about the addressee's type of evidence is incorrect or incomplete, the use of a different evidential by *A* is fully expected.

In sum, the proposed account codes the current speaker's assessment of the type of evidence available to the addressee in the current context as a preparatory condition. The possible answers are not constrained in any way by a flipped evidential in an interrogative, but that the answer will typically contain the same evidential as the question is expected in situations in which the speaker's assessment of the situation is correct.

4.3 On-behalf readings of the reportative in interrogatives

As illustrated in (27a) (repeated from 12), the reportative does not need to flip in interrogatives and can also be used to ask a question on someone else's behalf. In this use, the evidence holder remains the speaker *S* and the reportative provides the grounds for asking the question, not for settling it. This is captured in (27c). As with

27 As the examples in (19)–(21) show it is not necessary that the addressee explicitly challenges the speaker's presupposition; merely using a different evidential is sufficient. This suggests that evidential preparatory conditions are not in the CG. Section §5 therefore argues that they are not presuppositions in Stalnaker's sense. Presumably, the addressee could challenge the speaker presupposition explicitly in the same way other presuppositions can be challenged. In English (Germanic), for example, presuppositions can be challenged with circumlocutions like Hey *wait a minute* (von Fintel 2004) but not with direct denials like *No* or *That's not true*. I currently lack data on how presuppositions can be challenged in Cuzco Quechua.

presentations, this speaker-oriented evidential preparatory condition has implications for the sincerity condition of this type of question: instead of the speaker, it is a third-party principal *P* who wants to know the answer. As with (6b), the sincerity condition is about the current speaker's mental state, that is, their belief that the principal who originally asked the question wants to know the answer. This is shown in (27b).[28]

(27) a. Imayna=**s** ka-sha-nki.
how=REP be-PROG-2
'(She asked) How are you?' (Conversation, Faller 2002: 233)

b. Sincerity conditions: {*S* believes that ***P*, *P* ≠ *S*, wants *A* to provide an answer to *I***}

c. Preparatory conditions: {***S* has reportative evidence that supports asking *I***}

The formulation of the preparatory condition in (27c) highlights that the reportative indicates the source for the question about *I*, as opposed to the source for one of the propositions in *I* as is the case in its other two uses. However, (26) and (27c) can be unified as in (28).

(28) Reportative preparatory condition (unified):
The evidence holder has reportative evidence that supports *S* raising *I*

On the on-behalf-reading, the fact that a third party principal has asked the question supports *S* raising *I*, that is, asking *I* on their behalf. On the flipped reading, the fact that *A* has reportative evidence that bears on the issue *I* supports *S* asking *A* about *I*. When used in a declarative, the fact that *S* has reportative evidence that bears on *I* supports *S* raising the issue *I*, which, recall, is the singleton set {*p*}, that is, raising *I* in this case amounts to *S* presenting *p*.

As a final observation, note that the reportative has an effect on the sincerity condition of the speech act it occurs in only in the two cases where the speaker is the evidence holder, that is, when they present *p* or when they ask a question on someone else's behalf. This makes sense, as by acknowledging a report by someone else as their source, the speaker also transfers the mental state associated with assertions and questions to that source. On the flipped reading, it is not the current

28 In the example in (27), the original question was addressed to the same addressee. It is conceivable that the reportative can also be used to ask a question on someone else's behalf to a different addressee, though I do not currently have any such example. If this turns out to be possible, then the sincerity condition needs to be formulated only in terms of the principal's desire to know the answer, without this being a request directed at a particular addressee.

speaker who has a reportative source, and the desire to want to know the answer therefore remains their own.[29]

5 The status of preparatory conditions

As mentioned in the preceding section, it seems fairly uncontroversial that a speaker who uses an evidential in a question presupposes the addressee's type of evidence, even though most analyses of the evidential flip do not in fact implement it as a presupposition that needs to hold in the current context. However, considering only their use in declarative sentences, Faller (2002) argues explicitly against analyzing evidential conditions as preparatory conditions, which, recall, are felicity conditions that need to be presupposed or taken for granted by the speaker in order for speech act to be non-defective (Vanderveken 1990: 113). If preparatory conditions are understood as propositions that are taken by the speaker to be in the CG at utterance time, that is, constitute background information that the addressee as well as the speaker have accepted as true for the purpose of the current discourse (Stalnaker 2002), then evidentials cannot be presuppositions because the type of evidence the speaker has in support of a proposition is typically new information for the addressee (Faller 2002: 117; Murray 2010: 84). This however contrasts with their contribution in interrogatives, where, "the evidential content is presupposed: the speaker expects the addressee's evidence to be of a certain type given previously introduced information. However, here it is clear that the contribution of the evidential must be in the common ground before the question, otherwise the question is infelicitous" (Murray 2010: 85). Consequently, Murray considers the evidential condition in questions a presupposition in the sense of Stalnaker (1973) (Murray 2010: 144).[30]

In Murray's analysis, evidentials contribute a not-at-issue proposition. She captures the difference in informativity of this proposition in the two sentence types as a difference in how it interacts with the CG. In declaratives, the evidential condition is directly added to the CG and eliminates any worlds from the context set

29 One might wonder whether a third reading of the reportative in questions might be possible where the evidence holder is the addressee, but where it is a third party principal who wants to know the answer. It seems to me that such a reading is ruled out on pragmatic grounds. As just discussed, the reportative affects the sincerity condition of the speech act performed by the evidence holder. On the flipped reading, this would be the answer speech act.

30 As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, treating the evidential condition as a shared background assumption would seem to make answer parallelism obligatory. This may be the correct prediction for Cheyenne, but, as discussed in Section §4.1, it would be the wrong prediction for other languages, including Cuzco Quechua.

(= the set of worlds in which all propositions in CG are true) in which the speaker does not have the indicated type of evidence. In interrogatives, however, the evidential condition does not eliminate any worlds, because it is required to be already in the CG at the point of utterance. It is however not clear what in this system ensures that the evidential condition in interrogatives is already in the CG at utterance time. Presuppositionality is usually treated as a lexical property, but as far as I understand, Murray does not treat the evidentials themselves as presupposition triggers. Doing so would amount to claiming a systematic polysemy such that every evidential that can occur in both declaratives and interrogatives has a non-presuppositional as well as a presuppositional sense. But even if one claimed such a polysemy, it is not clear what would prevent the non-presuppositional sense from occurring in interrogatives.

Without an account of how the evidential condition becomes presuppositional in interrogatives, there are two options. We can either treat evidentials as non-presuppositional in both sentence types (e.g., by analyzing them as a sincerity condition instead as in Faller 2002), but then lose the insight that interrogatives with evidentials *are* presuppositional, or develop an account in which they are presuppositional in both.

By analyzing the evidential condition as a preparatory condition, this paper explores the second option. The presuppositional status of the evidential condition in interrogatives is automatically accounted for, though not the fact that it is not necessarily a shared presupposition. For declaratives, what needs to be resolved on this approach is the fact that evidentials typically provide new information. This can be achieved by not analyzing preparatory conditions as presuppositions in Stalnaker's sense but as propositions the speaker takes for granted, but which need not be shared by the addressee. This way of thinking about preparatory conditions is needed also for other types, for example, the preparatory condition of advice in (29).

(29) Preparatory condition for advice:
What is advised is good for the addressee (Vanderveken 1990: 174).

Consider a situation in which someone made a mistake at work and intends to keep this from their boss. I might instead advise them that they should own up to it because I believe that this will be in their best interest. The addressee, at that point, does clearly not share this belief. Indeed, it seems that typically, advice is issued on the assumption that the addressee does not already accept that the advised course of action is good for them. If they did, then there would be no need to issue the advice. Similarly, consider the preparatory condition (i) that *S* does not know the answer in (23b) for canonical information-seeking questions. Usually, addressees only become aware that the speaker does not know the answer upon being asked. For example, if a stranger asks me for directions to the university, I would normally not have had any assumptions about what they knew or did not know about how to get there.

In each of these cases, one could appeal to accommodation, that is, the process by which the addressee comes to accept an informative presupposition into the CG as a result of the speaker manifestly having presupposed it (Stalnaker 2002: 710). However, as Murray (2010: 84) observes, presuppositions being informative "is a context-dependent effect, and not well suited to analyze the *primary* [emphasis added] effect of an entire class of morphemes." This accords with Stalnaker's (2002) view that accommodation exploits the standard way of conveying presuppositions: "If it is mutually recognized that a certain utterance type is standardly used, in some conventional linguistic practice, only when some proposition is (or is not) common belief, it will be possible to exploit this recognition, sometimes to bring it about that something is (or is not) common belief …." That is, in order for the addressee to recognize the speaker's intention for them to accept the presupposition into the CG, the utterance used must be of the type that is normally used in a context in which it is in the CG. To take Stalnaker's running example, Alice can rely on Bob accepting that Alice has a sister when she utters "I have to pick up my sister from the airport" even if she knows that Bob does not know that she has a sister, because the possessive phrase *my sister* is standardly used in contexts in which the proposition "the speaker has a sister" is in the CG. That the informative use of a presupposition is an exploitation of its normal, shared use becomes clearer when considering examples that are not so easily accommodated. For example, explaining that one was late because "my fire engine broke down" (Levinson 1983: 205) would be inappropriate in most contexts in which the speaker is not part of the fire brigade, if the proposition that the speaker has a fire engine is not already in the CG.

However, as discussed above, the evidential condition in declaratives, the preparatory condition for advice, and the first preparatory condition of questions that the speaker does not know the answer, are standardly informative, not shared.[31] Accommodation is therefore not the right tool to account for them. Instead of analyzing them as shared assumptions, the notion of presupposition proposed by Gauker (1998) is better suited for informative preparatory conditions. Gauker considers presuppositions to be the speaker's take on those facts in the objective propositional context "that are particularly relevant to the

31 Regarding (ii) and (iii) in (23b), it seems that they cannot be informative because it is the addressee whose intention and ability are described, and people would normally be assumed to know their own intentions and abilities. However, while these conditions might not provide the addressee with new information, it is not clear to me that they can be considered to be in the CG at the time of utterance. The CG contains common or shared beliefs, that is, both speaker and hearer need to be mutually aware that the other accepts them. This does not seem to be a requirement for these preparatory condition. That is, a speaker who asks a question does not need to know that the addressee accepts that they are willing and able to provide an answer. That the speaker assumes that this is is the case would be new information to the addressee.

conversational aims of the interlocutors, whether they are aware of these facts or not" (Gauker 1998: 150). This definition allows a speaker to take a proposition for granted without the addressee also being expected to share it, that is, presuppositions may be new information for the addressee. While Gauker aims to account for all types of informative presupposition, my aim here is more modest. As just discussed, the Stalnakerian accommodation approach works well for instances of informative uses of presuppositions that are normally used in contexts in which they are in the CG. But the Gaukerian conception is needed to account for the evidential condition and other preparatory conditions that are typically informative. While there is no CG in Gauker's approach, he nevertheless seems to implicitly assume that the goal of discourse is for the interlocutors to come to a common understanding of what the actual context is. In cases where a speaker's presupposition is new information for the addressee, they "may acquiesce in the speaker's evident take", especially when the speaker is viewed as having special authority (Gauker 1998: 168). Given that the speaker has special authority over their own source of information, the addressee will normally accept the evidential preparatory condition. While each participant has special authority over their own sources of information, this does however not mean that these are inscrutable. In fact, the fact that a speaker can use an evidential anchored to the addressee in a question requires that their source of information is accessible to the speaker as well. However, in a case in which the participants' takes on the context diverge, it is the participant that the evidential is anchored to who takes precedence. Thus, as discussed in Section §4.1, if the speaker knows that the addressee spoke to someone about an issue but does not know that they also have direct evidence bearing on that same issue, then it is not infelicitous for the addressee to use the direct evidential in an answer to a question containing the reportative. Rather, it is the question that is defective (though not unsuccessful).

Given that preparatory conditions on this view do not need to be shared, the relevant context against which they are evaluated cannot be the CG. Instead, we might require that presuppositions are satisfied if the speaker believes that they are true (or is committed to them in a commitment-based framework). For example, we might say that the preparatory condition of having reportative evidence is met if the speaker believes that they have reportative evidence. However, Gauker argues instead that the right type of context contains facts, that is, propositions that are true in the objective context, not the participants' beliefs about those facts. Sbisà (2002) argues in a similar vein that "cognitive" contexts (involving the representations of the intentional states of participants) are not sufficient to account for speech acts as social actions because they "demand too little of the agent" (p. 428). If only cognitive contexts were relevant, speakers would only be required to hold the relevant intentional state, but there would be no requirement

to make sure that their intentional state correctly reflects reality. She gives the example of a speaker who mistakenly believes the door to be open and orders the addressee to close it. But if the addressee knows that the door is in fact already closed they would clearly be under no obligation to close the door as a result of the order.[32] Thus, when evaluating whether or not a speech act is *actually* appropriate and not merely *appears* to be appropriate (p. 428), it is the actual circumstances that matter, not the speaker's beliefs about them. This is even clearer for declarative speech acts, where a preparatory condition not holding results in an overall unsuccessful speech act. For example, if a low-level manager mistakenly believes that they have the authority to fire an employee, then sincerely uttering the words *You are fired* does nevertheless not constitute an act of firing.

On such an objective conception of context, speech acts with an evidential would be considered inappropriate in contexts in which the evidential condition does not hold. If someone was told that *p* but misremembers that they themselves witnessed that *p*, then using the direct evidential would be considered inappropriate even though the speaker believes that they have direct evidence. That this is the right approach is supported by an observation by Weber (1989: 424) about the use of evidentials in Huallaga Quechua. The neighbours of a man do not believe anything he says because he is known to constantly use the direct evidential and therefore "always speaks as though he had witnessed what he is telling about." [quotation marks in the original]. The implication here is, though Weber does not say so explicitly, that the man in question did in fact not witness most of what he is telling about.[33] That is, the evidential condition in this case does not hold, and the other community members therefore consider this man's assertions inappropriate, regardless of what he himself believes. Thus, Gauker's conception of the context seems to be applicable also to evidentials, though a more in-depth discussion of what role exactly it plays in communication is needed. Since it is not necessary to make the move to objective contexts to account for the interrogative flip with evidentials, I will leave this discussion here. The main aspect of Gauker's approach to presuppositions that we need in the analysis of illocutionary evidentials is that the evidential condition is not necessarily a shared assumption.

32 Sbisà goes one step further and claims that the addressee would not consider the speaker's utterance to be a successful performance of an order. This, however, seems to me too strong. While defective, and unable to have the intended perlocutionary effect, I would say that an order has nevertheless been issued.

33 This unusual communicative behaviour appears to be linked to the fact that the speaker in question is referred to in the community as 'loko', leading Weber to surmise that he may be mentally ill.

6 Conclusions

The main aim of this paper was to argue that the evidential condition should be analyzed as a constraint on the current context also in interrogative clauses, instead of analyzing it as a constraint on the possible answers. This was implemented as a preparatory condition in the speech act theory of Searle and Vanderveken (1985) and Vanderveken (1990). The paper focussed on the reportative evidential of Cuzco Quechua, which was analyzed as contributing the preparatory condition that the evidence holder has reportative evidence that supports *S* raising the issue *I* denoted by the sentence it occurs in. In declarative clauses, this amounts to the condition that the speaker is in the possession of reports that support the proposition expressed *p*. In interrogative clauses, there are two readings: on the flipped reading, the addressee *A* is expected to base their answer on reportative evidence, on the on-behalf reading, the speaker has reportative evidence for someone else asking the question. In the two cases where the evidence holder is the speaker, the reportative moreover implies a modification of the corresponding sincerity condition. In declaratives, the speaker believes that a third-party principal *P* believes the proposition expressed, on the on-behalf reading of interrogatives, the speaker believes that *P* wants to know the answer. There is no effect on the sincerity condition on the flipped reading because the splitting off of the principal from the speaker role takes effect in the answer, and this is not recorded as a felicity condition for the current speech act. This is summarized in Table 1.

An anonymous reviewer has asked whether the current account is really that different from accounts that make evidentials part of the answers, given that placing a constraint on the current context crucially also affects the answers to a question on the flipped reading. To this, I would reply that the difference lies in what we take to be encoded by an evidential. In accounts that make the evidential semantically part of the answers, it is left to pragmatic inference that the speaker must have knowledge in the current context of what type of evidence the addressee is likely to have. On the account proposed in this paper, it is the latter aspect that is

Table 1: The contribution of the reportative with different types of speech acts.

	Sincerity condition	**Preparatory condition**
Presentation of *p*	*S* believes that some $P \neq S$ believes *p*	*S* has reportative evidence for *p*
Flipped question	*S* wants *A* to provide the answer	*A* has reportative evidence that bears on *I*
On-behalf question	*S* believes that some $P \neq S$ wants *A* to provide an answer	*S* has reportative evidence that *P* asked the question

encoded, and it is left to pragmatics to explain why the default is for the addressee to use the same evidential in the answer as the one in the question. For languages that do not require answer parallelism, such as Cuzco Quechua, the current account is more appropriate. For languages such as Cheyenne in which non-parallel answers are considered infelicitous or non-compliant, the former type of account would be more appropriate.

The second aim was to discuss what type of constraint the evidential condition is. Because it is typically new information to the addressee in declarative sentences, it cannot be a shared assumption in the CG. Instead, Gauker's definition of presupposition as the speaker's take on the objective context is a better fit for the evidential condition, and indeed preparatory conditions more generally. Gauker's notion of presupposition has also been appealed to by Matthewson (2006) to account for typical presuppositions triggers like *hu7* 'more' and *múta7* 'again' in St'át'imcets (Northern Interior Salish, Canada), which, unlike their English counterparts, do not "place constraints on the common ground of discourse." (p. 63) The current paper therefore contributes to making the case for distinguishing between presuppositions that must be in the CG, and others that only require the speaker to take them for granted.

This paper has taken the perspective of classical speech act theory. In other work (Faller 2019, 2023), I have developed accounts of evidentials in Cuzco Quechua in the commitment-based framework of Farkas and Bruce (2010). My aim in using these different frameworks is to understand what (dis)advantages each of them has. As I show in Faller (2023) in particular, the commitment-based approach to discourse replicates several notions from speech act theory, the main difference being that commitments are public commitments which do not necessarily map onto the participants' true beliefs. In making a discourse commitment a speaker takes on certain responsibilities (Alston 2000). For example, in committing to having a certain type of evidence the speaker assumes responsibility for producing their evidence if requested (Brandom 1994; Krifka 2014). However, the framework of Farkas and Bruce (2010) and work that builds on it, does not readily accommodate speaker presuppositions of the type discussed in this paper, which are not shared with the addressee. Faller (2023) therefore treats the evidential preparatory condition like a regular discourse commitment, which does however not quite capture the idea that the speaker takes it for granted. It is therefore an interesting question for future research how such presuppositions can be modelled.

Acknowledgments: This work would not have been possible without Inés Callalli, Edith Zevallos (†) and Natalia Pumayalli, who have shared their knowledge of Cuzco Quechua with me over the years. I'd like to thank Viviana Masia and Roland Hinterhölzl for inviting me to participate in the workshop on *The Pragmatics of*

Evidentiality in 2021 and for giving me the opportunity to contribute to this issue. The questions and feedback I received at the workshop, as well as the detailed comments from two anonymous reviewers, greatly helped me to improve this work. Any errors and shortcomings are of course entirely mine.

Abbreviations

1, 2, 3	first, second, third person
ABL	ablative
ACC	accusative
BEN	benefactive
BPG	best possible grounds
CIS	cislocative
COM	comitative
CONJ	conjectural
CONT	continuative
DISC	discontinuative
FUT	future
HORT	hortative
IMPR	impressive
LOC	locative
NX.PST	non-experienced past
OBJ	object
PL	plural
POL	polarity
POSS	possessive
PROG	progressive
PST	past
PTCP	participle
REP	reportative
SG	singular
TOP	topic

References

Alston, William Payne. 2000. *Illocutionary acts and sentence meaning*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

AnderBois, Scott. 2014. On the exceptional status of reportative evidentials. In Todd Snider, Sarah D'Antonio & Mia Wiegand (eds.), *Semantics and linguistic theory (SALT)*, vol. 24, 234–254. LSA & CLC Publications.

Bhadra, Diti. 2017. *Evidentiality and questions: Bangla at the interfaces*. Rutgers University. (Doctoral dissertation).

Bhadra, Diti. 2020. The semantics of evidentials in questions. *Journal of Semantics* 37(3). 367–423.

Bhadra, Diti. 2022. Evidentiality: Unifying nominal and propositional domains. In Daniel Altshuler (ed.), *Linguistics meets philosophy*, 243–274. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bochnak, M. Ryan & Eva Csipak. 2019. Reportative deontic modality in English and German. *Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung* 21(1). 199–214.
Brandom, Robert. 1994. *Making it explicit: Reasoning, representing, and discursive commitment*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Cusihuaman, Antonio. 2001. *Gramática Quechua: Cuzco-Collao*, 2nd edn. Cuzco: Centro de Estudios Regionales Andinos "Bartolomé de las Casas".
Davis, Christopher, Christopher Potts & Margaret Speas. 2007. The pragmatic values of evidential sentences. *Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory (SALT)* 17. 71–88.
Eberhard, David M., Gary F. Simons & Charles D. Fennig (eds.). 2022. *Ethnologue: Languages of the world*, 25th edn. Dallas, Texas: SIL International. Available at: http://www.ethnologue.com.
Eckardt, Regine. 2020. Conjectural questions: The case of German verb-final *wohl* questions. *Semantics and Pragmatics* 13. 9:1–9:54.
Ehrich, Veronika. 2001. Was *nicht müssen* und *nicht können* (nicht) bedeuten können: Zum Skopus der Negation bei den Modalverben des Deutschen. In Reimar Müller & Marga Reis (eds.), *Modalität und Modalverben im Deutschen*, vol. 9 (Linguistische Berichte Sonderhefte), 149–176. Hamburg: Buske.
Espinoza, Darío. 1997. *Tanteo puntun chaykuna valen*. Lima: CHIRAPAQ-Centro de Culturas Indias.
Faller, Martina. 2002. *Semantics and pragmatics of evidentials in Cuzco Quechua*. Stanford University. (Doctoral dissertation).
Faller, Martina. 2007. The Cusco Quechua reportative evidential and rhetorical relations. In Andrew Simpson & Peter Austin (eds.), *Endangered languages*, vol. 14 (Linguistische Berichte Sonderhefte), 223–251. Hamburg: Buske.
Faller, Martina. 2011. A possible worlds semantics for Cuzco Quechua evidentials. In David Lutz & Nan Li (eds.), *Proceedings of semantics and linguistic theory (SALT)*, vol. 20, 660–683. Ithaca, NY: LSA & CLC Publications.
Faller, Martina. 2014. Reportativity, (not-) at-issueness, and assertion. *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society* 40. 62–84.
Faller, Martina. 2017. Reportative evidentials and modal subordination *Lingua* 186-187. 55–67.
Faller, Martina. 2019. The discourse commitments of illocutionary reportatives. *Semantics and Pragmatics* 12. 1–53.
Faller, Martina. 2023. Conjectural speech acts in Cuzco Quechua. *Journal of Pragmatics* 214. 144–163. https://doi-org.manchester.idm.oclc.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2023.05.007.
Farkas, Donka F. 2022. Non-intrusive questions as a special type of non-canonical questions. *Journal of Semantics* 39(2). 295–337.
Farkas, Donka F. & Kim B. Bruce. 2010. On reacting to assertions and polar questions. *Journal of Semantics* 27(1). 81–118.
Farkas, Donka F. & Floris Roelofsen. 2015. Polarity particle responses as a window onto the interpretation of questions and assertions. *Language* 91(2). 359–414.
Foris, David Paul. 1993. *A grammar of Sochiapan Chinantec*. University of Auckland. (Doctoral dissertation).
Garrett, Edward. 2000. *Evidentiality and assertion in Tibetan*. Los Angeles: University of California. (Doctoral dissertation).
Gauker, Christopher. 1998. What is a context of utterance? *Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition* 91. 149–172.
Goffman, Erving. 1979. Footing. *Semiotica* 25(1/2). 1–29.
Hamblin, C. L. 1973. Questions in Montague English. *Foundations of Language* 10(1). 41–53.

Izvorski, Roumyana. 1997. The present perfect as an epistemic modal. In Aaron Lawson (ed.), *Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory 7*. Ithaca, NY: CLC Publications.
Karttunen, Lauri. 1977. Syntax and semantics of questions. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 1. 3–44.
Korotkova, Natalia. 2016. *Heterogeneity and uniformity in the evidential domain*. UC Los Angeles. (Doctoral dissertation).
Kratzer, Angelika. 2012. *Modals and conditionals*. Oxford: OUP.
Krifka, Manfred. 2014. Embedding illocutionary acts. In Tom Roeper & Peggy Speas (eds.), *Recursion: Complexity in cognition*, vol. 43 (Studies in Theoretical Psycholinguistics). Dordrecht: Springer.
Levinson, Steven C. 1983. *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lim, Dongsik. 2015. Evidentials in interrogatives: A case study of Korean. *Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung* 15. 419–434.
Littell, Patrick, Lisa Matthewson & Tyler Peterson. 2010. On the semantics of conjectural questions. In Tyler Peterson & Uli Sauerland (eds.), *Evidence from evidentials*, 89–104. Vancouver: University of British Columbia.
Lyons, John. 1977. *Semantics*. 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Matthewson, Lisa. 2006. Presuppositions and cross-linguistic variation. In Christopher Davis, Amy Rose Deal & Youri Zabbal (eds.), *NELS 36: Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the North East Lingusitic Society*, vol. 1, 63–76. Amherst, MA: Graduate Student Linguistic Association.
Matthewson, Lisa, Henry Davis & Hotze Rullmann. 2007. Evidentials as epistemic modals: Evidence from St'át'imcets. *Linguistic Variation Yearbook* 7. 201–254.
Matthewson, Lisa & Hubert Truckenbrodt. 2018. Modal flavour/modal force interactions in German: *Soll, sollte, muss* and *müsste*. *Linguistische Berichte* 255. 259–312.
McCready, Elin. 2014. What is evidence in natural language? In Elin McCready, Katsuhiko Yabushita & Kei Yoshimoto (eds.), *Formal approaches to semantics and pragmatics: Japanese and beyond*, 155–180. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.
Mejía Huamán, Mario. 2016. *Curso de Quechua 40 lecciones*. Lima: Universidad Ricardo Palma.
Murray, Sarah. 2010. *Evidentiality and the structure of speech acts*. Rutgers University. (Doctoral dissertation).
Murray, Sarah. 2014. Varieties of update. *Semantics and Pragmatics* 7. 1–53.
Murray, Sarah E. 2017. *The semantics of evidentials*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Murray, Sarah E. & William B. Starr. 2021. The structure of communicative acts. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 44. 425–474.
Muysken, Pieter. 1995. Focus in Quechua. In Katalin Kiss (ed.), *Discourse configurational languages*, 375–393. New York: Oxford University Press.
Nuyts, Jan. 2000. *Epistemic modality, language, and conceptualization*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Palmer, Frank R. 1986. *Mood and modality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pancheva, Roumyana & Deniz Rudin. 2019. Speaker discourse roles and the discourse profile of reportative evidentials. In Julian J. Schlöder, Dean McHugh & Floris Roelofsen (eds.), *Proceedings of the 22nd Amsterdam Colloquium*, 327–336.
Rullmann, Hotze, Lisa Matthewson & Henry Davis. 2008. Modals as distributive indefinites. *Natural Language Semantics* 16(4). 317–357.
San Roque, Lila, Simeon Floyd & Elisabeth Norcliffe. 2017. Evidentiality and interrogativity. *Lingua* 186-187. 120–143.
Sánchez, Liliana. 2010. *The morphology and syntax of topic and focus: Minimalist inquiries in the Quechua periphery*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Sbisà, Marina. 2002. Speech acts in context. *Language & Communication* 22(4). 421–436.

Schenner, Mathias. 2008. Double face evidentials in German: Reportative 'sollen' and 'wollen' in embedded contexts. In Atle Grønn (ed.), *Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 12*, 552–566. Oslo: University of Oslo.

Searle, John R. 1969. *Speech acts*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Searle, John R. & Daniel Vanderveken. 1985. *Foundations of illocutionary logic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Stalnaker, Robert. 1973. Presuppositions. *Journal of Philosophical Logic* 2(4). 447–457.

Stalnaker, Robert. 2002. Common ground. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 25. 701–721.

Stalnaker, Robert C. 1978. Assertion. In Peter Cole (ed.), *Pragmatics*, 315–332. New York: New York Academic Press.

Stephenson, Tamina. 2007. Judge dependence, epistemic modals, and predicates of personal taste. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 30(2). 487–525.

Tenny, Carol & Peggy Speas. 2003. Configurational properties of point of view roles. In Anna Maria Di Scuillo (ed.), *Asymmetry in grammar*, 315–343. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Tenny, Carol L. 2006. Evidentiality, experiencers, and the syntax of sentience in Japanese. *Journal of East Asian Linguistics* 15(3). 245–288.

Tunque Choque, Daniel. 2017. *Antología Quechua idioma de los Inkas*. Cusco: Editorial Moderna: Karina Tuero Zúñiga.

Valderrama, Ricardo & Carmen Escalante. 1982. *Gregorio Condori Mamani, autobiografía*, 2nd edn. Cusco: Centro de Estudios Rurales Andinos "Bartolomé de Las Casas".

Vanderveken, Daniel. 1990. Meaning and speech acts. In *Principles of language use*, vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

van Elswyk, Peter. 2023. Expressing belief with evidentials: A case study with Cuzco Quechua on the dispensability of illocutionary explanation. *Journal of Pragmatics* 203. 52–67.

von Fintel, Kai. 2004. Would you believe it? The king of France is back! (Presuppositions and truth-value intuitions). In Anne Bezuidenhout & Marga Reimer (eds.), *Descriptions and beyond: An interdisciplinary collection of essays on definite and indefinite descriptions and other related phenomena*, 315–341. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Weber, David J. 1986. Information perspective, profile, and patterns in Quechua. In Wallace Chafe & Johanna Nichols (eds.), *Evidentiality: The linguistic coding of epistemology*, 137–155. Norwood: Ablex Publishing Corporation.

Weber, David J. 1989. *A grammar of Huallaga (Huánuco) Quechua*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Wolf, Lavi. 2015. *Degrees of assertion*. Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. (Doctoral dissertation).

Zeevat, Henk. 2003. Particles: Presupposition triggers, context markers or speech act markers. In Reinhard Blutner & Henk Zeevat (eds.), *Optimality theory and pragmatics*, 163–199. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.

Zimmermann, Malte. 2004. Zum *Wohl*: Diskurspartikeln als Satztypmodifikatoren. *Linguistische Berichte* 199. 253–289.

Zimmermann, Malte. 2008. Discourse particles in the left periphery. In Benjamin Shaer, Philippa Cook, Werner Frey & Claudia Maienborn (eds.), *Dislocated elements in discourse*. New York: Routledge.